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**SIDELIGHTS ON
THE THIRTY YEARS WAR**

SIDELIGHTS ON THE THIRTY YEARS WAR

BY
HUBERT G. R. READE

VOL. II.

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TO MY BROTHER

MAJOR GENERAL R. N. R. READE, C.B., C.M.G.,

and

TO MY FRIEND

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SIR REGINALD RANKIN, Bt.,

Who has pictured with his pen so many of our modern wars

THIS BOOK

IS DEDICATED

in gratitude for their kindness and for their encouragement to me
in my task.

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V. Moor: "Geschichte von Currätien und der Republik gemeinen drei Bünde (Graubünden)," von *Conradin von Moor*, 3 Bde. [Chur, 1870], Vol. I., pp. 1-2, The Geography of the Grisons (Cf. Vol. II., Part II., pp. 856-857, Brother Reginald's Description of the Passes in 1629 [*Sprecher*, *Gesch.* I., pp. 595-596]; Vol. I., pp. 73-81, The Roman Roads in Rhoetia; Vol. II., pp. 244-246, Luxury in the Grisons about 1600; pp. 367-369, The Bloody Assize of Thusis, 1618 [*Anhorn*, *Graubündner Krieg* I., 51, *Sprecher*, *Gesch.* I. 84]; pp. 424-463, The Bloody Assize of Davos, 1620, The Valtelline Massacre [*Sprecher*, *Gesch.* I., 128-129, 132]; à *Porta*, *Hist. Ref.* II., 284. *Sprecher*: [*Schweiz. Gesch.* II., pp. 139-149], The rising at Tirano, 19 July, 1620 ["Notes of an Eye Witness," printed in Italian in 6 Vol. d. *Arch. f. Schw. Gesch.*, pp. 251 *et seqq.*], The Retreat through the Malenggerthal [Salis-Marschlins, *Denkwürdigkeiten*, p. 69, *et seqq.*, p. 453; Note 56, Foreign Influences [Cf. à *Porta*, *Historia Reformationis* III., p. 309, *Lavizzari*: "Memorie Istoriche," pp. 143 *et seqq.*, pp. 495-497, The Attitude of Spain and France (Cf. *Juvall* *Denkwürdigkeiten*). Vol. III., pp. 674-685, The Rising in the Prättigau, 24 April, 1622; pp. 795-799, The distress in the Winter of 1622-1623 [*Sprecher*, *Gesch.* I., 437], pp. 862-865, The Capuchin Missions in the Grisons (*Clemente*, *Istoria delle Missioni*, pp. 2-40); pp. 865-867, The Plague in the Grisons, 1629 [*Lehmann* *Republik Graubünden* II., p. 66. *P. Kaiser*, *Graubündner Geschichte*, p. 205], pp. 867-869, The Peace of Chierasco, April 7, 1631.

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VIII.—THE WAR OF THE VALTELLINE, 1620-1635.

Chur. Bischofliches Archiv.

URKUNDEN REGISTER DES HOCHSTIFTES CHUR. NO. I. GRAUBÜNDEN.

Mappa 53 [B. 1608-1625], 1618, July 7. "Instructio Predicantium," Letter to Anton (Nicholas), Pastor of Schänfigg, The Plans of the Protestants against the Catholics [*Historica Relatio*, A.P. 125, B. 133], 1619,

March 29. The Heads of the Three Leagues in Chur warn the Commands that Alonso Casal is about to invade the Grisons from the Milanese, Sept. 13. The Bishop of Chur warns the Nuntio that the Agreement with Spain is most detrimental to the interests of the Catholics, Wishes to resign his See, Oct. 21. The Emperor Ferdinand II. writes to the Three Leagues to protect the Bishop and Chapter of Chur, Oct. 28. The Protestants summon the Bishop before the Blood Assize at Zizers. He had already been condemned to death on Sept. 15, 1618, by that at Thusis as a sympathiser with Spain, 1620, Jan. 1. Report of the Outrages committed by the Protestants on the Catholics, April 25. The "Band of Altdorf," signed by Pompeius Planta, Ant. Molina, etc., July 28. Robustelli's letter written to the Catholic Communes to announce the Rising in the Valtelline, August 8. Letter of the Duke of Feria, Governor of Milan to the Lords of the Grisons as to sending troops into the Valtelline, Sept. 16. Bishop of Chur to Cardinal Borghese, announcing the occupation of Bormio by the heretics, 31 December. Bishop of Chur calls on Feria to restore the Valtelline to the See, Dec. 31. Feria's Instructions to Pompejo Ant. Maglino to treat with the Bishop on the subject, 1621, Jan. 2. Card. Borghese to Bishop of Chur, The Pope is sending Johan à Porta and Caspar Aliscius, Preachers, to the Inquisition at Milan, July 21. Archduke Leopold to Card. Bellarmine, The Treaty of Madrid is ruinous to the Catholics, because it confers equal rights both on Protestants and Catholics, He will oppose it, Aug. 16. Father Ignatius reports on his mission to Germany, He had not seen the Duke of Bavaria, but had conversed with the Preacher Aliscius in his dungeon at Innsbrück, from which he writes, Aug. 19. Archduke Leopold to Card. Bellarmine, Recommends the Bishop's claims in the Valtelline to him, Aug. 25. Gregory XV. to Bishop of Chur, Is sending Bp. Alexander of Campania to try and effect a settlement in the Valtelline without detriment to the Catholic Faith, Oct. 20. Archduke Leopold writes to the Leagues to threaten them with an invasion on account of their treatment of the Catholics, After the Austrian invasion the position of the Catholics improves [*Hist. Rel., A. P. 148, B. P. 150*], 1622, Jan. 5. "Nota d'alcuni discorsi, et parole seguite tra il Ducha di Feria, et li Ambasciatori della Legha Grisa," Jan. 6. Gregory XV. to Archduke Leopold, Asks him, as Bishop of Strasburg, to help the Bishop of Chur to recover his rights, April 18. Father Ignatius to Bishop of Chur, Reports on his mission to Rome, Account of his shipwreck, April 23. Gregory XV. to Philip IV., the Archduke Leopold, and the Eight Catholic Cantons, Asks them to declare war on the Protestant Grisons who are outraging the Catholic Faith, April 24. Murder of Father Joh. Fidelis of the Mission in Prättigau. [*Hist. Rel. A. P. 163, B. 163*], June 6. The Ten Jurisdictions offer to restore their former rights to the See of Chur, if the Bishop will secure the release of the Preachers Joh. à Porta, Caspar Alexius, Blasi Alexander and of Captain Ruinelli, June 25. Gregory XV. to Bishop of Chur, Orders him to reclaim the former property of the Church and See, 1622. *Historia Religionis R. Urkunden aus dem 17ten Jahrherndert. I. R., "Ueber Valtelliner Mord und Poschiàvo" [I. Cart. R. p. 117-119], In a modern hand, do. p. 34, 1622, Oct. 16. "Ein Bericht an den Nuntius ueber Verschiedenes, besonders über die Predicanten Joh. à Porta und Caspar Alexi, Bishop of Chur to Nuntio, 1623, Jan. 23. Scappi, Nuntio in Switzerland, orders the Bishop to claim his rights, 1624, August 8. "The Heads of the Treaty for the Restitution of the Valtelline and Palatinate, made for Thirty Years between France, England, Holland, Denmark, Bethlen Gabor, Venice, the Swiss and the Grisons," Another copy is in London, British Museum, Manuscript Dept. Add. 10,236 infra., Cf. Mantua, Francia, E. xv.3, 673. Priandi to Duke, Paris, 21 June, 1624.*

Mappa 54 [1625-1640], B.

1625, Aug. 21, Archbishop of Mainz to Bp. of Chur, Orders him as his Metropolitan to recognize no one as his Protector except the Emperor. 1626, Feb. 17, Pope Urban VIII. calls on the Catholic Cantons to defend the Rights of the Sec of Chur in the Valtelline. May 10, Urban VIII., warns the Kings of France and Spain that the rights of the Church must be safeguarded if the Valtelline is restored to the Grisons. April 7, Father G. B. da Castaro asks for particulars of the martyrdom of Father Fidelis, with a view to his canonization. June 21, Father Donatus in Schuls gives an account of the state of the Lower Engadine. Dec. 8, Bishop Joseph Moor of Chur sends Father Ignatius to Rome on behalf of the Engadine Mission. 1628, July 24, Ferdinand II. informs the French Ambassador that he has ordered the Grisons to refuse a passage to the French troops. 1629, July 1, Aug. 6, Ferdinand II. invests Bishop Joseph with the Imperial Regalia. Aug. 8, The Leagues sign the Erbvereinigung with Austria and the House of Austria. 1630, Report as to the state of the Catholic Church in Rhoetia, Reasons for the differences between the two creeds. 1632, Nov. 8, Father Eseckiel reports on the state of the Lower Engadine. 1633, Jan. 21, Father Trino and the Lower Engadine.

As to the connection between Rudolph and Pompejo Planta, Casati, and Archduke Leopold, Cf. *Rott, Edouard*, "Histoire de la Représentation Diplomatique, etc.", op. cit., "L'Affaire de la Valtelline" (1^{re} Partie, 1620-1626). 1620, April 25, p. 317. Note 6, Pietro Vico to the Senate of Venice, Zurich. 27 January, 1620 [Frari, Svizzera X.]

London, British Museum MSS. Dept.

Add. MSS. 11, 309, Letters of Fray Fulgentio to the Duke of Buckingham from various towns in Italy (1616-1626), 1 Vol. 1620, November, In letters dated from Milan, he attributes the Rising in the Valtelline to Casati and Gueffier. 1625, In letters from Urbino and other towns in Central Italy, he describes the Savoy-Genoa War and Lesdiguières' movements.

Turin: *Inghilterra*: Mazzo 3 [1619-1620] op. cit., Gabaleone to Duke, London, 4 April, 1620, mentions Dohna's satisfaction that the Duke had closed the Passes to the Spanish Troops, in fulfilment of his agreement with Christian of Anhalt under the Treaty of Rivoli, Art. 2, of May 18, 1619. [Cf. Turin. No. 117, 2^o Trattati Diversi. Inv. d'Addizione Mazzo 1^o. [Anni 1362 in 1789]. No. 7, Trattati Diversi, 1619, The Treaty of Rivoli.]

London, British Museum, Manuscript Department.

Add. 10, 236, f. 228, Meeting of Grisons Preachers at Hilatz [Ilanz], 15 June, 1620, f. 233, League for Thirty Years made at Paris against Spain (undated). [Cf. Chur, Mappa 53, 1624, August 8], f. 329. Memorial from Petrossa to Olivares on the Art of Government.

Royal MSS. 14a, xiii., "Relatione di Savoia fatta dal Smo Sig. Fran. Molino, l'anno 1586," p. 634, The Waldenses.

Eg. 2,053, f. 347, Memorial from Catholics of Valtelline why the Treaty of Madrid should not be carried out, October, 1621; Journal of Card. F. Barberini's Mission to Spain, 1626. [Tratados collected by D. Gaston de Torquemada, 1556-1665.]

Mantua. Archivio Patrio Gonzaga, Spagna 616.

E. xiv. 3, Nerli to Duke, Madrid, 1623, Jan. 1, League of Avignon (France, Switzerland, Savoy, Venice), about Valtelline. Jan. 26, Spain and the Restitution of the Valtelline. Feb. 17, Olivares to please the Queen has come to terms with France about the Valtelline. March 24, Feria ordered to hand over the Forts of the Valtelline on Deposit to the Pope. June 30, The Forts deposited in the Pope's hands, Olivares felt his credit at stake in the matter.

Do. Francia, E. No. XV., 3, 673, [1621-1625], Giustiniano Priandi to Duke, Paris, 1623, March 30, Settlement of the Valtelline Question imminent

1624, Sept. 28, The Thirteen Cantons at the Diet of Baden had promised the French Ambassador that they would confirm the Treaty of Madrid, but the Eight Catholic Cantons did so with a reservation as to the exercise of the Catholic Faith in the Valtelline. Nov. 23, Cœuvres enters the Grisons, His plans for joining the Venetians through Val Camonica. Dec. 14, It is thought Cœuvres' plans will fail. 1625, Apr. 26, Everyone blames the Duke of Feria as the cause of the fresh troubles in the Valtelline, Card. Francesco Barbarini brought powers to settle the Question with France and Spain. June 13, The Suspension of trade with France makes Spain more conciliatory. July 1, As Barberini treats the Italian Question without any reference to a settlement in Germany, his position is difficult. Aug. 8, The Settlement of the Valtelline question would lead to one between Savoy and Genoa.

Munich: Allgemeines Reichs Archiv., 30 jähr Krieg. A. 195, 1626. News letters from London and Brussels. Rota's Mission. 1626, Alessandro d'Alais (?) to Kuttner, Paris (?). 31 Jan., The War in Italy, The Venetians wish to quit the Valtelline.

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IX.—BELGIUM IN 1622—SIEGE OF BERGEN-OP-ZOOM.

Villa: "Ambrosio Spinola," op. cit., pp. 400-405. Battle of Hochst, Siege of Bergen-op-Zoom.

Villa: "Corr. de la Inf." op. cit., pp. 240-242, Isabella to Philip IV. 1622, April 7, Danger of leaving troops unpaid.

Reigersborch: op. cit., pp. 4-7, Reigersborch to Grotius. 1622, 10 May, Weston's mission to Brussels.

"*Gazette de Bruxelles*," 26 Novembre, 1905, "Funérailles de Prince."

Campan: "Bergues sur le Soom assiégée le 18 de Juillet, 1622, par les Trois Pasteurs de l'Eglise d'icelle," Par Ch. Al. Campan [Bruxelles. Par la Société de l'Histoire de Belgique, 1867, 1 Tome.]

Nugent: "The Grand Tour," op. cit., Vol. I., pp. 208-209 "Bergen-op-Zoom"; p. 218, "Gertrudenburg."

Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España Tomo LIV. "Correspondencia de Don Diego Fernandez de Cordoba sobre la Guerra del Palatinado hecha en 1622" [Madrid, Viuda de Calero, 1869, 1 Vol.], pp. 5-6, 1622. Alvaro de Losada to Cordoba, *Undated*. Dangerous position of Spanish army, If Mansfeldt would join the Spaniards Ban against the Palatine could be put in execution, Spinola's plan for retaining the Palatinate to close the Rhine to Dutch trade; pp. 8-10, Losada to [undated], The quality of Cordoba's troops; pp. 178-281 (Draft), Cordoba to his wife, Wimpffen, May 7, The Battle of Wimpffen; p. 250, Cordoba to his brother, 22 June, Halberstadt in the Palatinate; pp. 251-253, "Account of what took place in the Palatinate on 22 June, 1622; pp. 269-274, "List of the Districts which the Catholic Army occupied in June, 1622, after Halberstadt's defeat" [undated], Cordoba's plans for occupying East Friesland and Emden; p. 280-281, Mansfeldt to Cordoba, "Assidange," 12 July, Has with Halberstadt been dismissed from the King of Bohemia's service; pp. 307-310, Cordoba's account of the Battle of Fleurus (29 August); p. 322, Cordoba to his wife, 26 Oct., Spinola is sending him to Westphalia.

Roozes: Rubens op. cit., Vol. III. [22 July, 1622 to 22 October, 1626.]; 1622, p. 4, Peiresc to the Abbé de St. Amboise, Paris, 27 July, Rubens sends news of the siege of Bergen-op-Zoom; p. 32, Peiresc to Rubens, 8 Sept., A Plan of the Siege of Bergen is being exhibited in Paris, do. to do. 20 Oct., The Huguenots say that Spinola burnt a number of his wounded alive when

leaving his camp before Bergen, The Plague at Sedan, Terror of the Duke of Bouillon.

R. Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep., Drummond-Moray, pp. 105-106, Dutch raid into Brabant; pp. 107-108, Siege of Bergen-op-Zoom.

Earl Delawarr's MSS. [Dorset MSS.], p. 285, 1622, May 6 [Received], Weston to Cranfield, The Dutch raid into Brabant.

Duke of Northumberland's MSS., Royal Letters, p. 116, Elector Palatine to Queen of Bohemia, Sedan, Aug. 30, Hague Sept. 30, 1622, The Siege of Heidelberg, Its Capture [Undated], News of War in Palatinate.

Riesler, op. cit., Vol. V., p. 219, The Battle of Fleurus, 1622; pp. 221-222, Bavaria and the Armistice in the Palatinate, 1622.

Birch: "Court and Times of James I." op. cit., Vol. I., p. 304, April 12, 1622, Dr. Winniffe, preaching before the Prince of Wales, compares Spinola to the Devil.

Kemp: "Maurits von Nassau," op. cit., Fourth Part, pp. 150-154, The Campaign of 1622.

Klopp: "Der Dreissigjährige Krieg bis zum Tode Gustaf Adolf's, 1632" [Paderborn, Schönigh, 1893, 3 Bde.] von *Otto Klopp*, Vol. II., p. 253, Mansfeldt's personal appearance, pp. 261-262, Influence of Mansfeldt's conduct; p. 304, The position of Lower Saxony as regarded the Emperor.

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IX.—BELGIUM IN 1622—BERGEN-OP-ZOOM (SIEGE OF).

Brussels Etat et Guerre.

No. 187.—Correspondance de l'Infante Isabelle avec Philippe IV., Tome XI. [8 Janvier au 29 Juin, 1622.]

1622: 8 Jan., Infanta to Philip IV., Is launching some fresh ships, 10 Jan. do. to do., Gondomar writes that James I. will remain on friendly terms with Spain, although the Parliament is against it, Philip's delay in sending money to pay the soldiers is very dangerous, Explains the reasons, Philip IV. to Ofiate, 22 Jan., Suggests that the Electorate might be transferred to the Palatine's son, whilst Bavaria should administer its territories, Would give Bavaria Burgau, Only wishes to settle German affairs, Wants nothing for himself from the Palatinate; p. 50, do., Approves Spinola's proposals for an Armistice in the Palatinate, Wants ships building at Ostend to be ready to take the sea in May, Infanta to Philip IV., March 21, Emperor and England are sending envoys to Brussels about the Palatine's affairs, but the final settlement is to be left to a Diet of Electors to be convened by the Emperor, Difficulties in manning the ships at Ostend. p. 497, Infanta—Palatine visits Mansfeldt, Effects of his visit, do. to do. May 15, The Battle of Wimpffen, June 2, Philip IV. to Infanta, Ships at Ostend should be sent to Spain to protect the coasts, as the Dutch are said to have allied themselves with the Moors to raid them; p. 248, Baron de Roysellon offers her a kind of shell, incendiary ball, and chain shot.

No. 188 [Juillet au Novembre, 1622.]

July 4, Infanta to Philip IV., Emperor asks that Electoral dignity should not be restored to the Palatinate, as it had been given to Bavaria, Is very anxious as to German affairs on account of Bavaria's policy; July 9, do. to do., Spinola has taken the field; July 27, do. to do., Spinola besieges Bergen, His reasons; July 28, Philip IV. to Infanta, Thinks France will make trouble about the Valtelline, Delay in ratifying the Treaty of

Aranjuez, Wishes her to get Emperor to allow her to hold Juliers in deposit ; Aug. 16, Infanta to Philip IV., All Juliers, Berg, and Mark have been occupied except Emmerich and Rees which the Dutch hold, Gives news of the siege of Bergen, Mansfeldt has left Alsace for Lorraine, and means to enter the Netherlands ; Aug. 28, Philip IV. to Infanta, She must beware of Mansfeldt's treachery ; Sept. 9, Infanta to Philip IV., Announces Mansfeldt's defeat at Fleurus, His troops have joined the Dutch ; Sept. 29, do. to do., Maurice has entered Brabant, Has sent Cordoba against him ; Oct. 7, Philip IV. to Infanta, Has written to Oñate approving of the transfer of the Electoral dignity to Bavaria ; Oct. 8, Infanta to Philip IV., Spinola withdraws from Bergen, His reasons, James I. is furious that Tilly has massacred the English garrison of the Castle of Heidelberg ; Nov. 8, do. to do., Gives account of Spinola's position ; Philip IV. can only take part in the Diet as Chief of the Circle of Burgundy, which is the Sixth dignity in the Empire, but ranks below the Palatine, Difficulties in the way of a settlement about the Palatine ; Nov. 16, Effect of the capture of Mannheim by Tilly, Spain should remain neutral as regards the English and the Catholic League in the Palatinate, but should accept Frankenthal on deposit so as to prevent it from becoming a base for Mansfeldt, Has seen Digby and given him a copy of Philip's letter to Tilly.

No. 189 [Décembre, 1622 ; au Décembre, 1623.]

Dec. 28, 1622, Philip IV. to Infanta, Wishes for a Suspension of Arms for a year in Germany to give time to settle matters there, Has written to the Emperor about this.

London, S.P.O.

Foreign Ministers of State, Newsletters, *Flanders*, No. 19, Brussels, 17 March, 1622, It was decided to celebrate Archduke Albert's funeral now that Spinola had returned.

Brussels, *Etat et Guerre*.

No. 132, op. cit., Spinola to Franco, de Gaustegui [Holograph], 4 May, 1622, Orders him not to quarter troops in certain villages, do. to Pedro de San Juan, 14 Oct., Orders as to quartering troops, very carefully corrected in Spinola's own hand.

No. 188, op. cit., pp. 244-246, "Contract with Nicholas van Maestrat of St. Omer and Cornelis Janssen Livhon of Antwerp for four ships of war, with which they offer to serve H.M. in the Spanish Fleet," Very full particulars are given as to the ships. [Cf. *Archæologia Cambrensis* op. cit., Jan.-July, 1873. "Sir Robert Mansell, etc., by G.F.C., July, 1873, p. 230, Preparing Merchant Ships for Cruisers ; p. 231, The Great Ship proposed by Capt. Pett ; pp. 221-222, The English Fleet for Algiers, 1620-1621.]

London, S.P.O.

S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 130, No. 60, Chamberlain to Carleton, London, May 11, 1622, Coloma's visit to James I., The Battle of Wimpffen ; Vol. 33, No. 49, do. to do., Oct. 12, Mannheim in danger ; Vol. 134, No. 15, do. to do., Nov. 10, Parliament men pricked for Sheriffs, Conway Secretary of State ; Vol. 128, No. 96, do. to do., No. 97, Locke to Carleton, 30 March, Reports of intended Spanish invasion.

Turin : Spagna, 18, Tarantaise to Duke, Madrid, 1622, May 26, Genoa refuses financial aid to Spain, June 17, Feeling at Madrid as to the Dutch raid into Brabant, Feria thought to be refusing to obey orders from Madrid.

Munich, *Reichsarchiv*, 30 jähr. Krieg, A. 147, 1622, "Papal que su Alta, La Infanta Da Isabel mandó dar al Sr. Conde de Schwarzenberg, etc." Protests to the Emperor against the Transfer of the Electorate from the Palatine to Bavaria, Spain cannot assist the German Catholics on account of the war with the Dutch, and the Transfer will mortally offend England and the other allies of the Palatine.

PRINTED.

X.—CHARLES IV. OF LORRAINE AND CHARLES EMMANUEL I. OF SAVOY.

Digot: "Histoire de Lorraine," par A. Digot [Nancy, G. Crépín-Leblond, 1886, 6 Tomes.]

Vol. V., pp. 162-166, Charles IV. and England in 1627, Montagu's arrest ; p. 265, Value of a Franc of Lorraine in 1635.

Hanotaux: Vie du Cardinal de Richelieu, op. cit., Vol. I., pp. 428-429, The "Princes Etrangers," The Princes of Lorraine [quoting *Fontenay-Mareuil*, Mémoires, pp. 25-26] ; pp. 575-577, Other Princes of the same kind, Bouillon, The Grimaldi of Monaco, Nevers, afterwards Dukes of Mantua, of the Nivernais, Principalities of Dombes, Rethel, Salm, and some lands in the Departments of Creuse, Corrèze, and Puy de Dôme, belonging to the Vicomte de Turenne and the family of La Tour d'Auvergne.

"Collection des Inventaires Sommaires des Autorités Départementales antérieures à 1790, publiées sous la Direction du Ministre de l'Intérieur." Tomes 1-6, "Meurthe-et-Moselle" [Nancy, V. Collin, 1875 et seqq.]

CHARLES EMMANUEL I. OF SAVOY.

Raulich: "Carlo Emanuele I. Duca di Savoia," *Italo-Raulich* [Milano: Hoepli, 1896, 2 Tomes], Vol. I., p. 85, Cardinal Borromeo compares Charles Emmanuel to Sebastian of Portugal.

MANUSCRIPT.

X.—CHARLES IV. OF LORRAINE AND CHARLES EMMANUEL I. OF SAVOY.

Nancy: *Bibliothèque Municipale*.

Fonds de Lorraine.

"Histoire de Charles IV. Duc de Lorraine, MS. Anon., pp. 56-74 ; 1626 : Richelieu sends Guron to offer the Empire successively to Bavaria, Savoy and Lorraine, but they all refuse it ; pp. 49 seqq., Charles IV. incurs the hatred of Richelieu, and negotiates with Charles I. of England, Montagu's mission, Its results [1626]. His Duchess.

According to the Preface, this History was compiled from the Private Letters of Duke Charles IV., and the Duchess Nicole, the Duke's instructions to his Envoys in France, Germany, Italy and Spain, the Memoirs (now in MS. at Nancy) of his Confessor Father Donat and the Registers of his State Papers, with various printed materials, The writer did not know the Duke personally.

Chambre des Comptes de Lorraine.

Serie B.

Art. 1298, 1606 : Cte de la Hutterie's accounts giving the cost of the Prince of Vaudemont's journey to England.

These accounts are extremely curious and give a very full account of the life at the Court of Nancy.

B. 7,752, 1624 : Compte de Philippe Fournier.

"Pour la façon d'une loge au Jardin du Palais pour serrer les orangers, lauriers, et genets d'Espagne."

B. 1,302, 1607 : do. de Claude de Malvoisin.

"A Jacques Bellange peintre, pour un grand tableau de la Reine d'Ecosse" [Mary Stuart.]

B. 1,305: Comptes d'Etienne Hubert, trésorier du Comte (François) de Vaudemont.

"À un individu du lac de Come" pour orangers, limons, et cédrats que le comte avait achetés de lui pour envoyer en son jardin d'Autrey, etc."

B. 1,354, B. 1,362: The Duke and Princess Claude de Lorraine buy diamonds and sweetmeats for their valentines, 1614.

B. 1,387, 1617: "Robe donnée par le Duc à Mlle. de Liguiville pour sa royauté le jour des Rois.

B. 1452-1625: Au sieur du Plessis, Exempt des gardes, envoyé vers le Colonel Cratz pour se plaindre des désordres que commettaient ses gens aux environs de Sarrebourg et de Phalsbourg.

B. 1,362, 1614: Au Sieur de Rozier pour acheter les instruments et autres choses nécessaires à la fabrication des nouvelles especes d'or que le duc a ordonné être faites sous sa conduite et direction suivant le traité qu'il en a passé avec lui."

B. 1,377-1616: "Achat près d'un marchand d'Augsbourg d'une "apothicairerie" faite en forme de coffre garnie de layettes et flacons d'étain à mettre drogues, onguents, et eaux, et de deux tableaux d'argent, figurés des figures de Notre-Seigneur et de Notre Dame," are amongst the most curious entries. Payments are made to a man, who had been bitten by a mad dog for his expenses on a pilgrimage to Saint Hubert, and to a native of Canton Uri who had looked for mines of rock-crystal in the Vosges. In 1619, money is received from the sale of goods of convicted sorcerers.

CHAPITRE DE LA CATHEDRALE DE TOUL.

G. 81, 1623: Ordre au prévôt de Void d'informer des violences et désordres commis audit lieu par le Baron de Fontenoy qui avait logé sa compagnie levée pour le service du roi d'Espagne.

CHARLES EMMANUEL I. DUKE OF SAVOY.

London, British Museum, Manuscript Department, Catalogue of the Royal MSS., 14 A.xiii.

"Relatione di Savoia fatta dal Smo Signor Franco. Molino, l'anno, 1586," pp. 627-673; pp. 627-628, The descent of the Dukes of Savoy, their titles, Charles Emmanuel I., His character; p. 628, Savoy; p. 630, Piedmont; p. 634, The Waldenses, The Revenues of Savoy, Their Expenses.

PRINTED.

XI.—CHARLES, PRINCE OF WALES, AT MADRID, 1623.

F. de Jesus: "El Hecho de los Tratados del Matrimonio del Principe de Gales" por el Maestro F. de Jesus [London, Camden Society, 1869, 1 Vol.], edited and translated by S. R. Gardiner, pp. IX.-XI., Meaning of "Tolerancia" [Connivance at Exercise of Catholic Religion privately] and "Libertad de Conciencia" [Public Exercise of the Catholic Religion guaranteed by Law]; pp. 19-21, What Philip the Third's views on the subject were: pp. 1-13, History of the Marriage negotiations from 1604 to 1615; pp. 13-19, Their Course in 1616-1617, Junta of Theologians consulted; pp. 20-25, Digby's visit to England in 1618; pp. 25-36, Troubles arise in connection

with the Palatine and Bohemia, 1620-1621, Negotiations for a marriage between Charles and a French Princess [pp. 36-37] ; pp. 36-46, Gage's Mission to Rome, 1622 ; pp. 47-51, Olivares' Memoir to Philip IV. on the Marriage, His Instructions to Albuquerque in Rome, Dec., 1622 ; pp. 51-53, Gage's negotiations at Rome, Digby's at Madrid ; pp. 54-56, Charles arrives at Madrid, 17 March, 1623 ; pp. 53-87, Charles at Madrid ; p. 58, Charles, Buckingham, and the Meeting with the Theologians ; pp. 64-65, Gregory the Fifteenth's Secret instructions to the Nuncio ; pp. 65-79, The marriage negotiations and the Junta of Theologians ; p. 80, Charles' interview with Philip IV., July 17, His engagement announced ; pp. 83-84, Reasons why the negotiations grow lukewarm ; pp. 85-89, Charles leaves Spain, "*Die Christliche Welt*" Evangelisches Gemeindeblatt für Gebildete aller Stände, " Vierundzwanzigster Jahrgang, No. 9 Marburg i.H. den 3 März, 1910 " ; pp. 199-207, *Holl, Karl*, " Die Reform der Kurie durch Pius X. " Account of the Organisation of the Curia. *Times Literary Supplement*, Thursday, April 30, 1908, " George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham," review of " Romance of George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham," by *Philip Gibbs* [London, Methuen, 1908, 1 Vol.]

Boverius : " Consultatio Orthodoxa de Religione " [Matriti, 1623, 1 Vol.], *Zaccarias Boverius*

Part I., Regula 7, pp. 104-106, " In quâ Ecclesiæ Principatum, etc.," might well be compared with Icon Basiliké, 24 " Upon their denying His Majesty the attendance of His Chaplains ; p. 147, For Zaccarius Boverius, Cf. *F. de Jesu*, op. cit., p. 58.

" Eikon Basilike," " The Portraiture of His Sacred Majesty in his solitude and sufferings," printed Anno Domini, 1648." Section 24, Cf. *supra*.

Morel Fatio, " L'Espagne, etc.," op. cit.

" Diario di Camillo Borghese da Roma in Spagna, 1594," pp. 175-191, Account of Madrid.

Nugent : " The Grand Tour," op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 240-244, " Madrid."

" Catécismo, que significa Forma de Instruccion," etc., " Forma de las Oraciones y Plegarias que se hacen en la Yglesia de Dios " [En casa de Ricardo del Campo, London, 1596, 1 Vol.], London, British Museum, Press Mark, C. 53, a.3, There is another edition printed at Geneva about 1559. The book is from the French of J. Calvin.

Goetz : " Die Politik Maximilian's I. von Bayern," op. cit. Zweiter Theil, Erster Band, 1623-1624.

For the English Spanish Marriage, 1623, pp. 102-103, Note 2, Spinola's plan for the settlement of the Palatinate, Schwarzenberg, Brussels, April 1, Kaiser, April 24, Elector of Mainz, April 14, May 1 ; p. 117-118, Schwarzenberg to Kaiser, April 8, England will hand over Frankenthal to Spain, but refuses the Armistice ; pp. 148-149, Oñate to Eggenberg, May 1, A German settlement indispensable ; p. 257, The Imperial Councillors recommend that Spinola's plan should be accepted Aug. 2 ; pp. 266-268, Father Hyacinth to Maximilian on Tilly's victory at Stadtlohn. Spa, Aug. 12 ; pp. 273-279, Maximilian to Donnersberg, How the victory should be used, Aug. 19, do, To Father Hyacinth, Aug. 29 ; p. 334, Count Johann of Zollern to Maximilian, The Spanish attitude to Bavaria, Sept. 26 ; pp. 302-305, Tauner to Maximilian ; pp. 303-305, Hyacinth to do., Spain and Tilly's army, Sept. 2 ; pp. 312-313, Maximilian to Tilly, Tilly and Spinola, Sept. 10 ; pp. 319-323, Hyacinth to Maximilian, The Palatine and the Armistice, Would like to send Father Alexander to England, Sept. 14 ; p. 324, Maximilian sends Father Hyacinth full powers to treat with the Infanta, Sept. 30 ; p. 418, Note 1, 1624, Hyacinth to Jocher, People at Brussels do not want the Anglo-Spanish Marriage, 12 Jan. ; pp. 431-436, Hyacinth to Jocher, Spinola urges that Spain should assist Bavaria,

March 9, March 16; p. 442, Hyacinth leaves Brussels, the negotiations fail, April 15.

Maximilian and Father Alexander's Negotiations in England for an understanding with the Palatine, pp. 389-390, Khevenhüller to Ferdinand II., Madrid, 23 Nov., 1623. The English mission to Madrid; pp. 393-394, Ferdinand II. to Maximilian, Nov. 29. The English proposals were submitted to Philip IV. on Nov. 29, the Spanish answer is dated Jan. 5, [Brussels, *Etat et Guerre*, No. 190, f. 1, Philip IV. to Infanta, Jan. 3, 1624, encloses copies of both]; p. 400, Note 1, Hyacinth to Alexander (undated); pp. 406-407, Maximilian to Cardinal of Zollern, Comments on the English proposals, Jan. 4, 1624; pp. 410-411, Count Zollern to Maximilian, Remarks on folly of Spain, Jan. 8; pp. 418-419, Hyacinth to Jocher, Position of the English Marriage, Jan. 20; pp. 421-422, Khevenhüller to Maximilian, The English Marriage, Jan. 24, do. to do., His conversations with Olivares, Feb. 20; p. 422, Note 1, Maximilian to Khevenhüller, Indignant at attitude of Spain towards him, Feb. 20; pp. 427-430, do. to do., His views as to the Marriage negotiations differ from the Pope's, March 7; pp. 431-436, Hyacinth to Jocher, Failure of Father Alexander's mission to England, March 7, March 16, Hyacinth reports that Father Alexander has returned to the Continent, April 20.

Khevenhüller's Views, pp. 22-23, Khevenhüller to Eggenberg, The King and a Palatine Marriage for the Emperor's younger daughter, Madrid, Jan. 9, 1623; p. 22, Elector of Mainz, conversation with Father Hyacinth at Regensburg on 20 March, Hyacinth advocates the Anglo-Spanish Match; p. 123, Khevenhüller to Eggenberg, The Palatine Marriage, Madrid, 12 April; p. 156, do. to do., Olivares will live to thank those who warned him against the English Match, 5 May; pp. 250-251, do. to Maximilian, The Methods of the Spanish Minister, 1 Aug.; pp. 309-311, do. to the Emperor, Owing to the Palatinate Question, Olivares has changed his views as to the Marriage, Sept. 7.

Symonds: "The History of the Renaissance in Italy," by John Addington Symonds, "The Catholic Reaction," Part I., p. 232, Note 1, "The Expulsion of the Jesuits from Flanders and Naples in 1622."

Roses: "Rubens" op. cit., Vol. V. (6 Sept., 1628 to 26 Dec., 1631), pp. 201-205, Rubens to Olivares, 21 Sept., 1629, Aston's son married by a Catholic priest to Weston's daughter.

Reigersborch, op. cit., pp. 9-11 to Grotius, 9 Oct., 1623, Distress in Holland, The English-Spanish Marriage.

Riezler: "Geschichte," op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 243-245, Maximilian and the College of Electors, 1623; p. 243-244, Bavaria and the Spanish Match; pp. 251-252, Maximilian and France, 1623.

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Mar and Kellie, Earl of, pp. 47-48, James VI. to Lord Mar, Holyrood House, 5 February, 1601, Mar's mission to Queen Elizabeth to explain James I. relations with France and Spain; Preface, p. IX., James I. to Lord Mar, Greenwich, 17 May, 1603, as to Anne of Denmark's letter and Drummond's mission to Pope Clement VIII.

Marquis Townshend, p. 21, 1622, Philip IV. to Olivares; pp. 22-23, 1622, Newsletter, Spanish Match.

Sir Vincent Corbet, p. 76, 1624, Rupture of the Spanish Match announced, Scene in Parliament.

University of Edinburgh (Laing MSS.), Vol. I., pp. 163-165, "Donna Maria, Infanta of Spain."

Lord Kenyon : pp. 29-30, Buckingham's Speech in the House of Lords on breaking off the Spanish Match, Feb. 24, 1624 ; pp. 32-33, Lord Bristol's Articles against Buckingham (1626).

Royal Historical Society, London, 1912 : "English Merchants and the Spanish Inquisition in the Canaries," Introduction ; pp. IX-X., The tolerant attitude of the Inquisition in the Canaries to English Merchants."

Kemp : "Maurits von Nassau," op. cit., Fourth Part, pp. 154-156, The Campaign of 1623.

Klopp, op. cit., Vol. II. [1621-1628], pp. 283-285, Frederick's attitude towards England, 1623 ; pp. 302-303, Maximilian of Bavaria and Peace ; pp. 315-318, Battle of Stadtlohn and its consequences ; pp. 361-364, Rusdorf's version of Buckingham's quarrel with Olivares.

Clarendon : "The History of the Rebellion," by *Edward, Earl of Clarendon* [London, 1702, 8 Vols.], Vol. I., p. 38, Buckingham and Countess Olivares.

De Haro : "Nobiliario Genealogico de los Reyes y Titulos de España," *A. L. de Haro* [Madrid, 1621.]

Hume : "The Court of Philip IV.," by *Martin Hume* [London, Nash, 1907, 1 Vol.], p. 309, Premium on silver at Madrid in 1636 ; pp. 321-322, Prices at Madrid in 1637.

The Harleian Miscellany [London, White and Cochrane, 1811], Vol. 8, "A short view of the Life and Death of George Villiers, Duke of Buckingham, by *Sir Henry Wootton, Kt.*" [London, Printed for William Sheares, 1641.]

"CHARLES' JOURNEY TO SPAIN."

Villa : "Corr. de la Inf." op. cit., pp. 242-243.

Sclopis : "Delle Relazioni Politiche tra la Dinastia di Savoia ed il Governo Britannico (1240-1815) con aggiunta di Documenti Inediti" [Torino, Dalla Stamperia Reale, 1853, 1 Vol.], pp. 10-16, Colonel Dallot's Mission to England in 1640 to arrange for a marriage between Charles, Prince of Wales, afterwards Charles II., and his cousin Luigia Maria Cristina of Savoy. [The documents connected with this Mission are at Brussels, Etat et Guerre, Card. Inf. Ferdinand.] Negotiations for giving England a Naval Station at Villefranche, 1674.

Villa : Ambrosio Spinola op. cit., pp. 418-420.

Calendar of State Papers, Colonial, East Indies : Vol. II., 1622-1624, The East India Company sells Portuguese Property in England, Their relations with Buckingham. [Cf. London, Brit. Mus. MSS. Dept., *Harl.* 6,987, James I. to Buckingham, 31 July, 1623], p. 65, 1622, Sept. 7 ; p. 124, 1623, July 23 ; p. 125, July 23, 1623 to July 23, 1624 ; p. 151, Sept. 12, 1623 ; pp. 256-257, March 8, 1623-4 ; p. 207, March 10, 13, 1623-4.

Return of Members of Parliament op. cit., Vol. I., Parliaments of 1620-1, 1623-4.

"The Petition and Remonstrance of the Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading to the East Indies, etc., to House of Commons. [London, Printed for Nicholas Bourne, 1628, 1 Vol.], pp. 2 *et seq.*, Description of Buckingham's conduct, Description of East India Trade.

Encyclopædia Britannica (Times' Edition), Vol. XIII., p. 695, "Hormuz."

"The Imperial Dictionary of Universal Biography" [William Mackenzie, London, Glasgow, and Edinburgh, 6 Vols.], Vol. V., v. 563. *Olivares* Gaspar Guzman, Count of [1587-1645.]

Rusdorff [Johann Joachim von], "Mémoires et Négotiations de M. de Rusdorff," par *E. G. Cuhn* [Leipzig, 1789, 2 Tomes], Vol. I., pp. 148-150, Rusdorff to King of Bohemia, 10-20 Dec., 1623, Arrival of an envoy from the Nuncio at Brussels, who is privately introduced to Buckingham by the

French Ambassador (Cte. de Tillières), p. 161, do. to do., 18-28 Dec., Description of the Envoy's [della Rota's] personal appearance; pp. 172-177, do. to do., 27 Dec., He had come with a letter from Lord Argyll to Sir Wm. Alexander, Master of Requests [Cf., *id.*, p. 202, p. 225], Conway had refused to see him, His object was to propose the Bavarian marriage for the Palatine's heir.

G. E. C.: "The Complete Peerage by G. E. C." Vol. VII., "Stirling [1633, Earldom], Sir William Alexander."

Birch: "Court and Times of James I." op. cit., Vol. II., p. 377, Chamberlain to Carleton, March 21, 1622-3, Charles' presents at Madrid; p. 403, do. to do., June 14, 1623, Entertaining the Spanish Ambassador, The "Trial Dinners"; p. 422, do. to do., Oct. 11, The Return of the Prince of Wales; p. 426, do. to Mead, Oct. 29, The accident at Blackfriars Chapel (Oct. 26); p. 426, do. to Carleton, Oct. 25, The effects of the Spanish Journey.

D. N. B. op. cit., Vol. X., p. 420, Clarke (Edward), fl. 1630 (by G. G. Gordon Goodwin.)

Murray, Eng. Dict., op. cit., Vol. III., p. 585, "Doiling."

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XI.—CHARLES, PRINCE OF WALES AT MADRID, 1623.

London, British Museum, MSS. Department.

Sloane 901: "A description of the Escorial or House of the King of Spain.

Sloane, 3,602: "Relacion Breve de España, Casa y Corte de su Magd. y villa de Madrid, fecha el año de 1611"; Cap. 1, Description of Spain; Cap. 2, The Escorial, Aranjuez, Casa del Campo, Pardo, Casa de la Moneda de Segovia, The Armoury at Madrid, Crucifijo de Burgos, Cathedral of Toledo; Cap. 3, Spanish Manners and Customs.

Havl. 3,822, Cuelbis: "Corographia de las Españas," by D. Diego Cuelbis. An account of a tour in Spain in 1599 by a German Patrician from Leipzig, possibly Jakob von Kolb or Korb.

Brussels, E. et A.

No. 366, Doc. 176: "Diversi Considerationi d' importantia sopra l' Alliança che pretende il Re d' Inghilta con la Mata di Spagna [About 1622], Remarks bearing on the question of an alliance between England and Spain, and showing that the hatred of the English nobility for James I., both because he was Scotch and because he interfered with their wives and daughters, might lead to a revolution and to the King's expulsion from England.

London, S.P.O.

Roman Transcripts, No. 90 [General Series], [A.D. 1621-1625], Nunciature Miscellanea, 146 Rome, 13 Aug., 1621, To the Nuntio in Spain, the Patriarch of Alexandria, Consequences of the Victory at Prague, The Pope sends Hyacinth da Casale to Germany. MSS. from San Pietro, Perugia p. 1757, William Lord to his brother, Feb. 10, 1623, The conditions as to Religion to be allowed to the Infanta, Propaganda, Vol. 347; p. 153, Father A. F. da Racconigi to Prefect of Propaganda, 24 Feb., 1623, His opinion as to James I. wish to converse with a priest on religious subjects, Thinks the Spanish Marriage will never be arranged as the King and Prince are so hostile to the Catholic Religion, Had, at the King's request, drawn up a book entitled "Chiave Reale di David," giving his own system for arguing with heretics and was to discuss it with H.M. at Theobalds. [This book does not seem to be in the British Museum.]

Archivio Particolare: Madrid 20, March, 1623, An account of the Prince of Wales' arrival at Madrid, do., 1 April, 1623, His State entry into Madrid. *San Pietro Perugia*, Wm. Lord to his brother, London, Jan. 4, 1624, Thinks the Marriage will be concluded.

Barberini, Bibl. Vat.

The Barberini Collection, now in the Vatican Library, was made by Card. Francesco Barberini, Cardinal Nephew to Pope Urban VIII., [1623-1644], who died in 1679.

VII. 5, 11 (1602), Anne of Denmark to Pope Clement VIII., 1602, Credentials for Edward Drummond, LL.D. whom she is sending to the Pope to treat for her reception into the Catholic Church, ; No. 122, John Cecil to the Bishop of Politiano, Nuncio at Paris; After 1 May, 1611, Prince Henry's feelings as to the Catholics, do. 29 March, 1611, Elizabeth had asked James I. on her bended knees not to marry her to a Catholic, as the Treasurer was anxious he should do, This was the reason for the match with the Palatine being made up, Wootton had been sent with full powers to Savoy to conclude a match with an Infanta of Savoy for Prince Henry; pp. 125-126, do., 20 May, 1611, The Savoy match certain; p. 138, do., Nov. 27, 1612, In consequence of Prince Henry's death, the Council had remonstrated against the Palatine Marriage, which the King alone favoured, Negotiations for a marriage between Prince Charles and Henrietta Maria of France would be continued; p. 140, do. (1612-1613), After Prince Henry's death, James I. had consulted the Bishops to know if a Catholic could be saved or not, On their reply that it was possible he said that he asked because he was arranging a Catholic Match for his son.

Barberini Transcripts, Series I. 129.

Bibl. Vat. Barb. CVII. 6, 3,619, pp. 1-3, Letter from John Colleton acting Deputy Arch.-Priest of England to Card. Barberini, London, 26 Aug., 1621, Accredits John Bennett as his Agent to Rome and begs that the Pope will grant the dispensation for the Spanish Match; pp. 6-8, do. to Pope Gregory XV., 4 Feb., 1622, Begs him to sanction the marriage, as it will be a blessing to the English Catholics, and asks that the Episcopal Hierarchy may be restored in England, do.; pp. 9-11, do. to Pope Gregory XV., London, 3 Id., Nov. Styl. Ang. 1622, Thanks him for appointing a Bishop over England, The King will not recognize him openly, but will, in his heart, be glad of the appointment as the Bishop will prevent the publication of the libels which annoy him so much; pp. 12-13, do. to Pope Urban VIII., London, 1 Sept., 1624, expresses the regret of the English Catholics at the rupture of the negotiations for the Spanish Match; p. 256, Card. F. Barberini to George Con., 29 Dec., 1636, Has explained to Mr. Hamilton that the Church opposes the restoration of the Palatinate to Charles Lewis, because of the difficulties which it would occasion to the Catholic inhabitants.

Barberini CVII. 10, 19, *Bibl. Vat. Barb.* 8, 623, p. 22, Chelison and the Members of the College of Douay to Gregory XV., 5 Oct., 1621, Beg him to grant the Dispensation for the Spanish Match.

Bibl. Vat. Barb. 8,630 (*Barb. CVII.* 17), *Series I.*, 134, pp. 29-32), Card. Ludovisi to the Nuntio in Spain, 18 April, 1623, Acknowledges his letter of April 1, which had annoyed him greatly, as he finds that, do what he will, he cannot please the King and Olivares, He had done his best to secure the Dispensation because he thought, upon the whole, they wished for it, Is glad to leave the matter to them, as, then, the English cannot blame the Church; pp. 32-35, do. to do., April 18, The dispensation is granted solely because of the benefits which will accrue to the Catholic Religion in England from the Marriage, although it will be impossible to secure these unless with the consent of Parliament, The Nuncio is to secure all the advantages he can; pp. 85-100, Headnotes of the resolutions taken at the meetings of the

Cardinals at which the Marriage was discussed ; p. 55. 19 July, Olivares writes to ask the Pope to grant the Dispensation as soon as possible ; pp. 133-141, Al Nuntio di Spagna, drafted by Mgr. Ciampoli, 22 October, As to the difficulties which the Cardinals are making as to the dispensation, Olivares had asked Pope Urban VIII. to write to James I. and the Prince of Wales, Sends these letters.

Bibl. Vat. Barb. 8,638, p. 142, Madrid, 26 August, 1623, Asks that Zaccaria da Saluzzo may be allowed to remain at Madrid, He has finished his book and can be useful in instructing the Prince.

Bibl. Vat., Barb. 8,630, pp. 144-146, Madrid 5th Dec., Nuntio reports that the Marriage will take place on Dec. 9, The Infanta is most anxious that Zaccaria da Saluzzo may go with her to England as her Chaplain, He is well thought of by the English, who like his book ; pp. 6-14, The Instructions to the Nuntio as to the Marriage Dispensation.

Foreign Series, Spanish Transcripts, Series 2, No. 27 (1622), "Correspondence of Gondomar" (1622). Copied from "Embajada de Gondomar, Bib. de Palacio, Madrid, Est. K. plat. 8.

1622-3, p. 63, To Philip IV., 31 Jan., 1622, Has received Philip's letter of Dec. 28, James I. is greatly pleased at the King's wish to assist the Palatine.

No. 28, Philip IV., 1 Sept., 1623, Meeting of Council, Inojosa reports that the Dutch have given Buckingham eighty thousand ducats [£24,000], to appoint a Secretary of State in their interest and to settle the dispute about Amboyna, Buckingham must be won over at all costs, If the Prince leaves Spain without marrying the Infanta, it is really of no consequence,

S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 142, No. 34 (Conway Papers), Conway to Sir Thos. Wentworth, his "Noble Cosen," April 4, 1623, The Prince's arrival at Madrid, Details of his journey ; do. Vol. 143, No. 31, do. to Lord Treasurer, Windsor, 20 April, Describes the Prince's first interview with the Infanta ; do. Vol. 145, No. 39, Kensington to Conway, Madrid, 27 May, Praises Buckingham's conduct at Madrid ; do. Vol. 147, No. 80, Chamberlain to Carleton, London, June 28, Porter persuaded the Prince to go to Spain, Inojosa's arrival ; do. Vol. 151, No. 89, London, August 30, Chamberlain to Carleton, "Here is a rich ship called the Palsgrave arrived from the East Indies laden with pepper, cloves, nutmegs, and other commodities."

THE PRINCE OF POLAND WOOS THE INFANTA.

S.P. For., Spain, Bundle 25, f. 293, 1622. Copy of a letter from Spain touching the match, A Polish Embassy is expected at Madrid to ask for Infanta's hand.

S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 132, No. 39, July 12, 1622, Locke to Carleton, Duke of Florence's son suitor for Infanta ; do. Vol. 137, No. 5, January 4th, 1622-3, Chamberlain to Carleton, Report Charles is going to Spain in person to bring back the Infanta by May.

London, British Museum, Manuscript Department,

Add. 8,355, Relazione di Leonardo Moro 1627, Amb. Veneto, appresso la M. Cattca, pp. 252-283 ; p. 260, Ormuz ; p. 263, Trade of Spain with the Indies ; pp. 266-268, The Spanish Budget ; pp. 274-276, The King, Inf. D. Carlos, Inf. D. Fernando, Inf. D. Maria ; p. 277, Spinola, Spain and Germany ; pp. 280-281, Savoy, Genoa.

Harl. 6,987, Correspondence between James I., Prince Charles, Buckingham, etc., 17 February, 1623—26 April, 1624. This includes the letters from Spain.

Add. MSS. 37,028, 1622, Dec. 30, Philip IV. to Pope Gregory XV., Places himself entirely in His Holiness' hands as to the Dispensation, f. 42,

Gregory XV. to James I.; 2 May, 1623, Answers a letter from the King, Urges him to bring back England to the Faith and to treat the Catholics well, f. 62, Instructions to Innocencio Massimi, Bishop of Bertinoro, 12 April, 1623, to treat for the dispensation, He may give the dispensation if the Infanta is guaranteed the safety of her religion and the right to name her servants, "Liberty of Conscience" for Catholics, and the right of educating her children till the age of 12 are waived, f. 57, Notes on policy to be pursued by Pope Urban VIII. to Charles I. on his accession. Is to remind him of his letter of 29 June, 1623, to the late Pope, in which he expresses his desire for the restoration of Unity to Christendom, The Pope is advised to induce Louis XIII. to secure the expulsion of Buckingham, who wishes to marry his daughter to the Palatine's son, and will be a relentless foe to Henrietta Maria.

Egerton, 318, Consultas del Consejo de Estado tocantes à Italia, 1623; p. 4, The Prince of Wales objects because the Privy Councils of Scotland and Ireland, as well as the English Privy Council, will have to swear to the Marriage Articles; p. 75, Aug. 4, 1623, Discussion as to a Note from Lord Bristol asking Philip IV. to urge the Emperor and the Infanta Isabella to effect a settlement in Germany; pp. 76-77, 10 August, 1623, Discuss the Negotiations with Holland and Oñate's letter of 14 June, 1623, asking for instructions as to the Spanish claim to Alsace; p. 103, Congratulate the Emperor on the Victory of Stadtlohn; pp. 181-195, 18 September, Discussion as to the junction of the Spanish forces in Flanders with those of the Catholic League, f. 216, 22 Sept., No negotiations should be begun with Holland, "unless the former truce is approved of"; pp. 166, etc., 19 Sept., In consequence of what Inojosa writes as to the progress which is being made in England in carrying out the concessions to the Catholics, the marriage may take place sooner.

As to the affairs in connection with the sale of plunder from the East Indies in London; f. 98, 19 August, "Discussion of a report from the Council of Portugal as to the news from the East Indies, and of Inojosa's report of the steps which he has taken with the King of England with reference to the sale of the plunder from Ormuz, etc., in London."

Egerton, 335: Orders issued by Philip IV. in 1623 to the Presidents of the various Councils and the Chiefs of the Administration.

F. 228b, Pardo, 12 Jan., 1623, Portugal is to fit out a fleet to take reinforcements to the Indies in consequence of the Fall of Ormuz; f. 367b, Madrid, 27 April, 1623, Sends Juan de Ciriça the Report of the Council of Portugal as to the letters which the Prince and Buckingham have given for the English trading to the East Indies, and the expression of the belief of the Council that others should be given; p. 136, Report made by King Philip IV. to the Council of Castile as to the condition of his dominions six years after he had come into possession of them [1627], Explains the impossibility of breaking off the Marriage Negotiations with England except at the risk of a war; p. 382, "Orden que el Rey D. Felipe IV., sent to all his councils to discharge his conscience on 16 August, 1627," Confesses that he has done wrong in taking other people's property and in raising burdensome taxes, Rebukes the mal-administration of Justice and the Corruption of the Courts.

Egerton 338, f. 144, Ferdinand II. to Philip IV., Vienna, 1 May, 1624, Warns the King that the States of Holland have persuaded Louis XIII. to join with them, Mansfeldt, and Brunswick in attacking Spain and the Empire, Assures him of the support of himself and the Catholic League; f. 147, Ferdinand II. to Louis XIII., May, Begs him not to join with England against Spain.

Additional MSS. 25,689, ff. 9-161, "Historia de la Vida de Don Gaspar

de Guzman, Conde de Olivares, Privado del Rey don Phelipe 4° *escrito por el Conde de la Roca*. pp. 65 *et seqq.*, Philip 4 hears the news of the arrival of Charles at Madrid; p. 73, Olivares' speech to the Council on the advantages of the marriage, Olivares on Mary Stuart [was printed in 1659 as the "Fourth Part of the Miscellanies of Don Juan Antonio de Valencia Idiaquez Corregidor Perpetual de la Ciudad de Salamanca," dedicated to Philip IV.]

Egerton: 2,080, 1623, f. 251a *et seqq.*, Précis of Inojosa's and Carlos Coloma's despatches to Philip IV. from 16 July to 4 August, 1623. July 16, Buckingham has been bribed by the Dutch to make the marriage fail; July 17, Buckingham's object is to please the Puritans, James I. regrets he sent his son to Spain; July 24, The King is more favourably disposed to the Marriage now that he sees Spain is acting in good faith, The question of its consummation is most important; July 30, The Catholics are delighted at the steps which James I. has taken to make concessions to them, The English insist that the Infanta must come home with the Prince, Inojosa asks for instructions.

Additional 36,446, Aston Papers, Vol. III. [1622-1623], Correspondence of Sir W. Aston, p. 145, Inojosa to Aston, 22 Aug. 1623, James I. is carrying out his agreement for the relief of the Catholics; p. 226, London, 19 Nov., Congratulates him on the return of the Prince; p. 242, Aston to Inojosa 9 Dec., Hopes all will go well and that the marriage will not be wrecked in harbour, Aston to Buckingham, 27 Nov., 23 Dec., Explains their proceedings in deferring the Betrothal, Correspondence on the subject between Bristol and Cirica; p. 275, Aston to Prince of Wales, Nov. 29, Dec. 9, reports the steps he has taken in deferring the Betrothal; p. 141, Carleton to Aston, Hague, 31 July, 10 Aug. 1623, The Battle of Stadtlohn, The Correspondence between Philip IV., Charles, Prince of Wales, and the Infanta; p. 157, Charles to Condesa de Olivares, Madrid, 1-11 September, 1623, Thanks her for delivering a message from the Infanta.

Additional 36,447, Correspondence of Sir W. Aston, Vol. IV. [1624-1625] p. 11, Philip IV. to James I., 6 Jan., 1624, The Palatine's affairs; p. 4, Bristol to Philip IV., 10 Nov., 1622, Asks Philip IV. to compel the Emperor to restore the Palatine by force of arms, 12 Dec., Philip refuses; p. 9, Answer of Philip 4 to Bristol and Aston's 4th Note, 9 Dec., 1623, Lays particular stress on the intrigues of the Palatine with the Turks; p. 4, Terms proposed for the Palatine by Bristol on 1 Oct., 1623, f. 89, Aston to Charles, 5-15 June, 1624, Announces that the Marriage negotiations have been broken off; pp. 110-117, Narrative of Sir W. Aston's proceedings from 26 June, 6 July, 1623 to 12-22 July, 1624, July 12, 1623, Aston's interview with the Nuncio, July 16, The Prince tells Olivares he is leaving; pp. 112-113, July 17, The Prince proposes, July 18, The engagement is announced, Aug. 8, The dispute at the Play, Sept. 7, The Departure of the Prince; p. 116, The postponement of the Espousals; p. 89, June 5, 1624, The Infanta's jewels are returned.

Additional 36,449: Correspondence with Prince of Wales and Buckingham, 1623-1624.

Turin: Raccolta Mongardino [A collection of documents made in the Eighteenth Century, preserved in the Royal Archives.] Letter from Duke of Lorraine to his Agent at Rome, Nancy, November 10, 1606, asking the Pope, at James the First's request, conveyed to him through Lord Hay, to send Cardinal du Perron to England to discuss theological matters with him [Cf. *Nancy, "Chambre des Comptes de Lorraine. Series B. 1298. 1606, "Cte de la Hutterie's accounts."*]

In the same collection there are many papers, which were submitted to Pope Paul V., discussing the question whether the Pope had power to issue a Dispensation for a marriage between a Protestant and a Catholic, as one

was proposed between Prince Charles, and a sister of the Grand Duke of Tuscany. The Theologians held that such a power existed.

Inventario No. 94, Neg. d'Inghilterra, M. 1 [Anni 1281 in 1623], Minutes of Instructions from Charles Emmanuel to M. de Villa to go to England to arrange a marriage between Charles, Prince of Wales, and the Infanta Maria of Savoy. 2. To ask James I. to act as arbitrator as to his claims to Geneva, and in his disputes with Berne about Vaud, [No. 6, Materie Politiche, 1612-1613.] *Lettere Ministri, Spagna*, 18.

Tarantaise to Duke, Madrid, 1622, Jan. 11, Ferdinand II. is being pressed to marry the Dowager Duchess of Saxony, a sister of Anne of Denmark, who is about to become a Catholic, although most people think he will marry Leonora Gonzaga of Mantua, who is supported by Eggenberg; March 7, Suggests that the Duke's 4th son Prince Tommaso should marry, D. Maria, Olivares' only daughter [Prince Thomas was the ancestor of the present King of Italy]; May 26, The Minister of Genoa has told the King that the Republic has no money to advance him, and that if he wishes to raise it from private individuals, he must pay two or three per cent a month for it, as Charles V. used to do, as they can no longer advance money at 7½% for which they themselves have to pay far more; June 17, All the forces at Milan are to be sent to Flanders on account of the Dutch Raid into Brabant; July 20, The Spanish statesmen say that the Duke of Mantua is the greatest enemy Spain has. Hence their coolness as to helping the Emperor who has married his sister; Dec. 6, The King has just told the English Ambassador that if the Emperor will not give back the Palatinate to the Palatine, he will take up arms against him, Tarantaise had told Digby that the English Marriage depended upon the Pope, However, he knew that a push was being made in favour of the Emperor's son. Count Olivares seems inclined to the English marriage, Many of the English Embassy attend Mass, and some communicate, particularly a stepson of Digby's; Dec. 12, Aston had told him that the Marriage was settled, but that everything depended upon the Pope who seemed inclined to approve of it, The King and most of the English are neither Puritans nor Protestants, but "Politicians," who could be easily brought to agree to it, as there is no great difference between them and the Catholics; Dec. 31, News has arrived of the Capture of Ormuz by the Persians. 1623, Feb. 18, Polish Ambassador has arrived at Madrid, Bristol is very uneasy because he thinks he has come to make up a match between the Infanta Maria and the Prince of Poland, but the Ambassador told Tarantaise that this was not the case. The Emperor thought of giving the Prince his daughter, but she was a hideous hunchback; Duke of Savoy to Tarantaise, Turin, March 12, Says they have heard the Prince of Wales had left England for Madrid, Tarantaise to Duke, March 21, After giving an account of a Carnival procession at Court, says it is rumoured that the Prince of Wales has arrived at Madrid, In a letter of the same day Tarantaise gives a long account of his arrival, and reception by Philip IV.; March 28, The Polish Ambassador is much annoyed by the Prince's arrival, the Imperial Ambassador (Khevenhüller), is working against the match; March 31, April 6, Details of the visit, The Prince had come with Philip's approval [*Cf.* Calendar of State Papers, Venetian (1621-1623); pp. 482-483, Alvise Corner to Doge, Madrid, 23 October, 1622, for a good account of Charles, *Cf.* do.; pp. 452-453, Relation of England of Girolamo Lando, Sept. 21, 1622], April 12, April 18, Brother Zaccaria Boverio da Saluzzo had arrived on Holy Saturday [April 15], on a summons from the Nuncio sent by the Pope's express orders; April 23, He has been employed to draw up a Treatise as to the reasons for embracing the Catholic Religion, "as they have had a hint that when the Prince has been made to understand his errors clearly, he will

embrace it"; April 28, May 5, 13, 14 English behave disrespectfully in the Royal Chapel on the Day of the Exaltation of the Holy Cross [May 3]. Quarrel between Buckingham and the Nuncio. The Nuncio has not seen the Prince, but Zaccaria da Saluzzo undoubtedly has, although he will not confess it, Buckingham says James I. would gladly receive Catholic theologians, and told the Nuncio so; May 26, Zaccaria is very busy with his book; May 28, June 10, July 16 (sic), June 14, July 17, The Prince wishes to leave *re infectâ*, July 18, The Prince's engagement is announced to Tarantaise by Bristol; July 24, August 5, 8, The Prince of Wales was leaving on Sept. 8; Aug. 15, 24, It is thought the Marriage will soon take place; Sept. 12, The Prince left on the 9th, "not too well pleased," Zaccaria had presented the Prince with his book on Sept. 8, and the Prince approved of its title, "Consultatio Orthodoxa," Tarantaise thinks the Marriage is destined not to take place; Sept. 18, Philip IV. takes leave of the Prince, The jewels given by the Prince turned out to be of little value; Sept. 20, Gives an account of the reception of Zaccaria's book, and a description of its writer; Sept. 25, Zaccaria is leaving for Rome, and is to take Turin on his way; Oct. 20, Zaccaria returns to Madrid about March and is to go with the Infanta to England; Nov. 2, Great anxiety is felt because no news has arrived of the Prince's arrival in England; Dec. 6, The marriage is put off till Dec. 9; Dec. 18, Gives an account of the rupture of the Marriage owing to the King of England's demand for the restoration of the Palatinate; Dec. 23, The plan for the marriage seems dropped at Madrid. 1624, Jan. 15, Spain will work for the restoration of the Palatinate, *Turin: Roma*, 33 [Anni 1621 in 1624.]

Alessandro Scaglia to Duke, Rome, May 21, 1623.

Spaniards surprised that they have got the Dispensation so quickly, but Philip IV. will have to guarantee the observance of the terms; June 17, The Spaniards wish not to be placed under such an obligation; July 1, Most people at Rome think that the marriage will take place.

Brussels, E. et. G.

No. 132, op. cit., pp. 135-146, Account of the arrival of Charles, Prince of Wales, at Madrid [Printed in "Rubens, Diplomatico Español," by Cruzada Villamecil; pp. 21, et. seqq.], do.; p. 101, Van Male to Spinola, London, 15 April, 1623, Every one in London is delighted at the Prince's reception at Madrid, He has sent for his tilting armour; p. 179, Polyxena Spinola to Spinola, Madrid, 9 Feb., 1624, The marriage negotiations are broken off, Spinola to Mirabel, 25 May, 1623, Explains the advantages of the new harbour at Mardyck, do. to Van Male, 1 June, 1623, Is greatly annoyed that the Dutch have attacked the galleon "San Ambrosio" in Leith harbour, and regrets that some of the galleons have taken refuge in Aberdeen [Cf. *London, S.P.O.*, Foreign Series, Flanders, 1623, XVI. (176), News of the burning of the "St. Ambrose" (175), Complaint of the Master of the galleon "St. Ambrose" of Ostend, May 14, 1623.]

Turin, Raccolta Mongardino.

"Relatio Itineris Sermi, Principis Angliæ in Hispaniam."

Genoa, Spagna, Mazzo 24.

Serra to Doga, Madrid, March 22, 1623, The Prince of Wales' arrival.

Marco Battista Serra to Doge, Jan. 7, 1626, Juan de Ciriça, by Olivares' orders, explains to him the history of the English Marriage negotiations from the Spanish point of view.

Mantua, R. Archivio di Stato (Archivio Patrio Gonzaga), E. Esterni, No. XV., 3 Venezia.

Francesco Battuino, *Venezia* to Duke, 22 Oct., 1622, The Pope had told George Gage, the English Minister at Rome, that he was very sorry that James I. was now so hotly in favour of the heretics, Gage replied that the

Spaniards for all their pretended zeal for Religion courted the heretics when it suited their interests and used them to keep France in constant turmoil.

E. Esterni. XIV. 3, *Carteggio di Spagna* [1623-1625], Busta 616.

Marchese *Francesco Nerli* to Duke of Mantua.

Madrid: 1623, Jan. 1, The League of Lyons between France, Switzerland Savoy, and Venice, about the Valtelline, The taking of Ormuz will differ the Conclusion of the Marriage Negotiations with England for many months, as the part the English have played in taking Ormuz will have to be settled first; Feb. 17, The arrangements for the restitution of the Valtelline had been concluded that day, Olivares agreed to them to ingratiate himself with the Queen, who will not hear of a rupture with France; March 18, Arrival of Charles at Madrid; March 10, N.S., Marchese D. Giovanni Gonzaga to Duke, The arrival of the Prince of Wales; March 18, 19, 24, Nerli to Duke, Details of the Prince's Visit, Feria has been ordered to deposit the Valtelline in the hands of a Papal Commissary; May 16, Buckingham's quarrel with the Nuncio; June 30, The forts of the Valtelline have been deposited in the Pope's hands to Olivares' delight, "as he thought his influence at stake in this affair"; July 19, Announces the Prince's engagement; Aug. 24, Olivares receives the news of the election of the new Pope; Sept. 14, Gives the news of the Prince's departure, The quarrel between Buckingham and Olivares, The Prince's doctor, Sir K. Digby, said the Prince would never carry out his engagements, He would forget the Infanta directly he landed in England, Gives an account of the "Consultatio Orthodoxa," but says it has been held back from publication; Dec. 13, The postponement of the marriage, 1624; Jan. 25, The English ambassador still thinks the marriage possible, The restitution of the Bergstrasse to the Palatine is the greatest obstacle; April 24, Rumours of war between England, the Emperor, and Bavaria; July 4, The French Ambassador informs Philip IV. that England is negotiating for a marriage with a French princess; Aug. 1, It is said that the Prince of Poland is coming to Madrid to negotiate his marriage with the Infanta Maria; Dec. 31, Barcelona, Nerli was leaving for Italy by the galleys which have come from Genoa for the treasure from the Flota, but finally decided to return by land with the Papal Nuncio from Lisbon.

Do. E. XV. 3, 673, *Francia*, Busta 673 [1621-1625], *Guistiniano Priandi* to Duke, Paris.

As the Mantuan Court had no representative in London, most of the English news reached Mantua through Paris; Priandi was an intimate friend of Queen Marie de Medicis. 1623, March 9, Announces that the Prince of Wales had been at Court *incognito* on the previous Saturday, but had not been recognised; March 16, Doncaster had arrived to make James the First's excuses because the Prince had not come officially, The Spaniards expect to renew the Truce with the Dutch through the mediation of England; July 21, 29, Inojosa has succeeded in appeasing James I. annoyance at the delays in Spain; Sept. 15, The French Ambassador at Madrid announces that the Marriage negotiations are broken off; Oct. 5, The Prince pledged himself, before he left Spain, to marry the Infanta. 1624, Jan. 18, The Palatine and Buckingham the obstacles to the Spanish Marriage; Jan. 29, Recall of Bristol; Feb. 8, As the Anglo-Spanish negotiations seem on the point of being broken off, France has made overtures to England about Henrietta Maria; March 1, Lord Rich sent to Paris about the French Marriage; March 22, Rich's negotiations, The Anglo-Spanish negotiations will certainly be broken off; March 29, Padre Maestro is making a final effort in England on behalf of Spain with the Pope's support, but thinks he will arrive too late to do any good; April 12, James I. has

announced that the negotiations with Spain are broken off; May 10, England has made an offer to France for Henrietta Maria and for an alliance to recover the Palatinate; June 14, Spain had proposed a double Marriage between the Infanta of Spain and Monsieur, and Madame (Henrietta Maria), and D. Carlos to whom the Netherlands would be handed over, but it is thought that this is only a trick to stop the English Marriage, so the French have paid no attention to the offer. [Cf. Mantua, Spagna, 616, Striggi to Duke, Madrid, Feb. 4, 1624]; June 21, The English threaten to break off the Marriage negotiations unless France will join the League for the Palatine; June 29, This question and that of the concessions to the Catholics in England are making difficulties; July 27, The Prince will not come to Paris to be married; Sept. 8, Thanks to the efforts of the Queen Mother, the Prince and Henrietta Maria became engaged on the anniversary of the day on which he had left Spain in the previous year; Oct. 11, Details as to the negotiations for the dispensation: Oct. 19, England demands that France shall join in an offensive and defensive alliance in support of the Palatine before the Marriage Articles are signed, Spain is working hard for the Restitution of the Palatine and the renewal of the Marriage negotiations, The Prince and Buckingham will not hear of this; Nov. 23, The Marriage Articles signed, Buckingham is to come to Paris with full powers from the Prince for the marriage, which is now publicly announced. 1625, Feb. 7, Marriage postponed because the Pope had made some alterations in the Marriage Articles; April 15, Death of James I. known at Paris; May 7, Death of the Prince of Orange; May 16, Account of Henrietta Maria's marriage; August 8, France now takes little interest in the Palatine, May do something to please England.

Munich, Kgl. Bairisches Allgemeines Reichsarchiv., 30 Jährig-Krieg, A. 147
 1622: Papel que su Alta, La Infanta Da. Isabel mandó dar al Sr. Conde de Swartzenberg, Embajador del Emperador en Bruselas, etc., "Protests against the Transfer of the Electorate to Bavaria, as it will only lead to further trouble in Germany [Cf. *Munich, Kgl. Bäter Geh. Staats-Archiv. Kaste Schw. 377-48, "Spanien's Procedere gegen Båyern," do. 319-8, "Betreff, Acta Anglica 1623-4." 1623, "Memoire des Ambres du Roy de la Gr. Bret. du 29 Novembre (S. M. le Roi d'Esp.). 1624, Response au Roy de la Grande Bretagne, do. 5 Janvier. 1624, Cf. *All. Reichs, 30 jåhr., No. 232, do. 1629, 19 April, 1629, Instructions from the Electors of Mainz, Cologne, Treves, Maximilian of Bavaria, and the Bishops of Wurzburg and Bamberg, as Directors of the Catholic League to their Envoy to the Kaiser, Heidelberg, Contains the Resolutions come to at the Meeting of the League at Heidelberg to refuse help to the Infanta in Flanders.]**

Munich, Geh. St. Archiv., Kast. Schw. 292-4, Graf von Khevenhüller, "Berichte aus Madrid," 1620-1624, Khevenhüller to Maximilian. 19 Sept., 1622, Zuñiga told him he was sent by Philip IV. to say that H.M. would be guided by the advice of the Infanta Isabella, etc., even if they were against the Transfer of the Electorate, The King was offended because the Emperor had not consulted him as Head of the House of Austria beforehand on that subject, Fortunately a courier had arrived from the Emperor with a letter of 25 August announcing his plans, He had warned them against exchanging their alliance with the Emperor for one with England, The King and his Ministers would gladly see the Transfer carried out, but was afraid because Saxony, Mainz, Treves, and Neuburg were so much opposed to it, However this matters little as Philip IV. and Zuñiga are in favour of it; do. to do.; 25 Sept., Frankenberg had said that the Emperor had written to thank Philip IV. for having instructed his Ambassador to support the Transfer, The attitude of Spain would ensure that Maximilian would receive the Electorate, The King really approves of the Transfer and is encouraged in

this by Zuñiga, but must conceal his views on account of the English ; Oct. 7, to Eggenberg, Zuñiga's death will make a great change, His office has been given to Olivares who is a great partisan of England ; Oct. 10 to Maximilian, Spain will remain neutral in the question of the Transfer ; Nov. 10, Philip IV., thanks to Oñate, Isabella, Mainz, and Saxony is now against the Transfer ; Nov. 22, Maximilian to Khevenhüller, Hopes Spain will not ratify the Armistice with Mansfeldt to please England ; Dec. 10, Khevenhüller to Maximilian, Will try to get Spain to promote the Transfer. 1623, Feb. 19, The Nuncio had persuaded Olivares to support the Transfer, annotations on Olivares' Letter to the Nuncio, " Like Maurice and Charles V.", " Words, Words, Words " ; 20 March, Khevenhüller to Maximilian, Charles' arrival at Madrid ; 12 April, Thinks Prince's visit will be a failure, It will either punish Spain for her Pride or result in a miracle. He certainly came on an invitation secured by Gondomar and Bristol, Olivares already seemed disappointed at the outlook. [All the extracts up to Feb. 19, 1623, are the ciphered portions of Khevenhüller's despatches for this period.] Aug. 22, Khevenhüller to Maximilian, The English proposals of Aug. 22 as to the Marriage and the Palatine, Khevenhüller comments on them to Olivares, do. to do. ; September (?), Olivares explains to the Nuncio and Khevenhüller how he has cheated the English, do. to do. ; Sept. 12, Announces Charles' departure, His visit had led to no definite results as to either the Marriage or German affairs, Olivares had promised the Nuncio and Khevenhüller that, so long as Maximilian was alive, he would do nothing to secure the restoration of the Electorate to either the Palatine or his son, It would be a question for negotiation whether they should be allowed to administer the Palatinate, Spain would never abandon her alliance with the Emperor for the sake of the English Marriage, do. to do. ; Oct. 1, The Infanta and Spinola are anxious for a Truce with the Dutch, Philip IV. and Olivares are against it, The Nuncio and Khevenhüller are opposing it, so as to prevent the War being wholly thrown upon Germany ; 23 Dec., England demands Spain should declare war on the Emperor if he will not restore the Palatine, Spain, out of self-respect, cannot consent to this. 1624, 24 Jan., do. to do., England continues to press Spain to take up arms, Khevenhüller heard from Olivares that Spain would never separate from the Emperor to secure the English marriage, and, if England declared war on the Emperor, they would, so Khevenhüller heard, break off the Marriage negotiations, Olivares said Buckingham ruled everything in England, do. to do. ; 20 Feb. Tells Olivares he should consult Bavaria about all German affairs. He said she would be compensated for her war expenses, To restore the Palatinate to the Palatine would mean an endless war in Germany, do. to do. ; Aug. 19, The King had returned to the English Ambassadors all the jewels which Charles had given the Infanta, and all the letters which he had written to her, and which had not been opened.

Do. *Kast. Sch.* 319-8, " Betreff Acta Anglica, 1623-1624," op. cit.

1623 : " Advis de Monsr. de Plessen sur ce que le Roy de Bohême peut répondre aux lettres du Roy de la G. Br. du 20-30, Novembre. 1623. Rusdorff à M. Maurice, 16-26 Nov. ; do. to King of Bohemia, 22 Nov. 2 Dec. [In " Correspondenz Johann's von Rusdorff, Cohn. Leipzig. 1790 2 Bde. are the letters of Rusdorff to K. of Bohemia, " for the Mission of the Gentleman " autorisé Du Nonce du pape à Bruxelles," (della Rota), Vol. I., Letters XXX., XXXII., 30 Nov., 10 Dec., 18-28 Dec., written from London.] do. to K. of Bohemia, 17-27, Dec., 1623. 1624, Plessen to Rusdorff, Hague, 8-18 January ; All these letters relate to the negotiations for a marriage between the Palatine's eldest son and the Emperor's daughter, and to Rota's Mission to England Rusdorff to K. of Bohemia, 17-27 Feb. ; Rota

said the Spanish Ambassadors in London were annoyed that Maximilian and the Palatine should become reconciled without consulting them, Neuburg was only in the Spanish interest because he was obliged to be so, and, if the negotiations took another turn, would, Rota said, join the Palatine without any heed of the House of Austria.

Do. Kast. Schw., 319-8, Acta Anglica, op. cit.

1623, James I. to Christian IV. of Denmark, 12-22 Feb.; Opposes the Transfer of the Electorate to Bavaria, Rusdorff to K. of Bohemia, 5-15 Oct.; Announces Charles' return, The Infanta is sending D. Diego Mexia to England to treat for the restoration of the Palatinate, do. to do., 16-26 Oct.; The Prince had reached London that day, Rusdorff had learnt secretly that before he left Spain, the Prince had sent Clerk to instruct Bristol not to hand over the Proxy for the Marriage, even if the Papal Dispensation arrived, until further orders.

Do. Kaste Schwarz, 486-23, Betreff Briefe aus England, 1621-1635.

This contains the correspondence of Henrico Silsdonio of Liege and Watten, and Lorenzo Stefani of Rouen, Calais, and Paris with Maximilian, Henrico Silsdonio forwards letters of an unnamed correspondent in London.

The letters copied extend from 19 May, 1623, to 10 Sept., 1626, and deal chiefly with the Spanish Marriage, events at Court, and, incidentally with the Plague of London in 1625. The writer of these from London is almost certainly a Jesuit, who wrote from the House of the Society in St. John's, Clerkenwell. [Doley's "Records of the English Province S.J." Series XII., p. 569, contains a Biography of Dr. Silsdon, whose real name was Bedingfield, Cf. "Collectanea" and the Index sub. v. "Watten."] Doley is the best authority for the organisation of the Society in England during penal times. [Cf. Rev. J. Keating, 31 Farm Street, Berkeley Square, London, W. to the Writer, Oct. 14, 1912.]

THE PURITANS AND THE PALATINE AS SUCCESSOR TO THE ENGLISH THRONE.

Geh. St. Arch., K.S., 486-23, 1624, London, 6-16 February. Prince of Wales thinks King may abdicate in his favour and it was thought, (as James I. had no intention of doing so), that those who wished to ruin the Prince so that they might bring in the Palatine, were encouraging him in this belief.

BUCKINGHAM'S DAUGHTER AND THE PALATINE'S SON.

Munich, Geh. St. Arch. Kaste Schw., 486-23, Lorenzo Stefani to Elector, 29 Jan., 1624, Buckingham's object at present is to stand well with both the King and the Prince, but, if the latter were to die without children, he was quite willing to see the Palatine's son crowned, and would then marry him to one of his own relations, in order still to keep the sceptre in his own hands.

BELGIUM IN 1623.

Brussels, Etat et Guerre.

No. 189: Correspondance de l'Infante Isabelle avec Philippe IV., Tome XIV., Décembre, 1622 au Décembre, 1623, p. 62 Philip IV. to Infanta, Feb. 11, Lord Bristol asks that Frankenthal may be placed in the Infanta's hands on deposit, and restored to the Palatine if peace is not made with the Emperor within a year; p. 127, Infanta to Philip IV., May 11, Frankenthal has been handed over to her for 18 months, James I. fearing a loss of prestige had not signed the Suspension of Arms in Germany which had been arranged

for 17 months. The Dutch fleet has sailed for Pernambuco ; p. 145, do. to do., The Emperor has signed the Suspension of Arms and called a meeting of Princes at Frankfort to arrange for a General Peace ; p. 203, do. to do., Oct. 11, Tilly had followed Mansfeldt to Emden, but had fallen back through want of supplies, Mansfeldt would only surrender his positions to the Dutch ; p. 235, do. to do., Dec. 7, In accordance with Philip's instructions was trying to arrange for a marriage between the Palatine's eldest son and the Emperor's daughter, did not know what England wished.

PRINTED.

XII.—1624-1626—BREDa, GENOA, CADIZ, CORSICA.

Jones : "Dover," by *John Barrington Jones* [Dover, Dover Express Office, 1907, 1 Vol.], p. 173, Mansfeldt at Dover, 1624, Archcliffe Fort.

Rooses : Rubens op. cit., Vol. III., pp. 252, 309, 313, The Infanta and Rubens, Murder of the Duc de Croy. 1624 : Vol. IV., pp. 243-247, Spinola and the Duchess Dowager of Croy ; Vol. III., pp. 319-321, Spinola and Breda.

Riezler : Geschichte Bayerns op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 254-261, Buckingham and Bavaria, 1624 ; pp. 269-270, Mansfeldt and Breda.

Villa : "Ambrosio Spinola," op. cit., pp. 420-450.

Münch : Historisches Taschenbuch, Herausgegeben von Friedrich von Raumer, Neue Folge, Erster Jahrgang. [Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus, 1840], pp. 109-189 II., "Die Belagerung von Breda, in den Jahren 1624 und 1625 durch Ambrosio, Marquis von Spinola," von *Ernst Münch*, pp. 113-116, Description of Breda ; pp. 117-121, Garrison, Posts occupied by it ; pp. 121-138, Spanish operations ; pp. 138-149, Dutch attacks on Breda ; pp. 164-187, Last Phases of Siege, Mansfeldt.

Nugent : "The Grand Tour," op. cit., Vol. I., pp. 187-189, Breda.

Lefebvre : "Histoire de Calais," op. cit., Tome II., p. 496, Mansfeldt at Calais ; pp. 390-391, Henrietta Maria's Journey to England.

Reigersborch : Brieven, op. cit., pp. 12-14, The Siege of Breda, 21 Jan., 1625 ; Appendix III., p. 759, 31 Dec., 1624 ; Appendix VIII., pp. 794-795, 19 Nov., 1625 ; pp. 17-18, 18 Feb., 1625 ; pp. 21-24, 3 March ; p. 25, 11 March ; pp. 31-34, 18 March ; pp. 35-36, 25 March ; pp. 37-38, 14 April ; p. 40, 21 April ; pp. 42-44, 29 April ; p. 49, 2 June ; pp. 56-57, 24 June, Spaniards recapture Bahia ; p. 64, 24 August, Funeral of Prince Maurice ; pp. 65-66, 22 September ; p. 72, 5 October ; pp. 73-74, Relief of Nienburg.

Calderon : "El Sitio de Breda" by *Don Pedro Calderon de la Barca*. [No Place, Publisher, or Date.]

Le Mesurier : "Genoa, Her History as written in her buildings," Five Lectures by *E. A. Le Mesurier*. [Genoa, A. Donath, publisher, 1889, 1 Vol.], pp. 158-160, Charles Emmanuel I., Duke of Savoy, attacks Genoa, 1625.

Khevenhüller op. cit., Part X., p. 1,015, Spain and the Sea Power of the Hapsburgs, 1625, do. ; p. 1,314, Schwarzenberg at Brussels, 1626, Part X., p. 957, Views of a Member of the Council of Ten about Genoa, 1625 ; p. 1,035 The Flota of 1625.

Glanville : "The Voyage to Cadiz in 1625," being a journal written by

John Glanville [London, Camden Society, 1883, 1 Vol.], pp. 33-35, Council of War, Thursday, Oct. 20, 1625, Occupation of Gibraltar proposed by Capt. Henry Bruce.

Corbett: "England in the Mediterranean, 1607-1713," 2 Vols. [London, Longmans, Green and Co., 190] by *Sir Julian S. Corbett*, Vol. I., pp. 154-159, Account of Bruce's proposals as to seizing Gibraltar, 1625.

Staley: "Heroines of Genoa," etc., op. cit., pp. 222-224, Genoa dedicated to the Blessed Virgin, March 25, 1626.

Birch: Life of James I., etc., op. cit., Vol. I., pp. 487-490, Mansfeldt's levies in England.

Varese: "Storia di Genova fin'all' 1814." [Genova, 1836, 6 Vols.] by *Carlo Varese*, Sub anno 1624, Note on Zuccarello.

Goetz: "Die Politik Maximilian I. u.s.w." op. cit., pp. 629-630.

Braun und Hogenburg: "Civitates Orbis Terrarum," op. cit., Vols. 6. Vol. I., p. 2, "Cadiz"; Vol. V., pp. 5-6, "The Tunny Fisheries."

Morre, "Guide to the Old Church at Delft," by Dr. G. Morre. [Delft, Koumans, 1907], 1 Vol., p. 11, The Monument of Anna van Marnix, Lady Morgan.

Royal Historical MSS. Commission Reports: Earl Cowper, Vol. I. [The Coke Papers], Marquis of Bath, Vol. II., pp. 44-47, 1596, July 8; Lord High Admiral to Burghley, Description of Cadiz, House of Lords, Third Report, pp. 33-34, Mansfeldt's Levies, House of Lords, Fourth Report; pp. 2-3, Mansfeldt's levies; Reading, p. 3, Press for men for Mansfeldt and Cadiz. Southwell Cathedral, pp. 547-548, Song on Mansfeldt's Volunteers; Ipswich, p. 255, Ships for Cadiz, 1596; Great Yarmouth, p. 319, Press for Cadiz, 1625, The Dunkirkers, 1625; Rye, p. 172, Duke of Croy's Murder, 1624; County of Wilts., pp. 95-96, 1625, Pensions to men pressed for Mansfeldt's expedition; Rochester, p. 164, 1625, Oyster brood destroyed by cold; *Calendar of State Papers, For. Venetian*, Vol. XX., 1626-1628 p. 552; 1628, Jan. 8, To the Baile at Constantinople, a plan for capturing Gibraltar.

Corbett: "Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816," Edited, with elucidations from Contemporary authorities by *Julian S. Corbett*, L.L.D. [Printed for the Navy Records Society, 1908]. Part III., Carolingian, I. Viscount Wimbledon, 1625; II., The Earl of Lindsey, 1635, pp. 50-52; The Fighting Order; pp. 63-72, Sir Thomas Love's Instructions, 1625; p. 73, Captain N. Boteler in his "Dialogue on the Ordering of Fleets," praises them.

Bassompierre: "Journal de ma Vie," Mémoires du Maréchal de Bassompierre, par le *Ms. de Cantenac*. [Paris, Lib. Renouard, 1875, Tomes 4], Vol. III., p. 178, Agreements with Savoy and Spain, 1623; pp. 205-210, France and the Savoy-Genoa War, 1625; pp. 254-282, Bassompierre's Mission to England, 1626; Lord Mayor's Day, Fête at York House.

Kemp: "Maurits van Nassau," op. cit., Fourth Part, pp. 159-160, Campaign of 1624; pp. 160-164, The Siege of Breda, 1624-1625; pp. 164-169, Illness and Death of Maurice, 23 August, 1625.

Herm, Hugo, Soc. Jesu, "Obsidio Bredana, armis Philippi IV., auspiciis Isabellæ, ductu Ambrosii Spinolæ perfecta, Antwerpiae, 1626," fol. quoted largely by *Ernst Münch ut supra*, Mentioned in Rubens' Correspondence.

USE OF SUBMARINES IN 1624.

Osborn: "Morning Post," Thursday, London, 31 July, 1914, p. 11, "Logs," by *E. H. Osborn*, A paper on the Inventions of Napier of Merchiston.

MANUSCRIPTS.

XII.—1624-1626, BREDA, GENOA, CADIZ, CORSICA.

Brussels: Etat et Guerre.

No. 190: Isabella to Philip IV., Tome XV., Janvier-Juin, 1624, p. 31, Philip IV. to Isabella, Feb. 6, 1624, Orange offers to treat for a Suspension of arms for six months, She is to negotiate, do. to do., Feb. 24, Is to ask James I. and the Palatine to send envoys to Brussels to treat for a settlement of the Palatine's affairs; p. 91, Infanta to Philip IV., March 14, James I. will join Sweden, Denmark, etc. if Philip IV. disregards the rights of the Palatine's sons to please Bavaria, but as Emperor has transferred the Electorate to Maximilian they must recognise him as Elector, Will do her best to arrange a truce but the Dutch will make difficulties, Mme. de T'Serclaes has brought a letter from Don Manuel of Portugal to Pecquius to say that the Dutch would renew the Truce of 1609 as it stood, Philip IV. to Infanta, March 18, France had sent a Minister to Bavaria, Emperor must send the Infanta powers to treat for a General Peace, do. April 16, Inojosa said James I. wished to declare war on Spain, Infanta to Philip IV., Bavaria was so suspicious of her intentions that the Emperor had not yet sent her the Powers, Tilly wished the Imperial Army to unite with Spain, drive the Dutch from Emden, and attack the Provinces from that side. Philip IV., as he cannot satisfy England except by restoring the Palatine, should throw James I. over, and come to terms with Bavaria, whom the Emperor dare not offend, April 17, do. to do., Sends him a plan for attacking the Dutch East Indies, April 19, Philip IV. to Infanta, Mme de T'Serclaes gave no new reason for reopening negotiations on the basis of the Truce of 1609, but he would negotiate for a Truce if the Dutch would reopen the Scheldt, April 22, do. to do., She must send Spinola to defend the Palatinate, and strengthen Irish regiments for an invasion of England, May 17, Infanta to Philip IV., Dutch will only treat for renewing the Truce of 1609, May 24, Philip IV. to Infanta, Leaves Infanta a free hand to deal with England, May 30, do. to do., Bavaria's claims must be settled by the Diet at Cologne, Isabella is to take no notice of Tilly's offers without referring to the Emperor, June 18.

No. 191: Isabella to Philip IV., Tome XVI., Juillet—Novembre, 1624. Philip IV. to Infanta, English spies engaged by Inojosa must be paid regularly, July 3 [Cf. No. 190, Philip IV. to Inojosa, April 16, 1624]. Infanta to Philip IV. will try to arrange Truce on basis of reopening Scheldt, July 13, do. to do., Mme. de T'Serclaes writes that this cannot be done, July 13, do. to do., Spinola is near Breda, July 29, Philip IV. to Infanta, She is to see a person who has come from a meeting of the Irish Clergy, where the Liberty of Ireland was discussed, Van Male is to keep in touch with Ireland, July 30, do. to do., Infanta is not to negotiate again with the Dutch unless they make the first advance, Aug. 10, do. to do., The Dutch have occupied Bahia, Aug. 17, Infanta to Philip IV., In answer to his letter of Aug. 10, can only tell him the plain truth that the war will last for ever, as every enemy of Spain is using the Dutch against her, and this will lead to disaster, if Philip IV. does not take more energetic measures to defend himself, Announces that Spinola has laid siege to Breda, Sept. 12, Philip IV. to Infanta, Having seen paper brought by "the Catholic" [Jean Brant] allows her to open negotiations for a six months' suspension of hostilities, Oct. 11, Infanta to Philip IV., Is going to restore Frankenthal to the Palatine despite the protests of Bavaria, The enemy had failed to surprise the Citadel of Antwerp or to raise the siege of Breda, Oct. 24, do. to do., News of Siege of Breda, Oct. 27, Philip IV. to Infanta, Thinks Siege of Breda inadvisable as it will be long and costly, Cannot increase his

remittances, Oct. 31, Infanta to Philip IV., England is allowing Earnest de Mansfeldt to raise twelve thousand men to relieve Breda, Nov. 24,

Do. *E. et de l'Audience*, No. 629, Correspondence Historique, 1624, Newsletter from the Hague, The Plague, Aug. 10; Newsletters from Amsterdam, The taking of Bahia, Aug. 26; Aubert le Mires, Dean of Antwerp, to Secretary de la Faille, The second attempt to surprise Antwerp, Nov. 16; List of Spies at Antwerp, Infanta to Tilly, Brussels, Gives him news of Mansfeldt's levies in England [Printed in "*La Correspondance de Tilly*," par le Cte. d. Villermont, Tome II., p. 310], To M. de Guernoval, Brussels, Dutch building ships at Rotterdam to bring Mansfeldt's troops from Calais, Dec. 9; Secretary de la Faille to M. de Soavastre, Hopes Breda will fall in a month, Mansfeldt unpopular in England, Dec. 16.

Do. *E. et G.*, No. 132, op. cit., 1624, D. Fernando Giron to Spinola, Has suggested a marriage between Polyxena Spinola and the Duke of Feria, 24 Jan.; Polyxena Spinola to Spinola, Philip IV.'s journey to the South of Spain, 9 Feb.; Francisco Crespo to Spinola, Account of Martyrdom of Father Carlos Espinola in Japan, 2 July [For "*Martyrs of Japan*," Cf. *Times*' "*Historians' History of the World*, Vol. xxiv., pp. 596-597.]

Wolfgang Wilhelm, Duke of Neuburg to Spinola, Asks him not to overburden his states with quarterings, Aug. 27; Charles Alexander, Duc de Croy to Spinola, Brussels, Congratulates him on his successes near Breda, Sept. 1; Olivares to Spinola, Madrid, Announces his daughter's marriage with the Marques de Elche, Oct. 10. 1625, Burneau to Spinola, London, James I's illness, April 4; Van Male to Spinola, London, Charles I's accession, The English fear of Dunkirk, April 19; do. to do., Funeral of James I., Object of English naval preparations unknown, Buckingham's enquiries as to Corsica, which the Genoese have reinforced, He goes in command of the fleet. [Cf. *Turin, Inv.* No. 93, Mat. Pol. *Negoziations con Genova* (Anni 1383 in 1633), Mazzo 10, No. 12, "*L'Impresa di Genova, 1624*." Cf. p. xli. *infra*], May 16; Bruneau to Spinola, Chelsea, Buckingham has given Gondomar's gentleman a friendly reception at Oxford, Progress of the Plague in London, Aug. 15.

No. 192: Infanta and Philip IV., Tome XVII. [Décembre, 1624—Mars., 1625], Infanta to Philip IV., News of Mansfeldt's preparations, Dec. 7, 1624; Philip IV. to Infanta, Hears Mansfeldt's levies intended to relieve Breda, Leaves her free to continue the siege or raise it, Déc. 24, 1624; Infanta to Philip IV., Impossible to effect a settlement in Germany without an arrangement with the Palatine, Jan. 12; Philip IV. to Infanta, She is to hand over Frankenthal to James I. without considering Bavaria, Jan. 20; Infanta to Philip IV., Mansfeldt has landed in Brabant, March 11; Philip IV. to Infanta, Must try and get James I. and the Palatine to proclaim a Suspension of Hostilities in Germany on their own account, James I. thought the Valtelline and the Palatinate might be exchanged, March 30.

No. 193, do., Isabella and Philip IV., Tome XVIII., Avril au Décembre, 1625; Infanta to Philip IV., Everything in Germany depends upon the Palatine and the Duke of Bavaria, Spain cannot remain neutral, as she would lose too much if the Catholics were worsted, May 10; Philip IV. to Infanta, Encloses a paper showing how the Belgians are being alienated by Over-taxation, Requisitions, and the disorders committed by the soldiery, May 25; Infanta to Philip IV., Sends an account of the Surrender of Breda, June 9 [Cf. Philip IV. to Infanta, May 31, showing his great anxiety at the news that the enemy were trying to raise the Siege], Philip IV. to Infanta, Announces the Surrender of Bahia to Don Fadrique de Toledo, Says that Mme. de T'Serclaes has been talking too much in Holland, as to the part which she has played in the negotiations, July 11; Infanta to

Philip IV., The successes at Breda and Bahia will incline the Dutch to a Truce, Aug. 6; Philip IV. to Infanta sends plans for the Invasion of England, Sept. 11, 19; do. to do., gives news of the English fleet Oct. 24; Infanta to Philip IV., Criticizes his plans for the Invasion of England and Ireland adversely, Nov. 5; Philip IV. to Infanta, Sends news of the English attack on Cadiz [enclosing letter of Nov. 5 from Jerez], Nov. 7, 11; Infanta to Philip IV., Observations on these letters and on the invasion of England, Dec. 5; do., No. 488, op. cit., Brizuela to Arguello, Madrid, The English attack on Cadiz, Nov. 6; do. to do., The arrival of the Silver Fleet, Dec. 3.

London, *British Museum, Manuscript Department*: Harl., 3,822, op. cit., "Corographia de las Españas," by Don Diego de Cuelbis, ff. 408-416, Description of Cadiz [1599].

Reg. 14, a.iii., "Discurso de Cadiz, 1592."

Add. MSS., 25,689 op. cit., "Vida del Conde de Olivares, etc.," by Count Roca, ff. 89-90, The Attack on Cadiz, 1625.

Dublin, *Trinity College, Library, MSS. Department*.

No. 806: *Miscellanea*, "The Earl of Essex's Voyage to Calles," ff. 346 et seqq., Anonymous. do. ff. 342 et seqq., "Abstract of matters treated of at the Electoral Day at Mulhausen," 1625.

No. 861: *Miscellanea*, Lord Wimbledon's answer to the Charges brought against him at the Council by the Earl of Essex and nine other Colonels as to the Cadiz Expedition, those signing the Charge being Ro. Essex, Hen. Valentia, Thomas Cromwell, Chas. Rich, Ed. Conway, Mich. Gere, Ed. Harwood, Jo. Bunch, Jo. Watts, Jo. Chudleigh, Wimbledon throws the blame upon the Colonels and upon the want of supplies.

Do., No. 959, *Miscellanea*, ff. 293-307, *Relacion de lo sucedido á Don Fadrique en el Brasil: es de relacion de los que por Mdo. de Su Magd. se imbiaron á D. Tomas Tamaio su Chronista p. la Hista.* f. 307, gives an account of his preparations to relieve Cadiz, but he suspended his preparations on learning of the departure of the English, He had put into Malaga on his return from Bahia.

Brussels, *E. et G.*, No. 301: *Correspondance de l'Infanta Isabella avec Olivares [1621-1625]* op. cit. 1624, Feb. 24, Olivares to Infanta, Encloses her a paper suggesting that Spain should make friends with the petty princes of North Germany instead of with France and England, The Catholics are devoted to the Emperor, the Protestants would welcome Spanish protection against Denmark, She could use their territories as a base for attacking Holland by the Zuyder Zee and through Friesland.

Genoa, *R. Archivio di Stato*.

Lettere Ministri, No. 2,433, *Spagna*, Mazzo 24 [Anni 1623 in 1627.]

Marco Battista Serra, Madrid, to Doge, 1625, May 31, Serra explains the reasons why he thinks the English Fleet will attack Genoa; July 1, explains that the French cannot attack Genoa by land, now that Spinola's forces have been set free by the fall of Breda. How the English fleet will be hampered by the Genoese galleys if they advance up the Gulf; Aug. 22, The junction of Toledo's fleet from Bahia with the fleet in Spanish harbours will prevent the English from entering the Mediterranean, The Fall of Breda, Cf. June 16, July 1, The letters on the English Expedition to Cadiz are those from Nov. 6 to Dec. 3, 1625, The letters from Juan de Ciriça to Philip IV.; May 20 and from Philip IV. to Juan de Ciriça; May 3, deal with the help given by Spain to Genoa.

Do. *Litterarum Registri*, No. 1889 [Anni 1621-1625, Johannis Baptæ, Panesii, Secrii], Letters from the Senate of Genoa to Serra.

1625, Senate to Serra, May 3; June 12, Tuscan naval preparations, Guise's fleet at Marseilles; June 18, English and Dutch fleets to sail in

July ; Sept. 12, Sending reinforcements to Corsica [*Cf. Brussels, E. et G.*, No. 132, op. cit., Van Male to Spinola, April 19, 1625]. Oct. 11, English fleet has sailed, It is believed that one division will attack the Gulf of Spezzia, after having secured a harbour in Corsica as a base ; Oct. 18, The harbours of the Riviera, especially Spezzia, are to be placed in a state of defence.

Do. Lit. Reg., 1892 [John Baptistæ Panesii, *Cancrui Anni 1625-1629*] Oct. 31 ; The Venetians are raising Turkish troops for Savoy, The English fleet has sailed, Bruneau sends particulars, Nov. 20 ; Al Rmo. Padre Presidente della Congregatne Casinense, The Senate wish to obtain for Genoa an arm of their patron St. Bernard, which is preserved in the Church of San Niccolo di Siluara, Senate to Serra, Genoa, 3, 9 December; acknowledge his despatches about the attack on Cadiz, and ask for news of the Flota, Jan. 28, 1626 ; Have heard the English fleet have returned to England, Feb. 6 ; *Regi Hispaniarum*, Thank him for having let Serra see the papers about the English Marriage [*Cf. Spagna, Mazzo 24, op. cit.*, Serra, Madrid, to Doge, 7 January, 1626.]

Do. Registrum Litterarum Corsicæ, No. 439 [Anni 1623-1625], 1625, Doge to Governor of Corsica, Genoa ; July 31, Special services in honour of St. Bernard are to be held throughout the Genoese dominions on his Saints' Day, Aug. 20 ; Aug. 1, do. to do., Result of the inspection of the coast defences of Corsica, the Martello Towers ; Aug. 22, On account of the prospects of a failure of the vintage in the Genovesato, Corsican wine is only to be exported to Genoa ; Oct. 3, Gallies sent from Genoa must be sent back to defend the Riviera from French privateers.

Do. Lettere Ministri, No. 2,543, Vienna, Mazzo 26 [Anni 1623 in 1627], *Celio Levanto*, Vienna to the Senate, 1625, "Presents made at the Imperial Court at Christmas, 1625," vary from 10 ducats to Prince Eggenberg's Secretary to 1 ducat to the Porter at the First Door, Total 35 ducats ; Jan. 25, No alarm is felt thanks to the hope of help from Spain either at the attitude of England or the preparations of Mansfeldt ; Feb. 18, March 8, The negotiations for peace with Turkey ; March 26, An envoy from Bethlen Gabor at Vienna professing friendship for the Emperor, This is thought a trick, as he is giving the same assurance at Constantinople, Ferdinand II. has ordered that every burgher of Vienna, who is a heretic, must turn Catholic within four months or leave the city, The policy thought risky ; April 5, A Walloon Engineer had got drunk, and had explained how the Porta di San Tomaso at Genoa, the Western gate of the City, which commanded the road to Turin, could be blown up by treachery.

THE SPANISH GOVERNMENT AND THE ARMADA OF 1588.

Lettere Ministri, 2,419, *Spagna, Mazzo*, 10 [Anni 1588 in 1593], Ettore Picameglio to Senate, Madrid, Dec. 20, Dec. 24, 1588, Medina Sidonia is to command another expedition against England in the following year.

Turin : *Lettere Ministri, Spagna, Mazzo 18, op. cit.*, 1624, *Tarantaise to Duke*, Madrid, Feb. 2, Philip IV., Journey to the South of Spain to try and induce the Andalusian Procurators to the Cortes to consent to the new taxes. A marriage between the Prince of Wales and Henrietta Maria of France is talked of, Buckingham is abusing Spain and Olivares everywhere, especially because Philip IV. did not ask the Prince to dine at his table ; April 7, Philip IV. was insulted by the mob at Seville, The English marriage seems forgotten at Madrid ; April 17, The Andalusians have refused to increase their grant of money ; June 28, The galleons from new Spain bring bullion and cargo worth 12,144,203 ducats, The Spanish navy was in a worse state than it had been in Philip III's time, The Dutch preparing to attack Brazil, from which the King draws 350,000 ducats from the duties on Sugar

alone ; Aug. 15, The news of the Taking of Brazil has greatly annoyed the King ; Sept. 7, A fleet fitting out to recover Brazil, Spain has refused to make any arrangements with Denmark for exchanging Danish fish for Spanish wool and other produce, as they say the Danes befriend the Dutch ; Sept. 26, Better news from Brazil, Breda is besieged ; Oct. 26, Tarantaise praises the Duke of Neuburg who was visiting Madrid, The expense of bringing horses from Cordova to Turin ; Nov. 28, They have refused to give Neuburg back his fortresses, Cleves, Juliers, etc., as he would only lose them at once. 1625, Feb. 25, Philip IV. has made Neuburg Governor of Wesel for life ; March 6, Distress at Madrid owing to the hard winter, Cost of Tarantaise's household 6,000 ducatoons a year his necessary expenses, His income under 3,900 ducatoons ; April 7, Spain threatened that if Savoy moved a man against Lombardy they would send all their galleys to Villafraanca, and they were trying to buy over the Governor of Nice, Tarantaise suggests that, if the Duke could get M. de Lesdiguières' consent, he might get his army to proclaim him King, There had been a " King of the Allobroges," or " King of the Cottian Alps " in Cæsar's time, and the title of " King of Cyprus " had been held in the family, This would be a far better way than by obtaining the Royal title through a grant from the Pope or the Emperor ; May 4, James I. death is much felt by the Spanish Court as Charles I. is so warlike and so hostile to Spain, A large English fleet is being fitted out ; July 20, The news of the Surrender of Breda reached Madrid on June 14, The rejoicings in the City, A letter from the Infanta Isabella dated from inside Breda on June 25, The news of the Recovery of Brazil arrived on July 5 ; July 30, It is thought that the English Fleet, " which has caused so much anxiety," will not sail ; Sept. 30, Rumours are rife that the English Fleet has sailed, but the coasts of Spain are well fortified, Ceuta is said to be threatened by the English and the Dutch, but has been reinforced ; Nov. 12, The Expedition to Cadiz ; Dec. 25, The arrival of the Flota, The burial of Prince Philibert of Savoy, Tarantaise visits the burial vaults in the Escorial, The coffins of Charles V and Philip II., Many English vessels took refuge in Saltee and have been repaired there. 1626, Jan. 28, March 29, The Financial straits of Spain ; Aug. 30, Loans from Genoese and Portuguese ; Oct. 8, The Infanta Maria married to the King of Hungary, but the marriage is not to be consummated until he has been elected King of the Romans, The Emperor wishes the Empire to be made hereditary, but this the Electors will scarcely agree to, Gondomar dies of the Plague near Burgos on his way back from Flanders ; June 23, Oct. 8, 12, Nov. 12, The negotiations for Peace between Savoy and Genoa, Spain wishes to bring it about, for they can never allow Genoa to be occupied by a foreign prince [Eventually Savoy sold Zuccarello, the ostensible cause of the war, to Genoa], The Pope and Olivares will not allow the Duke to take the title of King of Cyprus in the Treaty. Spain can always find money for her wars through the Genoese Merchants ; Dec. 25, The arrival of the " Flota " with 17,000,000 Pesos or Pieces of Eight, say £3,400,000.

Do. *Inghilterra*, Mazzo 4 [Anni 1621 in 1629], Secretary Barozzi to Duke, Salisbury, Oct. 20, 1625, The English Fleet was said to have returned to Port, on hearing that the ships at Dunkirk had come out and attacked the Dutch Blockading Fleet, Had he arrived before the Fleet sailed, Buckingham said they would gladly have assisted Savoy by the loan of some vessels or in some other way, Gives an account of his journey to England and of his interview with the King and Queen, Buckingham and Barozzi discussed the plans for attacking Genoa, but Buckingham said it would be difficult for them to find ships as they had to guard the English Ports and to keep up the blockade of Dunkirk ; Oct. 22, He found that the English Fleet had no settled plan of campaign but only meant to attack the Spaniards, He had

seen the French ambassadors, whom he had told that he found people in France anxious to come to terms with the Huguenots and Rochelle. The ambassador was not friendly with Buckingham, who refused to make the concessions to the English Catholics, which France asked as her price for assisting Denmark and Sweden. Buckingham thought only of obliging the Queen of Bohemia and of gaining the favour of the English Parliament by this means; Oct. 23, Carlisle said want of money made him hesitate to send an English fleet against Genoa. Had France declared war on Spain and joined with Savoy in asking for naval help, the Venetian Ambassador said that the English fleet would at once have been sent into the Mediterranean, 100,000 foot had been enrolled in England to resist an invasion and all the beacons had been put in order; Oct. 25, The King had told the Venetian Ambassador that he had certainly promised the ships to the Prince of Piedmont, and, but for his necessities, would have sent them. As it was, his fleet was going to strike a blow for the common cause; Oct. 29, He had been definitely told that for the reasons already given England could not help Savoy with ships or money but hoped to do so later on. All the Lords he had dealt with were Buckingham's creatures; Oct. 31, The fleet at Dunkirk was said to have got out to sea. He was crossing by Dover and Boulogne in place of by Dieppe to escape the risk of being attacked by privateers. Duke of Savoy to Abate Scaglia; Dec. 15, Hears from His Comptroller of Finances at Nice that the English Fleet is coming into the Mediterranean.

Do., No. 11: *Materie Politiche*, 1626: "Proposals from Savoy to England to continue the war against Spain, although it has made peace with France, drawn up by Secretary Baroccio, and a request for ships from England for an expedition against a place not named, which is believed to be Genoa. Instructions to Abate Scaglia on the same subject." A summary of this paper is headed "Relatne. del negotiato del Segro. Baroccio in Ingha." A paper enclosed with it is "Demandes faictes par Mons. l'Ambassadeur. Abbe, de Scaglia pour les vaisseaux que S. Altesse desire de S. Mté. pour s'en servir à l'entreprise a elle declarée." As the first paper speaks of the dissolution of Parliament on account of the proposal to impeach Buckingham, which took place on 28 June, 1626, it may date from July, 1626 [The plan proposed is not altogether unlike that alluded to in *Genoa*. Lit. Reg., 1889, Senate to Serra, Oct. 11, 1625, let. cit.] do No. 12, "Instruzione del Principe di Piemonte Vittorio Amadeo, datata in Parigi, al Marchese di S. Maurizio, per portarsi alla Corte d'Inghilterra, sollecitarvi la spedizione de Vascelli già concertata coll' Ambasciatore Scaglia, e render conto a S. M. Britannica dell' oggetto e successo del Viaggio di do, Principe in Francia." Paris, 1 March, 1626, St. Maurice is to negotiate with Buckingham, Carlisle, and Conway, and explain how advantageous a diversion in the Mediterranean will be if England means to attack the Atlantic coast of Spain and is to thank Buckingham for having sent Montagu to see him. As Conway is father-in-law of Wake the English Minister at Turin, he is to say how much the Duke of Savoy values him. He is to tell Mme. de St. Georges, Queen Henrietta Maria's confidante, that the Prince is supporting her interests in Piedmont.

THE PROJECTS FOR AN ATTACK ON CORSICA.

Do. Inventario No. 93, *Materie Politiche*, *Negoziazioni con Genova* (Anni 1383 in 1633), Mazzo 10., No. 12, "*L'Impresa di Genova*, 1624." This includes six papers, and was probably compiled for the Prince of Piedmont before his visit to England in June, 1625.

1 "Notes on the Genoa and Corsica Expedition," addressed to H.R.H., points out that if eight thousand infantry were sent to attack Corsica, they

would conquer the island easily and be hailed as liberators by the inhabitants, Calvi should be attacked in the first instance as it is the nearest port to Villafranca, The Duke might take the title of King of Corsica.

2 *Giovanni Sebastiano Marini*, a Corsican, gives an account of the wrongs inflicted by Genoa upon Corsica, Heavy taxation, Arbitrary imprisonment, the maladministration of Justice, and the non-observance by Genoa of the terms made with the Corsicans after the suppression of Sampiero's rebellion in 1567.

3 Notes as to getting up a rising in Genoa in favour of Savoy without Savoy appearing openly in the matter.

4 A description by an Engineer of the various fortifications, The Genoese had only 24 gallees.

5 A letter from the Citizens of Genoa asking the King of France and the Duke of Savoy to free them by forcing the Senate to admit ten plebeian families chosen by ballot every year, etc.

Amongst the various noble families in Corsica mentioned in these papers are the Counts of Lenaca and Cinarca, the La Roccas, Istrias, and Ornanos, but the Bonapartes are not mentioned, although the Bacciocchis are in one of 1625.

These papers are probably those seen by Buckingham [*Cf.* Brussels, op. cit., Van Male to Spinola, May 16, 1625], A Franciscan monk, whose name is not given, drew the notes up, The bearer of them was coming to Turin on the pretext of a pilgrimage to the Santo Sudario [the Holy Shroud, in which Our Saviour was laid], and did not know the contents.

[Captain Giovanni Bacchioeccho is mentioned as the commander of a company of train bands in Ajaccio in *Genoa* Registrum Litterarum Corsicæ, No. 439, op. cit., Doge to the Governor of Corsica, Genoa, 3 October, 1625.] *Cf.* Brussels, *Etat et Guerre*, No. 194, Philip IV. to Infanta Isabella, 12 February, 1626.

London, S.P.O.: Foreign Series, Savoy, No. 11 [Aug., 1624—1625], p. 5, 1625, May: "Proposition of the Savoyard Ambassador in Paris to Charles I. on the occasion of his marriage to send his fleet to join Savoy and Guise in attacking Genoa," Scaglia was the writer, He points out that Genoa was the mainstay of the power of Spain and Austria, and was far more important to them than Mexico, Peru, and the Indies [*Cf.* do., 1624, Nov. 8, Wake to Conway, Turin, Brussels, *E. et G.*, No. 194, Philip IV. to Infanta Isabella, 12 Feb., 1626.]

London, British Museum, Manuscript Department, Additional MSS. 34,310, 34,311, Letterbooks of Sir Isaac Wake, Vol. I., 1624-1625.

THE SAVOY-GENOA WAR, A.D. 1625.

Wake to Conway, Turin, 14 June, 1624, N.S., Arrived on June 2, and had explained to the Duke the policy pursued by James I. for recovering the Palatinate with the aid of France, in which the Duke encouraged him to persevere, Explains the difficulties which are likely to arise as to the Mantuan Succession and as to Zuccarello. [The latter was to prove the cause of the Savoy-Genoa War]; Oct. 28, At the Conference at Susa on Oct. 18, at which the Duke, Wake, Lesdiguières, and the Venetian Ambassador, Sig. Lorenzo Paruta, were present, it was decided that the object of the League should be the recovery of the Grisons and Valtelline from Spain, and to prevent Archduke Leopold and Tilly from seizing the Rhetian Alps; Nov. 9 Sends Conway the proposals of Savoy through Lesdiguières' gentleman M. de Valois, These include the loan by England to Savoy of merchant ships to attack Genoa, This latter plan was reported verbally by de Valois; Dec. 12, The Pope has threatened the Duke of Savoy through Zaccaria da Saluzzo that if he does not withdraw from the League for the Recovery

of the Grisons he will declare him the "Troubler of the Peace of Italy." In the despatches of 5 Aug. 29 September, 1624, suggestions are made as to the French plan of campaign; Nov. 26 gives details as to the Duke's conversation with Father Zaccaria; Venice, Dec. 20. Describes his voyage by boat down the Po from Turin to Casale and Venice. He left Turin on Dec. 4, and reached Venice on Dec. 16. 1625, Venice, Feb. 14, The Genoese and Milanese are in great fear of the French and Savoyards. At Milan the Spaniards only wish themselves out of the Valtelline. More details as to the English attack by sea on Genoa; March 1, Conway had evidently received Wake's proposals as to the Genoa expedition coldly, but Wake gives reasons supplied by Savoy and Lesdiguières for undertaking it. As things stood Spain could not hope to defend both Brazil and Italy. In a despatch of 17 Jan., he says that this argument had been advanced by the Venetian Senate; Feb. 24, Lesdiguières wrote to Wake that he and Savoy had decided to accelerate their expedition so as to anticipate the expected intervention of the Pope; March 1, Wake sends this message on to Conway; March 28, The expedition is making progress in the Genovesato; April 18, The Venetians are beginning to see the extreme importance of the Savoy-Genoa War, Spanish affairs are in a "Labyrinth," and all Italy is beginning to awake to the weakness of Spain. If Genoa falls, Spain will be ruined. The Genoese were afraid to admit a large Spanish force lest they should take the city, Caracciolo, the General sent them by Fera, had been defeated by the Duke of Savoy at Voltaggio on April 8, Lesdiguières had, however, refused to attack the City of Genoa until he had taken Gavi, which he was then besieging, Fera was to hold the forts at the entrance to the Valtelline, viz., Riva, etc., at all costs; May 2, Gavi surrendered on April 17. The Genoese were so frightened that they had offered to throw over their alliance with Spain and ally themselves with France, Genoa would certainly be taken if the Savoyards advanced; May 23, The Prince of Piedmont had defeated the Genoese, The Duke of Guise's ships were at Villa Franca and, if they were joined by the Dutch, it would go hard with Genoa; June 27, The armies of Savoy and France were remaining inactive, The Fall of Breda had greatly encouraged the Genoese who were said to have bought over Lesdiguières, but as the Constable had been placed in great danger by an ambuscade, this was certainly untrue; July 4, The Prince of Piedmont was preparing to besiege Savona, but could do little unless the allies were masters of the sea, Forty English, French, and Dutch ships were said to have reached Marseilles; July 18, Béthune, the French Minister at Rome, had refused the Pope's proposals for an armistice, The Spaniards had taken Acqui which was held by a French garrison, The Duke of Savoy would not relieve it, so that France and Spain might get entangled with one another, The inhabitants had risen in favour of the Spaniards, The operations against Savona would have to be suspended in consequence of the fall of Acqui (which was in Monferrat); July 31, Sickness was bringing both armies to a standstill, The want of a fleet had been the cause of the failure of Savoy, for Genoa and Savona must have fallen, had the ships arrived just after the victory of Voltaggio, or when the Prince of Piedmont was attacking Savona. As it was the allies had not dared to undertake regular siege operations against either place, as both of them could be relieved by sea, whilst, on the other hand, Fera, who lay in the Milanese, could at any time sever their communications with Piedmont and France, and coop them up in the mountains, The Duke of Fera had placed Acqui on deposit in the hands of its bishop, and was, evidently, anxious to avoid an open rupture with France.

In a despatch of May 23, Wake points out that "until we shall see what will become of Breda and of Genoa, nothing can well be resolved on." In one of June 6, he said that he had told the Venetians that it was useless

for him to go to Switzerland to get the Protestant Cantons to close the Passes against the Imperial troops. The Catholic Cantons would not help them. Tilly was lying in the Marquisate of Baden, within striking distance of Basle, and would, probably, not move unless the King of Denmark came into Germany with an army, whilst Mansfeldt could not leave the Netherlands and advance into Alsace until the fate of Breda was decided. The Venetians themselves were terrified because the Emperor had sent Maradas into Friuli, and were sending troops to that frontier, whilst Cœuvres could not force the Spanish forts at Riva and Gravedona.

Munich, Kgl. Bayrisches Allgemeines Reichsarchiv., 30 jähriger Krieg, A. 125: 1625, Bernardino Roca to Sr. Marco Croia, Veneto, etc., Spang 29, April, Writing from the Dutch headquarters he gives an account of the army under Prince Frederick Henry. Fears Maurice's death may have unfortunate consequences, Mansfeldt's army is in a bad state. The objects aimed at are uncertain; H. W. G. Dungen, May 22, Gives an account of the repulse of the English at Terheyden, praises their conduct, Thinks Breda cannot be relieved; Trumbull, Brussels, 31 May, Gives an account of Terheyden, Thinks Spain will gain nothing by taking Breda; Carleton, Hague, June 2, There is no hope for Breda; Trumbull, Brussels, June 2, Announces surrender of Breda, Lord Oxford is dying. His character; June 14, The rejoicings at Brussels for the surrender of Breda, The Infanta and Cardinal de la Cueva have gone there; July 5, Announces the recapture of Bahia by the Spaniards; Aug. 16, Account of the fleet at Dunkirk; Aug. 23, The plague in London and in Flanders; Aug. 30, There were 25 ships of war at Dunkirk besides brigantines, frigates, and shalloops; Sept. 20, There were four or five thousand men on the 25 ships of war at Dunkirk; Alvisé Contarini, Hague, Sept. 29, There were 50 Dutch vessels blockading Dunkirk, and the Spaniards who were lying under a fort near Gravelines, would have to fight their way out to sea; Trumbull, Brussels, Sept. 27, The Spanish fleet might sail at any moment; Unsigned Hague, Nov. 3, The Dutch blockading fleet off Dunkirk had been dispersed by a hurricane on Oct. 27, The Dunkirk vessels had put to sea and raided the herring fleet; Contarini to Marc. Anto. Padavino, Venetian Resident at Vienna; Hague, Nov. 10, The States have prohibited trade with the Obedient Provinces, but the mails cannot be stopped on account of the interests of the merchants; Unsigned, Hague, Nov. 14, The fleet sails for Cadiz, Fears there will be friction between the Dutch and the English; H. W., Hague, Nov. 24, Buckingham and Holland had reached the Hague.

Rota writing from North Germany, 25 Nov., 28 Nov., 1 Dec., gives an account of the intentions of Christian IV. of Denmark. His one object is to restore peace to Germany; Contarini, Hague, 10 Dec., 12 Dec., Pecceter the Swedish Envoy in England had been at the Hague and said Gustaf Adolf was anxious to help in Germany notwithstanding his troubles with Poland. The Dutch had agreed to help the Danes; Unsigned to d'Estrées, French Ambassador in Holland; Morbegno, Dec. 12, Suggests the Milanese should be attacked from the Valtelline, so as to make a diversion; The Milanese had only its militia to defend it, as it had been stripped of troops. The French were building forts to protect the Valtelline against the Spaniards at Riva. 1625-6, Queen of Bohemia to Count de la Tour (Thurn), Hague, Jan. 5, Gives an account of Buckingham's visit. He has made her many promises. The English fleet has failed at Cadiz.

Do. Dreizig-jährigen Krieg, A. 190, 1625. Chiefly newsletters from Brussels, Gives an account of Mansfeldt's troops in England, their disorderly conduct especially in Kent [Joh. Jacob, London, Jan. 7, 1624-5] and of the efforts to relieve Breda; Wake writing from Venice, Feb. 21, describes the capture of Chiavenna on Feb. 11, by the French under Cœuvres; Father

Hyacinth to Jocher, Rome, July 19, comments on Feria's successes in Monferrat.

Munich, Kgl. Bayer. Geh. Staats. Archiv., Act. Betreff, Berichte aus England, 1621-1635. Kast. Schw. 486-23.

1624: London, Angry though the King was at the outrages committed by the Dutch upon the English traders in the Moluccas, the Prince had induced him to allow levies to be made in England for the States, Buckingham was in higher favour than ever and he and the Prince were "but one and the same" London, July 19; Lorenzo Stefani, Paris, Oct. 8, Rouen, Nov. 20; Calais, Dec. 10; The Pope had been forced to grant the dispensation for Henrietta Maria's marriage, without any conditions in favour of the Catholics out of fear of displeasing France, On the other hand the King of France had been made to see how dangerous it would be for him to ally himself with England for the recovery of the Palatinate, Negotiations for the Marriage had at one moment nearly been broken off on this account.

1625: Henrico Silisdon to Elector, Liege, Three thousand heretics had been converted in England during the previous year and they had 260 students at Liege, Feb. 12; Lorenzo Stefani, London, The preparations for the fleet were being hurried forward, May 23; It could not however sail until it had been revictualled as the provisions were spoilt, The pressed men were committing great excesses on their road to Plymouth, July 4; The plague had broken out on the fleet, Provisions for only two months had been taken on board, July 18; London, News of the plague, It has broken out in the house next to the writer's, Aug. 2; Lorenzo Stefani to Elector, Rouen, Even the heretics note how good God has been in preserving the Catholics from the plague, They say, however, that this is a sign that they are not numbered amongst the Elect, as they do not suffer like the followers of the Gospel do, Gives news of the Parliament at Oxford, Aug. 26; After the English fleet had sailed, there had been a great panic on shore as they feared that Spinola might effect a landing near Harwich, 10,000 men had been sent there, Rouen, Nov. 25; Stefani's letters of 3 Dec., give news of the taking of Fort Puntal, which must lead to a breach with Spain; Stefani, Rouen, The Dunkirkers had taken many of Buckingham's suite, when on their voyage to Holland to attend him during his visit to the Palatine, Dec. 20.

1626: Announces the return of the English fleet, Calais, Jan. 28; and the precautions taken to prevent the news of what had taken place being spread by the soldiers who had returned, Rouen, Jan. 31. London, Describes the successes of the Dunkirkers, The King will not allow any further proceedings to be taken against Cecil, who has been created Lord Wimbledon, on account of the Cadiz Expedition, This was owing to Buckingham, A fresh fleet of forty or fifty sail was being fitted out, it was thought for the West Indies, 24 April; The King's partiality for Buckingham might lead to a popular rising, as the English knew that England was powerless either for the offensive or the defensive, and were driven wild by the news of the Catholic victories in Germany, of the peace in Italy, and of the preparations in Spain and Flanders, May 23; A fleet under Lord Willoughby's command will soon sail from Portsmouth, It is not known what the object is, Sept. 10.

Manua: R. Archivio [Archivio Patrio Gonzaga], Carteggio di Spagna. E. XIV. 3 [1623-1625], Busta 616.

Marchese Francesco *Nerli* to Duke, Madrid, 1624: Spaniards much displeased at the taking of Brazil by the Dutch, Aug. 11; The fleet to recover Brazil is being fitted out slowly, Aug. 25-Sept. 18; The Council expects to be attacked shortly by France and Savoy, though not before the winter, and thought it might be well to stir up the Huguenots underhand, Oct. 14; It was feared that the galleys of France and Savoy might "play

some pranks " with the Genoese galleys which had come to Barcelona for the silver from the Flota, Dec. 18.

Marchese Alessandro Striggi to Duke, Madrid, 1624: The Question of Zuccarello, Genoa, Sept. 27; A certain M. "Forco," a Burgundian, had given the Spaniards an account of the plans adopted at the Conference of Susa [Cf. Wake to Conway, Oct. 28, Nov. 9, 1624], Peace or War lay with the Pope, Dec. 29.

1625: Spain had handed over the affairs of the Valtelline to the Pope, Jan. 17; Forco's statements as to the designs of France and Savoy against Genoa, Feb. 2, 4; Mentions the plan for marrying Henrietta Maria of France to the Infante D. Carlos, and giving him the Netherlands, Feb. 4; It was hoped that Breda would soon be taken, April 6; Olivares pleased with the Duke's letter in which he pledged himself not to cede any fortress to France, April 17; Good news of Breda, May 2; D. Fernando Giron had been ordered to send twelve galleons commanded by Pedro de Ribiera to Italy, and many galleons were building in Lisbon to resist the Dutch and English, June 8; It was said that one hundred sail of English ships had been seen in the Straits of Gibraltar, They were thought to be going to Marseilles, and thence to Genoa, July 3; The news of the Taking of Breda, A few days later came that of the recapture of Bahia, The Nuncio was afraid that the Spaniards might now turn on Italy, It was feared that some of the disaffected Genoese might hand over Genoa to France, July 16; Outrages committed by the "Polacchi," Polish Cossacks when Feria took Acqui, July 28; People were getting nervous as to the English fleet, Aug. 3; Measures were being taken to prevent the English fleet from passing the Straits of Gibraltar, Sept. 23; The Cadiz Expedition, Nov. 12, 13, 14, 15, 19; The arrival of the Flota, Dec. 3, 12; Retreat of the English Fleet from Spanish waters, Dec. 28.

Do. E. XV. 3. 673 (1621-1625), *Francia*.

Giustiniano Priandi to Duke, Paris, 1624: Spinola was about to take the field, July 5; Was preparing to lay siege to Breda, Aug. 16; The Siege of Breda had been begun, Sept. 7, 14, 21; Maurice's movements, Sept. 28; Mansfeldt raising troops, Oct. 28; The Siege of Breda going badly for the Dutch, Nov. 2; Créquy brings the news of the arrangements made between Lesdiguières and Savoy about the war, Nov. 9, 23; Mansfeldt commissioned by James I. to raise 12,000 men for the Palatine, Dec. 10; News from Breda, Cœuvres' plan for invading the Valtelline, Dec. 14.

1625: The French determined to relieve Breda at all costs, Jan. 3; Lesdiguières ordered to cross the Alps and keep the Spaniards in check so as to give Cœuvres an opportunity to enter the Valtelline, Jan. 12; A fleet being fitted out in England to sail in March, Jan. 19; Mansfeldt's efforts to relieve Breda, Jan. 24; Barberini's mission from the Pope to Spain and France to treat for peace, March 14; The French say Savoy has violated his engagements to Mantua, but can do nothing as they need the help of Savoy in Italy, April 26; The Duke of Savoy and Lesdiguières are quarrelling about Gavi, May 6; The Death of the Prince of Orange, May 7; Frederick Henry gives up the attempt to relieve Breda, Lesdiguières wishes not to attempt the siege of Genoa, June 6; The surrender of Breda, June 13; The English Fleet is being fitted out very quickly, No one knows their intentions, June 17; Description of the occupation of Breda, Lesdiguières blames himself for the failure in Italy, July 1; Barberini thinks he can effect a settlement between Savoy and Genoa as well as of the Valtelline, Aug. 8; The Plague in England, The Infanta is inspecting the Flemish coast, Aug. 21; Barberini's negotiations about the Valtelline had been broken off, chiefly because the Pope would not allow the Valtelline to be given back to the Grisons, Sept. 5, 12; the English fleet has sailed for Spanish waters, Oct. 4; Announces the conclusion of an Alliance for 15

years between the English and the Dutch, and the recall of the English Ministers from Madrid and Brussels, Oct. 18; It is thought the English fleet is going to Cuba. The blockading fleet off Dunkirk has been dispersed by a storm, and the Dunkirkers have come out and attacked the Dutch herring fleet, Nov. 18; Louis XIII. had received proposals from certain persons to cut off Rochelle from the sea by means of a dyke, though one could not be built during the winter months, Nov. 22; News of the defeat of the English at Cadiz, "A certain Savoyard" [i.e., *Scaglia*] "is being sent to England," for the purpose of arranging an alliance between Venice, Savoy and England, "He is a clever fellow, but ill-suited for the ecclesiastical habit," Nov. 29; Rejoicings at Brussels for the arrival of the Flota, Dec. 26.

Do. E. xv. 3. Francia, Busta 675 [1626-1627], Priandi to Duke, Paris, 1626, The Savoyard Ambassador had settled the differences between France and England, Feb. 6.

PRINTED.

XIII.—LIFE AT BRUSSELS, 1625-1626.

Hymans: "Bruxelles à travers les Ages," par *Louis Hymans* [Bruxelles, Bruylant Christophe, et Cie. 1884, 2 Tomes], Vol. I., pp. 62-63, The Market Gardens at Schaerbeck, p. 80, Brussels in 1650, described by a French Colonel, Duplessis l'Ecuyer, pp. 211-224, The Palace, The Parc; p. 256, The Canals in the Parc, These descriptions are based on "Itineraire de Pierre Bergeron dans les Pays Bas espagnols en 1612," *Sanderus*, "Brabantia Illustrata," 1659, and *La Serre*, "Histoire curieuse de tout ce que s'est passé à l'entrée de la reyne mère du roi très chrestien dans les villes du Pays Bas." [Anvers, Plantin, 1632]. Pp. 332-335, 350, 394, 399, 422-424, 430-431, 450, The Infanta Isabella and the Religious Orders.

Weale: "Belgium, Aix-la-Chapelle, and Cologne," by *James Weale* (London, 1859, 1 Vol.), p. 61, The Augustinian Church at Brussels [Cf. Roman de la Cour de Bruxelles, p. 470], p. 310, Montaigne.

Tournay: "Le Roman de la Cour de Bruxelles," par *Jean de Tournay* [Aix-la-Chapelle and Spa, 1628, Tome I.], The Copy in the Royal Library at Brussels comes from the Heithsema Collection and contains a very incomplete key to the characters in a nineteenth century handwriting. Amongst them are Spinola, The Great Alcandre; Mlle. de Berg, Chloris; Cte. Henri de Berg, Cloridon.

Historical Manuscript Commission Reports: *Rye*, p. 172. 1624, The Port closed by the English Privy Council on account of the Duke of Croy's murder.

Rooses: Rubens op. cit., Vol. III. (du 27 Juillet, 1622, au 22 Octobre, 1626), *passim*.

Thackeray: "Contributions to 'Punch,' etc." by *William Makepeace Thackeray*, Works in 13 Vols. [London, Smith, Elder and Co., 1900], Vol. VI. "Little Travels from Richmond to Brussels," pp. 281-282, Portrait of the Infanta Isabella by Rubens in the Museum at Brussels described.

Villa: "Ambrosio Spinola," op. cit., pp. 450-453.

Murray: "A Handbook . . . to Holland, Belgium, Prussia and Northern Germany, etc.," by *John Murray*, 4th Edition [London, John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1843], p. 120, The paucity of monuments with Spanish inscriptions in Belgian churches.

MANUSCRIPT.

XIII.—LIFE AT BRUSSELS, 1625-1626.

Brussels: Etat et Guerre.

No. 196: Correspondance de l'Infante Isabelle avec Philippe IV., Tome XXI., Janvier-Mai, 1627. Philip IV. to Infanta, 27 January, 1627, Enquires as to the luxurious living of the Spanish troops in the Obedient Provinces. He himself is averse to such practices for soldiers [Postscript holograph]. Infanta to Philip IV., 27 February, 1627, Wholly denies these reports, Points out that the Spanish troops receive only very low pay and cannot afford such a way of living.

London, British Museum MSS. Department, Add. MSS. 20,785, Andrade, Cristoval de, "Descripcion de Flandes," written for the Duke of Lerma in 1611, Ff. 95b, 97b, "Antwerp, The Streets, The Canals, The Bourse."

PRINTED.

XIV.—BELGIUM IN 1626—SPAIN—THE INVASION OF ENGLAND AND IRELAND.

Villa: Ambrosio Spinola, op. cit., pp. 445-457.

Rooses: "Rubens," op. cit., Vol. III. [1622-1626], pp. 417-418, 1626, Rubens to Valavez, Buckingham asks Dutch to admit English garrisons into the Cautionary Towns, They refuse, Spinola and the Cadiz Expedition, "It was the maddest folly," 9 Jan.; pp. 425-426, do. to do., 12 Feb., Dutch cruelty to their prisoners; pp. 447-448, do., to Pierre Dupuy, 24 July, Tilly's cruelty to the peasants of Upper Austria, The Rhine-Meuse Canal; pp. 453-454, Olivares to Rubens, 8 Aug., Olivares describes his troubles to Rubens; pp. 460-462, Rubens to Valavez, 11 September, Describes the repulse of a Dutch attack on Kildrecht and Hulst near Antwerp. The Battle of Lutter; pp. 472-473, do. to Pierre Dupuy, The Characters of the Infanta and Spinola, 1 October; pp. 479-481, do. to do. The doings of the Dunkirkers, The "Flota," 22 Oct., Vol. IV. [1626-1628], pp. 9, 13-14, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, The Spanish attack on Sluis repulsed 5 Nov.

Gachel: "Lettres Inédites de Rubens," op. cit., 1626, Oct. 29, Emperor saved by the breach between Bethlen Gabor and the Hungarians; Nov. 5, Olivares' attitude to England; Nov. 12, The Rhine-Meuse Canal, The Flota; Nov. 19, Naval plans; pp. 23-25, The origin of Rubens' negotiations with Buckingham, Buckingham and Rubens first met at Paris in 1625, In December 1626, Rubens arranged to meet Buckingham's agent Gerbier at Calais under colour of selling some pictures to Buckingham; pp. 55-59, Campaign of 1626.

Riezler, S., op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 282-284, Bavaria and the Conference of Brussels, 1626.

Khevenhüller, op. cit., Part X., p. 1,015, Spain and the Sea Power of the Hapsburgs, 1625, do.; p. 1,316, Schwarzenberg's negotiations at Brussels, 1626, do.; p. 1,509, Failure of the Conference at Brussels, 1626; do. p. 1,519, Christian IV. and the Hanse Towns; Part XI., p. 153, The Convention of the Hanse Towns and the Spanish Proposals, Feb. 23, 1628.

MANUSCRIPT.

XIV.—BELGIUM, 1626—SPAIN—THE INVASION OF ENGLAND AND IRELAND.

Brussels, E. et G. No. 194, Correspondance de l'Infante Isabelle avec Philippe IV., Tome XIX. [Janvier-Juin, 1626.]

1626, Jan. 4, Infanta to Philip IV., Announces the return of fifty vessels of the English fleet in a very bad condition; Jan. 4, Philip IV. to Infanta [Cf. No. 193, Philip IV. to Infanta, 28 Nov., 1625], Sends plans for destroying Dutch and English trade with the Baltic and White Sea, based on the ships at Dunkirk and Mardyck. Gondomar had suggested that an invasion of England would be possible, so Spanish agents should be sent there to stir up disaffection, Mansfeldt, who was furious at the suspension of his pay and pension from England might be bought over, Was sending Sora to Poland to get Polish help against the Dutch, and to win over Denmark by granting a Commercial Treaty [Cf., *Turin, Spagna*, 18, Tarantaise to Duke, 7 Sept., 1624, for Spanish refusal to make one in the previous year]; Jan. 15, Infanta to Philip IV. sends plans for attacking the Dutch fisheries drawn up "by persons zealous for his service"; Jan. 22 [Cf., No. 193, Philip IV. to Infanta 19 Sept., 1625], Philip IV. to Infanta, Sends criticisms by Olivares by the Infanta's observations as to the invasion of England, The Infanta points out that only twenty ships were available in Flanders, that Tyrone and Tyrconnel had no influence in Ireland, and that the Hanse Towns were in rebellion against the Emperor, Ships would have to be sent from Spain. Olivares thought all these matters could be arranged, but no ships could be sent from Spain as they had no naval stores owing to the breach with England; Feb. 12, Philip IV. to Infanta, Mirabel wrote from Paris that the Savoy Minister there was going to London to propose that England should attack Corsica jointly with the Duke or send a fleet into Italian waters to assist the allies, She must get her confidants in England and those Bruneau had hired there to prevent this [Cf. *Turin, Inv.*, No. 93, *Genova, Mazzo* 1, No. 12, "L'Impresa di Genova, 1624," cit. do., *Mat. Pol.* 1626, No. 11, Proposals from Savoy, etc." cit.; No. 12, Instructions of Prince of Piedmont to San Maurizio, etc., 1 March, 1626, cit.]; Feb. 16, Infanta to Philip IV., Gondomar should try to hire agents in England, Mansfeldt too untrustworthy to negotiate with. Deficit on the Budget, Impossible to raise Walloon troops as there are hardly any left, Neuburg should not be employed to negotiate with the Dutch, Archduke Albert mistrusted him, It would be well to let the project of invading England drop for a time, but the fleet at Dunkirk should be strengthened so as to force the English to keep their fleet at home, and to harass the Dutch trade, do. to do.; April 21, The Dutch had strengthened their blockading fleet off Mardyke, She had signed an agreement with Duke Frederick of Holstein for the use of his new town of Friedrichstadt; do. to do., June 3, Had made proposals to the Emperor and Duke of Bavaria for an offensive and defensive alliance against all the rebels in the Empire, thus including the Dutch as members of the Circle of Lower Burgundy, If these proposals were accepted, the Dutch would be so hampered in their trade that they would come to terms, Spain must have a port on the Baltic, and all the German rivers must be closed to Dutch Trade [This Despatch gives a summary of the Maritime Policy of the Hapsburgs, It is enclosed with a copy of the "Answer of Her Highness the Infanta given through John Charles, Baron of Schomberg, to the proposals made by the Ambassadors of His Imperial Majesty and of the Elector of Bavaria, 23 May, 1626, given at Brussels, 28 May, 1626]; May 29, Schwarzenberg to Schomberg, Brussels, In his reply Schwarzenberg said he had no power to deal with the points raised, but must refer them to the Emperor, who understood his offer to extend to his

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giving assistance against the Dutch, who were rebels to the Empire and adherents of its armed enemies.

Do., No. 195 [Juillet-Décembre, 1626.]

1626, July 12, Infanta to Philip IV., Rubens sends her news that the Dutch are preparing a new attack on Brazil, Encloses copy of letter from Emperor to Count Schwarzenberg, June 22, H.I.M. will not accept Spanish reinforcements if they are not to be employed in Lower Saxony on the ground that Spain does not wish to go to war with Denmark, Would not object to Spain having a Baltic port, but will not agree to refuse to make peace with the Palatine until this object is attained, The Ambassadors of the Catholic League tell her that the League will not go to war with the Dutch, as the business seems such an endless one, Trade with Holland could not, the Emperor wrote, be prohibited without the consent of the Diet; July 14, Philip IV. to Infanta, She should ask Denmark to negotiate in a Diet or Meeting of Electors for the Pacification of Germany, and to point out that if the Danes support Spain, they can, at the moment, command the trade of Europe, Will only make a defensive League with the Emperor and the Catholic League unless they will help him in Flanders by making a diversion against the Dutch, She must at all costs remain on good terms with the Duke of Bavaria as he could ruin the House of Hapsburg if he got himself made King of the Romans; Aug. 9, do. to do., After detailing his plan for unifying the forces of Spain, the King says he does not wish to keep the Palatinate. His only wish is that his hereditary states, which are Imperial fiefs, may enjoy the protection of the Empire in the same manner in which its other members enjoy it, He must have a port in Northern waters to hamper Dutch trade; Aug. 27, Infanta to Philip IV., Is negotiating with Denmark, He should communicate with Bavaria about the Baltic Port at once; Sept. 9, Philip IV. to Aytona, Will restore Palatinate without asking for the repayment of his expenses; Sept. 9, Philip IV., to Infanta, Should tell Bavaria that he is only carrying on his wars in Germany and with England in the interests of Bavaria, The Duke should show his gratitude by closing the German rivers, giving Spain a port on the North Sea, and securing a long truce or peace for the Obedient Netherlands; Oct. 14, Infanta to Philip IV., The vessels at Dunkirk have broken the English blockade and taken or sunk many English vessels; Nov. 15, Philip IV. to Infanta, Authorises her to send reinforcements to Tilly; Dec. 12, Infanta to Philip IV., A confidant of Gustaf Adolf of Sweden has asked her to secure the good offices of Spain and the Emperor to mediate for a peace between Sweden and Poland, She had written to Poland on the subject, Eric Larsen was also commissioned to effect arrangements as to trade between Spain and Sweden, Sweden had refused an offensive and defensive alliance with England, France, Denmark, and Holland, and was at peace with all the world except Poland, The King heartily desired a universal peace, He however made no offer as to the restoration of Livonia and Prussia to the Poles; Dec. 22, Infanta to Philip IV., Will not send reinforcements to Tilly as Duke of Bavaria said that they were not required, They should take advantage of the King of Sweden's request that they should make a peace between him and Poland, in order that Poland might be set free to help Austria, unless, indeed, they might displease the Poles by doing this, so she advised Philip not to make any definite agreement with the Swedes, Larsen was treating on behalf of the Swedish merchants, with Gustaf Adolf's consent, to arrange that they might sell their copper in Spain.

Do., *Etat et de l'Audience*, Correspondance Historique, 1626, No. 630.

1626, Jan. 10, To Mons. Benoit at Nancy, The English fleet has returned from Cadiz in a pitiful state; Aug. 11, William Sterill, England is very anxious for peace on account of the loss of the trade with Spain, which, with France, was their most profitable customer [Cf. to Benoit,

24 Jan., 1626] ; Nov. 13, To Councillor Pastor, Willoughby has been forced to return to England with his fleet, having accomplished nothing, owing to a mutiny amongst his men on account of the bad provisions ; Dec. 5, De la Faille to Benoit, Gives an account of a fête given by Buckingham to Bassompierre, who was on an embassy to London, in which tableaux were performed showing Marie de Medicis restoring peace between France and her sons-in-law the Kings of England and Spain, When the text of the Treaty had been brought to Bassompierre for his signature, he found that important alterations had been made in it, On his objecting to these, Buckingham had at once come to see him, and said that the agreement should be redrafted in accordance with his wishes, Great concessions had been made to Henrietta Maria [Cf. to do., 14 Nov., 1626]. Do. E. et G., No. 301, Correspondance de l'Infante Isabelle avec Olivares [1625-1633.] 1626, April 21, Infanta to Captain D. Martin de Idiaquez, The twenty ships from Spain should go straight to the herring fisheries, do all the damage they can, and then run straight for Ostend, as the Dutch are sending thirty six ships to blockade Dunkirk and Mardyck.

Mantua : Spagna 617 cit.

1626, Jan., Striggi to Duke, Madrid, Announces the return of D. Federigo de Toledo from service in the Atlantic ; Jan. 5, A loan of six million scudi has been raised from private persons at Genoa for Flanders, and is to be paid by instalments of three hundred thousand scudi [£75,000], a month ; Feb. 10, As all the rivers are swollen by excessive rains it is impossible to bring supplies along the roads, so there is a general dearth ; Feb. 21, Bread 6d. a loaf ; March 1, The Treaty of Monzon, It is said that the English fleet is to be fitted out again for service on the Spanish coast, Account of the forces which are to be called for from the various countries of the Spanish Empire in view of their unification for military purposes ; June 2, Philip IV. had agreed to the Treaty of Monzon from his wish to revenge himself on England Card. Barberini explains that Spain had concluded this treaty under pressure from the French whose hands were now free because they had come to terms with the Huguenots ; July 7, On account of the want of Naval Stores no fleet is to be fitted out against England [Cf. Brussels, E et G., 194, Philip IV. to Infanta, 22 Jan., 1626], Now that the Swiss have thrown over Spain for France, Savoy can bargain as to granting the Passage through Savoy to Spanish troops going to Burgundy ; July 18, Card. Spinola, the Marquis' son has got the Archbishopric of Granada, worth 40,000 Scudi [£10,000] a year ; November, Striggi to Marliani, Gives detailed accounts of the cost of keeping house at Madrid, The board of three persons came to twenty Lire a day, say 60 ros. od., List of Prices ; Dec., 12, Forty English and Dutch vessels which had set out to meet the Flota had been dispersed by a storm, The Flota had arrived with Twenty-two millions of Pesos, or Pieces of Eight [£4,400,000.]

Munich. Kon. Bair., Geheim-Staats. Archiv., Kon. St. A., Kaste Schw., 261-6, Correspondenz mit der Infantin zu Brüssel, 1626-1631.

1626, Oct. 28, Infanta to Maximilian, Is requested by the Elector of Treves to ask him to spare the Electorate so far as possible from quartering for his troops ; Nov. 20, Maximilian to Infanta, Will comply with her request about Treves, as the Elector is nearly ruined by contributions already. Do., *Kast. Schw.*, 486, 23, op. cit.

1626, Jan. 28, Lorenzo Stefani to Elector, Calais, Announces the return of the fleet from Cadiz, and the escape of a Dunkirk vessel, which had put into a harbour in which the fleet was, passed itself off for Dutch and brought back information ; March 24, do. to do., Rouen, The English are going to attempt to take Dunkirk ; 14-24 April, London, Complains of the raids of the Dunkirkers on the English coast ; A fleet of 40 or 50 sail is fitting out in England, it is thought to attack the West Indies ; Sept. 10, London,

All the seamen are being summoned to Portsmouth, and it is thought the fleet will sail when it has been revictualled for the second time, as most of the stores are gone bad, Lord Willoughby has been appointed Admiral of the fleet in which there are only ten of the King's ships.

Munich, Allgemeine Reichs. Archiv. A. 195, 30 jähr. Krieg.

1626, Sept. 4, London, News of the Battle of the Lutter has caused great depression; Sept. 12, *Brussels*, Rejoicings for the victory of the Lutter.

MARCHEVILLE'S MISSION TO BAVARIA, 1626.

1626, Dec. 6, *Paris*, Marcheville is to inquire why the Duke has sent no answer to Louis XIII. proposals sent by him after his interview with Father Alexander of Alais (della Rota), He is to impress upon Maximilian the King's desire to restore tranquility in Germany whilst respecting its Liberties, and is to show him the Treaty as corrected and shown to Father Alexander.

ALEXANDER D'ALAIS' MISSION.

1626, 31 Jan., *Paris*. To Kuttner, The Bishop of Mende is going to England to bring about a reconciliation between Richelieu and Buckingham, The Prince of Piedmont is in Paris to secure the continuation of the war in Italy, and to bring certain accusations against Lesdiguières who has sent his son-in-law Marshal Créquy to Paris to defend him, Richelieu's character; 14 Feb., to do., Bassompierre's mission will be a failure as Parliament will not confirm the agreement; 28 Feb., The grave manners of the Prince of Piedmont have made him very unpopular at Paris, Richelieu's motives; 11 Feb., Richelieu's reasons for concluding peace with the Huguenots; 28 Feb., Louis XIII. and Richelieu; 3 March, Richelieu accuses Louis XIII. of lying, and said he was only trying to keep Bavaria quiet; 17 March, Rota to Elector, Richelieu's diplomacy is a system of deception, "*doli Richeliani*"; 7 April, Jocher to Rota, Thanks him for exposing Father Joseph's tricks during the whole of the negotiations; 26 March, 17 July, News letters from London giving an account of the proceedings in Parliament and of Bristol's impeachment; 4-14 Aug., 4 Sept., London, The fears of a Spanish invasion of England; 22 Aug., 12 Sept., 19 Sept., News letters from Brussels, The Campaign of 1626; 14 Oct., A memorandum presented by Count Frankenburg to Olivares, and Olivares' answers, The Spanish Policy as to the Duke of Neuburg, the Conference at Brussels, the Palatinate and Bavaria, Why Bavaria cannot assist Spain; (mainly because the Spanish forces with Tilly were recalled to Flanders just before the Battle of Lutter).

VOL. II

SIDELIGHTS ON THE THIRTY
YEARS WAR

CHAPTER I

WHILST the Spaniards were preparing to renew their contest with the Dutch in the plains of Brabant, events had been in progress amongst the distant mountains of the Alps which were to exercise a far-reaching influence upon the fortunes of their empire.

But for the disputes about the Valtelline, it is possible that France would have held aloof from the German war, or would, at most, have aided the Dutch with her gold and not with her men. In the Valtelline Cardinal Richelieu saw the last link in the chain which in his eyes the Hapsburgs were weaving round Europe, and, possessed as he was by the idea that Spain and Austria were aiming at Universal Monarchy, he believed that if the Valtelline came under their flags the ruin of his country sooner or later was inevitable.

The Valtelline in the main corresponds with the Italian province of Sondrio and comprises that valley down which the Adda flows westwards from the heights of the Stelvio and the Ortler between the snows of the Rhoetian Alps and the pastures of the mountains of Bergamo to the orange groves of the Lake of Como.

Almost at the point where the Adda enters the northern arm of the lake it is met at right angles by another valley, that of the Maira, which runs southwards from the Splügen Pass, and on its way passes the fortress of Chiavenna, the Key of Italy, that rocky fastness where the roads from the valleys of the Rhine, the Inn, and the Po converge. Thus the Valley of the Valtelline, which turns the precipices and the glaciers of the Gothard and the Bernina, commands the most ancient roads across the Alps, by which even before the foundation of Rome the races of Central

Europe traded with the Mediterranean. In the Seventeenth Century, moreover, the route through the Valtelline was the only one by which the Austrian and Spanish Hapsburgs could undertake joint military operations without being forced to yield to the exigencies of such potentates as the Duke of Savoy, the Swiss Cantons and the Republic of Venice, whilst beyond the mountains lay those German and Austrian lands which had been recovered by the Counter Reformation for the Catholic Faith.

In 1621 the Valtelline was, however, the property neither of the Spaniards nor the Austrians. Since 1512 the Valley with its dependencies of Chiavenna and Bormio had been held by the Lords of the Grisons by cession from Maximilian Sforza Duke of Milan.

The Grisons, now the goal of the pleasure seekers of the world, were in the days of James the First a state which probably in the eyes of European diplomatists was of far greater importance than either Russia or Sweden.

The Commonwealth of the Grisons, whose territories north of the Alps corresponded nearly with those of the present Canton of Graubünden was formed by a confederacy of three Leagues which had been founded to resist the oppression of the feudal superiors of the country of whom the most important were the Bishops of Chur, the House of Austria, and the Counts of Werdenberg. These Leagues were firstly the *Cá Dé* or God's House, which included most of the central districts and dated from 1360; secondly, the Upper or Grey League, founded in 1395 in the Valley of the Vorder Rhein; lastly, that of the Ten Jurisdictions which extended eastwards of Davos. Over this latter league the Hapsburgs claimed feudal rights, as they did also over the Lower Engadine. The Emperor Maximilian, however, had in 1499 after the Swabian War recognised the independence of all three leagues. In 1524 they had united into a commonwealth by the Treaty of Ilanz; two years later their Diet had abolished the temporal rights of the See of Chur, and decreed the free exercise of religion, whilst a few years earlier they had become the perpetual allies of the Swiss Cantons with the exception of Bern.

The Reformation had made great progress amongst all the three races—Germans, Romansch, and Italians—which inhabit the Canton, and to the disgust of the Roman Curia, Italian-speaking Protestants were to be found in great numbers in their

southern valleys, which might thus become centres whence the doctrines of Zwingli and of Calvin might be propagated throughout the Peninsula. Saint Charles Borromeo, as Archbishop of Milan, had kept a watchful eye upon these danger spots, and more than one Protestant pastor had been carried off by treachery from his parsonage in the Valtelline to the Holy Office at Milan. The Vatican had good reasons for apprehension. It was, indeed, notorious that the most vigilant agents of the Inquisition had never succeeded in detecting those inhabitants of Lombardy, of Venice, and even of the States of the Church, who yearly repaired to the recesses of the Cottian Alps, to attend the religious celebrations of the Waldenses, and who on their return did their utmost to spread that heresy amongst the Italian populations. Yet in Savoy the Waldenses were kept under firm control by the Ducal Government, whilst the Lords of the Grisons, who were the rulers of the Valtelline, were in many cases men who were zealous upholders of the Zwinglian tenets. Hence Rome dreaded and hated the Italian dependencies of the Three Leagues.

We have used the language of the Chancelleries in speaking of the Grisons Leagues and of the Lords of the Grisons. In reality these expressions were far from corresponding with the facts. Nature itself had determined the form of government of a country which was so broken up by mountains, rivers, and valleys, that its several districts seemed all but separate nations, and were peopled by peasant proprietors who were inspired by the sentiments of an aristocracy rather than of a democratic proletariat. Almost every separate parish had acquired its liberty from its feudal superiors at the price of its own exertions. When, therefore, it joined in a league with its neighbours, it retained its sovereign independent rights unimpaired. Both men and women had the right of voting, in some cases even children, and it was thought that an important reform had been accomplished, when the age at which the right could be exercised was raised to fifteen. Even in England at that time there was no law to exclude minors from the House of Commons. A boy of eighteen, "Baronet Mills' son," was a candidate for Lymington in 1625, and William Cavendish, afterwards first Earl of Devonshire, sat for Devonshire some years before he came of age. [Cf. *Return of Members of Parliament, etc.*, Vol. I.]

For judicial purposes these parishes were grouped into districts, each of which had its own court of appeal. Every one

of them had its own laws and customs, which as a rule differed widely from those of its neighbours, but this form of government was, in reality, the one which was best suited to a community in which the differences caused by language, by religion, and by the natural features of the country, were all but insurmountable. All the Leagues, of which the Grey League was the most important, were represented in the Diet, which consisted of seventy-four members. It met alternately at Ilanz, at Chur, and at Davos, and dealt with all matters relating to the general interests of the Leagues and to the administration of their subject territories south of the Alps. No resolution, however, which affected the whole community, could be adopted by the Diet, unless it was approved of by the districts voting in their several parishes, and received the sanction of the majority of the latter. A Committee of the Diet, which was known as the "Pittach," and which consisted of the Presidents and the Chancellors of the three Leagues, with a delegate from each of the twenty-nine districts, had the power of deciding as to the questions which were to be submitted to the parishes. During the recesses of the Diet the work of administration was carried on by the three Presidents, assisted by a few Councillors.

The Diets, as a Venetian Envoy wrote, only contained ten or twelve persons of good breeding; the other members were country clowns, who might be fittingly designated by any title except that of "Most Illustrious." Many of these rustic delegates were, however, of noble birth, whilst others who were of the middle class exercised great influence in their own neighbourhoods. The Grisons, indeed, were in the hands of great landlords, some of whom like the de Salis and the Plantas ranked amongst the most ancient nobility in Europe.

Members of such families often entered military service abroad, and on their return home worked in the interest of their former employers. Nor did Austria or the Bishop of Chur fail to take advantage of every possible opening to assert their feudal claims over various districts, whilst the Rights of the Holy Roman Empire, though much diminished by the concessions which the Commonwealth had wrung from Maximilian, still subsisted. Thus foreign powers had every means of interfering with the policy of the Grisons, which from the very beginning of the Seventeenth Century had become a leading factor in that of many European communities.

The Grisons, like their Swiss neighbours, had since the time of Francis the First, been the allies of France, which was the hereditary enemy of the House of Austria. But, when in 1556 Spain annexed the Duchy of Milan, it became her interest to secure a passage for her troops through the Valtelline to the Tyrol and the German dominions of the House of Hapsburg; this right of passage could not be acquired without the consent of the Grisons. It was natural that France should oppose such a treaty by every means in her power, and for many years her opposition proved successful. Gradually, as the sea power of the English and the Dutch increased, Spain, in the course of her long struggle with the Netherlands, was forced to rely more and more upon the land communications which ran across Europe from Genoa to the North Sea, and thus by 1600 the question of her right of passage over the Alpine Passes had become even more important to her than it had been forty years before.

According to a report drawn up in 1629 for Philip IV. by Reginald, a Dominican friar, who was a native of Chur, the Swiss Confederation only controlled one of the passes then in use over the Central Alps, although their confederates the Valaisans held the Simplon. On the other hand, five passes led from Chur into Italy, and six from Chiavenna and the Valtelline into the Lombard and Venetian plains, whilst the Umbrail afforded the readiest means of communication between the portion of the basin of the Adige which lies in German Tyrol and the various passes which led from the Valtelline into the Engadine. These passes, he adds, were of special importance in times of plague and also when an army had to advance by several routes. That they were reckoned the easiest roads over the Alps is also shown by the fact that the posts from Bologna to Lyons crossed the mountains by way of the Bernina and Albula Passes from Brescia to Chur and Zurich. But these eastern passes were in the territory of the Grisons, whilst Savoy and Venice controlled all the other roads which led from Italy into Central and Northern Europe.

Savoy under Charles Emmanuel was gradually shaking off the control both of France and Spain, Venice hated both branches of the Austrian House, and the Catholic Cantons of Switzerland were sinking into obscurity before the advance of their Protestant confederates, Bern, Zurich, and Basel. Thus Spain, if she was

to secure her ends, was forced to seek them in the Rhoetian Alps, where, as has been already said, the way lay open for every kind of intrigue.

For a century the leading men of the Grisons had been in the receipt of pensions from France, and had spent their easily won gains upon imported luxuries. Silk, gold and silver lace, and costly embroideries were worn in the cottages of the Engadine, foreign wines and spices figured at the banquets, and large sums were expended upon visits to fashionable watering-places such as Pfäfers and Baden in Aargau. At these persons of the most widely differing ranks were brought together. Men and women bathed for hours in the same public bath, tables floated on the water, and were surrounded by guests eating, drinking, and jesting with the onlookers in the surrounding galleries. The bath was followed by concerts and splendid balls in which foreign travellers found themselves dancing with Abbesses who entertained them to supper in the refectories of their convents and loaded them with gifts of gold medals, fringed handkerchiefs, and ibex horns.

The Alpine pastures and the pinewoods of the Grisons could not furnish their proprietors with the means to support these extravagant outlays, and they were forced, therefore, to seek other resources from the sale of their votes at the polling booths and in the Diets, or by becoming mercenaries in foreign states. But for their Italian possessions the Grisons from their geographical situation might well have remained wholly aloof from European politics, but from these possessions they drew considerable revenues, and the Valtelline lay open to invasion on every side. Thus they could not live without the support of a foreign ally, and the choice of that ally was the source of those passionate party conflicts, in which the leaders were usually retired officers who drew their pensions from a foreign master, and these in the end brought disaster upon a state which had completely forgotten its home interests in the desire to further those of other powers.

The chief factions which divided the Commonwealth were the Spanish party and the French party, which latter eventually absorbed a Venetian and a neutral party. The Spaniards enjoyed the support of the more violent Catholics, the French that of the Protestants. Amongst the leading families the Plantas were in the Spanish interest whilst their hereditary

rivals and enemies, the De Salis, threw their whole weight into the opposite scale. Both parties could adduce valid arguments for the policies which they advocated. The Spanish party showed that the commercial interests of the Grisons were dependent upon the Milanese from which they drew their corn, and that not only did the Valtelline lie open to the Spaniards, but the Austrians could at any time overrun the Valley of the Rhine, the Lower Engadine and the Münsterthal. It might be true that the French were the hereditary allies of both the Leagues and their Swiss confederates, but the French were too far off to send them help in the event of an attack should Austria decide to make one.

The Republic of Venice was the first power which occasioned serious disputes amongst the Leagues on the subject of their alliances abroad. The Venetians had long been dependent upon the aid of foreign mercenaries, many of whom were enrolled beyond the Alps, and, unless they passed through the Grisons, could only reach Venice by traversing Spanish or Austrian territory.

It was therefore of vital importance for the Republic to secure an alliance with the Leagues, and negotiations with this object were opened in 1599. These proposals were received with pleasure, especially by the Protestant preachers. Venice was indeed an object of suspicion at Rome on account of her tolerance in religious matters. Bormio lay within easy reach of the Veneto, and so in time of need her forces could speedily unite with those of the Leagues, finally four thousand of the Bündners earned their bread under her flag as sugar bakers and tavern keepers.

The alliance was therefore sanctioned both by the Diet and by the parishes, and on the fifteenth of October, 1603, was sworn to in Saint Mark's by the Grisons' envoys on a Bible which they had brought with them for the purpose, the treaty being concluded for ten years. In return for a yearly payment of about forty thousand francs [£1,600] Venice received the right of raising six thousand men in the Commonwealth in case of need, and the right of passage for those levied elsewhere. The treaty was a source of annoyance to France which regarded the Grisons as a dependency, and had no desire to see them taking independent diplomatic action, even though Venice was the closest ally of Henri IV, but Spain saw in it a deadly blow which cut her off for ever from the Rhoetian passes.

Spanish pride took fire. Fuentes, who was then Governor of Milan, at once prohibited the export of cereals, and began the construction of a fort bearing his own name, to the south of the point at which the Valtelline runs down to the Lake of Como.

The fury of the Leaguers at the news of Fuentes' proceedings knew no bounds. The populace clamoured to be led to attack the hated fortress; their leaders refused to plunge unaided into a war with Spain. Negotiations were begun which led to the signature at Milan of a convention by which Fuentes consented to raise the embargo on corn on condition that the Grisons should not grant a passage to any French soldiery without informing him beforehand so that he might be able to prevent them from undertaking any enterprise against Spanish territory. Thus Spain, on the pretext of exercising this right of veto, could interfere at any moment in the domestic affairs of the Leagues. The parishes refused to sanction this agreement, but the effects of this incident upon the political life of the Republic proved to be lasting.

The legal institutions of the Grisons were but ill adapted to meet their requirements in troublous times. All offices were elective, the electorate were a mob, and though there might be a High Court for every six or seven parishes, the Commonwealth had no final court of appeal. An attempt to form one had been baffled by the Grey League which would not allow offenders against its laws to be tried outside of its own jurisdiction. Hence no tribunal existed before which those accused of treason against the State could be brought. The populace, however, had means of its own for meeting this difficulty, which it applied in cases where the partiality of the district courts for transgressors in high places had been too glaringly displayed.

Every district had its own banner, which was kept by the "Landamman" or District President. When the "Landamman" held the country to be in danger, he assembled those on the jury list of his parish, and handed the banner to an ensign chosen by them from amongst their number. The whole body then set out upon a march through the district to persuade the other parishes to join them. When they had secured sufficient support they established a tribunal in some suitable place composed of magistrates elected for the purpose, assisted by assessors who were often local ecclesiastics. The offenders were then summoned before this court, and were, as a rule, sentenced

to death, to exile or to heavy fines. These tribunals were popularly known as Bloody Assizes.

In 1613 the treaty with Venice expired, and the Venetians made desperate efforts to secure its renewal. These efforts proved unsuccessful, for the Leaguers knew that Spain would never leave them at peace whilst they refused her privileges which they had granted to her rivals.

Venice was at war with the Archduke Ferdinand, and the so-called Uskoks or Croatian pirates of the Adriatic, and now saw the recruits whom she had enrolled abroad prohibited from crossing the Grisons to join her armies. Spain, at the same time, saw herself menaced by Savoy, who could at any moment close to her the passes over the Western Alps.

As a result of this situation party spirit in the Grisons ran higher than ever before. Foreign ambassadors were forced to interest themselves in the parish elections.

In 1616, when Venice was in the greatest danger from Ferdinand of Styria, Padavino, the Secretary of the Council of Ten, accompanied by some of the Lords of Zurich, appeared before the Diet at Ilanz and besought them to permit him to canvass the parishes. The Diet refused their consent, but notwithstanding this, Padavino, who was joined by several preachers, assembled the parishes at Gruob and laid his proposals before them. He promised fourteen thousand francs [£540] to every parish in the Grey League which would vote for the alliance with Venice, and gave extravagant entertainments to the burghers on the Electoral Roll. He visited Val Bregaglia and gave its inhabitants the privilege of exporting ten thousand oxen to Venetian territory free of duty. It cost him six thousand francs [£240] to gain over one insignificant village, but before he left the Grey League he had secured nineteen out of their twenty-seven votes. Everywhere as he passed along the people met him with jugs of wine and loaded him with blessings. He had to drink so many healths that his own health suffered in consequence.

Shortly afterwards Casati, the Spanish envoy appeared before the Diet to oppose the alliance with Venice, and Spanish doubloons began to fly about especially in the God's House League. On his side the French Envoy was at work to induce Chur and the districts round it to support the Venetians, and an Imperial representative arrived to assist Casati. It is impossible to

say what amount of money was expended on bribing the Leaguers.

Under such circumstances the elections were a scene of corruption and rioting. When the Mayor of the Upper Engadine was to be chosen in 1615, many persons lost their lives in an affray at Zuz; armed parties arrived from the Lower Engadine and Val Bregaglia to support their respective candidates; peace was only restored by the intervention of the heads of the Leagues. When at Gruob men were forbidden to canvass, their wives did so in their place, every voter was loaded with gifts, and even children under fifteen passed before the tellers to swell the majority.

Such was the condition of the Grisons at the moment when James I. was seeking to bring the opponents of Spain and Austria both in Italy and Germany to act in unison against the policy of the Hapsburgs, and was thus bringing the question of the Alpine Passes yet more prominently into the foreground. As early indeed as December, 1613, he had, as we have seen, promised the Duke of Savoy that he would assist him to come to an understanding with Bern and Geneva, and a year later Sir Albertus Morton, who had visited Marshal de Lesdiguières, the Governor of Dauphiny, at Grenoble, informed his master that the Marshal was in accordance with his views, which had been those of Henri IV. At a very early stage in these negotiations the Elector Palatine wrote to the Duke of Bouillon that he had requested Landgrave Otto of Hesse, who was visiting France, to inquire whether in case the existing differences between the King of Spain and the Duke of Savoy were arranged through the good offices of France, Louis XIII. would induce the Duke to prevent the Spanish forces from being transferred from Italy into Germany, if it was intended to employ them against the Union. In February, 1616, at the request of the Venetian Ambassador Barbarigo, James I. asked his son-in-law to employ his interest as a leading Prince of the Empire to prevent any members of the Empire from assisting Ferdinand of Styria against Venice. Frederick accordingly wrote to the Emperor asking him to do his best to restore peace, and also persuaded the Council of the Evangelical Union to support Venice in its efforts to secure the rights of passage from the Grisons. The Margrave of Baden likewise had long been working to bring about an alliance between the Union and the Evangelical Cantons of Switzerland.

Owing, however, to the engagements which Zurich and Bern had contracted with France, such an agreement would require the sanction of the French King, and this he would not consent to give. Thus the passes of Savoy and Switzerland were gradually becoming closed to Spain by Protestant diplomacy, and the final blow was struck when by the Treaty of Rivoli it was stipulated that the Duke of Savoy, as Imperial Vicar in Italy, should, at the request of the Bohemian States, refuse to permit Spain to send any troops to Germany or Bohemia through his territories, and should induce Venice to do the same. If the Spaniards tried to force a passage, the Duke pledged himself to raise six thousand foot and twelve hundred horse to oppose them, and to make a diversion by attacking Alsace, then held by Archduke Leopold. In return, the Palatine and the Prince of Anhalt had engaged themselves to use their influence to secure the election of the Duke either as King of Bohemia or as Roman Emperor.

A little later on when the Duke loyally acted upon these engagements, the intervention of Spain in the Grisons could only have been avoided if she had refrained from taking any part in the politics of the Empire.

The Venetians, despite all their efforts, failed to secure the renewal of their alliance with the Grisons, but the contest had greatly exasperated party differences in the Leagues. The preachers, especially in those districts of the Rhine Valley which lay open to invasion from the Tyrol, began to turn against Venice, whilst Toledo, the Viceroy of Milan, offered the Leagues really favourable terms if they would come to an arrangement with Spain. The parishes rejected his proposals. Rudolf and Pompejus Planta, who were his chief supporters, succeeded in getting Padavino expelled from the country, and the outlook for Spain seemed unusually favourable.

But so long as the agitators in the Leagues could make a living out of politics, it was impossible that party strife could ever cease. Wealthy Leaguers were in the habit of investing their money in the purchase of a post in the administration of the Valtelline, and since 1603, when the Diet had renounced the right of appointment to these offices, they had been in the gift of the parishes in the Leagues. As a rule these posts were connected with the judicial institutions of the district, and though the salaries attached to them were low, they were often sold for double or treble the amount.

To recoup themselves the purchasers had to resort to illegal means, and it was notorious that justice in these courts was always sold to the highest bidder. The Valtelline paid a tribute of £3,380 a year to the Grisons, and had also to furnish a force of three thousand men. The parishes on the Valtelline had, it is true, the right of electing their own town councillors, who, with deputies chosen from the whole valley, formed a provincial assembly, but its decisions were subject to a referendum to the parishes in the Leagues. The assessment rolls were drawn up by a Chancellor elected by the village Mayors. Under these conditions it was impossible for the Valtelliners to exercise any effective control over the administration, and during a short term of office in the Italian districts of the Commonwealth the holders could acquire riches sufficient to enable them to purchase the highest posts in its administration. Lastly, the Protestants in the Leagues from whatever motives never desisted in their efforts to bring over the Catholic Valtelliners to their own faith, and thus kept religious strife burning brightly in the valley; under such conditions it is evident that it was impossible to extinguish the flames of party hatred in the Leagues themselves.

Thus at the very time when an understanding with Spain seemed assured by Toledo's offers, the hopes of a lasting settlement were rudely dissipated.

The most violent of the Protestant preachers were to be found in the Lower Engadine, a district which was not yet wholly emancipated from the control of the Hapsburgs, and where the chiefs of the local aristocracy, the Plantas, were partisans of Spain. These preachers, amongst whom Caspar Alexius, Anton Vulpius, and Tontsch were the most prominent, assumed the leadership of the moribund Franco-Venetian party. Their followers, mostly Romansch speaking Lower Engadiners, were good but ruthless soldiers, and imbued with a gloomy fanaticism which is often found amongst small tribes of mountaineers. As a pasquinade of the time says, the preachers were born stirrers-up of strife, and angels turned devils. Besides those already named, George Jenatsch, of Samaden, who was a member of the Synod of 1617, was also prominent. He was an unscrupulous partisan who, however, far excelled his colleagues in political talent.

The chief objects of their hostility were Pompejus Planta of

Rietburg and Rudolf Planta of Wildenberg, and a furious attack was made upon them at the synod held at Bergün in the spring of 1618. The two Plantas were branded as traitors to their country; letters were sent to all the evangelical congregations to warn them to be upon their guard, and it was resolved that the members of the synod on their return home should attack them from their pulpits. The order was eagerly obeyed, and the churches, especially in the Lower Engadine, rang with denunciations. The parishes, headed by Jenatsch, set out upon a "flag-march" against Rudolf Planta, who, from his arbitrary manners, was very unpopular. He himself escaped but his castle of Wildenberg was sacked, and the correspondence found in his house revealed the names of his supporters. In vain Pompejus Planta invoked the protection of the Diet; the deputies were overawed by the multitudes who streamed down from the mountains under the banners of their parishes towards Chur and Ilanz, whilst smaller detachments were sent to arrest the leaders of the Spanish party in the Valtelline and at Chiavenna.

About the same time some Protestant partizans in the Grey League circulated proposals for a massacre of the Catholics. The writers stated that men of high standing in the Engadine were anxious to exterminate the betrayers of their country and, for all that fools were saying about them, thought it better to fall in battle than to die by the headman's hand. As yet only the members of the God's House League had been convened as they were anxious to purge themselves of the stain of Spaniolism which they had incurred the year before. Nothing had yet been done in the Ten Jurisdictions, but there had been some rioting in four districts of the Grey League, and every one there was now utterly against the Spaniards. "Be sure of this: we must win once and for all, or all perish together. When we have found the Spanicizers' nests we must either hurl them to the ground and destroy both eggs and chicks, or if they get the best of us we must bear the hardest of yokes for all time to come."

In this letter was enclosed a document headed "Instructions to the Preachers" in which the plan for uprooting the influence of the Spaniards was set forth in detail. It began with the assertion that the liberties of the Protestants, especially in the Lower Engadine, were in the greatest danger from the Papists and Spaniards. Hitherto they had defended themselves by cunning

diplomacy, but this would avail them no longer, as there was not a country chawbacon who thought a Protestant's word worth a farthing. They would now have to employ another weapon, that of quick, sharp action, "and by that we shall prevail." They must not give their opponents a moment's breathing space. "Let us then act daringly. If we would deserve well of our fatherland, we must break out where no man looks for us, and play neck or nothing." They must win over the country people with courteous, silken words, so that "they may look upon us as Fathers of the Fatherland and shepherds of souls, and do our best to make them mistrust all Papists and Spaniards, and become zealous defenders of religious liberty." The Papists were upon no account, however, to be driven to desperation, unless they could be caught and killed at the same stroke. "For those who are at bay are oftener than not held to be in the right for that very reason, and they will find supporters in every quarter." In the meantime the Protestants must seek to gain partisans by every means whether "by bribery (for they would sell their souls for money)" or by encouraging ill-feeling amongst the Catholics, and by getting the noisier of the self-styled patriots out of their way. These gentlemen were looked upon by the vulgar as heroes and so would make excellent agents for stirring up trouble amongst them. "In a word, we owe our safety solely to the cowardliness and want of spirit of our adversaries." If they did not strike whilst the iron was hot, they would lose their chance once and for all. Every art of intrigue, chicanery, and calumny must be set to work to stir up factions amongst their opponents. Traps must be laid to ensnare the best and most high-minded of their leaders. "We must drive them from the country, cast them forth, and slay them, but be careful to do this in such a fashion that it may appear to be the act not of ourselves but of the deputies of the Grisons," as "it will thus be an easy matter for us to put a stop to any risk which might seem to threaten our own necks. Let us cut off the tallest ears, first the bishops, the abbots, the prelates, the preachers who speak against us, and then the Spaniolizing politicians; let us set the others at loggerheads amongst themselves and they will tear one another to pieces. Let us exalt some and set down others, and so they can easily be kept in hand without danger, for if we do not cut them down we shall be cut down ourselves, but once we have got them in our

grip we have nothing to fear." The Protestants would have the Diet in their hands, and could imperceptibly secure the bulk of the people, "and, if I may say so in a word, we can make ourselves safe for ever by the banishment or death of three hundred men." If they could not win over the whole of the Diet they might, with the support of the peasants, enlist its leaders, at least, in their ranks, and if they took care not to offend the magistrates by acting too openly, they might secure every debtor and vagabond in the Leagues by promises of plunder.

Such was the letter addressed by "Yours truly whom you know," to the "Reverend Nicholas Anton, Minister of God's Word at St. Peter's at Schänfigg." Together with another from Pastor Stephen Gabriel of Ilanz, in which plans against the Catholics were recommended to the consideration of his colleagues, it speedily found its way into the hands of the Bishop of Chur.

The "Instructions to the Preachers" were not destined to remain a dead letter. They form the clue to the policy pursued by the Protestants of the French and Venetian party against the Catholics and the supporters of the Spaniards during the next two years, a policy which explains, if it does not justify, that act of revenge which is known as the Massacre of the Valtelline. So far as can be seen, the Catholics up to July, 1618, had done nothing whatsoever which could serve as a pretext for such measures on the part of their opponents, and such proposals can only be looked upon as a proof of the lengths to which political factions could go in the Grisons Commonwealth.

It cannot be denied that these documents are genuine. Whilst they were being circulated from valley to valley, and from manse to manse, some of the Engadiners who had been sent into the Valtelline arrested two of the local Catholic leaders, Prevost of Val Bregaglia and Giovanni Rusca, Archpriest of Sondrio, and sent them under a guard to Thusis.

At Thusis a Bloody Assize Court was at once set up. It was formed of sixty peasants who chose as their assessors nine of the more violent pastors, several of whom had been prominent in the troubles in the Engadine. These assessors, as might be expected, regulated the proceedings of the Court at their pleasure. It was left to them to lay before the tribunal every charge which could be raked up against the partisans of Spain. These

"angels turned imps" shewed themselves "blood-thirstier than any lynx." No opponent of the Venetian party could hope for a fair trial. The rack was in constant use. The Bloody Assize of Thuisis lasted from August, 1618, until January, 1619. During that time one hundred and fifty-seven persons were sentenced, some to death, some to banishment, and some to confiscation of their property, or to heavy fines, by men who acted at once as judges, jurymen and witnesses. Prominent amongst the worst of them were Johann à Porta and Caspar Alexius. The former had been educated for the priesthood by his kinsman Beatus, a former bishop of Chur. He had been struck by lightning at Davos but his escape had only hardened his heart. In 1613 he had been elected priest of Zizers by the parishioners and had forthwith bribed a certain Waleric Winkler to accuse certain prominent Catholic clergy and monks of having procured an Indulgence from the Holy Father to commit offences during the heats of summer which would have disgusted the dwellers in the Cities of the Plain. Winkler was promptly cited before the local courts by the injured persons to answer for his slanders, and confessed that he had been induced to make them by Johann à Porta. On this Maximilian Johann à Porta and other preachers, with whom the court was crowded, broke out into loud cries against the judges "as is their usual way," drove away the witnesses for the prosecution, and seem, indeed, to have prevented the tribunal from pronouncing a verdict. Caspar Alexius, who was the son of a small farmer at Sondrio, and who during his studies at Zurich "had scarcely wetted his lips with learning," was pastor of Camogask, and was known as a brutal scoundrel who was falser "than Jambres." It was owing to these two men that the Tribunal of Thuisis was induced to order the torture and execution of Rusca, the Archpriest of Sondrio.

Rusca's condemnation was, indeed, the crowning outrage of the Bloody Assize. The Archpriest was a man of over fifty, of quiet and blameless life and well known for his knowledge of Hebrew, Greek, and Latin. He had lived upon very intimate terms with the leading Grisons members of the provincial administration. On account of constant attacks of fever he had setons in his arms and was thus less able to endure the torture of the cord. The charge brought against him was that, in the year 1594, he had joined in a conspiracy either to kill Scipio Calandrini, the Protestant pastor of Sondrio, or

to kidnap him and carry him to the Inquisition at Milan. This accusation was solely based upon some evidence which, in 1608, had been extorted under torture from a bravo of bad character. Rusca was able to prove that he had already been tried upon this charge at Chur and had been acquitted, yet, notwithstanding this, he was put to the question. On Sunday, the first of September, he was thrice drawn up in the strappado, although weights were not hung upon his feet. Next day he was twice jerked in the same fashion, and it was found that he had fainted. He was let down but shortly after passed away. It was then seen that his mouth was covered with blood and that he had bitten through his tongue. Two days afterwards Rusca's body was buried by the hangman under the gallows. Though the preachers gave out that he had been poisoned by his gaoler, it was soon publicly known that he had expired upon the cord. The more moderate Evangelicals vainly blamed the tyranny of these self-appointed judges, which was destined to be terribly avenged upon their co-religionists in the Valtelline. His fellow prisoner Prevost was executed.

On September the fifteenth Johann von Flügi, the aged Bishop of Chur, was condemned to death as a Spanish sympathiser and was forced to seek refuge with Archduke Leopold in the Tyrol. The goods of the See were confiscated and heavy fines were imposed upon the Chapter. Much of the money went into the pockets, to all appearance, of such men as Johann à Porta, who went about bragging that he was Bishop of Chur, and was usually saluted by that title by his intimates. Men far more able to defend themselves than Archpriests and Canons were not left unscathed. Rudolf and Pompejus Planta were condemned to banishment for life, under penalty of having their arms and legs cut off by the hangmen if they were taken in the Leagues. Their property was confiscated, their houses were pulled down, and a price of twelve thousand francs [£480] was set upon their heads. The Plantas flew into Switzerland, with the firm purpose of chastising their ruthless persecutors, and though their vengeance was for a time delayed it was none the less terrible.

Such was the Bloody Assize of Thusis, which was the cause of those troubles which not only for a time ruined the Grisons, but also brought about that contest between France and Spain, which was to give the French for nearly fifty years supremacy in

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Europe. As Robustelli, the leader of the revolt in the Valtelline said with truth in his manifesto to the Catholic Powers, the fact that these tribunals allowed themselves to forget every instinct of justice at the bidding of the preachers, could only mean that they were determined to destroy the Catholics root and branch.

The Catholics, in their turn, sought their revenge by means on which custom had conferred some show of legality. The villages of the Grey League set out upon a "Flag March" to Chur which they found crowded with men who had hastened thither from the God's House League and the Ten Jurisdictions to defend the Protestant Cause. After some fearful rioting the Evangelicals were driven from the town, and the Grey Leaguers set up a Bloody Assize at Chur which met at the beginning of January, 1619, revised all the sentences pronounced by the Thuis Tribunal, and inflicted punishments on the preachers in the Lower Engadine. In their turn, the Protestants set up an Assize at Davos which proceeded to enforce the sentences pronounced at Thuis, and compelled those who had incurred the penalty of banishment to quit the Grisons. The exiles took refuge in Switzerland, in the Tyrol, and in the Milanese and besieged the Catholic Cantons, Archduke Leopold and the Duke of Feria with appeals for help.

The Catholic Powers, however, were in no position to come to their assistance. Their thoughts were occupied with the Bohemian question and with the approaching Imperial Election, whilst, for the time at least, Spain was unwilling to depart from her policy of inaction. The Governors of the Spanish provinces in Italy, however, considered themselves to be all but independent of the Government at Madrid, and were often inclined to embark upon a policy of adventure without waiting for its approval. Feria, so he imagined, saw that his fortune would be made if he could secure for his master the coveted right of "Passage" through the Rhoetian Alps and did not therefore, hesitate to give his ear to those who had suffered so much in the cause of Spain. He may, indeed, have suspected or even known that the Protestants in the Leagues were already engaged in those intrigues with the Bohemian rebels with regard to the subject of the Passage, which some months later were to take a form very dangerous to the interests of the Hapsburgs. As early as March, 1619, the Heads of the Three Leagues wrote from Chur to warn the parishes that Alonso Casati the Spanish Agent at Lucerne was only waiting for the arrival of Maximilian Moor from Milan to invade the Val.

telline with Spanish forces, and that it might be expected that an insurrection would break out there at the beginning of April. A little later on a Spanish Agent arrived at Innsbrück from Milan and invited the Archduke Leopold to support such an insurrection by making a diversion in the neighbourhood of the Umbrail Pass. At the end of May the Duke of Savoy signed the Treaty of Rivoli, by which, as has been seen, another barrier was raised to close the Alpine Passes to the Spaniards and the Austrians.

In the Grisons meanwhile the last traces of legal order had been effaced by the action of the Tribunal at Davos. The efforts of the Swiss Cantons to mediate proved fruitless. Johann à Porta and his confederates were reported to be plotting against all the neighbouring Catholic States, and had given bitter offence to the Archduke Leopold by seizing the Abbey of Churwalden of which he was protector so that the foreign powers had good reasons for intervening to restore tranquillity in the Leagues. For the moment Spain found an unexpected ally in the French, who had already been gravely offended by the treatment which had been meted out to the official interpreters of their Legation, Rudolf and Pompejus Planta. In the vain hope of checking intrigues from outside, the Diet had expelled all the foreign agents from Chur, amongst them being Gueffier the representative of France. In his fury at this insult he panted only for revenge and his Secretary, Antonio de Molina, a native of Val Mesocco, lent him valuable aid in effecting his purpose.

An agreement between Spain and the Grisons was, it is true, in force, but, in the eyes of the Bishop of Chur, its terms were most detrimental, both to the Catholic Religion and to the rights of the Bishopric, and he wrote to the Nuntio in Switzerland that he wished to resign his See. Possibly in consequence of this letter Ferdinand II., who had been elected Emperor at the end of August, wrote on October 20th to the Three Leagues calling upon them to protect the Bishop and the Chapter. The Imperial Missive seems to have been looked upon as a challenge by the Protestants, and on October 28th, they cited the Bishop, who, since he had been sentenced to death by the Tribunal at Thusis, had been living in exile in the Tyrol, under penalty of forfeiture of life and goods before a fresh tribunal which they had set up at Zizers. The outrages upon the Abbey of Churwalden and upon the See and Chapter of Chur together with the death of Rusca were keenly felt by the Catholics throughout the Leagues,

and it was obvious that if they rose against their oppressors they would do so with the approval both of the Imperial authorities and of their ecclesiastical superiors.

The Imperial authorities indeed would not have been without legal justification upon other grounds for their intervention. Both the Grisons and the See of Chur were members of the Empire, and the preservation of all rights of transit was one of the duties specially incumbent upon the Emperor. Yet when in September, 1619, the Elector Frederick was chosen King of Bohemia, Johann à Porta and Caspar Alexius went upon a mission to Prague, as envoys from a party at least amongst the Protestants, to congratulate him upon his election, and to engage in the name of the Three Leagues that they would not grant a passage through the Valtelline to the Emperor, to the King of Spain or, indeed, to any prince soever. It is uncertain, however, whether these envoys were acting with the authority of the Leaguers or not.

The election of Frederick had, as we have seen, aroused Spain from her apathy as to European affairs. On September 24th, Philip III. had written to Oñate that he was upon no account to interfere in the Bohemian question, but when, at the end of October, he learnt that the rebels had chosen the Palatine for their King, he instructed Archduke Albert to take action forthwith without waiting for further orders from Spain. The Archduke at once proceeded to send for troops from Milan and, as both the Emperor and Bavaria were clamorous for help, proposed to occupy the Lower Palatinate with thirty thousand foot and five thousand horse until such time as Frederick could be put to the ban.

Under these circumstances the question of the Passage became more important than ever as such a force could not be collected in Flanders unless with the help of reinforcements from Italy and Spain.

Of these facts Rudolf and Pompejus Planta were fully aware. During the early winter they made a visit to Alsace, and from there proceeded by Constance and the Tyrol to Lombardy and Soleure, where the Diet of the Swiss Cantons had assembled early in January, 1620. Everywhere they solicited help for the Catholic cause and they found a ready hearing alike from Archduke Leopold and Feria. At Soleure they met Robert Myron, the Ambassador of France with whom Gueffier was then staying. The Catholic Cantons were desirous that the Diet should send an

expedition into the Leagues to support an offer of mediation on the part of the Confederates, and to put down the contending factions by force of arms, but the proposal fell through owing to a dispute between Bern and Fribourg. Myron loaded the Diet with reproaches for their fractious conduct.

The French Ambassador told the Protestants in so many words that the horrors perpetrated by the Tribunal at Davos made their hearts beat with joy. Myron had already learnt from the Plantas that a secret envoy from Milan had induced Archduke Leopold to promise that he would support a Catholic rising if one took place, and to prepare to occupy the Münsterthal. Feria would assist the Catholics in the Valtelline, if they rose under native leaders, and organise a simultaneous attack on the Hinterrheinthal from Val Mesocco. All these forces were to advance upon Chur, where a Bloody Assize would seal the Catholic triumph. From Soleure the Plantas proceeded to Altdorf where they are said to have had some conversations with Casati which had momentous results for the future of the Three Leagues. [For the interview between the Plantas and Casati. Cf. *Faszbind, Thos. Gesch. des Kantons Schwyz* (Schwyz, Kalin, 1834), Vol. IV., pp. 85-86.]

It was about this time, in the middle of January, 1620, that Philip III. sent definite orders to Archduke Albert to undertake the expedition to the Palatinate, which the Archduke at the end of December, 1619, had asked him to sanction without delay. On the third of February three separate despatches were sent from Brussels to Madrid to ask for the appointment of a general to command it, but it was not until the fourteenth of April that it was finally decided that Spain should occupy the Palatinate. By that time the Catholic Electors had met at Mühlhausen, and had determined to maintain strict neutrality. When it became clear that the Spaniards could not rely upon the help of the Catholic League in carrying out the Ban against the Palatine, the question of sending reinforcements from Italy to Flanders became one of pressing importance. The Protestants were keenly alive to this, and Gabaleone informed Charles Emmanuel at the beginning of April of the delight which Dohna had expressed at his refusal of Feria's request to be allowed to send troops over the passes of the Western Alps, and at the contempt with which he had rejected the Pope's demand for the payment of a tithe for the German War. Nor could any Catholic be indifferent to the fate which menaced his co-religionists in the Valtel-

line at the hands of à Porta and Alexius, who were also urging the Protestants to attack Spain and Austria.

The line taken by Savoy seems to have made it plain that Spain would have to take action without delay if she wished to retain the power of sending her troops by land from Genoa to Flanders. But, at the same time, the dates given serve to show that it is most unlikely that Casati, in January, 1620, should have received orders from Philip III. or a suggestion from Archduke Albert to arrange for a massacre of the Protestants in the Valtelline. [*Brussels, E et G*, 183, Archduke Albert to Philip III., 14, 22 December, 1619; 16, 31 January, 1620. *Do.* 184, 3, 24 February; 14, 18 April; 14, 31 May; 16 June, 1620. *Do.* Philip III. to Archduke Albert, 24 September, 5 November, 9 December, 1619, *Do.* 1 January, 3, 24 February; 23, 25 March; 9, 31 May; 10 June, 1620. *Turin, Ing*, 3 Gabaleone to Duke, 4 April, 1620.]

Many Grisons exiles had joined the Plantas at Altdorf, and, on the twenty-fifth of April, 1620, they signed a document which was to prove the ultimate cause of that Massacre in the Valtelline which History has never forgotten, but there is no proof that any Spanish agent was responsible for the step.

This document is preserved in the Episcopal Archives at Chur and is what in Scottish history is usually known as a "Band," or a bond by which several persons agree to act together for a common political object.

Its signatories were Lucius v. Mundt, Pompejus Planta, Ant. à Molina, Jörg Siborsch, Joh. Anton Gioier, Jos. v. Capolli, Balthasar v. Mundt, Fabio à Prevosti, Daniel v. Planta, Jos. Curay, Hans Lion.

Of these Pompejus Planta was the most important of the Catholic leaders who had been banished from the Leagues by the Assize of Thuzis, whilst Antonio à Molina was Secretary Interpreter to the French Legation at Chur and later on was himself French Minister to the Grisons. There seems to have been no representative of Spain amongst the signatories unless the Plantas were authorised to act on behalf of Casati.

The text runs as follows :

"In view of the fact that some faithless members of the Leagues are carrying on pernicious intrigues which jeopardize the liberties of our Fatherland, are persecuting ourselves and many others amongst our fellow-citizens, and have violated not only the Charters of the Leagues, but also their pledges and oaths to other

princes who are friendly to our country, the undersigned citizens of the Leagues engage and bind themselves to one another under the following conditions :—

“ (1) The General Charter of the Leagues and the other laudable treaties which have been entered into and sworn to by our ancestors shall remain in force.

“ (2) The liberties of the Fatherland shall be replaced upon their ancient footing and maintained.

“ (3) With this object every one shall do his utmost to resist the tyrannical policy of the Tribunals of Thusis and Davos, and strive to prevent it from being carried into effect.

“ (4) All the leaders, instigators, and ringleaders of these ruinous actions shall be punished or else rooted out as poisonous weeds and enemies of the Fatherland.

“ (5) We all and everyone of us, as well as all those who are wronged, shall be assisted to obtain impartial, Godly, and equitable justice, be freed from the tyranny practised against us, and be compensated for the damage, which we have sustained, out of the goods and chattels of the tyrants.

“ (6) In accordance with the Charter a good police shall be established.

“ (7) We will remain united in thought and deed. If any disputes arise amongst us as to the business in question, certain of us shall decide them and we must all comply with their decision.

“ (8) A special Trust shall be formed, which, like every one of us who is entrusted with money for our praiseworthy work, shall inform the Society of the fact, and shall render a true account of the same when requested by any of our number to do so. If anyone has lent money for this business it shall be repaid him, or if anyone has under stress of necessity been a borrower from our funds, he shall pay back the amount *pro rata*.

“ (9) We swear that with God's help, we will never desert one another, but will stand by one another faithfully with goods and blood, and carry out what is set down above.

“ In case violence is used against any of us we will protect and shelter him with all our power. He of us who does not hold to his promise shall be accounted dishonourable and faithless.

“ (10) We swear that we will not reveal any thing which has been decided upon here, whether verbally or in writing, without the knowledge and consent, and unanimous approval of us all. When the business has been completely carried out, all the three

originals (of this agreement) shall be collected together and burnt.

"Done at Altdorf on the 25th of April, 1620."

The "Band of Altdorf" set the seal upon the policy which, in July, 1620, brought about the insurrection of the Valtelline Catholics which had its sequel in the massacre of the Valtelline Protestants, but it is more than improbable that any such wholesale murder was contemplated by those who signed it.

Even its Fourth Article is only directed against the ringleaders in the Tribunals of Thuzis and of Davos, and states that, if these leaders cannot be punished by the Law, they are to be "rooted out," by other means, as "enemies of the Fatherland." It may be true that those who put their names to such an agreement in the England of our day would be looked upon as murderers, but it may be doubted if, in the Seventeenth Century, they would have been regarded as such in any European country except England. It was, indeed, almost everywhere held permissible to employ any and every means to punish oppressors whom the law was too weak to reach. The policy of the Vehmgericht in Westphalia, of the Council of Ten at Venice and of the Aulic Council at Vienna, which used poison as a means of removing dangerous opponents, was, in its essence, inspired by this spirit; in Scotland, "Bands," like the Band "of Altdorf" were, in practice, regarded as legitimate weapons in political warfare, whilst, in England, such courts as the "Star Chamber," which had been called into existence to supplement the ordinary courts, were, when considered from a legal point of view, nothing but legalised illegality. In reality, those who wished to punish the authors of the War of 1914 by resorting to the forms of law, would have acted in a very similar fashion to the founders of the Star Chamber, for it is hardly consistent with the spirit of any modern code to create crimes by *ex post facto* legislation. The "Band of Altdorf" was designed to punish those who had circulated the "Instruction to the Preachers."

The "Band" was certainly not drawn up at the direct instigation of Spain. Molina, as has been said, was the Secretary of the French Legation at Chur, and the first article which provides for the maintenance of existing treaties, is worded so as to serve the interests of France rather than those of Spain, for the French connection with the Grisons dated back to the time of Francis I. It is true that, as early as November, 1620, it was generally

believed in Italy that Casati and Gueffier, the French Minister at Chur, were the authors of the rising in the Valtelline. [*London, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 11,309, "Letters of Fray Fulgentio to the Duke of Buckingham (1616-1626.)"* Fulgentio to Buckingham, November, 1620.] But although we shall find Pompejus Planta, one of the signatories, giving orders a few weeks later, that the passes from the Valtelline into the Grisons should be guarded, so as to prevent anyone from escaping into the Leagues, there is no evidence to show that a massacre was contemplated. Indeed some statements which, in January, 1622, the Duke of Fera made to the Deputies from the Grisons who had come to Milan to treat for an alliance with Spain, may serve to exculpate Casati from this charge. All these deputies were Protestants, yet the Duke, in an interview with them on the fifteenth of January, did not hesitate to say, "My King spends some hundred thousand crowns a year in France, so has got some good friends and correspondents in that Kingdom, who keep the French King from doing what he would like to do. You of the Religion, put your whole trust in that King, but he will best you yet for he has taken a most binding oath, to root out those of the Religion wholly and entirely."

"The Ambassadors replied that this might bring about a war between the two Crowns and, probably, one in France. The Lord Duke answered that it was not yet time to stir up one in France, but that the moment his own King had got his affairs in Germany satisfactorily settled, France would be attacked, and she would find her work cut out for her. He went on to say: "If this alliance with you gentlemen can also be arranged, it would give me a reason for going back to Spain with a joyful heart, as I shall be a great man there and be loaded with honours and rewards. You have put yourselves too much in the hands of the French Ambassador Gueffier, for I have letters of his which show that he is the principal originator of the rising in the Valtelline." Thereupon Lord Landrichter Schwind begged him to let him have a copy of the said letters, but the Duke replied, putting his hands on his breast: "Believe me, this is so, as I am a gentleman of honour." [*Chur, Episcopal Archives, Mappa 53. "Nota d'alcuni discorse et parolle, seguite tra il Duca di Fera, et li Ambasciatori della Legha Grisa,"* February, 1622.] Such was the report made to the Leagues, by their ambassadors in February, 1622. They added that "Another great Lord said: 'Gueffier has managed

his master's business in the Leagues so well that, if he went back to France, he ought to have two heads for he would assuredly lose one of them.' "

It is possible that in his irritation at the result of his campaign against the Huguenots in 1621, Louis XIII. may have taken an oath to exterminate them. It seems incredible that Feria when treating for an alliance with the Deputies of the Leagues scarcely eighteen months after the Massacre of the Valtelline should have dared to assert that Gueffier had been the chief author of the insurrection which had brought it about, if he had felt conscious that the deputies would have been thoroughly justified in reproaching him with his own share in it. It is true that, once the Catholic Valtelliners had risen, Feria, on his own responsibility, did all in his power to support them, but that by no means involves him in the guilt of having premeditated the massacre which followed on the rising. On the whole it seems most probable that neither Feria, Casati, nor, perhaps, even Gueffier, were directly responsible for the Valtelline Massacre, but that it was the outcome of an outburst of passion on the part of an ignorant and fanatical mob, driven mad by the wrongs which they had so long endured at the hands of their oppressors from the Grisons.

The terms of the "Band of Altdorf" were kept secret, but the public soon became aware that some important agreement had been arrived at by the leaders of the Grisons exiles. Fabio à Prevosti began to enrol men at Milan, where many immigrants from the Leagues were established, as a force for an attack on the Valtelline. So openly were his levies conducted that the very children playing in the streets, and the maids drawing water at the conduits were gossiping about the intended massacre, which was said to be fixed for the twenty-fourth of June. Several persons, amongst them a former nurse in the family of Senator Papirio Cattaneo at Milan, informed the Tribunal at Davos. Their statements were confirmed to some slight extent by particulars sent to Chiavenna by the Burghermaster of Zurich, and by letters signed by Pompejus Planta and Hans Lion, and addressed to Molina which fell into the hands of the authorities. In these Molina and his associates were urged to carry out their promises as everything was in readiness and orders had been given to watch the passes so that no one might escape. Through their agents Giovanni Guiciardi and Giulio della Torre, the conspirators in the Valtelline itself were in close touch with the exiles at Milan,

but there seems to be no evidence to show that they had any correspondence with the Government at Madrid, whilst though Archduke Albert again and again pointed out that the expedition to the Palatinate could not be carried out without reinforcements from Italy, he evidently had not the slightest idea that an insurrection in the Valtelline was in contemplation. If, then, Feria had a hand in the matter, he acted entirely on his own responsibility, and it is certain that even if he favoured an insurrection, the guilt of the massacre does not lie at his door.

All through the early summer of 1620, the Leaguers in conclave at Thusis were receiving warnings of the approaching risings, but the warnings fell on deaf ears. Possibly the failure of Maximilian Moor's scheme for invading the Valtelline from the Milanese had lulled them into security. Pietro Vico, the Venetian Envoy in Zurich, wrote in urgent terms to entreat the Leagues to arm against such a conspiracy. No answer was returned to his request until his letter had been referred for consideration to all the councils and parishes. Vico came in person to Chur, but the Heads of the Leagues refused him an audience. Colonel Guler, the President of the Court proposed that reinforcements should be sent into the Valtelline but his proposal was rejected on account of the expense involved in carrying it out.

One precaution was, however, taken by the Diet. For the sake of economy they had garrisoned their Italian frontier with Militia from the Valtelline which they had placed under the command of Giovanni Giacomo Robustelli, a nephew of Rudolf Planta, who had himself been sentenced to a fine of seven hundred florins, [£58 6s. 8d.] by the Davos Tribunal, and who had not yet forgotten the wrongs which he had sustained at their hands.

In the middle of July the storm burst. All of a sudden Austrian troops assembled on the Luziensteig, the pass over which runs the road from Germany and the Vorarlberg to Mayenfeld and Chur. Gioier and Molina, two of the signatories of the "Band of Altdorf," invaded the Hinterrheinthal by the San Bernardino from Val Mesocco, and Pompejus Planta burst into the Münsterthal, sacked the villages, expelled the Reformed preachers, and forced the inhabitants to swear allegiance to Austria which claimed feudal rights over the valley. For a moment Colonel Guler drove back Gioier into Val Mesocco and thus prevented Planta from advancing into the Lower Engadine, but his triumph was short-lived. On the twentieth of July news reached him that the

Valtelline was in revolt and that every Protestant in the valley was a fugitive or a corpse. [*Brussels, E et G*, 184. Archduke Albert to Philip III., 16 June; 1, 6, 9 July; 2, 12 August, 1620. Philip III. to Archduke Albert, 10 June; 15 July; 1, 5 August, 1620. Chur, *Episcopal Archives*. Mappa 53, "The Band of Altdorf, 25 April. *Copia della lettera scritta ai Communi Catholici*, 28 July, 1620. *Ein Bericht dem nuntius über Verchiedenes besonders über die Predicanten Joh. á Porta und Caspar Alexi*, 16 October, 1622. London, *Brit. Mus., Royal Mss.*, 14a. XIII., Molino, F. *Relatione di Savoia*, 1586, p. 634. Moor, Carl, *Gesch. v. Curratien* (Chur, 1870), quoting Muller, *Schweizerische Gesch. Porta, Historia Reformationis*, Sprecher, "Schweiz. Gesch," *Berner Neujahrsblatt*. Ragaz, Professor, Dr. J. *Die Bundner Geschichte, in elf Vortragen* (Chur, 1902), quoting Planta, "History of the Planta Family." Rott, Edouard, *Mery de Vic et Padavino, Quelques Pages de l'Histoire diplomatique des Lignes Suisses et Guises au commencement du XVII. me Siècle* (Basel, F. Schneider, 1881.) Do., *Inventaire sommaires des documents relatifs a l'histoire de la Suisse* (Berne-Collin, 1881-9, Do. *Histoire de la Representation diplomatique de la France auprès des Cantons suisses* (Berne, 1900), Hanotaux, G. op. cit., *Times Historians*, etc., op. cit., Vol. XI., Vol. XVI. Mayer, K. *Konversations Lexikon*. Art. Vol. VIII., "Graubünder," *Le Poste Necessaire* etc., op. cit. (Brescia, da J. B. Bozzolo, appr. D. Tarlino, 1562.) The following are also used in this chapter: *Turin Trattati Diversi*, I. Treaty of Rivoli, 18 May, 1619. Chur, Mappa 53, Translation of a Letter from Pastor Stephen Gabriel of Ilanz to the Preachers, 15 June, 1618. *Gottlose Pläne der Predicanten, Der Mordplan, Instructio Predicantium*, 7 July, 1618. Bishop John of Chur to the Nuncio, 23 September. Emperor to the Grisons, 20 October. Summons to the Bishop to appear before the Tribunal at Zizers, 28 October, 1619. "A description of the outrages committed by the Protestants upon the Catholics," 1 January, 1620. Venice, Archives, *Frari, Svizzeri*. Vico Pietro to Senate of Venice, Zurich, 27 January; June, 1620, quoted by Rott. London, *S.P.O., S.P. For, Germany* (States), Vol. 14. Elector Palatine to Duke of Bouillon, January, 1615., James I. to Elector Palatine, 27 February, Elector Palatine, Answer to Sir Henry Wootton's Proposals, 27 April, 1616. Ditto, *S. P. For, Savoy*, Vol. 2, Sir Albertus Morton to Winwood quoting conversation with Marshal de Lesdiguières, 23 January. Carleton to Winwood (quoting letter to himself from James I.,

dated 3 December, 1613), Turin. 26 March, 1615, *London, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS.*, 11,309, "Letters of Fray Fulgentio to Duke of Buckingham (1616-1626), "November, 1620." *Ditto, Royal MSS.*, 14 A. XIII., *Molino, F. Relazione di Savoia*, 1586, p. 634. *Faszbind, Thos., Gesch des Kantons Schwyz* (Schwyz, Kalin, 1834), Vol. IV., pp. 85-86].

CHAPTER LI

"BEHOLD, I, even I, will bring a flood of waters upon the earth." Such were the words which Savonarola had taken for his text, when, from the pulpit of their *Duomo*, he had announced to the Florentines the coming of the French into Italy. Such were the words which should have echoed through every church in the Grisons on that fateful Sunday, July the nineteenth, 1620, when the Valtelliners rose against their oppressors.

Signs and portents, which, in later years, were interpreted as omens of some coming woe, had not been lacking. At Sondrio, on May the eighth, the festival of its patrons, Saints Gervasius and Protasius, the watchmen who had kept watch upon the church tower on the previous night, told the town authorities, that at midnight the church had streamed with a mysterious light, and that they had heard a noise as of a crowd of people loudly disputing.

When they approached with a lantern the brightness suddenly disappeared, the voices were hushed, and the weights of the clock which were stones fastened to cords were dashed to the ground, whilst the great clock bell on the same night pealed violently several times.

During that same month of May the inhabitants of Poyra often heard low singing and a wailing voice issuing from their chapel by night, and the older of them recalled that the same sounds had been heard when the vallies were ravaged by a pestilence in 1588.

The Protestants in the Valtelline were constantly receiving warnings of their danger from their Catholic neighbours, and pedlars and beggars had repeated to the magistrates that it was the common talk in the Milanese that the heretics were to be murdered. These warnings remained unheeded. At last a messenger was arrested at Mantello with letters from Giacomo Robustelli and Gio. Guiciardi to Gio. Martino Paravicini, asking him to hold his men in readiness to assist them on Sunday, July the twenty-sixth. The bearer had had time to throw the des-

patches into the Adda, but the news that he was arrested alarmed the conspirators so greatly that they resolved to hasten the rising by a week. Some inhabitants of Bianzone had been imprisoned by order of the Davos Tribunal for refusing to allow a Protestant preacher to be installed in the village, and had under torture made confessions which whether true or false implicated many of the richest and most distinguished Catholics. No further delay was possible.

On Sunday, July the nineteenth, the storm burst. Before day broke, the church bells were everywhere sounding the call to arms, and everywhere the multitudes armed themselves for the slaughter of the Protestants, not one of whom, despite the repeated warnings, had sought safety in flight. That the outbreak, however, was a political, as well as a religious one is shown by the statements even of Protestant writers that Catholic as well as Protestant officials were hounded down by the mob. The divisions between the parties even in the Valtelline did not indeed always coincide with religious lines, for the preacher Georg von Saluz had long been persecuted by his own colleagues on account of his sympathy with Spain.

The chief leaders in the rising were Giacomo Robustelli, with his associates Marco Antonio, and Simone Venosta, who were members of a family which had long been established at Grosio. According to tradition, it was in their Justice Room that the massacre was planned. That Justice Room, with its splendidly carved wainscoting of fragrant Arve wood, is now placed in the Engadine Museum at St. Moritz. The ceiling with its deeply moulded coats of arms is supported by caryatides, which represent men and women in every age of life with faces heavy with thought or contorted with grief and pain. Their bodies end in fishes' tails. Such surroundings were no inappropriate ones for such a conspiracy.

On Saturday, July the eighteenth, Robustelli arrived at Tirano with an armed band of a hundred and fifty of the most desperate bandits to be found in Brescia, Bergamo, and the Milanese. He at once sent out a party to Pietramala, a position which commands the road from the Bernina and Poschiavo by which alone help could arrive from the Grisons.

At daybreak the great bell rang out. Robustelli's followers began firing upon every Protestant who showed himself, and when the Catholics gathered in the churchyard, a man jumped

up upon the wall, and cried out that, by the command of Holy Church, every Lutheran in the valley, save only women and children under twelve years of age, was to be put to death that day. Plundering was strictly forbidden. Thereupon the crowd rushed to the Town Hall and armed themselves with the weapons stored in the armoury.

All the officials in the place were killed, many after making a desperate resistance, but the rabble rarely ventured to come to close quarters with them. The Protestant preacher Antonio Basso was shot down, and his head was nailed to the pulpit of his church, whilst the crowd yelled, "'Downie,' come down, you've preached enough." Basso's end was not soon forgotten. Months after his death his voice was heard preaching in his church at the usual hour of service, the bell rang and through the barred doors unseen lips were heard muttering in hollow tones: "Woe, woe to you! God's vengeance for the innocent blood poured forth here."

From Tirano the murderers went on to Teglio, where the populace had already been roused to madness by a report that Dutch soldiers were hidden in the valley and would exterminate the Catholics. The mob at once rushed to the church where the Protestants were assembled, and as its doors were blocked up with benches began firing through the windows. Thereupon the doors were opened and the women were allowed to come out, but the rest were shot down one by one as they showed themselves. Seventeen took refuge in the church tower: the mob heaped up the seats and pews at the foot of the stairs and set them alight. All were smothered.

Despite the efforts of the Chancellor of the Valleys, Nicholas Paravicini, to prevent a rising, similar scenes took place at Sondrio and a hundred and seventy Protestants perished in a massacre which lasted a week. In all eight hundred victims fell in the Valtelline, and in the territory of Bormio. The authority of the Grisons was overthrown. Robustelli established a provisional government, and as soon as the tidings reached Fort Fuentes a Spanish force was hurried up to support him.

Chiavenna, however, remained faithful to the Leagues, as it lay open to the Splügen and could only be approached from the Valtelline by a narrow road along the Lago di Mezzola.

Fugitives from the Valtelline speedily conveyed the tidings into the Grisons, amongst them was the notorious Caspar Alexius,

who now held the pastorate of Sondrio, his native place. He had received an early warning of the events at Tirano and Teglio, had thereupon collected some of his congregation and some boys who were boarding with him to learn Italian, and had made his way to the Alp of Sondrio where many Protestants lived. From there he hoped to reach the Engadine by traversing the higher mountains. The fugitives kept high above the Val Malenco where they could see the whole population under arms, but, at last, they were forced by hunger to descend into it near its head from which the Moretto Pass runs to the Maloja. Here they hid in a little wood, which gave its name to the neighbouring inn of Bosco. Through the gathering darkness they saw many scattered fires burning, but, when they sent out a scout to reconnoitre, he brought back word that they were the watchfires of the rebels. On this, they gave themselves up for lost, and slunk into the thickest coverts, "praying God to deliver them from this danger." Two cows strayed into the thicket and they were thus enabled to appease their hunger. This gave them some fresh hope. They remained in hiding all the next day. Towards evening they heard a sudden and terrible noise of fighting which, however, ceased again almost immediately, leaving them in doubt as to who had gained the victory. They again sent out some scouts who fell in with a band of militia from Val Bregaglia, which was on its march to occupy Bosco, and hold it until the Landsturm could arrive from the Grisons. The fugitives were thus saved from death by the sword or famine. Travers, the Captain of Sondrio, who was supposed to belong to the Spanish party, was made a prisoner by the rebels, but was soon released and sent into the Venetian territory.

Robustelli lost no time in appealing to the Catholic parishes of the Grisons, and sent to them as his representative Dr. Giacomo Parabelli with a letter explaining his reasons for his conduct.

His explanation was practically identical with that which, as we have seen, he gave at the same time to the Catholic Powers, and, it cannot be denied, that he had good grounds for his justification in the attitude of the Thuisis and Davos Tribunals towards the Catholics, and in the resolutions which had been privately taken by the Protestant Preachers, as to the means by which they hoped to extirpate the Catholic Religion. Robustelli does not, however, allude to the "Instruction to the Preachers." Possibly he was not aware of its existence. He contented himself

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with reminding the Catholic parishes that they would willingly have prevented these outrages had they not been prevented by their confederates from doing so. Of the civil administration of the Valtelline he spoke with well merited scorn, for it could not be denied that the Grisons had violated every condition to which they had agreed when the Valtelliners accepted their alliance. The Valtelliners, indeed, had always contended that they were the allies and not the subjects of the Leagues. They asserted that the rights which they had enjoyed under the agreement by which Mastino Visconti had early in the Fifteenth Century ceded the valley to the Bishop of Chur, could not be taken away either by its subsequent cession to the Grisons by Maximilian Sforza in 1512, although this cession had in 1519 been sanctioned by the Emperor Maximilian's Charter of Confirmation, or by the "Everlasting Peace" concluded between the Leagues and France in 1516. These claims were not without importance during the diplomatic controversies of the succeeding years. Robustelli concluded by saying that his one object was to maintain peace and order in the valleys and that he was most desirous to remain faithful to the Three Leagues.

Whatever Robustelli's own wishes may have been, the first object of the Leaguers, on receiving the tidings of the insurrection, was to recover territories which they looked upon as lost. By the twenty-ninth of July, two thousand men had been assembled at Chiavenna, and the forces of other districts were advancing by the Maloja to support the militia of Val Bregaglia. The expedition, however, resulted in a complete failure. The Catholics of the Grey League remained at home as they were unwilling to take up arms against their co-religionists: the Protestants in the Rhine Valley feared to stir whilst the Austrians were massed on the Luziensteig, and there was no proper co-operation between the two columns of the Leaguers. The Lords of the Grisons had already written to the Duke of Fria to remonstrate with him for having sent troops into the Valtelline. In his reply the Governor of Milan pointed out with studied insolence that Their High and Mighty Lordships seemed to think that it was in some degree to the interest of the Milanese to intervene in the Valtelline in support of the Catholic religion. As, on the contrary, such a pretension upon their part, supposing that it really existed, would be greatly to the detriment of that religion, he could not see upon what grounds he could interfere in such

matters. His only object in sending artillery from Riva into the valleys had been to preserve order.

Gueffier, apparently, speedily repented of what he had done. Directly he had received the news of the massacre, he wrote to Captain Rudolf von Schauenstein who was then taking the waters at Pfäfers, to say that if the Leaguers would follow his advice, he hoped to be able to settle the question without further bloodshed. The Leagues disdained to answer, and Gueffier in revenge entered into an intrigue with Casati and the Catholic Cantons in the hope of inducing them to refuse a passage to the troops whom Bern and Zurich were sending into the Grisons under Colonels Mülinen and Steiner. Thanks to bad generalship this expedition also was unsuccessful. The allied forces crossed into the Valtelline, but were defeated at Tirano by the rebels who were assisted by the Spaniards, and retired in disorder into the Rhine Valley.

Casati, like Gueffier, was overwhelmed when he heard what the outcome of his conversations with the Plantas had been. He fell into a deadly melancholy and sickness on learning the news, and if we may believe the report of a conversation between Feria and Dr. Parabelli "had, a week later received counter orders from the King and instructions not to mix himself up in the affairs of the Valtelline." Although this story, as it stands, rests upon the presumption that Casati had all along been acting under orders from Madrid, a presumption for which there is no proof whatsoever, it may yet serve as evidence to show that Casati had played no part in organising the massacre. Feria himself, according to the same authority, thought that if the Spaniards could get possession of the Valtelline and of the Umbrail Pass without a war, it would be a very good thing, but that if this could not be done they ought to give up all thoughts of doing so rather than draw the war into Italy, which he foresaw might be the result of any such attempt.

Great excesses had been committed during this expedition by the contingents from Bern and Zurich, who had massacred many Catholics, had profaned their churches, and had threatened to establish heresy by force. In consequence of their conduct, the five Catholic Cantons had sent an expedition over the Oberalp Pass to assist the Grey League. They had pushed on into the neighbourhood of Chur, and had been guilty of many atrocities against the Protestant Ministers. On their appearance the

leaders of the Venetian party fled from the country. About the same time Archduke Leopold offered to assist the Bishop of Chur to recover the Valtelline for his see in right of Mastino Visconti's grant two centuries before. The offer was not a wholly disinterested one for as Johann à Flugi had not as yet appointed a coadjutor, the Archduke might hope to secure the position for his own nominee. Moreover, as the Bishop of Chur was not only a suffragan of the See of Mainz, but also a vassal of the Empire, the Valtelline, if it were restored to his church, would thus come under the control of the Emperor and of one of the chief leaders of the Catholic League. Archduke Leopold's policy was, therefore, a far-sighted one, and it was justified by the fact that he had lately arrested Johann à Porta and Caspar Alexius in the disguise of merchants at Breisach on their way to Bohemia with a mission from the Protestant Leaguers. Bishop John at once informed the Curia of their capture and, in his reply, Cardinal Borghese, by the Pope's command, suggested that they should be sent to the Holy Office at Milan "where the wretches might be brought back by reflexion to a better frame of mind." They were however detained in the Archduke's prisons at Innsbrück under the watchful eyes of their own diocesan.

The Kingdom of Bohemia was already tottering to its fall. By the middle of September, 1620, Spinola was overrunning the Palatinate and Maximilian of Bavaria had forced his way through the circle of the Bohemian mountains. Victory seemed once more to be returning to the House of Hapsburg. The Grey Leaguers plucked up their courage at the news. They entered into negotiations with Feria upon their own account, and came to an agreement with him by which the Valtelline was to be restored to the Leagues on the conditions that the exercise of the Reformed Religion was forbidden in that territory, that they concluded an alliance with Spain and that they granted the right of passage to her armies. Naturally the two other Leagues refused to ratify these terms, and for a moment the dissolution of the Commonwealth seemed to be imminent.

The attitude of Austria, meanwhile, was a somewhat remarkable one. Bishop Flügi was still in exile at Innsbrück, and Archduke Leopold was doing his utmost to induce him to appoint an Austrian as his coadjutor, and had informed him that he must not upon any account fill up the office without his knowledge. At the same time, as we learn from a letter from Oñate to Philip III.,

the Imperial Ambassador at Rome interviewed the Pope about the beginning of November, and asked him to persuade the French and Venetians to quiet down the troubles in the Valtelline so as to leave a freer hand to the King of Spain. Paul the Fifth promised that he would do so, but begged that the Emperor would join in the request. He expressed great fears that war would break out, as he knew that the King of France had written to the King of Spain to say that unless the Spaniards took their hands off the Valtelline, or some arrangement could be arrived at there, he would have to make a move. "His Holiness also told me that the Duke of Savoy is anxious to avail himself of this opportunity to reassert his claims to Monferrat, and to take action in the matter. His Holiness wishes that the Governor of Milan would have looked upon these negotiations as a means for forming the Valtelline into a new canton, a plan which had, he said, been suggested to the Duke." As but a few years before the disputes between the Catholics and Protestants in Appenzell had been settled by dividing the Canton into two half cantons without prejudice to its position amongst the Swiss Confederates, the Pope's suggestion appears more feasible than that of handing over the Valtelline to a Bishop of Chur, who was an Austrian nominee.

Ferdinand II. handed this despatch to Oñate who, when transmitting it to Madrid, pointed out, as has already been said, that any settlement to the benefit of the House of Hapsburg and the Catholic League, which did not offer equivalent advantages to the French, would certainly involve Spain in a war with France, and we have seen that Oñate's advice had led Philip III. to instruct Archduke Albert to treat for the renewal of the Truce with the Dutch.

A few days after the Pope's conversation with the Imperial Ambassador, the news of the Battle of the White Mountain rang through Europe. The triumph of Catholicism seemed assured. In his exultation Bishop John à Flugi at once wrote to Feria to claim the Valtelline, Bormio, and Chiavenna, on the ground that more than two centuries before these territories had been given to the See of Chur by Mastino Visconti. No Spanish statesman could view with equanimity the establishment of a fresh ecclesiastical principality in the Italian lands. Feria, when instructing his agent Maglino to treat with the Bishop, simply denied the right of Mastino to make any such cession of territories which he

had never possessed. The envoy was at the same time to urge the Bishop to persuade the Catholics in the Leagues to refuse Gueffier's offer to restore the Valtelline to the Grisons with the help of France. This would be an injury to the Catholic Faith, for Gueffier was conspiring with the Venetian Agent to set up the Protestant against the Catholic party. Spain would do her utmost to assist the Valtelliners to resist any such attempt, and, if the Bishop remained faithful to her interests, she would restore him all his dues and rents. As the Bishop, before he received this offer, had written to inform Feria of Archduke Leopold's action with regard to his nomination of a coadjutor, and to say that he proposed to appoint Joseph Moor, a Canon of Chur, to the post, it is evident that in his heart he was a true friend to Spain.

France had looked on in silence whilst Spain was taking action in the Valtelline, and Gueffier, for a time, in his resentment at his treatment by the Protestants, had worked hand in hand with Casati to secure his revenge. In reality, however, the French viewed the situation in the Rhoetian Alps with alarm, but their troubles at home with the Huguenots, which were only partially settled in October, 1620, had forced them to remain quiescent. At the time of the dispute with the Huguenots, the Queen Mother Marie de Medicis had taken up arms against the King and it was not until late in October, after the Prince of Condé had totally defeated her forces at the Ponts de Cé near Angers, that she had become reconciled to her son and had agreed to reside at Court. Louis XIII. was, therefore, left free to devote his attention to the affairs of France abroad, and, despite the Double Marriages, France had by no means forgotten her traditional jealousy of Spain.

When, a few weeks later, the news of the events in Bohemia arrived, France started from her seeming lethargy. She at once made overtures to the Dutch and intervened in favour of the Grisons. Early in 1621 Gueffier was invited to re-enter Chur in state, and it was arranged that Marshal de Bassompierre should be sent on a mission to Madrid to demand that Spain should restore the Valtelline to its former owners and renounce her alliance with the Leagues.

Bassompierre left Paris on the ninth of February and reached St. Jean de Luz on the twenty-fifth, the first day of Lent. Here he was greatly entertained by a ballet which the Basques performed before him. On his road from Bayonne he had seen more

than fifty boats hunting a whale and her calf. The calf was driven ashore. Next day he went to see it and found to his surprise that it measured fifty feet in length, although the natives of the country thought that it was only a week old. He arrived at Burgos on the third of March, greatly admired the Cathedral and visited the "Christ of Burgos," the crucifix which was one of the wonders of Spain. He went on to Madrid by Lerma, where he was lodged in the Duke's castle, which was full of costly furniture. He was met outside Madrid by Count Baraxas with the King's coaches and was received by M. du Fargis, the resident French Ambassador and the staffs of all the Foreign Legations who were waiting near them. Numbers of ladies had driven out to see his arrival.

Bassompierre was lodged in Count Baraxas' house, where he was entertained by the Countess and other noble ladies, and a table of fifty courses was kept up for him at the King's expense. On the morning after his arrival the Duke of Ossuna came in great state to welcome him. The Duke was dressed in a long Hungarian gown, lined with marten's skins and covered with costly jewels. He was carried in a sedan chair, round which walked over fifty Spanish and Neapolitan half-pay captains and ensigns, and was followed by a train of more than twenty coaches in which came his friends and kinsmen. The Duke embraced Bassompierre with the greatest effusion. They were old friends and had long before sworn brotherhood in the presence of Henri IV., at a revel at the house of the famous Zamet to whom that monarch had owed so much. All etiquette, therefore, was laid aside and they conversed in French.

The Marshal found that the Court of Madrid was, upon the whole, disposed to come to an understanding with France. But the day before his arrival the King had, indeed, written to Archduke Albert that he believed the French were only making these offers because James I. had refused to listen to Cadenat's suggestion that he should assist them against the Huguenots, but Philip III. was anxious to secure the withdrawal of the French troops in the service of the United Provinces, and believed that the French Resident at Brussels was sincerely desirous of effecting the extension of the Truce. He had also received a letter from Gregory XV., who had just been elected Pope on the death of Paul V., in which he said that he was willing to employ temporal as well as spiritual means to secure the restoration of the Valtelline

as the matter was one which so closely concerned the liberties of Italy. The Nuncio showed Bassompierre a copy of the Pope's letter and told him that the Ambassadors of England, Florence, and Venice had already spoken to the King in support of the French proposals.

Unfortunately Philip III. was on the brink of his fatal illness, and was forced, therefore, to postpone Bassompierre's audience. The patience of the Grisons Protestants had meanwhile become exhausted by these delays. On the fifteenth of February, the heads of the Venetian party, who had met at Grutsch, under the protection of Steiner and his Zurichers, had risen in revolt. The insurgents murdered Pompejus Planta in his castle of Rietburg, and, aided by Jenatsch and the Engadiners, drove the forces of the Catholic Cantons out of the Rhine Valley and back over the Oberalp, headed by their commander Beroldingen, who was better known as a cattle-lifter than as a soldier, and who made off without either his boots or horse. They had then put down the Grey Leaguers so that the Protestants were once more the masters in the Grisons.

Meanwhile Bassompierre was faring sumptuously as the King's guest. By the royal orders the Patriarch of the Indies granted him a Bull, permitting him and a hundred others to eat meat in Lent, and two troops of the royal comedians were sent to play at his house. At that season all theatrical representations were prohibited elsewhere, and as the courtiers were devoted playgoers, the hall where they were given was thronged with *grandees* and ladies. Those ladies, who came by invitation from Countess Baraxas, sat upon the dais with their faces uncovered, whilst the rest of the company sat upon the steps or in the body of the hall muffled up in their mantillas, and were regaled with cakes and hydromel. These entertainments did not occasion the Privy Purse any great expense. The two troops of comedians only got three hundred reals [£7 10s.], between them, but Bassompierre added a gift of twenty-five pounds. As the cast of comedies, like one of Calderon's plays, usually includes some ten characters, most of whom have to deliver long set speeches, the actors' profession cannot have been a very lucrative one in the great days of the Spanish drama. The entertainment ended with a sumptuous banquet served in the French style.

Bassompierre states that the rising in the Valtelline was solely due to the intrigues of Feria, who had thought that, in the then

state of Europe, he could occupy the valleys without any interference from outside. He had never imagined that the Italian powers, the Swiss and the French would band themselves together to insist upon the restoration of the Valtelline to the Grisons.

The Government at Madrid, which, as Bassompierre admits, had never sanctioned Feria's policy, were plainly anxious to see the question laid to rest. They appointed commissioners to treat with the Marshal, and the Tuscan envoy, the Archbishop of Pisa, was invited to be present at their conferences. But scarcely had the negotiations begun, when, on the morning of the thirty-first of March, Philip III. died.

His son came to the throne at an unfortunate moment. The truce with the Dutch, as we have seen, was to expire on the ninth of April, and the first letters which reached him from Brussels after his father's death announced the failure of Pecquiu's mission to renew it. In a burst of passion the young King had written to Archduke Albert to authorise him to renew hostilities, but, in the same letter, had announced his intention to come to an understanding with France about the Valtelline, so as to leave himself with free hands in the Netherlands. Accordingly Olivares who was Philip IV's favourite and confidant, sent an offer to Bassompierre to remove Feria's uncle, the Count of Benavente, from the commission which was treating with him.

It was now the middle of Holy Week, and no worldly business could be transacted at Madrid. Then, as to-day, long lines of penitents were walking in procession through the streets, beneath balconies crowded with on-lookers, following stages upon which the scenes of the Passion were represented to the life. Some repentant sinners staggered along with heavy crosses, others were scourging themselves to the bone. All the bells were silenced, the noise of rattling coaches was stilled, no ladies in sedans were to be seen, and the nobles laid aside their swords and went about on foot unattended by their trains of servants. All, muffled up in their cloaks, walked through the streets and squares alone. But when night fell, to the horror of Bassompierre, both streets and squares were filled with riots and disorder.

On the twenty-first of April Bassompierre had his first audience with the new sovereign, who gave him a very full and frank explanation of his views and intentions.

On the day previous to his audience, the Council of State, in its indignation at Pecquiu's reception had refused to prolong the

Truce with the United Provinces, and their decision had still further increased the King's desire to arrive at a settlement with France. The terms of this settlement were accordingly embodied in the so-called first Treaty of Madrid, which was signed upon the twenty-fifth of April subject to the exchange of ratifications at Paris.

The chief provisions of this treaty were that the Spaniards should withdraw their forces from the Valtelline which was to be restored to its former position. The Lords of the Grisons granted a general amnesty to all those concerned in the rebellion, and all innovations as to religion which had been made since the year 1617, were to be abolished, due securities, however, being given to the Catholics. France guaranteed the execution of the Treaty, which was ratified by Louis XIII. on the twenty-fourth of June.

Early in May Bassompierre took his leave of the King of Spain, to whom, speaking in his master's name, he once more recommended the interests of the Palatine, and proceeded to join Louis XIII. at his headquarters at St. Jean d'Angely. He carried with him a splendid reliquary worth some five thousand crowns [£1,000], "fairly filled with relics," which Philip III. had bequeathed to his daughter, Anne of Austria, and which was to prove the most lasting evidence of his mission to Madrid.

Unfortunately the Treaty of Madrid, favourable as it was to the temporal interests of the Grisons, was far from being acceptable to the extreme Catholic party, whether in the Three Leagues or in the Swiss Cantons. The Swiss Catholics refused to allow the Cantons to become guarantors for its execution, despite all the efforts of the Papal Nuncio and the French Ambassador to induce them to accept the convention in a modified form, whilst Austria, whose agent was Moor, a Buñdner by birth, had no reason to wish that the treaty should prove successful. In July Archduke Leopold wrote to Cardinal Bellarmin at Rome to point out that if equal rights were accorded to both Protestants and Catholics in the Leagues and in the Valtelline, as was proposed by the treaty, the cause of the Catholic Church in those districts would be lost. It was the Cardinal's duty to oppose the agreement in every possible way. On August the nineteenth he again wrote to Bellarmin urging him to support the claims of the See of Chur to the Valtelline. Bishop John had already sent Father Ignatius as his agent to visit the Duke of Bavaria, but he had

failed to see him as Maximilian was with his army on the frontiers of the Palatinate; the Bishop had also been in communication with the Duke's confidant, a Capuchin named Father Hyacinth, who was destined to play a prominent part in the diplomacy of the near future. On his way back from Germany Father Ignatius had stopped at Innsbrück and had visited Caspar Alexius in his prison. "I gave him a sound scolding for his devilments; he is playing the saint, but is a greater scoundrel than ever. I have recommended him and shall recommend him as he deserves." Such recommendations from a Capuchin to an Austrian gaoler could have but one meaning.

Whilst Archduke Leopold was intriguing to settle the Valtelline question to his own advantage, the new Pope, Gregory XV., was trying to settle it upon broader lines. Writing on the twenty-fifth of August to the Bishop of Chur, he informed him that he was sending the Bishop of Campania, who had been Nuncio in Switzerland, to Spain to try to negotiate a settlement which would not be detrimental to the Catholic Faith. His nephew, the Cardinal Secretary Ludovisi was, however, convinced that nothing could be done but by force of arms.

Cardinal Ludovisi was right. The patience of the Leaguers was exhausted by these long-drawn negotiations which seemed to postpone a settlement indefinitely. Despite the refusal of the Grey Leaguers to join in the expedition, the God's House League and the Ten Jurisdictions determined to invade the territory of Bormio. Jenatsch with an armed force compelled the Grey Leaguers and the Engadiners to join in this wanton defiance of Spain and Austria. The invasion failed, the ill-disciplined invaders were driven back in disorder from Bormio, and, in his turn, Archduke Leopold menaced the Grisons with an invasion of their territories to punish them for the wrongs which they had committed against the Catholics and the rights of Austria. At the end of October forces from the Milanese advanced upon Chiavenna and the Lower Engadine, and Austrian soldiery flooded the districts round Chur. No help arrived from Switzerland and the Protestant leaders were forced to fly. Some found a refuge in Switzerland, others took service with Mansfeldt in Alsace. The Lower Engadine and other places over which Austria claimed feudal rights were henceforth treated as Austrian territory. Such was the outcome of the march to Bormio.

Gueffier, to his credit, had done his best to prevent the Leaguers from committing this wanton folly, and had gone so far as to offer his own person as a guarantee that they would shortly recover the Valtelline by diplomatic methods. France, it is true, was at that moment in the midst of a civil war. Rudolf Planta occupied Chur and, though a show of independence was maintained, the Austrians ruled in the Grisons.

At Archduke Leopold's request the Leaguers in January, 1622, sent envoys to Milan, to the Duke of Feria, who, as has been seen, received them with frankness and goodwill. The outcome of their mission was the so-called "Treaty of Milan," which was concluded in January, 1622. By this Treaty the Leagues renounced their rights over the Valtelline and Bormio, but were allowed to retain Chiavenna. On the other hand the Spaniards consented to demolish Fort Fuentes and the fortifications which they had erected near Riva at the head of Lake Como. Austria received the Lower Engadine and the other districts which she claimed. The exercise of the Reformed Religion was prohibited in them, and the Leaguers were forbidden to enter into any treaties with them. The remainder of the Commonwealth entered into a perpetual alliance with Spain and guaranteed her the right of passage for her troops. Protestantism was abolished in the Valtelline and Bormio, and securities were given that the Bishop of Chur should receive the concessions for which he had asked the Leagues before the negotiations began. These included the restitution of the churches and monasteries with their revenues which had anciently belonged to his see, as well as those tithes throughout the Leagues which had been taken from the Chapter of Chur. He also claimed the right of exercising his episcopal functions in every part of his diocese, and that the free exercise of the Catholic Religion should be everywhere allowed, but without prejudice to his rights under the Civil Law. Finally his officials alone were to exercise jurisdiction in matrimonial causes. Archduke Leopold, who was not only Count of Tyrol and Landgrave of Alsace, but also a great dignitary of the Church as Bishop of Passau and Strasburg, had at the Pope's special request supported the claims of his right reverend brother, the more willingly, perhaps, as he intended to nominate his coadjutor himself. He did not, however, put forward the demand for the sovereignty of the Valtelline which Bishop John had made in the previous year. With Mansfeldt

threatening Alsace, the Archduke could not risk a quarrel with Spain.

Alessandro Scappi, Bishop of Campania, as Papal Nuncio in Switzerland, had already commissioned the Capuchins to preach in the Grisons and to fill up the vacant benefices throughout the Leagues, and, for the moment, these missionaries proved very successful in making conversions.

Pope Gregory XV. was, however, still dissatisfied despite the concessions made to the Church by the Treaty of Milan. On the twenty-fifth of April, 1622, he wrote to Philip IV., to Archduke Leopold and to the eight Catholic Cantons urging them to declare war against the Leaguers who were committing outrages against the Catholics, and to restore the Bishop of Chur to his rights, of which rights, however, the Supreme Pontiff refrained from giving a definition. Possibly he wished to see the temporal sovereignty over the Valtelline vested in the See of Chur, so that the entrance to the passes over the Rhoetian Alps might be in ecclesiastical hands, an aim which the Popes had striven to secure when they established such ecclesiastical principalities as the Bishopric of Trent and the Patriarchate of Aquileja on the southern slopes of the Alps. Philip IV. had, however, just ordered Feria to despatch all his available troops to Brabant where the flames of the villages burnt by the Dutch raiders could be seen from the walls of Brussels, and took not the slightest notice of the Pope's request.

The only result of these obscure intrigues was that the Valtelline question was left as a festering sore to poison the relations of France with Spain, whilst Archduke Leopold's conduct undoubtedly aroused in the minds of Spanish statesmen a distrust of Austria, which in the not distant future was to prove of grave detriment to both branches of the House of Hapsburg.

Such was the outcome of the failure of France and Spain to restore tranquillity to the Grisons by the First Treaty of Madrid. [Cf. List of Authorities, "The war of the Valtelline." for the quotations from Brussels, Chur, Turin Archives, and the printed sources.]

CHAPTER LII

THE stately ceremonies of Archduke Albert's funeral had been deferred chiefly in order to enable Spinola to be present at them. The Marquis, despite the hardships of a winter campaign, would not leave his army until Juliers surrendered, and it was not until the fourth of February, 1622, that the keys of the place were handed over to him, at eleven in the morning. The news of its surrender reached Brussels within thirty-six hours. During the blockade the Marquis had been busily preparing for the campaign of the following summer and had been buying up all the ammunition which was being manufactured in Cologne, Liege and the Bishopric of Münster. Unfortunately as has been seen, the resources of the Treasury were exhausted and the army suffered in consequence. Philip's delays in sending supplies threatened to provoke mutinies everywhere. Despite all his efforts Spinola could not pay his men regularly, for the contractors would not supply him with the sums which they had promised as they fell due. For a moment he had feared that the army which was blockading Juliers would rise in revolt. Ready money had grown very scarce at Antwerp, yet three hundred thousand ducats (£90,000) a month had to be found for the fleet and for the armies in the Netherlands and in the Palatinate, and D. Diego Mexia had pledged his word to the Infanta that this task should be accomplished. Nor were matters much better in West Flanders, where in the previous September Don Iñigo de Borja had failed in an attempt to recover Sluys by attacking the Isle of Cadzand, and had been forced to remain inactive near Eecloo until the winter when sickness had sent half his army into hospital. Spinola, himself had seen his hopes of overrunning Emden, Friesland and the Veluwe foiled by the unexpected resistance of Juliers, and by the necessity of observing Maurice who had remained encamped in the neighbourhood of Emmerich until sickness had decimated the Spanish infantry, and want of fodder had forced both armies to send their cavalry back to their garrisons. Nor were affairs much more promising in the Palatinate. Cordoba's foot were

now mostly raw recruits from Spain and from Italy who were infected by all the vices of Naples, his cavalry and artillery were without generals, whilst his transport was badly officered and was scattered all over the country and, so far as the men were concerned, new to its work, although its materiel was better than that with the army in Flanders.

Cordoba, however, who was the grandson of that Great Captain who had conquered Naples for Ferdinand the Catholic, was loved and trusted both by his men and by the Princes of the Catholic League, whose confidence in him was in no wise shaken by his withdrawal from Frankenthal. It was plain to all that Spain must rely upon her own resources if she wished to retain her hold upon the Palatinate, for the Bavarians did nothing except eat up the territories of their allies, whilst those of the princes of the Protestant Union remained unscathed. If Spain could not protect the members of the League the war might go on for ever. The soldiers openly said that if Mansfeldt would enter the Spanish service and levy a fresh army to execute the ban against the Palatine, this task might be accomplished, but upon no other conditions. This plan had been frustrated by Digby's folly. Spain had much to gain by occupying the Palatinate for she not only obtained the control of the Rhine frontier, but was also in a position to cut off the communications between the Dutch and most of the German Protestant powers. Once the United Provinces were deprived of their German trade and prevented from trafficking with neutral countries, an object for which measures were being taken in Flanders and in Spain, whilst privateering was being vigorously carried on against their seaborne commerce, they would be forced to sue for peace within a very short time. The Hanse Towns, which in 1620 had refused to assist Hungary and Bohemia were not likely to assist the United Provinces. They not only stood in awe of the Imperialists, but gained solid advantages from their position as neutrals. The trade of the Empire was diverted to their ports, whilst those of Spain which were closed to the Dutch were open to their vessels. Thus the policy of instituting a Continental Blockade against the United Provinces seemed likely to prove successful. But the fortunes of Spain depended upon her soldiery, and unless the soldiery could be kept contented, the outlook for the future was gloomy in the extreme. Negotiations were again in progress with Mansfeldt, but with little prospect of a favourable result, whilst at

the same time the Duke of Bavaria was clamouring for orders to be sent to Cordoba to disperse Mansfeldt's army. As no reinforcements for him could be spared from Belgium it might prove necessary to recall all the Spanish subjects in the Emperor's service to strengthen his forces in the Palatinate. Such was the tale of woe which the Infanta poured into her nephew's ear at a moment when every armorer, every carpenter, and every embroiderer in the Obedient provinces was toiling and moiling, and was to toil and moil for yet another two months to furnish forth the pomps and vanities of her husband's funeral.

Soon after the middle of January Mansfeldt advanced into Alsace, occupied Hagenau and besieged Saverne, but an Infanta with three armies in the field, and one of them with a Colonel Vere to face in the Palatinate, had no reinforcements to spare for a very untrustworthy Archduke Leopold. Mansfeldt's incursion into his territories was, as we have seen, not to be without some influence upon the course of affairs when the winter snows melted in the Grisons.

There was only one bright spot visible in this somewhat sombre outlook. James the First despite the remonstrances of a Parliament which he had dissolved with some precipitancy, was more than ever determined to remain upon friendly terms with Spain. The Infanta, therefore, asked Gondomar to give the King a hint that the Elector of Mainz was trying to bring about a suspension of hostilities in the Palatinate, and as James approved of the idea, she wrote to the Elector to beg him to continue his efforts. The Infanta had heard that there was some question of recalling Gondomar from England to assist her nephew at Madrid, but urged that, as he knew the country so thoroughly, it would be well to keep him in London until this business was settled. Philip IV. was equally inclined to peace and refused to lend an ear to advisers like Losada who counselled him to profit by the troubles in Germany to make conquests in the Middle Rhine. Eminent members of the English Parliament like Sandys and Coke, whose zeal for the Protestant Cause was, as Chaworth pointed out, by no means according to knowledge, would, indeed have been dumbfounded, could they have read the despatch which Philip addressed to Oñate upon this subject.

The plan, wrote the King, which seemed the most likely to bring about peace in Germany would be the transfer of the electorate and the electoral territories from Frederick to his son,

who should be brought up by a guardian to be appointed by the Emperor. Until the boy came of age the administration of the electorate might be entrusted to the Duke of Bavaria, who might be given the Marquisate of Burgau, despite the fact that he himself had claims upon it, together with some other lordships, in exchange for Upper Austria which he held as a pledge from the Emperor. The only advantage which he personally wished to gain for himself out of the Lower Palatinate was the restoration of peace to Germany, as that was a matter of the utmost importance both to the Emperor and to the Catholic League. At the same time he wrote to the Infanta asking her to support Spinola in his efforts to arrange an armistice in the Palatinate. A few days later he sent her a warning to be upon her guard in her negotiations with Mansfeldt as everyone in Spain knew him to be utterly untrustworthy.

By the middle of March it had been decided that both the Emperor and James should send representatives to Brussels. The envoys appointed were Count Schwarzenberg and Lord Weston, but they were only empowered to arrange for an armistice in the Palatinate as Frederick's fate was to be decided by a Diet of Electors which was to be convened by the Emperor.

Spinola, after the Archduke's funeral, was sent to Ostend to inspect the naval preparations which were in progress there. He found that three vessels had been launched and that six more were all but completed. It was somewhat difficult, however, to man them, as crews were hard to get, their seamanship left something to be desired, and they could only be engaged for one voyage. One vessel had been stranded off the coast of Lower Brittany, and another had run into Ostend pier, but the fleet, such as it was, would be useful for harassing the enemy's trade. The Dutch were so strong at sea that it was thought best that all the troops sent from Spain to the Netherlands should come through Italy.

Mansfeldt left Alsace about the beginning of April closely followed by the Archduke Leopold's forces and marched into the Palatinate when he made an unsuccessful attempt to surprise Kaiserslautern. Negotiations were still going on with him and Philip IV. was eager for their success high as were the terms which this soldier of fortune asked. At last a settlement was arrived at, and Mansfeldt was upon the point of signing the armistice, when the Palatine Frederick suddenly arrived in his camp. The Palatine had made his way through France in the disguise of

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a merchant, and had been taken by some of Archduke Leopold's soldiers who, however, had failed to recognize him and had let him go for two or three ducats [12s. to 18s.]. The moment he appeared Mansfeld tore up the agreement which he was to have signed next day and sent back Raville, the French gentleman who represented the Infanta, to his mistress at Brussels, Raville reported that the Palatine had told him that he would have nothing to say to an armistice which would be his ruin, but that he wanted either a good peace or a good war. The struggle, he had added, might well last through the year, as he was about to join the Margrave of Baden Durlach who had got together a large army, and he might expect strong reinforcements from the Protestants. His own people moreover, had plucked up their courage at his return. Even if the Emperor and England had sent envoys to Brussels, these gentlemen would wrangle the whole summer before coming to a settlement. The Infanta had no forces to spare for undertaking active operations and her new levies did nothing, but eat their heads off in barracks or pillage the countryside. The Infanta, when informing Philip of her failure, wrote in emphatic terms that if he did not send money at once the Palatinate would be lost. If the troops were to be paid at all, three hundred thousand ducats [£90,000], must be found every month. As the business houses in Antwerp could not meet the bills which had been drawn upon them in the previous year, because they had not received letters of advice from their correspondents in Spain, she implored her nephew to take the most stringent measures to force them to do so.

Frederick, after persuading Mansfeldt to return to his allegiance hastened to join the Margrave of Durlach. On the twenty-seventh of April they attacked Tilly and his Bavarians at Mingolsheim near Bruchsal and forced them to fall back upon Wimpfen. Cordoba, whose army amounted to four thousand foot and fifteen hundred horse, was in daily expectation of an attack by Durlach and so hastened over very heavy roads to join Tilly. The Margrave was advancing upon Wimpfen with a very large force and Frederick and Mansfeldt were threatening the Spanish garrisons.

Fearing that they might be overwhelmed, the Catholic generals decided to give battle upon the sixth of May. Durlach had arranged his transport waggons so as to form a laager and the Spaniards had great difficulty in getting up to his position. The Margrave's horse then charged some Bavarian foot on the left

wing and drove them back upon the main body. Cordoba galloped over from the right with the Spanish cavalry to support them, but his troopers held back and he found himself alone in the middle of the enemy, who, however, swept him forward with them in their charge upon his own squadron and so he managed to get away. Cordoba, in a letter to his wife, mentions an incident which shows what the mercenaries of that day were. Durlach's troopers, he says, recognized him not only by his dress, but because he spoke to them in Spanish, yet not one of them raised a hand against him. All they did was to try to tear the chain, which Spinola had given him, off his neck, for he felt it and found that it was broken. Cordoba's own troop, supported by some Germans, held their ground and thus gave the Bavarians time to rally. Headed by Tilly they once more rushed to the attack. The fighting at close quarters was desperate until one of the enemy's ammunition waggons blew up and threw them into disorder. Cordoba charged them on the flank; they broke and fled. The victory was complete. The Protestants lost three thousand killed and numerous prisoners with their artillery, baggage and standards. Mansfeldt's army, however, was still unbroken whilst Tilly and Cordoba could rely only upon their own resources, as no reinforcements could be hoped for from Flanders. The danger, therefore, was far from being over.

The news of the victory of Wimpfen reached Brussels at a very seasonable moment. Brabant had been stripped of cavalry to strengthen Count Henri de Berg who had been sent into Westphalia to oppose Christian of Brunswick and was driving him back from the Lippe towards the Lower Palatinate.

Prince Frederick Henry of Nassau saw his chance of making a diversion by leading a raid into the heart of Brabant. He collected a large force at Breda, and on the fourth of May advanced against Herenthals but failed to surprise it. From Herenthals he hastened by forced marches, carrying with him a train of pontoons to the river Demer. A few soldiers and peasants offered some slight resistance to his passage, but within an hour the Dutch had thrown a bridge over the stream and crossed it, headed by the English, led by Sir Charles Morgan. They took up their quarters by a strong castle, and sent out foraging parties, who raided the country far and wide. Brussels was aglow with bonfires for the victory of Wimpfen when these "fires of fury" blazed up without. All the villages round Diest, Louvain, and Mechlin, went up in

flames, but the loss was not great as they were but poor hamlets, and the peasants had fled with their cattle into the walled towns. The raiders, wrote an English volunteer, did not do the tenth part of the harm which they might have done, and yet did so much "as would pity anyone to see though our enemies." It was rumoured in the Dutch camp that the Infanta and Spinola had from the walls of Brussels seen her country round about on fire, but could not help it, and the English envoy Weston gazed from the ramparts upon the flames of the monasteries and churches. The diversion produced its intended effect. Henri de Berg was recalled in hot haste from Germany, and the Dutch fell back over the Demer, followed at a respectful distance by D. Luis de Velasco, who was not in force to attack them.

In her despatches, at all events, the Infanta attached but little importance to the raid, although gossip at Madrid asserted the contrary. Her mind was pre-occupied by the naval preparations at Ostend and by the peace conferences at Brussels, where she could do little except name Pecquius and Boisschot as her commissioners to negotiate with Weston and Schwarzenberg, as she had not sufficient powers from the Emperor to enable her to treat to any purpose. She at last confessed that it was hopeless to expect to come to terms with Mansfeldt. Boisschot had been to England where he had been received with great honours. He had delivered a speech in Dutch before the House of Lords and had been present at a review of the City trainbands. As he had come with but little baggage and few attendants he had been forced to hire a jewel to wear in his hat at Court. His constant companion had been Gondomar.

Whilst Weston and Schwarzenberg were, as the Palatine had foretold, wrangling over punctilios at Brussels, the Infanta and Spinola were usefully employed in pressing forward the naval preparations in the Flemish dockyards. As was the Spanish custom the hierarchy of Heaven had been ransacked to supply the names for the ships. The *St. Alonzo* and the *St. Isabel* had been launched in January, the *St. Louis* bore witness to the new born friendship between France and Spain, three other vessels were ready at Ostend. As it was reported that the Dutch were trying to arrange for a joint attack upon Spain with Muley Cidam, a pretender to the throne of Morocco, and with the pirates of Algiers, Philip IV. was anxious that these vessels should be sent to cruise off the coast of the Peninsula. It could not be doubted,

however, that they would be more usefully employed in harassing the enemy's trade. Both the Infanta and Spinola accordingly entreated the King to allow them to remain at Ostend. As has been seen the ships were armed with English guns and many projectors hastened to bring forward suggestions for their improvement. Baron de Ruyssele, an old French brigadier, offered that he would conduct some experiments with shells of his own invention which, if they exploded on a galleon, would either burst open its seams or set it on fire with incendiary materials, and with chain shot which would cut away the masts and rigging. The particulars given in a contract signed by some shipowners of Antwerp and St. Omer who proposed to furnish four vessels to the Spanish fleet will show what these cruisers were like.

It was provided that each of the ships should be one hundred and fifty feet long and thirty-one feet wide between decks. They were to measure thirteen and a half feet in height from the keel to the lower deck, and seven between the lower and the upper deck, and were to have forecastles and stern cabins. These were to be so proportioned that the tonnage of each vessel was to be rather over two hundred and fifty Lastres, a measure possibly equivalent to the English "Last" of four thousand pounds, so that they were of about four hundred and fifty tons burden, and were to have a mainmast and a foremast. Their armament was to consist of eighteen guns, being six, eight and ten-pounders, with ten iron mortars of the regulation model.

Every ship was to carry a crew of one hundred men, including a captain, master, and two pilots both of whom must be "qualified for the north and for the south," or in other words must be acquainted with the navigation to the White Sea and to the Baltic as well as with that to the Mediterranean and the Southern Atlantic. The captain was paid twenty ducats [£5 10s.] a month, the master ten ducats [£2 15s.] and the two pilots twenty-four [£6 12s.], each, whilst the ninety-six sailors drew one with another eleven reals (five shillings and sixpence) a man. The pay roll for each ship amounted therefore to four hundred and forty seven ducats of eleven reals each [£0 5s. 6d.], or in Flemish money to twelve hundred and twenty-nine florins of twenty placks [£122 18s. 6d.] a month. The contractors were to draw an allowance for ship's rations of twelve hundred florins [£120] a month, and if the ships on their arrival in Spain were passed by the inspectors, they were to receive a premium of nine reals (four

shillings and sixpence], a "tonelada" [2,000 lbs.] a month. Thus the total cost of each vessel, if their tonnage is calculated at an average of five hundred "toneladas," or four hundred and fifty tons, would amount to three thousand five hundred and fifty-four florins of twenty placks [£355 8s.] a month.

It is clear that a fleet of vessels of five hundred tons burden could play an important part in warfare in the shallow waters of the North Sea, and consequently the possession of the German harbours became an object of great importance to the Imperialists. As, however, not a single port on the coast line of either the North Sea or the Baltic between Ostend and Dantzic was either in Catholic hands or directly controlled by the Emperor, it was impossible for either Ferdinand II. or the Catholic League to obtain possession of any of them without the consent of the Electors and of the Diet. Nor in view of the fact that Christian IV. of Denmark was straining every nerve to get the Bishoprics at the mouths of the Weser and the Elbe into his hands, whilst Gustaf Adolf of Sweden was fighting with Sigismund of Poland to secure the crown of Sweden which Sigismund had forfeited for the sake of the Catholic faith, was it possible to doubt that if the Imperialists succeeding in getting a foothold upon the German seaboard, they would bring upon themselves the hostility of both the Scandinavian powers, which were then far more powerful than they are at the present day. Spinola's naval plans were, in short, the origin of that Maritime Policy of the Hapsburgs which led to the intervention successively of Denmark, of Sweden and of France in the conflict in Germany, and which, in the end, brought both Spain and Austria by its failure to the verge of ruin.

Events were already in progress which were to estrange the Catholic States of Germany from the Hapsburg powers and these events were in a certain degree the outcome of the Infanta's diplomacy.

The King of Spain, it is true, expressly instructed Oñate in May, 1622, to inform the Emperor that he did not wish to make any territorial acquisitions in the Lower Palatinate, as his sole object in sending an army thither had been to secure a settlement in Germany upon terms favourable to Ferdinand II. and to the Catholic princes. He had made no objections when Germerheim and other of the Palatine's fiefs were transferred to the Bishop of Spire, and remained silent when the Electors of

Cologne and of Mainz claimed other portions of the Palatinate. In vain the Infanta pointed out that such acts of aggression would render it hopeless to negotiate with Frederick and added an emphatic warning with her own hand to the despatch as to the conduct of the Elector of Cologne. For the same reason she was anxious to prevent the transfer of the Electoral dignity to Bavaria. The Emperor wrote to request her not to comply with the request of the English that the Palatine should retain it. In reply she wrote to Oñate to tell the Emperor that if the Electorate was transferred there could be no hope of peace. Neither England nor the Palatine would ever sanction it. Therefore, even if an armistice was arranged, the war would certainly break out again when it expired, and the whole cost of that war would fall upon the Imperial Exchequer. "I must frankly confess to Your Majesty," she said, "that this German business gives me very great anxiety for I see it growing more complicated every day. The Duke of Bavaria is thoroughly in earnest about the solemn investiture with the Electorate, and up to this very moment has never given the slightest sign that he wishes for a suspension of hostilities."

In her anxiety she also sent a note to Count Schwarzenberg, the Emperor's representative at Brussels, to point out the danger of the step. Although, in theory, the transfer of the Electorate was in the interest both of the Catholic Religion and of His Imperial Majesty, yet considering the actual state of feeling both amongst the Protestants and the Palatine's allies it would lead to greater troubles in Germany than ever. In that case both the Imperial throne and the Catholic princes would be in the utmost danger. All the Protestants who had hitherto remained neutral would take up arms against the Emperor and Spain, whilst the latter, owing to the war in Flanders, could neither give any effectual help in Germany nor continue the gigantic efforts which she had been making to support the Imperial Cause. She, therefore, begged the Emperor notwithstanding the declaration upon the subject which he had made at the Diet of Ratisbon, to postpone the translation until better times. She ended by saying that she had written this in order to clear her own conscience once and for all.

Her letter was promptly laid before the Duke of Bavaria and was destined to produce far-reaching results, for once Maximilian saw that his dearest wishes were being opposed by the

Infanta, he was not a man to be appeased by the most honied compliments.

In the meantime the fortunes of war in Germany continued to be favourable to the Catholic arms. After the Battle of Wimpfen the Palatine and the Margrave of Durlach had thrown themselves into the territories of the Landgrave of Hesse-Darmstadt and plundering and burning had marched through them towards the Main to meet Christian of Brunswick. The Bavarian cavalry, however, led by Tilly, attacked them on their march and drove them back towards Mannheim, making many prisoners of rank. The Palatine's foot threw down their arms and sought refuge in the woods and farms where they were cut down by the peasants whom they had plundered. Frederick himself was pressed so hard by Tilly's horse that the prisoners were astonished when they heard that he had escaped. Cordoba, in the meantime, came up in hot haste from the Palatinate with a large force, crossed the Rhine at Gernsheim, joined the Bavarians at Bürstadt Abbey and halted there to rest the horses, which had become worn out during two days' pursuit of the enemy and were unable to follow them through the woods between the Abbey and Mannheim. The Palatine's cavalry crossed the Bridge over the Neckar in such disorder that if the Spaniards and Bavarians had been able to follow them up whilst daylight lasted, they must have destroyed them utterly. News now reached the Catholic generals that Duke Christian was besieging Friedberg. They had been joined by the Spanish forces from Bohemia and determined to attack him. Their trains of baggage waggons laden with the spoil of Bohemia took so long to cross the bridge over the Main that the enemy had time to take up a position in front of Höchst which barred the road up the river to Frankfort. Their right was covered by some irrigation ditches and woods and their left by a deep ravine which ran down from the mountain. Their front was protected by a redoubt and trenches. On the tenth of June Cordoba opened his attack with a violent cannonade; his gunners forced the enemy to withdraw their pieces and were thus enabled to bring forward their own. A skirmish on the right flank developed into a serious attack. Christian hurried all his foot thither to strengthen it, and thus left the passage over the ravine open. Two battalions of foot and Tilly's Croats hastened to cross it. The Protestants fell back towards Höchst, pressed hard by the troopers who drove them over the bridge in disorder.

Many were thrown into the Main and drowned, others were cut down, and the rest fled, leaving behind them all their artillery and baggage. The peasants handled the fugitives even worse than they had done Mansfeldt's men and few escaped to join that General at Mannheim. Cordoba wrote in triumph that now that the two armies were united he would try to strike the enemy their death-blow. For the moment, indeed, the Palatine's cause seemed lost. Spinola sent a full account of the action to Madrid.

The Battle of Höchst has kept a place in literature. It was after that battle that Simplicius Simplicissimus, the hero of the romance which preserves to us the most vivid picture of the Germany of the Thirty Years War was driven as a child from his home into the forests of the Spessart. The story of the engagement must have been familiar to the author of that romance who was a native of a village in Baden.

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1622. Feb. 4; April 22, 25; June 2. Philip IV. to Oñate.

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Count Schwarzenberg."

Turin, Archives, Spagna. Vol. 18. Tarantaise to Duke of Savoy

1622. June 11, 17.

Cf. "List of Authorities," Belgium, 1622, "Siege of Bergen-of-Zoom."

CHAPTER LIII

It was not until the eighth of July that Spinola took the field for the summer campaign of 1622. The treasury at Brussels was, as usual, all but exhausted. In addition to the Spanish contribution of four hundred thousand ducats [ten reals] [£100,000], the Infanta could only reckon upon a revenue of two hundred and three thousand ducats [£50,750] to meet an expenditure of four hundred and fifty thousand ducats a month [£112,500], and had been forced to raise a loan by borrowing small sums from private persons. The Marquis, had, therefore, left his army in their winter quarters until after mid-summer, and had contented himself with provisioning Bois-le-Duc.

The position of affairs in Germany and the Netherlands was not, upon the whole, unfavourable to Spain, and Cordoba had proposed a plan of operations which involved the co-operation of the Catholic forces in both theatres of war.

By the end of June Cordova had advanced to the Lippe and encamped half a league from Wesel in order to cover Count Rittberg who was blockading Lippstadt, whilst forces left in Westphalia under Colonel Lintelo protected his communication with Tilly's army on the frontier of East Friesland. Mansfeldt had thrown himself into that province and was defending the difficult passes which were the only road by which Tilly could advance upon Emden, where the burghers had now restored their Count and expelled the Dutch garrison. Duke Christian of Brunswick's army was in the utmost disorder. The Dutch were divided into three bodies, one of which was trying to regain Emden, a second was observing Cordoba, and a third was protecting their frontiers in Flanders.

Cordoba saw that Friesland lay open to an attack, and accordingly proposed that the Spaniards should take Tilly and his army into their service for three or four months, so that they might wear out the Dutch by besieging their towns and raiding their territories. As an alternative plan, Spinola might lead his forces across the Yssel into the Veluwe. He might seize and

fortify some of the passages across the river, so that his soldiers might foray the district when they pleased, and thus oblige the Dutch to keep up as large a force in it as the Spaniards maintained in Flanders. The Spanish troops in the Imperial army might be recalled for this service, as Tilly would thus avoid violating his neutrality, whilst the Dutch would be prevented from recovering Emden and from hampering his advance into East Friesland. The loss of Emden would be a far greater blow to the United Provinces than would that of Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, or Grave. By holding that important port, Spain would become the mistress of the Ems as well as of the Rhine, and, incidentally, its occupation would insure the fall of Lippstadt. Once Mansfeldt was expelled from East Friesland he and Brunswick would be reduced to simple colonels, and could no longer render any service to the Dutch.

Cordoba's plans could only be carried out with Spinola's co-operation, and Spinola's army was in no state to undertake any operations at a distance from its base. His soldiers were upon the verge of mutiny, though he kept up so strict a discipline that men were hanged for stealing an egg. Their pay was constantly in arrears despite the enormous contributions exacted both from the Obedient Provinces and from Cleves, Juliers, and Guelders. The soldiers muttered that their commander, to cover his defalcations, had already arranged that his summer campaign should be a failure. Cordoba's advisers, however, thought that a mutiny might be prevented if the men were shown a little kindness and were ordered to prepare for active service, as they had never been known to mutiny when in the field. This should be done at once, as Brunswick had kept the cadres of his army together, and, if given a breathing space, might, within two months, raise fresh forces and attack Tilly. If people in Germany and Flanders really had the King's service at heart, they could either compel the Emperor to declare war upon the Dutch, or to force them to expel Mansfeldt and Christian from their territories, unless, indeed, they preferred to render these freebooters harmless to the Empire for the future by taking them into the service of the States. But as Cordoba's correspondent sadly remarked: "It is a very nice thing to be Captain-General, and, if there is no pretext for there being one, a man cannot hold such an office and waste the King's money." The Spaniards never forgot that Spinola was a Genoese.

Even if Spinola's army had been in the best possible state, any plans, which were based upon the co-operation of the Imperial and Spanish forces, could not be carried out without the consent of the Emperor and of at least the Catholic Electors, and it was already evident that there were those in Germany, and even in Flanders, who had not the King of Spain's "service at heart." This obstacle might well be insurmountable.

Spinola himself was by no means inclined to undertake any operations except in the immediate vicinity of the Obedient Provinces. He preferred, therefore, to leave both East Friesland and the Veluwe alone for the moment, and decided to lay siege to Bergen-op-Zoom.

Bergen-op-Zoom was, as the Infanta said, a very hard nut to crack. The fortress, which was one of the most important in North Brabant, stood upon rising ground in the middle of a morass and about a mile and a half from the Eastern Scheldt, with which it was connected by a navigable canal, and had a good harbour. The town lies twenty miles east of Breda, and the same distance north of Antwerp. It was noted for its splendid church, its well built houses, and its splendid squares, on one of which was a palace belonging to the Marquis of Bergen. The fortifications were very strong. Fort Kiek-en-de-Pot lay to the south and commanded the road to Antwerp; Fort Terroleas stood on the sea-dyke to the west; a third fort rose on the north of the entrance to the harbour. All the gates were guarded by strong hornworks, and the bastions by half-moons. The River Zoom, a tributary of the Scheldt, ran between Forts Kiek-en-de-Pot and Terroleas, and the whole of the surrounding country could be laid under water. The place was but weakly held, as Maurice, who attached great importance to Count Henri de Berg's operations, had kept the bulk of his forces near Emmerich. So long as its water communications remained open, Bergen was, in fact, in no great danger. The Dutch believed that the Marquis' object was to prevent Maurice from advancing up the Rhine, as if he succeeded in doing so, he would leave the way open for Cordoba to march upon Friesland. Spinola, however, had already gained over the Town Major of Bergen, and had arranged that he should open one of the gates to him, but, unfortunately for the Spaniards, their agent was killed in the first skirmish after they had appeared before the town, and the plan failed. They were thus compelled to undertake a regular siege.

Maurice, on the other hand, had not only to keep a watchful eye upon de Berg's movements, but also to be upon his guard against the garrisons of Groll, of Oldenzaal, and of Lingen, who were foraying Guelders, Overysse, and Cleves in every direction. As, owing to his want of money, his army was very weak, he could not hope to drive Spinola away from before Bergen. Such were the reasons which led the Marquis to undertake an enterprise which, at first sight, appeared far less likely to be of advantage than a campaign in East Friesland or on the Yssel. As the Infanta explained to Philip IV., although the place from its situation was very difficult to attack and could not be blockaded effectually, yet the proximity of Bergen to Antwerp rendered a siege far easier to carry on than that of any other fortress of the first rank, and it was an enterprise which would touch the enemy to the quick.

Spinola, therefore, after giving secret instructions to his commanders, set off towards the Rhine so as to throw the enemy off their guard. Upon his arrival at Maestricht, he despatched Count Salazar with a large force to take up a position near Bergen, and to occupy the town of Steenberg, which was very weakly held. He succeeded in doing so before Maurice had learnt that Bergen was in danger. Salazar had taken this important position in the very nick of time as had he delayed in carrying out his orders, the Dutch might have laid the whole country under water. Meanwhile Spinola had hastened back to Brussels, from which as he had previously arranged, he marched to join Salazar before Bergen, leaving Henri de Berg with a strong force near Wesel to observe the enemy. He also detached a portion of the same army to attack Papenmuts, the fort on the Island of Mondorp near Bonn, which blocked the navigation of the Rhine, as, if he could recover it from the Dutch, he would do much to ensure the success of the campaign.

Maurice took the field on the eleventh of July, and, for the moment, was completely deceived by Spinola's strategy. His first object was to hold de Berg in check. He, therefore, assembled his forces at Schenckenschans and turned a deaf ear to the reports of the designs which were on foot for attacking Bergen. His rash incredulity nearly cost him dear. That fortress during some days was only held by the burgher-guard and by a company of foot from Steenberg, whilst as the entrance to the harbour was blocked by a temporary dam, it might easily have been taken by surprise. Even as late as the thirteenth of July, Maurice

gave orders for three troops of horse to march from Bergen to join him. A few hours after they had left for Breda by boat, the magistrates received news which left no doubt as to the intentions of the Spaniards. They sent off a messenger at once to recall the horse, but their commander, Rithoven, refused to return. Near the gate of Breda, however, he was met by the governor, Count Justin of Nassau, who persuaded him to go back to Bergen, and took all responsibility for his doing so upon himself.

In the meantime, Maurice had despatched Colonel Famars with twelve companies of foot from his camp at Emmerich with orders to proceed by forced marches to Bergen, although he was still in the dark as to Spinola's plans, and relied upon the States of Zeeland to look after the fortress. Ten days later he was still preoccupied with de Berg's movements and without news from Bergen.

The magistrates of Bergen had already sent their Town Clerk, Bason, in hot haste to Middelburg to ask for assistance from the States of Zeeland. He arrived there at ten in the evening and found that the Councillors of State, after sitting waiting for him until a very late hour, had at last gone home. They assembled again immediately when they heard of his arrival, and, knowing of the danger which was impending over Bergen, at once sent messengers to muster eight companies of their foot which were in Brabant and Flanders, and prepared to send supplies into the place by sea.

On July the eighteenth, D. Luis de Velasco occupied Steenberg, and allowed its garrison, which had no cannon, to retire to Breda. On the same afternoon Paolo Baglioni appeared before Bergen with a force some six or seven thousand strong, and took up his quarters behind the Rayberg, a rising ground near the town, which the Walloon pastors, who chronicled the siege, sometimes speak of as a high mountain. On the following morning at daybreak Famars marched into the town amid salvoes of musketry, and two days later was joined there by the English Colonel Henderson with some English troops.

The garrison of Bergen, after receiving these reinforcements, amounted to about five thousand men. They were a motley gathering, for in addition to the Dutch troops, and numerous volunteers, they included companies of French, Scotch, Walloons, Germans, and Swiss. As the States-General had decreed that

all customs and excise duties should be suspended during the siege, they were followed by a train of sutlers. Famars and Henderson now drew lots for quarters. The north side fell to Famars and his French, whilst Henderson with his English, garrisoned the south side.

Half a century of warfare had taught the Netherlanders the value of strengthening the courage of a besieged population by religious observances. The Consistory, therefore, met at once and arranged that solemn prayers with a sermon should be celebrated daily by the three pastors of the town. The magistrates found this proposal "very savoury." The sittings of the Council of War were always opened with prayer, and the Church was so thronged at sermon time that on one occasion a service had to be held in the square before the Law Courts.

Many of the burghers feared that the place must inevitably fall before Spinola. Men said that when he was in the Palatinate seeking like a greedy wolf to devour that innocent lamb, a phrase heard every Sunday in London pulpits, he had taken towns as if they were birds' nests or eggs abandoned by the hen and that not one of them had dared to move a wing to defend itself. The inborn pride of a Genoese had made him say as he marched over its plains, "Now or never," and his victories in that hapless province had opened the floodgates of woe upon Germany. What chance, then, had Bergen to withstand such a foe?

Notwithstanding these forebodings the garrison was not slow in taking the offensive. On the nineteenth of July the cavalry beat up Baglioni's quarters at Biervliet and Rithoven was encouraged by their success to make an attempt three days later to drive the enemy from their position behind the Rayberg. The Dutch pikemen soon drove the Spaniards out of their advanced trenches, whilst the French forced their way into the camp itself and threw the horse into such disorder that many galloped off to Putte, three leagues away, and one of the fugitives rode without drawing rein to Antwerp, bearing the tidings that the Spanish army was lost. He was rewarded for his news with the halter. Meanwhile a large body of grooms and sutlers, each carrying in his hand a stick to imitate mounted arquebusiers, and divided into four squadrons with their flags, rode out of the Antwerp gate and drew up on the road to Borchvliet. They were received with a volley of musketry, but whilst a hand to hand fight was going on in the camp, they made their way into

the village and burnt it down. In the end, however, Rithoven was forced to draw off his men, who fell back into the town with some loss. Had the English and Scotch, indeed, been properly supported by the Dutch, they must have stormed Velasco's camp. Their failure rendered a prolonged siege inevitable.

The work of strengthening the fortifications was, therefore, actively pushed forward. The harbour remained open and vessels laden with supplies entered it at every tide. The besiegers raised a battery upon its north side, but their shots only cut the spars and rigging of a ship of war, without doing any further damage.

To supply the workmen's pay the magistrates imposed a tax of twenty sous [10d.] upon every tun of beer and of twelve [6d.] upon every puncheon of wine. All those employed upon the works were paid regularly and the contractors were held rigorously to their contracts as to time under penalty of death.

The Council of War met twice a day. The States-General, the Council of State and the States of Zealand were represented on the Board, which also included all the colonels and captains of cavalry, the commanders of every nation, and the sergeant-major with two captains of each of the five divisions. Twice a day it received reports as to the state of the garrison and of the works in progress. Amongst its English and Scotch members, the most prominent was perhaps Sir Charles Morgan, a scion of that great family of Tredegar which ranks amongst the most ancient in South Wales, whose gigantic form and high-bred features are preserved to us in the canvas of Vandyck. He had married the daughter of that friend of William the Silent Philippe Marnix de Ste. Aldegonde, the composer of the National Hymn of the rebel Netherlands, and had reared to her memory a tomb laden with gilding and with fantastic carving which still adorns the Old Kirk at Delft. Lord Mountjoy, his brother, Sir Charles Rich, and a brother of Lord Wentworth, were amongst the English volunteers.

Spinola's army likewise contained many English, Scotch and Irish. Lord Argyle, and the Earl of Tyrone, the exiled head of the royal O'Neills of Ulster, commanded regiments of their countrymen, whilst Lord Vaux was at the head of one which fought under the banner-blazoned with the red cross of St. George. The English, however, were not wholly trusted, and to prevent them from deserting were mixed up with the Belgians, the

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Burgundians and the Italians. Some of them, however, broke out of their lines, and ran at the top of their speed into Bergen to surrender themselves. When they were questioned as to their reasons for taking up arms against their religion by Edward Cecil, the youngest son of Lord Burghley, who was in the place on a mission from Maurice, they excused themselves by saying that they had been told that they were coming to Holland to be employed in the service of the Low Countries. It was charitably supposed that they had been deceived by a trick of the Jesuits.

The besieged were in a far better condition than the besiegers. As the harbour remained open the States-General poured supplies into the town, and "the continual arrivals and departures of boats going and coming, bringing and fetching, loading and discharging, made the harbour-side like those of the greatest trading towns." The Dutch wounded were sent off by water under the escort of a surgeon to the hospitals in Zealand and Holland, whilst the Spaniards on the other hand were jolted to Antwerp over the ruts and heath tracks of the Campine in waggons covered with white tarpaulins blazoned with the red saltire of Burgundy. The enemy's lines were within a musket shot of the ramparts and their operations were watched from them with interest by veterans who were too old to take an active part in the fighting. The first man, indeed, who was killed by Spinola's cannon was an old Major van de Villiers who had gone for a stroll along them to look at the foe. The ill-paid Spaniards "had nothing but desertion in their heads and quicksilver on their feet. From dawn to dusk nothing was to be seen but Spaniards and English bolting out of their holes like rabbits, or sneaking out of the ditches and brushwood and running top-speed towards the town," where they received a warm welcome. The cannonading never stopped day or night. Rubens, in his studio at Antwerp, listened to the roar of the guns, and in the trim walks of New Hall, James could not be persuaded that the sounds of an engagement between Spinola's privateers and some Dutch men-of-war, off the mouth of the Thames, were not those of the batteries at Bergen.

Spies swarmed everywhere. The Protestants at Antwerp kept their co-religionists informed of every movement of the enemy, whilst his correspondents within the town had encouraged Spinola to risk the attack despite the difficulties of the undertaking.

Throughout August the Spaniards continued to push on their approaches; the Dutch threw up a redoubt named the Crab's Sconce in the marsh to the north of the harbour to checkmate the efforts of the engineers who strove to block its mouth with a dyke of bales of wool and of the "sausages" which twenty years before had been so famous at the leaguer of Ostend.

Spinola had reached the camp late in July and had taken up his quarters on the north side of the town within range of the batteries at the Steenberg Gate, which frequently swept his lines, and blew his transport animals and waggons into fragments.

"On the night of the fifteenth of August, the Spaniards attempted to surprise the half moon which the besieged had thrown up before the Antwerp Gate. About eleven o'clock they made three furious charges. Walloons, Italians, English, Spaniards and Flemings rushed side by side on the outwork. Their shouts of 'Tue, tue,' 'Mata, mata,' 'Kill him, kill him,' 'Val, val, val aen,' rang in the ears of its defenders, who all kept quiet for a space, speaking not a word, and hiding their lighted matches, so as not to be seen and so to draw on the crowded masses of their assailants. The moment the Spaniards closed in upon the works, the two great 'dragons' upon the ramparts began to spit fire and discharged their 'boxes of sweets' upon them to such good purpose that the cries turned to sobs and the 'howling to yowling.' On all sides groans and shrieks of 'O mon Dieu,' 'O mon Dieu,' 'O Lord, O Lord' or of 'Jesu Maria,' 'O Madre de Dios' rang through the darkness, for each man in his anguish was calling upon his God."

Again and again the Spaniards closed up their ranks and charged, but they were driven back by the fire and were pursued by the defenders into the wood on the Rayberg. The watchers on the town walls by straining their ears could hear the clash of the swords and the halberds and pikes cracking and breaking as they fought hand to hand for a good hour. At last the Spaniards fell back and the Dutch returned to the redoubt "over ground soaked red with blood and strewn with the bodies of the slain."

Desultory fighting went on throughout the month of August, and was sometimes varied by night attacks in which the Spaniards were beaten off with hand-grenades. Spinola's supplies were beginning to fail and to secure his communications with Antwerp he was forced to fortify the villages of Putte, Hoogenheyde and

Drieschouwen. To increase his difficulties the States-General withdrew the protections which they had granted to the mills near Antwerp and Mechlin and threatened to burn them down. In retaliation Spinola laid an embargo upon the exportation of grain from the Obedient Netherlands into Holland and Zealand. As the irate chroniclers of the siege say : " That acme of shiftiness and corruption, that sharp, cunning schemer who always looks so far ahead and who shows his foresight by his plans," began to see that his undertaking could not succeed, and did not wish to leave himself " floating at the mercy of the winds and waves." If he was forced to fall back upon Antwerp, his army would have to subsist upon the resources of Flanders and Brabant.

The Spanish party in Bergen did not fail to circulate reports calculated to diminish the courage of the defenders. Every trumpet which came from Spinola to the Council of War reiterated that the Dutch were deceiving themselves in their expectation of receiving help from Mansfeldt as he had taken service in France and had marched off there with his army. Daily the enemy shouted to the sentinels in the trenches, that they could take the harbour when they would and letters from Antwerp carried the story throughout Europe, though the Antwerpens themselves knew too well that their barns and warehouses were overflowing with Spanish wounded.

Mansfeldt had once more become a factor of importance in the calculations of both the belligerents. The Battle of Höchst had no decisive results. Christian of Brunswick and Mansfeldt had escaped from the field to Mannheim and had subsequently crossed the Rhine with the intention of marching upon Haguenaue, a position from which they could either advance into Burgundy or against Archduke Leopold who was lying at Breisach to protect Alsace. Their army could with difficulty be kept together. The soldiers who only received a loaf every four days were clamouring for their pay, and asked Mansfeldt to disband them unless he could lead them into some fine fat country where they had not yet been. He must inevitably have been lost had Cordoba and Tilly advanced against him. Tilly had, however, remained beyond the Rhine on the excuse that it was his duty to protect the bishoprics of Mainz and Wurzburg, and the three thousand Polish horse who had been sent by the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria into the Lower Palatinate to reinforce the Spaniards could do but little to replace him. The Poles, as his

lieutenant, Montenegro, informed Cordoba, were incorrigible, and he would need all his skill to handle them. In reality it was the wish of Maximilian of Bavaria to secure a short suspension of hostilities.

The Palatine, who had taken refuge at Saverne, was soon forced by want of money to dismiss both Christian and Mansfeldt from his service, and sought shelter at Sedan with his uncle the Duke of Bouillon.

Mansfeldt, finding himself out of employment, promptly opened negotiations with the Infanta Isabella, and through the Count of Henin expressed his anxious wish to make his submission to Spain. As, however, most of his troops had marched into Lorraine from which they were threatening Burgundy and Luxemburg, his statements were probably, only intended to dispel the Infanta's suspicions. She could not have agreed to the terms which he asked as to the Imperial Cities without making a great noise in the Empire. Both Mansfeldt and the Palatine were indeed acting with consummate skill. From their position at Sedan they could make their way at their choice either into Flanders or into France, or might even march through Burgundy into Savoy, although it was generally believed that Charles Emmanuel viewed Mansfeldt with no friendly eye. Louis XIII. had, indeed, not yet ratified the arrangements as to the Valtelline which had been concluded at Madrid, and the peasants of the Grisons had expelled the Austrian garrisons from Chur and the Prätigau. The French King had met the Duke of Savoy at Lyons, and was doing his best to patch up an arrangement with the Duke of Bouillon, Lesdiguières, and the Venetians, all deadly enemies of Spain. Philip IV. had, therefore, good reason for urging Cordoba to unite with Tilly and enter Alsace which was of far more importance to Spanish interests than the Lower Palatinate, and which, moreover, was in the hands of his uncle, Archduke Leopold, upon whom he counted to guard the passes of the Rhoetian Alps. An attack upon Italy by the Protestant Armies or the French might take place at any moment, and, when Italy and Burgundy were at stake, the Lower Palatinate was as nothing. If Mansfeldt entered France, the Huguenots would flock to his standards, and he might, if he chose, re-enter Germany with a stronger army than before, and the Spaniards would gain little by having to deal with the quick-witted French, instead of lubberly Germans. Thus Tilly's inaction after the

victory at Höchst had placed Spain in a worse position than she had been in before it.

After a short halt at Thionville, Mansfeldt entered France, where he gave out everywhere that he wished to live and die in the French service. Until Mansfeldt's intentions were definitely known, the fate of Bergen must remain in suspense. Spinola was too weak to take the place unaided, and he could only count for reinforcements upon Cordoba's army which was lying at Neustadt in the Lower Palatinate to keep Mansfeldt from joining Brunswick by the Hundsrück and St. Goar. It was impossible for him to withdraw any of the forces with Count Henry de Berg, who was held fast by Maurice and who, if his army was weakened, could not be expected to retain his positions upon the Rhine and at Juliers.

It was not until August the sixteenth that the Infanta was able to inform Philip that Mansfeldt was advancing upon Sedan. She at once sent orders to Cordoba to march to Luxemburg to protect the Netherlands, leaving a few garrisons in the Palatinate. He was already following the enemy with nine thousand foot, two thousand horse and a train of artillery, and she had received despatches from him dated from Thionville on the twelfth. Mansfeldt was still continuing to negotiate with her agents, Count Henin and Jacques Bruneau, and had sent M. Flamant to Brussels to inform her that he had entered the French service. Philip was for once, more suspicious than his aunt, and sent her earnest warnings to be careful what she did as Mansfeldt was a treacherous scoundrel, and she must always be upon her guard with him.

The warning arrived too late when Mansfeldt had already shown himself in his true colours. From Thionville he had marched by Mouzon to Sedan, where he had joined the Palatine and Bouillon and had arranged to make a raid into Hainault. After getting together a few of Brunswick's troops and a handful of his own mutineers he set out northwards. On learning of his movements the Infanta at once sent orders to Cordoba, who was already at Luxemburg, to follow him up. Cordoba accordingly set out and hastened after the invaders who now gave out that they were upon their way to join the Dutch. He caught them up at nightfall upon the twenty-eighth of August at Fleurus five leagues south of Brussels. The next morning Mansfeldt's men advanced to the attack. They fought like rats in a trap as they

knew that if the Spaniards caught them upon the march they could expect no mercy. They were three times as strong as their opponents in cavalry, but were far weaker in foot. At the first charge they broke the ranks of the Neapolitans who fled in terror, but reformed, and with the Spaniards hurled themselves upon the foe. In their eagerness, however, they advanced too far and were all but cut off. To protect them Cordoba drew up his baggage waggons upon their flank. The effect of this movement was extraordinary. Mansfeldt's men at once fell back and though they again and again charged in frenzied despair they were at length broken by the Spanish horse, who drove them before them for five leagues, and took all their artillery and baggage with many flags and standards. All the foot was cut down and the horse suffered severely. Mansfeldt escaped with a few troops of cavalry and hastened to join the Dutch. Brunswick lost an arm and was at first reported to be dead. The battle lasted for six hours and veteran soldiers reported that the fighting was harder than any that had been seen for many years.

On the following day the Infanta visited the army and Cordoba received a most gracious reception when he came to kiss her hands. Notwithstanding their fatigues the troops looked very well and fired some salvoes of musketry and cannon in much better order than their commander had anticipated. Isabella despatched Cordoba to Bergen to join Spinola who was clamouring for reinforcements and to her delight was able to send some troops of cavalry belonging to the Emperor and the Catholic League which had arrived on the frontier of Luxemburg in pursuit of Mansfeldt, to strengthen Berg.

Cordoba by his skill and courage had saved the Obedient Provinces from very imminent danger.

Some of the guns captured at Fleurus bore the Palatine's arms and the motto, "Pour Dieu et pour le Roi," and the Infanta remarked with justice that this was a strange way of asking for Peace. Weston's hopes that he would arrange an armistice were rapidly vanishing.

The news that Mansfeldt had entered Hainault arrived at Bergen on the thirty-first of August, and was received with enthusiasm by the besieged. Letters from Antwerp reported that the Obedient Provinces were panic-stricken, and that not only had Cordoba been summoned from Germany to oppose the invaders, but that even the peasantry had been called to arms.

It was firmly believed that the Spaniards had been defeated. The Protestant losses were ignored, and the fact that their horse had forced their way through their assailants was hailed as the severest blow which the Imperial Crown had ever sustained. The God of Battles, men said, would soon strike down the insolent greatness of Spain, and her Empire seemed about to fall into ruin. Two days later it became known in the Spanish camp that Mansfeldt had been defeated, and, amid the wild rejoicings of the soldiery, some of the advanced trenches were left unguarded. They were promptly seized by the Dutch. On the following day a ship entered the harbour with the news that Mansfeldt had arrived at Breda. In their turn the batteries of Bergen thundered forth their joy. As a precaution against an attack from a relieving force the Spaniards removed some of their guns from the trenches, parked them on the heath, and fell back northwards from the "mountains" into the marshes by the Crab's scone.

Spinola had good grounds for discouragement. On the twenty-ninth of August the Spaniards had made a desperate attack with three thousand picked men upon the north side of the town and had taken one of the advanced half-moons, but were driven out of it again by the Dutch "who threw down upon them bombs, artificial fire, and blazing torches with tar." After a fight which lasted all night, "the foe were forced to retire," leaving behind them many dead, "who were nearly all clothed and armed like captains and great lords." Corselets of proof, precious weapons, images of Our Lady, crucifixes, and gold chains became the spoils of the victors. Every trench and every field was white with corpses. The prisoners taken in this attack unanimously stated that Spinola intended to push on his attack through the marshes in order to take the harbour, which, as he well knew, was the key to the place.

Cordoba and his forces arrived before Bergen on the eighth of September accompanied by a long train of camp followers and baggage waggons which defiled before the onlookers on the ramparts amid a storm of jeers. In their turn the Dutch took the offensive and made several successful sorties. As, however, the Council of War saw that the siege would probably be a prolonged one, they took steps to prevent the waste of gunpowder, issued orders through the magistrates that the inhabitants should lay in stores of grain, turf, butter and wood sufficient for three months, and made a careful inspection to ascertain whether their

orders had been carried out. Spinola's spies informed him that the place was reduced to the greatest straits.

The besiegers were, however, in no very good condition. Desertion was rampant for the trenches in which the Spaniards and Italians lay were "like some hole in San Thomé under the line," their ranks were ravaged by disease, and when a deserter was asked by the burghers where he had come from, he replied, "From Hell."

Cordoba was utterly discouraged by what he saw and heard. He had been placed in charge of an important position, but the works were all but broken down, and it was impossible for him to describe the exhausted state of the troops whom he had brought with him.

Yet the houses at Antwerp were shaking with the never ceasing cannonade and night attack followed night attack without intermission. The burghers were far from being terrified by the bombardment. Towns could not be taken by cannon shots. Spinola knew that Ostend had not fallen to his guns, and that he would want another sort of mittens, as they reminded one another, to take cats like them. To prevent spying and the needless expenditure of life in unauthorised attacks upon the enemy, stringent orders were issued that no one should go outside of the gates or beyond the lines without permission from the Governor.

Betting on the outcome of the siege ran high upon Antwerp Exchange and large sums were staked that the Spaniards would enter Bergen through a breach in the ramparts before the end of September. The merchants sent agents to place their wagers at Middelburg and at Amsterdam.

On September the twenty-first a solemn fast day was held by the besieged. On the twenty-ninth, Maurice, who had broken up his camp at Emmerich on the twenty-fourth, arrived with his army at Gertruydenberg.

Maurice had remained on the Rhine to observe Henri de Berg's movements at Wesel since the commencement of the siege, for he well knew that Bergen was in no danger so long as its communications with the sea remained open. On August the sixth he had repulsed a night attack, in which however, the Duke of Weimar had been taken prisoner, and two days later had failed in an attempt to surprise Bois-le-Duc, because his foot had not come up until day was breaking.

His movements were hampered by his want of money, which was as scarce amongst the Dutch as it was amongst their opponents. The provinces were extremely slow in paying up their contributions, although they were ready enough to observe the days of Intercession which were appointed by the States-General when Maurice announced that he should attempt the relief of Bergen. Their maritime trade was suffering severely from the attacks of the Ostend and Dunkirk privateers, whilst a powerful fleet under Don Fadrique de Toledo, which had been originally sent from Spain in order to attack a squadron which the Dutch were rumoured to have fitted out for an attack upon the Peninsula, had been sent to the Isle of Rhé to lay in wait for the ships which were usually sent thither from Holland in the autumn to load cargoes of wine and salt. The original plan had been that the galleons from Dunkirk should meet Toledo off the Scillies with supplies and that he should use those islands as his base. Philip, indeed, had asked the Infanta to despatch a courier to Madrid in order that he might keep the English ambassador advised of Don Fadrique's movements. As the Dutch lived by their fisheries and sea-borne trade they naturally felt the pressure of the sea-power of Spain, and Toledo whilst cruising off the Isle of Rhé would hamper Maurice's movements on the banks of the Waal. England, however, from her geographical situation, held the key to the position and, notwithstanding the part which the Palatine had played in Mansfeldt's raid, the Infanta wrote to ask for permission to give Weston some satisfaction as to the armistice, for they would lose nothing by doing so, and it might be well to keep the English ambassadors at Madrid in good humour.

It was, therefore, a great pleasure to Maurice when Mansfeldt after forcing his way through Brabant and making a rich booty, arrived at Tilburg at the beginning of September with a force some thousands strong and took service under the banner of the States.

By the twenty-ninth of September it was known at Brussels that Maurice after embodying in his army the forces which had reached him with Mansfeldt and Brunswick and some drafts from his own garrisons had arrived at Hoogstraaten with the intention of either making a great effort to relieve Bergen or of attempting the capture of Lierre, Antwerp, or some other important place. Count Henri de Berg who, in accordance with his instructions, had broken up his camp near Wesel on the first movement of the Dutch, was toiling after him, and it had been arranged that he

was to be joined at Lierre by the troops who had originally been sent in pursuit of Mansfeldt by the Emperor and by the Catholic League. At Lierre Berg was in a position to cover Antwerp and lay upon the flank of the line of advance from Hoogstraaten to Bergen. When sending these particulars to Philip the Infanta was fain to admit that the forces before Bergen had suffered severely, and that the desertions had been very numerous. The garrison had made a far better defence than had been expected, and as the army which was intended to relieve them was so strong, she could not but feel somewhat apprehensive. "May God dispose everything as is best for His service and for your Majesty's."

From Hoogstraaten, Maurice advanced to Rozendal, and entrenched himself there. On the thirtieth of September the garrison of Bergen learnt that he was on the march to relieve them. The States-General proclaimed a weekly fast day, and both sides knew that the decisive moment had arrived. As his last resource Spinola hurried on the construction of the batteries at the entrance of the harbour, of which they commanded the whole length, but the Dutch kept up such a deadly fire that the workmen were forced to lay down their tools, although every man employed upon these works was paid twenty-four francs [£1 0s. 0d.] a night. Such was the loss of life that out of a working party of forty not more than five or six would return uninjured in the morning. The expenditure of ammunition was unparalleled. The officers in charge of the magazines reported to the States-General that they had served out twenty-four thousand pounds of gunpowder in seventy-two hours, and sent urgent appeals to them to forward further supplies. Spinola, in his astonishment at hearing this, cried: "They must mean to fire all Holland or will their sandhills turn to powder?"

It was plain that all the sacrifices of the Spaniards had been made in vain. Their soldiery were worn out with their hardships and even the veterans of Bohemia and of the Palatinate were murmuring. They got no pay and received as rations a loaf of black bread every two days. They were weary of being led like sheep to the slaughter and of being cudgelled on by their officers to attack guns with pikes and swords. In one day eighty men of different nations rushed out of their lines in a confused crowd, swinging their hats in the air and crying out to the Dutch that they surrendered. Yet it was rumoured at Antwerp that the

outer forts of Bergen had fallen and that some three weeks before Spinola had effected a lodgment in the moats from which he had driven a mine under the great church, and intended to fire it when the building was crowded with worshippers. Once the place had fallen, it was believed that the Marquis would invade the Island of Tholen, the key to Zeeland, whilst Berg with the Bavarians marched into Friesland. Within six weeks, men said, the rebel islanders would be at the mercy of their former masters.

Events turned out otherwise. Maurice arrived at Rozendal on the second of October, and thus prevented either Berg or Anhalt from occupying it in accordance with Spinola's orders. It was expected that he would attack the besiegers' lines on the following morning and that the garrison would make a sortie to support him at the same moment. Even if he remained inactive it would have been impossible to collect forage for the Spanish cavalry, which would, therefore, inevitably be destroyed within the next four days. Directly, therefore, Spinola heard that Rozendal was in the enemy's hands he assembled his principal officers and with their unanimous approval drew his forces and artillery together and at two o'clock on the afternoon of October the second marched off in good order to Putte, a village lying between Bergen and Antwerp, which he reached without the loss of a man, a gun, or a baggage waggon. At Putte he met Berg and Anhalt and encamped there both to observe the movements of the enemy and to gain time to consider his plans for the future. On his way thither he had been forced to pass between the forces of Maurice and Mansfeldt and the garrison of Bergen, which had received considerable reinforcements. Yet, as has been said, he succeeded in doing so without sustaining the slightest loss. His retreat from Bergen is, therefore, reckoned, and justly so, to be one of his most famous military exploits. Even Cordoba expresses full approval of Spinola's conduct and states that he only retreated on the advice of his officers, although jealous critics like Losada murmured that it had been a piece of midsummer madness to send the veterans of the German wars to rot in the trenches before Bergen only to be treated like a rabble of raw recruits and to lose their arms, their equipments and half their numbers.

Great was the amazement of the garrison when they saw the besiegers' army filing away along the Antwerp road. On the second of October they were holding a celebration of the Holy

Communion followed by a solemn service in the afternoon as a thanksgiving for their victory two days before. Whilst the service was in progress, the sentinels on the ramparts saw the enemy packing up their baggage and preparing to depart. About three o'clock they set fire to their lines; the flames spread over the Rayberg and were seen that night in half the towns and villages of Holland and Zealand. At daybreak next morning the Spanish camp was empty, and soldiers and trumpeters were bringing back their spoils to Bergen, and the river was black with boats bearing the country people to visit the scene of such desperate fights. Maurice entered the place on the fourth and expressed his satisfaction at the heroic defence which they had made to its exulting burghers. The States-General issued orders that a public thanksgiving with prayers and an exhortation should be held in every church throughout the provinces. It was long remembered that the rains, which had been very heavy throughout the summer, had ceased when Maurice set out from Gravenweert to relieve Bergen, and that they had begun again as soon as his task was accomplished. The Prince remained with his army at Rozendal until the twenty-first of October and then returned to the Hague, which he entered on the twenty-sixth amid great public rejoicings. The defenders of Bergen had fired two hundred thousand cannon shots during the siege.

The news quickly spread throughout Europe, and was everywhere welcomed with joy by the Protestants. At Paris the Huguenots reported that Spinola had broken up his camp so hurriedly that he had set fire to the tents without removing the sick and wounded, many of whom had been burnt alive whilst others who had been injured in the conflagration had been found by the townspeople and removed for treatment to the town hospitals. There is nothing, however, to show that the Marquis was guilty of such inhuman negligence.

On the contrary, he, but a few days later, corrected with his own hand the instructions to the Commissioners who had been appointed to decide some disputes as to billeting in Flanders, and gave special orders that the Governor of Sluys should repay to the peasantry some monies which he had extorted from them.

The failure before Bergen was a deep disappointment to the Infanta although she did her best to force herself to look at it in a proper light. "It was," she wrote to Philip, "the fortune of war." Had Spinola not raised the siege when he did, both

his own army and Cordoba's must have been utterly destroyed by death in battle, disease, and desertion. They had only brought away seven thousand foot, and if these had been lost it would have been the ruin of the Obedient Provinces. A small garrison was left in Steenberg to keep the enemy in check but the place could not hold out without support and surrendered upon October the seventh on favourable terms.

Meanwhile Spinola's army was on its march from Putte towards Hoogstraaten, pillaging the villages along the road and infecting the countryside with a contagious dysentery of which many of the peasants perished. The highways were covered with dead horses and with sick soldiers, "dragging themselves along like worms." The German mercenaries and the scarcely more savage Croats perpetrated unspeakable outrages. A detachment of Italian soldiers seized the Castle of Genappe and, with the aid of the Dutch, endeavoured to excite a general mutiny, but the issue of a proclamation outlawing the mutineers brought their rebellion to a speedy end. It was impossible to issue pay to the soldiery, for although Philip had sent one hundred and eight thousand Sicilian ducats [£27,500], this sum was but "a drop in the bucket" in comparison with the Infanta's needs, yet she was profuse in her expressions of gratitude for the gift.

For a moment Spinola had thought of attacking Maurice in his camp at Rozendal. On reconnoitring the position, however, he found it to be fortified and held so strongly that he gave up his idea, and as he was in want of both provisions and forage fell back into Brabant and marched by Lierre and Aerschot to Maestricht, where he sent his army into their quarters to rest. In the meantime the Dutch withdrew from Rozendal and sent their cavalry to Grave by a road passing close by Genappe which had been evacuated by the Italian mutineers.

As the Infanta thought that Mansfeldt would carry on the war in Westphalia upon his own account she proposed to send Cordoba against him, much to that general's indignation. Westphalia, as he wrote to his wife, was a long way off, and it would be easy for Mansfeldt and Brunswick, with the support of the Dutch, to raise fresh levies of cavalry there for the next year's campaign, whilst the army which he had brought from the Palatinate was reduced to such a state that the enterprise could only land him in difficulties greater than those which he had already had to face.

On October the twenty-seventh the Spanish Council of State passed a note approving of Spinola's conduct in raising the siege of Bergen. At the beginning of November the Marquis went into winter quarters at Borcht, near Antwerp, and it was thought that the campaign of 1622 had at last reached its end.

Maurice, however, was by no means minded to waste the winter in idleness. No sooner had he reached the Hague than he proceeded to lay his plans for attacking Flanders, the province from which the Obedient Netherlands drew their wealth. Seeing that the Spanish forces were dispersed over a wide area of country he determined to risk an attempt upon Antwerp. He accordingly issued orders to his cavalry to rendezvous at Antwerp Heath by the thirtieth of November, and on the same day brought eighty-eight companies of foot by water to Dordrecht. He embarked there on the first of December and sailed with a flotilla of four hundred vessels to Willemstad, where he intended to land. Scarcely, however, had his squadron passed through the narrow gut which leads from the Old Maas into the Hollands' Diep than they were met by a violent storm. The cold was so severe that the spray froze as it fell upon the tackle and ropes, and it was impossible for the seamen to handle them. The Gut froze up and the next morning the Maas was so full of drifting ice that the ships had to take refuge wherever they could find shelter. Maurice with several sail put into Willemstad, but the rest of the flotilla was scattered and he had no means of communicating with them. His nephew, Count Earnest Casimir, with many of the transports, got frozen in close to shore near Zwaluwe, a village in North Brabant, and were forced to land their crews. Some of the vessels dragged their anchors and were dashed to pieces on a sand bank, but Maurice's chief anxiety was lest the enemy should succeed in setting those off Zwaluwe on fire. Thanks to these delays the Spaniards were upon the alert. The Prince, seeing that his plans had failed, returned to the Hague, where he arrived upon December the ninth. His disappointment was great for he had been so confident that he would succeed that, when going on board ship at Dordrecht, he had said to some gentlemen who had attended him to the shore, "Sirs, pray God for our venture, as God alone can make me fail in it: otherwise I have my quarry as safe as I have the hand I am holding out to you." He looked upon his failure, therefore, as the work of Providence. In their turn the Spaniards scored a success which they could set off against

their failure before Bergen. On December the twenty-ninth the Fort of Papenmuts, which had for so long closed the communications by the Rhine between the Palatinate and Wesel, surrendered to Berg after a blockade of eleven months, and thus the year 1622 ended with a Spanish victory.

[Archives, *Brussels. Etat et Guerre.* No. 132.

Spinola to Pedro de San Juan, 14 October, 1622.

Do.

No. 188.

Infanta to Philip IV.

9, 27 July ; 16, 17 August ; 9, 29 September ; 8 October ;
8, 13 November, 1622.

Philip IV. to Infanta,

28 July ; 25 September, 1622.

London, State Paper Office. S.P.O. Dom., Jas. I.,
Vol. 129.

No. 35, Chamberlain to Carleton, 13 April, 1622.

Bergues-op-Zoom assiégée par les trois Pasteurs (Berghen 1623).

Birch T., "The Court and Times of James I.," Vol. II., op. cit.

Correspondance de Cordoba, op. cit.

Correspondance de Rubens, Vol. III., op. cit.

V. I. Kemp, Maurits van Nassau, Part IV., op. cit.

Morree, Prof. G., "The Oude Kerck at Delft." (Delft 1906).

"Historical Manuscripts Commission Reports," op. cit. *Drummond Moray MSS.*

Times' "Historians' History, etc.," Vol. XIII., op. cit.

Villa R., "Ambrosio Spinola," op. cit.

Cf. "List of Authorities," Belgium, 1622. "Siege of Bergen-op-Zoom."]

CHAPTER LIV

To the military historian the campaign in the Netherlands is undoubtedly the most salient event of the year 1622; to the student who seeks to trace the causes which have changed the future of nations, the Netherlands campaign is far less important than are those which were being fought out upon the other theatres of war. It was of little permanent importance whether Bergen-op-Zoom passed under the Spanish flag or whether it continued under the rule of the United Provinces. It was of great importance to the future of Europe that Spain should have placed herself in such a position that she became a mere dependent upon the will of some secondary princes in Germany and that the understanding with France, which she had inaugurated by the double marriage between the crowns was once more exchanged for their ancient hostility. Such were the issues at stake in those campaigns in the Valtelline and in Germany in comparison with which the religious war in France, which kept the French engaged at home until it was ended by the signature of the Peace of Montpellier on the nineteenth of October, 1622, appears but an episode. By that peace it is true the Huguenot party were greatly weakened, but the Edict of Nantes was maintained in force, they were allowed to have an assembly consisting solely of laymen, and were allowed to retain the Cautionary Towns of Montauban and La Rochelle, whilst the Catholics agreed to demolish Fort St. Louis, which had been constructed to command Rochelle harbour. This agreement was not observed. Fort St. Louis was strengthened, its garrison was increased, and the seed was thus sown for the wars of 1625 and 1627, which were of such fateful importance for the future both of France and England. [*Bassompierre*, op. cit. Vol. III., pp. 109-154, p. 182, Note I. *Hanotaux*, G., op. cit., Vol. II., Part 2, pp. 434-435.] Had the Spaniards and Austrians known how to employ the opportunities afforded to them by the compulsory inactivity of France, they might well have secured a permanent settlement of all the questions at issue whether in Germany or in the Grisons, if not even

in the Netherlands, in their own interests. They had every reason to view the arrangement of a settlement in France by the Treaty of Montpellier with dismay.

The situation in the Grisons at the beginning of 1622 was upon the whole in favour of the Hapsburgs, as, though the Swiss Cantons had refused to ratify the Treaty of Madrid, the Austrians were in occupation of Chur and the Prätigau, whilst the Catholics held the Valtelline. The conclusion of the Treaty of Milan in the middle of January placed the Austrians in possession of a great deal of territory in the Leagues themselves, but, for that reason, gave dire offence to the Protestants of the Grisons. More than fifteen hundred of their co-religionists were living in exile abroad, whilst, at home, the preachers were expelled, the Reformed worship was put down and the Austrian Governor, Baldiron, ordered everyone to attend mass, although no one could be forced to become a Catholic. [*Ragaz, J.*, op. cit., pp. 249-254. *Moor*, op. cit., Vol. III., pp. 674-685.]. The Austrian soldiery were a band of robbers who snatched the very bread from the mouths of the starving peasants. [*Ragaz*, op. cit., pp. 249-254.]

The Pope had no wish to see the Valtelline in Spanish hands. So far as he dared he was, as has been seen, supporting the claims of the See of Chur to the restoration of those territories, and had through the Capuchins got control of the work of religious propaganda in the Grisons. It is uncertain, however, how far he approved of Archduke Leopold's wish to secure the appointment of his own nominee as co-adjutor to Bishop Johann à Flugi. [*Chur, M.* 53, Archduke Leopold to Cardinal Bellamine, 19 August, Gregory XV. to the Bishop of Chur, 25 August. Archduke Leopold to the Three Leagues, 20 October, 1621. Bishop of Chur to the Three Leagues (*undated*), Gregory XV. to Archduke Leopold, 15 January. Bishop of Campania (Nuncio in Switzerland), to the Provincial of the Capuchins, 15 January, 1622 (*Cf.* Bishop of Chur to Father Hyacinth of Casale, 16 June, 1621, and *Hanotaux, G.*, op. cit., Vol. II., Part 2, p. 529, as to the relations between Gregory XV. and Father Hyacinth.)]

Gregory XV. was, indeed, for ever repeating that the Treaty of Milan gave good grounds for France to make war upon Spain. Had it not been for their troubles at home it is probable that the French would have intervened in the early spring of 1622, but, though they were compelled, for the time, to remain inactive,

their resentment was none the less keen, especially as it was believed that the Extreme Catholic Party were responsible for the policy which had provoked the Huguenot War. It is possible that the French Ultramontanes were aware of the action which the Pope was taking with regard to the territorial claims of Chur, which would have been regarded with as little favour at Paris as at Madrid. [Cf. *Hanotaux, G.*, op. cit., Vol. II., Part 2, pp. 531-545, as to the attitude of the extreme Catholics.]

A few weeks later Father Ignatius arrived in Rome as the representative of the missions in the Grisons and received a most flattering welcome from both the Pope and Cardinal Ludovisi, who loaded him with gifts of pictures and crosses for the new Churches. Unfortunately for the father he was shipwrecked upon the coast of Tuscany, whilst upon his return from Genoa, and all these treasures had to be thrown overboard. He himself escaped only "in his skin and bones," but his chief regret was the loss of a picture of San Isidro Labrador, the yeoman patron of Madrid, who with other Spaniards, amongst them being Theresa of Avila, had been canonized but a few months before, which was in a frame adorned with the Papal arms and with the gold lace used in the Papal liveries. [*Chur do.* Father Ignatius to Bishop of Chur, Milan, 18 April, 1622.] Unfortunately the Protestant Leaguers were but little influenced by the charms of an ornate worship, and the orders issued by Baldiron speedily roused them to revolt. [*Moor*, op. cit., Vol. III., pp. 674-685.]

On the twenty-fourth of April, 1622, the tocsin was ringing from all the Church towers in the Prätigau, that valley lying beneath the snowy chain of the Rhoetikon, the boundary between the Leagues and the Tyrol, which was one of the chief seats of the extreme Reformers. Thuring Enderlin of Mayenfeld, though he could count but on the help of a few men from the Rhine Valley, had stirred the Prätigauers to rise. The Austrians had deprived them of their weapons, so they cut clubs ten feet long in the woods, and garnished them with spiked nails and knife blades, like the "Morning Stars" with which their forefathers had struck down the Hapsburg chivalry at the Malserheide. Others armed themselves with hatchets and scythes. Baldiron had already conceived suspicions that a rising was contemplated, and had sent messengers to recall his garrisons from the Inner Prätigau. They sought refuge in the Castle of Castels, and were blockaded there by the Prätigauers, whom they sought to induce

to raise the blockade by offering to allow two of their ministers to remain with them to celebrate baptisms and marriages. Their proposals were on the point of being accepted, when the besiegers received news that the inhabitants of Schiersch had risen against the Austrians. They rushed thither and at eleven o'clock on Sunday, April the twenty-fourth, the fight began. The Austrians kept up a heavy fire, but their muskets were of no avail against the clubs, and they were driven back into the Church. Their ammunition exploded, part of the roof fell in, and those who were firing from the gallery were forced to come down from it by ladders and were received by a crowd of infuriated women, who dashed out their brains with their clubs. Similar scenes took place at Grüsich and at Seewis where Father Fidelis of Sigmaringen was preaching a missionary sermon. He was in the middle of his discourse when a soldier rushed into the Church shouting that there was a fire at Schiersch. The congregation rose in confusion, but the Father, who did not hear the shout cried to them to keep their places and went on with his exhortation ending with the words: "Will you come to confession or no?" When all answered: "No," Father Fidelis took off his sandals, struck them together, and smote them so that the dust rose up over the heads of the congregation. All now began to rush out of the Church, and the preacher, who had heard shouting outside, tried to leave it with them. He had, however, already been fired at at Seewis, and so Claus, one of his trusty followers, threw his arms round him and begged him to stay inside. This the father refused to do, but, at least so the Protestant peasantry said, completely lost his head, ran wildly into the open air, sprang over the wall of the churchyard, rolled down the steep slope outside, and fell among the flying soldiery, where, in the heat of the pursuit, he was killed by Rudolf Hildebrand. Catholic chroniclers, however, related that when he came out of the Church into the meadow, the mob threw a rope round his neck and strangled him. Father Fidelis died what might well be called a martyr's death.

The missionary's body was decently interred in the churchyard at Seewis, but legends soon grew up around his tomb. It was said that a new and unknown flower of wondrous beauty had sprung up from his grave as a testimony to his sanctity. Men told how in his last sermon before leaving his monastery at Feldkirch, he had predicted the rising in the Prätigau, the defeat of the Austrians, his own martyrdom, and, finally, that the

Catholics would once more become the masters of the Grisons. Within a very few days after his death, when Count Sulz and Baldiron were gathering their forces to attempt to recover the country, a cloud suddenly rose between their army and the heretics, and, under the cover of this miraculous mist, their men carried the village of Schiersch. Directly they had done so, the cloud dispersed, and the weather once more became fine. The Blessed Martyr several times afterwards appeared to them in the heat of battle, and, on one occasion, at Saas, in the company of the Blessed Virgin. Such were the statements as to which the Bishop of Chur was asked to procure reliable evidence by Father Giovanni Battista da Castero, a Capuchin from Milan, who had been instructed by the Pope to draw up the brief for the inquiry as to the canonization of Father Fidelis. He apparently succeeded in his quest for Father Fidelis was enrolled by Urban VIII. in the ranks of the celestial hierarchy, and his festival is duly celebrated on the twenty-fourth of April in the Roman Calendar. A few months after his murder Father Fidelis' body was disinterred by Count Sulz from the churchyard at Seewis, and deposited with great ceremony in Chur Cathedral. His head was sent to the Capuchins at Feldkirch. Pope Urban VIII. was no friend to either the Spaniards or to the Austrians. Did he see in the Capuchin a martyr who had fallen for the Church and not for the Hapsburgs? Such oldworld touches lend a strange weirdness to the conflicts of an age of diplomatists and very mundane warriors. [*Chur, Hist. Rel. A. P.*, 163, *B.P.* 163. Entry as to Father Fidelis' death, 24 April, 1622. *Do.*, *M.* 54. Padre Giovanni Battista da Castero to Bishop of Chur. 7 April, 1626. *Moor op. cit.* Vol. III., pp. 674-685, quoting *Sprecher*, I., 133 and Note 8, and *Father Clemente, Istoria della Missione.*]

The Austrian garrison was quickly driven out of Seewis and fled to Mayenfeld, accompanied by a disorderly crowd of women and children. A powder waggon exploded as they were crossing the bridge over the Landquart, and many were forced over the parapet and drowned in the rush which followed. The whole of the Protestant world rang with the deeds of the Prätigauers, and, for a moment, it seemed as if the Grisons would shake off the Austrian yoke.

Circumstances, however, were against the Leaguers. The religious troubles in France prevented Louis XIII. from coming forward to assist them despite the entreaties of the Queen Mother

and Richelieu who were supported by Venice and Cardinal Ludovisi. The victories of the Spaniards and Tilly on the Rhine deprived them of Mansfeldt's aid, and he, moreover, was by no means to be wholly trusted. In the Milanese the threatening attitude of Savoy as to the Mantuan Question forced the Spanish garrisons to be kept at their full strength, but the Catholic Cantons of Switzerland did not support the efforts of the French to secure the restitution of the Valtelline under the Treaty of Madrid. Possibly their attitude was due to the secret wishes of the Pope with regard to the See of Chur.

As soon as he learnt of the rising, Archduke Leopold hastened from Alsace and assisted Baldiron and Sulz to organise an expedition for the recovery of the Prätigau. He soon, however, returned to Breisach, as Mansfeldt was threatening Hagenau. One touch of human nature softened the cruelties of the war. The League of the Ten Jurisdictions, fierce Protestants as they were, wrote to the Chapter of Chur, and offered to restore them their ancient rights and privileges, if only they would secure the release of the preachers Johann à Porta, Caspar Alexius, Blasi Alexander, and Captain Rinielli from Archduke Leopold's dungeons at Innsbrück. Their offer was not accepted. [*Chur*, M. 53. Ten Jurisdictions to Chapter of Chur, 6 June, Gregory XV. to Bishop of Chur, 25 June, 1622. Nuncio to Bishop of Chur, 23 January, 1623. *Turin, Spagna*, 18. Taran-taise to Duke, 17 June, 1622. *Moor*, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 674-683. *Ragaz*, op. cit., pp. 249-282. *Corr. de Cordoba*, op. cit., pp. 253-255. Montenegro to Cordoba. Eastein, 24 June, 1622. *Do*, p. 277. Archduke Leopold to Cordoba. Breisach, 30 June, 1622. *Hanotaux, G.*, op. cit., Vol. II., Part 2, pp. 531-545.]

The Grisons had already recalled the French agent, Gueffier, but the French were in no position to reward them for their complacency. Archduke Leopold was by no means inclined to leave the Prätigauers unpunished, but, chiefly to gain time for his preparations, he commenced negotiations with the Leaguers. They failed to see through his trickery, and, in September, a congress assembled at Lindau to treat for peace. For a moment the Archduke was free from any apprehensions on the side of Alsace. Tilly had the Palatinate at his mercy, Mansfeldt was in the Netherlands. Consequently he was free to settle his accounts with the Leaguers. Count Sulz advanced with a large force against the Lower Engadine. The Upper Engadine sought

terms from the Archduke, the Lower Engadine and The Ten Jurisdictions were left to their fate. By the third of September the villages of the Lower Engadine were in flames, old men, women, and children were massacred with savage cruelty, and the Leaguers were in full retreat over the Scaletta Pass, closely pursued by the enemy, who, on the following day, occupied and burnt Davos. Rudolf de Salis in vain attempted to defend the Prätigau; he was driven back by overwhelming forces, and Sulz and his army, plundering and burning, forced their way down the valley to Mayenfeld, where an Austrian garrison, decimated by dysentery and by the so-called Hungarian sickness with its accompaniment of severe headaches, had been lying through the summer. At Mayenfeld Sulz established his headquarters, and fugitives from the Lower Engadine and Prätigau crowded into the Protestant Cantons. [*Moor op. cit.*, Vol. III., pp. 795-797. *Ragaz*, op. cit., pp. 249-252. *Hanotaux*, op. cit., Vol. II., Part 2, pp. 531-545.]

The Leaguers were forced to yield and, late in September, signed the Convention of Lindau, with Archduke Leopold. By this convention the Lower Engadine and eight out of the Ten Jurisdictions were separated from the Leagues and united with the Austrian Tyrol, whilst Mayenfeld and Chur were to receive Austrian garrisons for six years. Thus whilst by the Treaty of Milan the keys to the Valtelline were left in the hands of the Spaniards, by the Convention of Lindau the Austrians became the masters of the Northern outlets of the Grisons passes. The last link in the chain of the land communications between Italy, Germany, and the Low Countries had been forged. France seemed to have been utterly discomfited. [*Hanotaux*, op. cit., Vol. II., Part 2, pp. 533-534.] The Papal Court, which believed that a war between France and Spain must inevitably result from the Convention, begged the Madrid Government to be prudent. [*Hanotaux*, op. cit., Vol. II., Part 2, pp. 533-734, quoting *La Valtelline, ou Mémoires, discours, traités et actes des négociations, etc.* (Genève, 1631, 248-251.).]

From the diplomatic point of view the position of France at that moment was not wholly clear. Early in the summer Du Fargis, the French ambassador at Madrid, had negotiated a fresh arrangement with Spain at Aranjuez. Under this agreement the Spaniards agreed to place the Valtelline in the hands of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, in place of evacuating it without

conditions under the terms of the Treaty of Madrid. The French, however, had delayed ratifying the Convention of Aranjuez, although Mirabel, the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, had pressed Louis XIII. to give him his answer when, in July, he was at Lyons on his way to Beziers. This delay had aroused the suspicions of Philip IV. He could not but suppose that the French King entertained some designs against Italy, for he was endeavouring to patch up an arrangement with his own rebels in hot haste, and had the intention of meeting the Duke of Savoy. Nor would Lesdiguières, the Duke of Bouillon, and the Venetians have dared to show themselves so openly hostile to Spain, had they not been assured of a backing from France. He, therefore, instructed the Infanta to consult Spinola as to the possibility of employing some portion of his army to effect a diversion in France, and urged, as has been said, that Cordoba should be sent to Alsace as it was of far greater importance than the Lower Palatinate. As, however, the Infanta, when this despatch reached her, was expecting at every moment to hear that Christian of Brunswick had invaded Belgium, and was also in the midst of her negotiations with Mansfeldt, she was compelled to refuse to arrange for such a diversion until she saw how Mansfeldt's affair turned out. [*Brussels, E et G*, 188 Philip IV. to Infanta, 28 July. Infanta to Philip IV., 17 August, 1622. *Hanotaux*, op cit., Vol. II., Part 2, pp. 531-532.]

CHAPTER LV

PHILIP IV. was anxious, and not without reason, to effect a settlement in Germany, before matters in Italy became more complicated. He could have but little hope of coming to that understanding with England which was indispensable if his naval plans against the Dutch were to be carried out unless he could prevent the Emperor from transferring the Electoral dignity from the Palatinate to the Dukes of Bavaria, and, in that event, he was bound to incur the enmity of Maximilian. Under such circumstances he could only follow a temporizing policy. At the Infanta's suggestion he declined to support the pretensions of the Bishop of Spire to Germersheim, although by his refusal he ran counter to the wishes of the Electors of Mainz and Cologne, both of whom were casting longing eyes upon territories which the Palatine's ancestors had formerly wrested from their sees. [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 188. Philip IV. to Infanta, 28 August, 1622.] A few weeks later he was instructing Oñate to inform the Emperor that he approved of the transfer of the Electorate to the Duke of Bavaria. He had, however, told Brother Hyacinth of Casale, who had come to him on a mission from the Pope, that though he had approved of the transfer of the Electorate, and would do everything in his power to support the Emperor and the Catholic Princes, he yet desired in the interests of the Catholics themselves, a fair and just settlement in Germany. Such a settlement seemed further off than ever.

After the Battle of Höchst, Frederick, who was disgusted by the excesses of Mansfeldt's rabble, had retired to Sedan after dismissing him and Christian of Brunswick from his service. [*Green, M.A.*, "Elizabeth, Queen of Bohemia," pp. 202-203. *Corr. de Cordoba*, op. cit., pp. 280-281. Count E. Mansfeldt to Cordoba, 12 July, 1622, enclosing letter from Frederick of 3 July, 1622.] He also yielded in so far to the representations of Lord Chichester, who had come to him from his father-in-law to induce him to negotiate with the Emperor, through the Infanta, that he had sent Andreas Pawel as his representative to Brussels,

after giving Weston full powers to treat there on his behalf. [Green, *M.A.*, op. cit., pp. 201-203.] Despite Pawel's assertions that the negotiations would fail, and that he might be just as well making ropes of sand, as dancing attendance on the negotiators, Frederick signed the Truce on the twenty-eighth of July. Tilly, however, on the pretence that he had not received instructions to suspend hostilities, laid siege to Heidelberg, a piece of treachery "which," the English Agents said, "roused the indignation even of the Infanta." [Green, *M.A.*, op. cit., p. 203, quoting "Roe's Negotiations," p. 63. Woodward to Roe, 3 July, 1622. *London, Brit. Mus., Harl. MSS.*, 1580, f. 199. Digby's Despatch, 16 September, 1622.] To judge from her own correspondence, however, the Infanta took the matter coolly enough, for her only remark as to the Palatine is that his dealings with Mansfeldt had made it very difficult for her to come to any arrangement with Weston, and that his gift of cannon to his former general was a strange way to seek peace and quietness. Frederick, indeed, showed, as usual, his incapacity for judging a complicated diplomatic situation. The terms offered him were, as he wrote to his wife, hard enough. The fortifications of Mannheim were to be demolished, and of the whole Lower Palatinate they were only to be allowed to retain the bailiwicks of Gernsheim, Heidelberg, and Neustadt. "God knows what the King will say to this. In England," he adds, "they still make a distinction between the Emperor and Spain, and yet both one and the other treat every one with contumely, and it looks as if they have divided up the Palatinate between them." He little knew that Philip IV. attached more importance to Alsace than he did to the Lower Palatinate, and that he had not the slightest wish to make any territorial acquisitions upon the Middle Rhine. He was, indeed, only too anxious to hold even Juliers, Cleves, and Berg in trust for the Emperor, as they could not be handed over to Neuburg, important though it was in the interests of himself, of Ferdinand, and of the Catholic League to keep those territories out of the reach of the Dutch. The Infanta never ceased urging him to enable her to give some satisfaction to Weston, for Spain would run the merest risk by doing so, and it might be well to do something to please the English. As at that moment Philip IV. was most anxious that his fleet should be allowed to use the Scillies as a base for their operations in the Channel, and was accordingly keeping Digby advised of Toledo's movements, it

was probable that he would not wish to quarrel with James I. It was clear, however, to the Palatine that in any event he must be a heavy loser, for, as he said, Digby's mission to Vienna had cost him the Upper Palatinate, and he would have to pay with the Lower for Weston's mission to Brussels. His only hope was that his father-in-law might at last take some good resolutions.

It was not very probable that James I. would "take good resolutions" if Spanish diplomacy could prevent him from doing so. But Tilly was not a Spanish general and certainly had not got "the service of the King of Spain" at heart. He went steadily on with the siege of Heidelberg. The place fell on the twenty-first of September. As the penalty for their brave defence Tilly put the English garrison to the sword. The governor was killed by a musket shot. The town had to endure all the horrors of a sack; the most beautiful of the suburbs of what, even then, was accounted the most beautiful town in Germany, was burnt to the ground; the Palatine's library was sent to the Vatican as a present to the Pope. [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 188. Philip IV. to Infanta, 28 July, 17, 18 August; 25 September, 1622. Infanta to Philip IV., 9 September, 1622. *Hist. MSS., Comm. Rep., Duke of Northumberland's MSS.* Royal Letters, p. 116. Elector Palatine to Queen of Bohemia, Sedan, 30 August; Hague, 30 September, 1622. *Green, M.A.*, op. cit., p. 207. *Krumer, J.*, op. cit., pp. 69-72.]

The King of England was already getting impatient at the delay in signing the armistice and, in the middle of September, sent orders to Weston to return home at once if it was not concluded. A fortnight later the Infanta learnt that he was furious at the news of the capture of Heidelberg, and that his anger was not likely to be appeased until the Palatine's affairs were settled to his satisfaction. He was still less likely to be appeased by the news that Tilly was besieging Mannheim, which was being stoutly held by Sir Horace Vere. [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 188. Infanta to Philip IV., 29 September, 8 October, 1622. *Hist. MSS., Comm. Rep., Duke of Northumberland's MSS.*, p. 116. Palatine to Queen of Bohemia. *Undated.*]

Such was the position of affairs in Germany at the moment when Louis XIII., by the conclusion of the Peace of Montpellier, was left free to attend to the interests of France abroad. Through the influence of Marie de Medicis Richelieu had received the Cardinal's hat upon the fifth of September and

was admitted to the Council, although the King told him not to consider himself a minister. The news of the conclusion of the Convention of Lindau reached Paris almost at the moment of the surrender of Montpellier, and the King, who had already announced his intention of visiting Lesdiguières at Grenoble, immediately began to negotiate for a meeting with the Duke of Savoy.

The Italian princes were more hostile to Spain than ever. The Pope was wholly under the influence of Cardinal Ludovisi, who had long been urging France to intervene in the dispute at a moment when Spain had her hands full in Germany and in Flanders, and when the Dutch were ready to join the Algerine pirates in an attack upon her coasts. Nor had the Duke of Savoy yet forgotten the Treaty of Asti; Venice still resented Bedmar's conspiracy; Mantua, Tuscany, and the minor Italian potentates secretly rebelled against an insolent ascendancy which they had no means of resisting. Even Genoa was beginning to murmur, and the Seignory had flatly refused to comply with Zuñiga's request to advance a million and a half ducats [£375,000] to the Spanish government. They explained that the Republic was poor and that though many of the private citizens were extremely rich, yet the State was not the master of their purses and possessions. If the King wished to carry on his wars he must, they said, be content to follow the example of his ancestor, Charles V., and pay two or three per cent. a month for advances. The Genoese merchants could not afford to give him money at seven and a half per cent. a year, as they had to pay far higher rates to those from whom they got it, and, come what might, they had to satisfy their own creditors, who would not be put off with the excuse that their own debtors had not been paid by Spain. Evidently the strain of the German war was beginning to tell upon the bankers from Suabia and the Main with whom the Genoese dealt at Piacenza Fair. Spain, as Cardinal Ludovisi had pointed out, had neither money nor credit, and Richelieu, when he visited his master at Valence, to thank him for his Cardinal's hat, urged him to reply to the Convention of Lindau by a declaration of war against her. [*Turin, Spagna*, 18. *Tarantaise*, 26 May, 1622. *Bassompierre*, op. cit., Vol. III., pp. 100, 158, Note 1. *Hanotaux*, op. cit., Vol. II., Part 2, pp. 532-538. *Times*' "Historians", etc., op. cit., Vol. XI., p. 449.]

On the seventeenth of November Charles Emmanuel I. and

Louis XIII. met at Avignon and discussed the affairs of Europe amid a round of splendid festivities. The Duke's object was to arrange a league between France, Savoy, and Venice, to force Spain to evacuate the Valtelline in accordance with the Treaty of Madrid, and to restore that province to the Grisons. He pointed out to his host that all Europe was ready to group itself round France, but, for the moment, his arguments proved unavailing. From Avignon the King returned to Lyons, where, on the fifteenth of December, he was visited by his sister, Christina the Princess of Piedmont, and her husband. They discussed a project for placing the Valtelline in trust in the hands of Henri III., Duke of Lorraine, a Prince of the Empire, who, as Duke of Bar, was also a French vassal, and whose wife, Christina Gonzaga, a Mantuan Princess, had claims to succeed not only to Mantua but to portions of Monferrat. A plan was also considered for sending an army of forty-five thousand men, to be formed by contingents furnished by France, Savoy, Venice, and the Swiss, into the Alps, but the French ministers were old worn out men, and refused to agree to a proposal which would have imposed upon them great personal hardships. Despite the Queen Mother's entreaties, the King returned to Paris without signing the treaty. For the moment the Austrians were left in possession of the Grisons, and Richelieu was forced to bide his time for crushing Spain in Italy. In vain the Jesuit Father Arnoux, the King's confessor, laboured to secure the Cardinal's appointment as Prime Minister. [*Bassompierre*, op. cit., Vol. III., pp. 159-161. *Hanotaux*, op. cit., Vol. II., Part 2, pp. 533-537.]

Philip IV., on the other hand, was doing his best to guard against the threatened attack by assuring himself of the friendship of England.

For this purpose he wrote to the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria to request them to induce the Catholic League to suspend operations against Mannheim and Frankenthal, which were still held by English garrisons, in the hope that he might thus appease James' anger at the taking of Heidelberg. In return the English might possibly persuade the Palatine and Mansfeldt to desist from giving further trouble, as, if both the opponents would make concessions, it would be the surest way of bringing about the peace which was so eagerly desired at Madrid. He also begged the Emperor to give Tilly orders to the same effect, and, evidently at Digby's instigation, wrote five days later to the Infanta,

instructing her to inform Tilly that if he made any difficulties as to complying with them, she would order the Spanish troops in the Palatinate to interfere and protect the English, with whom they were living upon very good terms. This despatch was carried to Brussels by one of Digby's servants, who requested that Her Royal Highness would furnish him with a précis of her orders to Tilly, which he could send to Whitehall. [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 188. Philip IV. to Infanta, 24; 29 October, 1622.]

Frankenthal was a pleasant town near the Rhine, about seven miles south-west of Worms, which formed part of the Electress Palatine's dowry, and which about forty years before had been made into a French Calvinists' settlement by one of the Palatine's predecessors. [*Green, M. A.*, op. cit., p. 549.]

Almost at the same time the Infanta was treating with Duke Frederick of Holstein, a Protestant and a Danish vassal, who had requested that his subjects might be allowed to trade freely with Spain, and thus for the first time entered into relations with a power which, by its geographical position and family connections, formed a link between North Germany and the Baltic States, a region which, for the most part, had hitherto lain outside of the purview of any statesmen of Southern Europe, save the Jesuits. [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 188. Infanta to Philip IV., 3 November, 1622.]

On the second of November Vere surrendered Mannheim to Tilly, to whom, so it was believed at Brussels, both that place and Frankenthal had been sold. As it had been known by the middle of October that Mannheim was all but lost the news excited but little surprise in England. During the day and night before the citadel surrendered the English garrison sustained two furious assaults; their powder was nearly exhausted and they had not men enough left to defend a position three times as large as the Tower of London, where every man had to stand in single line upon the walls at a pike's length distance apart. Had they held out three days longer, the place would have been taken by assault and they would have had their throats cut. [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 188. Infanta to Philip IV., 10 November, 1622. *London, S.P.O., S.P., Dom.*, James I., Vol. 133, No. 49. Thos. Locke to Sir D. Carleton, 12 October, 1622. *T. Birch*, op. cit., Vol. II., pp. 360-361. Chamberlain to Mead, 31 January, 1622-23. *Green, M. A.*, op. cit., p. 211.]

Great was the annoyance of the Infanta when she heard that

Mannheim had fallen. But two days before, she had written to inform Philip IV. of the measures which she was taking to carry out his wishes as to the pacification of Germany. Mansfeldt, it was true, had quitted the Dutch army when it left the lines of Rozendal, and would, it was thought, carry on the war on his own account in Westphalia, in which case she would send Cordoba and his veterans of the Palatinate to oppose him. Weston had left Brussels on the previous day, "with but very small content, and he and his people were behaving like wild beasts." On the other hand she had written to Oñate and Tilly that she had concluded an armistice with the King of England and the Palatine for the coming year, on condition that she should hold Frankenthal and Mannheim in her own hands on deposit, and that Heidelberg should be given back to the Palatine as his residence. If, by the end of the following year, no definite settlement had been arrived at, the Palatine was to receive Frankenthal and Mannheim from the Infanta and was to hand back Heidelberg to the Catholic League. She had advised Tilly to assent to this arrangement as it would be for the Emperor's service. She thought that there might be some difficulty in persuading Tilly to give back Heidelberg and Mannheim, which she had heard he was also holding, in accordance with the conditions of the armistice, but, if he refused to do so, the alternative basis of agreement, namely that she should restore the place, which she was holding herself, should be adopted, so that all the world might see His Majesty's earnest and sincere desire for the general peace and tranquillity without any thought of his own ends, and how anxious he was to satisfy the King of England. It was true that some questions might be raised as to handing back the places which Spain occupied in the Palatinate to the Palatine, unless they were to be looked upon as the guarantee which His Majesty held for the repayment of his expenses in carrying out the Ban.

There had been some idea of the King of Spain taking part in the coming Diet. He could, however, only do so as the Head of the Circle of Burgundy, and as this was only the sixth dignity in the Empire and, as such, inferior to the Electorate Palatine, it would be most improper for him to send Oñate to it as his representative, especially as Oñate, in his quality of Spanish Ambassador, would receive official reports of everything that transpired at it. [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 188. Infanta to Philip IV., 8 November, 1622.]

This correspondence between the Infanta and Philip IV. became vaguely known to the outside world, and rumours were in circulation in London that she had received orders to employ the Spanish forces against Tilly, unless he raised the siege of Mannheim and evacuated the Palatinate. Great, therefore, was the indignation when the news arrived of Vere's surrender. Men muttered that if he had only held out a few days longer, he would have been left in peace, and Buckingham was glad to avail himself of an explanation of the subject by Conway, in order to convince the King and Prince that Vere had acted rightly. [*London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom.* James I., Vol. 134, No. 15. Chamberlain to Carleton, 16 November, *do.* No. 20. Locke to Carleton, 20 November, Vol. 135, No. 13 (Conway Papers), Buckingham to Conway, Newmarket, 16 November, 1622.]

The prospects of an understanding between Spain, England and the Palatine soon clouded over. At Brussels everyone was surprised at the surrender of Mannheim, as it was asserted that it had neither been bombarded nor assaulted. Tilly, as the Infanta had feared, made difficulties as to carrying out the armistice without an express order from the Emperor. She wrote, however, to ask Oñate to induce Ferdinand II. to continue the negotiations. [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 188. Infanta to Philip IV., 13, 16 November, 1622.]

But Tilly was the General of the Catholic League and as such was forced to do the bidding of its chiefs. Even if Ferdinand II. was willing to order the evacuation of the Palatinate in order to comply with the wishes of his kinsman at Madrid, Maximilian of Bavaria and the Ecclesiastical Electors had no reason to sacrifice their private ends in order to bring about a reconciliation between Spain and England. The key to the situation was, therefore, in their hands, and Maximilian was not slow to use the opportunities which were afforded him by the course of events in other sections of the German theatre of war during the latter months of 1622 to secure his own objects.

In Juliers Count Henri de Berg had blockaded Juliers itself, but the city did not surrender until the third of January, 1623. Christian of Brunswick, after his withdrawal from the Lippe, sought refuge in Westphalia and endeavoured to get together an army with which to attempt another descent on the Lower Palatinate, where he expected to be joined by Maurice of Hesse, and, in consequence, Cordoba, although his men were utterly

worn out, received orders in November to advance into the County of Mark. His forces were now only four thousand strong, and the Spanish regiment could muster but two hundred on parade. In vain he expostulated with Spinola, who, although they were talking in the open air on the bridge at Maestricht, overwhelmed him with abuse. On his return to his quarters Cordoba sent Losada to explain matters to the Marquis, but Spinola, as was his habit when he wished to elude an inconvenient questioner, would not let his visitor utter a syllable, and raved wildly at his lieutenant's conduct. At last Losada succeeded in getting him to listen to reason, and after saying that his heart's desire was "to go into a monastery and stay there," he gave way and agreed not to send Cordoba to Westphalia. It was believed that smarting as he was at his own failure before Bergen, he grudged him his victory at Fleurus and the laurels which he would win if he destroyed Brunswick and his army. Such was the opinion of his detractors.

Unlike Losada, Spinola saw that Brunswick and Mansfeldt were the only checks upon Maximilian, who, master of the situation as he thought himself, stood in deadly awe of them. He could not, however, so long as he had the Dutch on his hands, intervene in person and bring about a settlement in Germany. If he allowed the Protestant forces, which were still on foot, to be destroyed, he would no longer have any pretext for keeping up Cordoba's army. Yet Cordoba's army was the only instrument which he could employ to put pressure on the German Catholics in the coming year and, by doing so, secure the conclusion of an armistice. Cordoba, however, was too proud to serve as a pawn in Spinola's game. He complained loudly of the position in which he found himself, and his complaints found an echo at Madrid.

By the beginning of December, Mansfeldt and Brunswick, with the assistance of the Dutch, were making levies in the coast lands between the Weser and the Elbe, and had also enlisted many of the soldiery, who had been disbanded by the Elector of Saxony, as well as the garrison which for nearly two years had been holding the Silesian fortress of Glatz for Frederick of Bohemia. They were also buying up saltpetre and other military stores in Lorraine, which they were smuggling through to Westphalia, and were intriguing to prevent the Elector of Saxony from attending the Diet at Ratisbon in person. Thus the affairs of the Empire

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would continue to remain unsettled, and the Dutch would have an opportunity of striking yet another blow at the House of Austria. [*Corr. de Cordoba*, op. cit., p. 322. Cordoba to his wife, 26 October, pp. 343-347. Losada to Feria. *Brussels*, 16 November, pp. 351-352. Gabriel del Rey to Cordoba, Cologne, 1 December, p. 366. Losada to Cordoba, 30 December, 1622.]

Alvaro de Losada, who had been Cordoba's agent to Spinola, was a man of some weight, and it is possible that during his visit to Brussels, he persuaded the Infanta to alter her views as to the proper attitude of Spain towards German affairs.

Writing on the sixteenth of November, she said that people at Brussels thought that it would be very unwise to take sides against the Catholic League or the Catholics in Germany or to employ the scanty Spanish forces in the Palatinate to assist the King of England or the Palatine in any overt way. It was right, indeed, to continue to use every possible good office upon their behalf, but, in the instructions which she had given to Losada, whom she was sending to England, she had made it clear that he was to explain to James I. that the word "interfere," which Philip IV. had employed with reference to these forces, was to refer solely to a diplomatic representation. It would be repugnant to His Spanish Majesty's conscience to take up arms against the League. By doing so he would make a scandal and cause grave injury to the Catholic Church, whilst such an act on his part would also be ruinous to the reputation of his crown. Losada was to add that Frankenthal was a nest of heretics, and crowded with outlaws from all the neighbouring states, and, also, that if it was not deposited in Philip's hands, it would serve as a base of operations for Mansfeldt and Brunswick. They would then be far too strong for the Spanish forces to hold in check, and all Germany would soon be crying out against Spain for preventing Tilly from occupying the place. In other words, the Infanta had for once turned a deaf ear to Spinola and had allowed herself to be guided by his opponents. [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 188. Infanta to Philip IV., 16 November, 1622.] The results of her change of views was destined to be disastrous.

Philip, on the other hand, was broader-minded than was his aunt where the interests of Spain were concerned. Although he refused to allow Digby, now Lord Bristol, to see his correspondence with Brussels on the ground that it contained much that he ought not to know, yet he showed him a despatch which he had

written to the Infanta to approve of her policy in pushing forward the armistice, and blaming Tilly for his delay. The King hoped indeed that a general suspension of hostilities would be brought about in Germany, and said that he had asked the Emperor to agree to one for a year so as to give time for a settlement to be arrived at. [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 189. Philip IV. to Infanta, 28 December, 1622.]

It was even rumoured in Holland that an envoy from Brabant had visited Maurice's secretary in order to see if a Truce would be acceptable to him, and that de Préaux was on his way from France to discuss the subject. But, though the Dutch were terrified at the exploits of Toledo's squadron which had played havoc with their convoys, their preachers were still hotly opposed to any compromise with Spain. The minister at Middelburg thundered against the new magistrates who were supposed to be in favour of an arrangement with the enemy, and told them that they all snatched at gain as if they were standing by a hayrick. [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 188. Infanta to Philip IV., 16 November, 1622. *Reigersborch*, op. cit., Vol. II., pp. 6-7. *Reigersborch* to Grotius, 15 December, 1622.]

On the other hand, when the Emperor, in compliance with Philip's request, sent Ulm, the Vice Chancellor of the Empire, to Munich to sound Maximilian upon the subject of an armistice, the Bavarian ministers pointed out that Mansfeldt and Brunswick were re-arming their forces and that the Archbishopric of Cologne was in imminent danger of an invasion. Such were the grounds on which they advised the Emperor to refuse to agree to the Spanish proposals, and such was the vicious circle in which Diplomacy seemed, as if spellbound, to be treading at the end of the year 1622. [*Munich, Geheim St., Arch. K. Schw.*, 292-4. Duke of Bavaria to Khevenhüller, 21 November, 1622. *Riezler, S.*, op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 221-222.]

CHAPTER LVI

If Maximilian of Bavaria was but little likely to shape his policy in accordance with the interests of Spain it was probable that Ferdinand II. would be scarcely more complaisant. Once more the story that the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs were leagued with the Pope to gain the monarchy of the world was to be proved an old wives' fable. The Emperor's second marriage was to be the cause of the divergence.

Ferdinand II. had been left a widower by the death of his wife Maria of Bavaria in 1616. As, since her decease, he had been perpetually surrounded by priests and women, all of whom, however, were members of his own family, and as these ecclesiastics and these kinswomen had the sole possession of his ear and of his heart, the question of his re-marriage was one of European importance. [*Vehse, E.*, op cit., Vol. I., p. 256.]

Various princesses were proposed for his choice. Amongst them were Henrietta Maria of France, and the Duchess Dowager of Saxony, a buxom widow, who was sister of Anne of Denmark, the late Queen of England. Although the Duchess was a Lutheran, she was on the point of turning Catholic, and so all good Catholics in Germany were eager for the marriage, "for the sake of gaining her soul," as Tarantaise puts it. She was, moreover, fairly young and was reported to be very pretty. The Emperor himself, however, was most anxious to marry Eleanora Gonzaga of Mantua, not only for her beauty, but because his favourite Eggenberg had been heavily bribed by her brother the Duke and had talked his master round. The plan was also favoured by Eleanora's kinswoman the Duchess of Tuscany. No marriage could have been more unwelcome at Madrid. The Spanish statesmen looked upon Duke Ferdinand of Mantua as their greatest enemy, and were mortally offended with the Emperor, because he had not given them the slightest hint of his intentions before the engagement was announced. When, therefore, in February, 1622, Father Hyacinth arrived in Madrid, to which he had been despatched by the Pope, at the request of

Ferdinand II. and Maximilian, to ask for help, he was received with icy coldness. It was thought, indeed, that Spain would have refused them support, had not the preservation of the House of Austria and of the Catholic Faith been at stake. As it was her aid was very grudgingly given, and we have seen how Cordoba in the Palatinate had to suffer for the Imperial love-making. "God forgive the Emperor for his folly, though I do not think he will go to Rome to do penance for it." The marriage took place at Innsbruck in the spring of 1622, but for many months Zuñiga's wrath remained unappeased. [*Turin, Spagna*, 18. Tarantaise, 11 January, 20 February, 20 July, 1622. *Vehse*, op. cit., Vol. I., p. 385.]

As the sentiments of the statesmen at Madrid were well-known at Vienna, the Emperor was scarcely likely to take much heed of any Spanish wishes in dealing with the affairs of Germany, although he was very liberal in his lectures to Philip IV. as to his policy and his duty. [*Turin, Spagna*, 18. Tarantaise, 20 September, 1622.]

Consequently the Infanta's representations to him through Schwarzenberg, as to the inexpediency of the "Transfer of the Electorate," fell upon deaf ears, although it was not until the end of July that it became publicly known that Ferdinand II. had decided the question in favour of Bavaria. The news greatly annoyed the English Ambassadors at Madrid, especially as their hope of using Turkey as a means of putting pressure upon the Emperor was considerably lessened by the death of Sultan Osman II., who had been murdered by the Janissaries as a punishment for his avarice. He was succeeded by his uncle Mustapha II. a man whose weak and irresolute character gave little prospect that he would favour a policy of action. [*Turin, Spagna* 18. Tarantaise, 27 July, 1622. *Munich, Geh. St. Arch., K. Schw.* 292-4. Frankenberg to Philip IV., Madrid, 25 September, 1622. *Times*' "Historians, etc.," op. cit., Vol. XXIV., pp. 374-375.]

As early as the eleventh of May, the Emperor had written to inform Philip IV. of his intention to transfer the Electorate to Maximilian. He was bound, he said, by every sentiment of honour and gratitude to fulfill his promises to the Duke. The Infanta had been informed of the Emperor's decision about the same time, and had promised him that, greatly as she disliked the plan, she would not hamper him by entering into any engagements with the English envoys at Brussels. The matter, indeed

seemed one which should be settled, not as one of the terms of a Truce, but when a definite peace was concluded. She pointed out that the Duke of Bavaria was throwing great difficulties in the way of the conclusion of a Truce in the Palatinate by pressing for a public investiture, and warned the Emperor through Oñate that, by sanctioning the Transfer, he had put an end to all hopes of peace. England and the Palatine would never agree to it. The war would certainly break out again, and the whole burden of it would fall upon his shoulders. Unfortunately Philip IV. received her despatch at a moment when, in his fear that the French would make an attempt on Italy and that Mansfeldt, whom Cordoba was too weak to hold in check, would raid Alsace, he thought himself forced to turn for help to Tilly and to Bavaria. [*Munich, Geh., St. Arch. K. Schw.*, 292-4, Frankenberg to Philip IV. Madrid, 25 September, 1622. Khevenhüller to Emperor, 19 September, 1622. *Brussels, E. et G.*, 188. Infanta to Philip IV., 4 July, Philip IV. to Infanta, 28 July, 1622. *Turin, Spagna*, 18. Tarantaise, 27 July, 1622.] Under these circumstances, as we have seen, Philip IV. and Zuñiga were forced to play a double game, and it is, perhaps, significant that the King did not inform his aunt that he had sent the Emperor a message to approve of the Transfer of the Electorate for more than two months, writing, indeed, only on the seventh of October, when Zuñiga was lying on his deathbed. In return Ferdinand II. sent him through Brother Hyacinth his assurances that he would support Spain, to which Philip IV. rejoined that, despite his intention of aiding the German Catholics, he desired, in their own interests, a fair and just settlement in Germany. In Philip's letter to the Infanta we can trace the guiding hand of his favourite Olivares, whilst the negotiations which preceded it give us the clue to Maximilian's hatred and mistrust of Spain. [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 188. Philip IV. to Infanta, 7 October, 1622. *Munich, Geh. St. Arch., K. Schw.*, 292-4, Frankenberg to Philip IV., 25 September, Khevenhüller to Eggenberg, 7 October, 1622.]

We have seen Zuñiga in 1617 on his way to congratulate King Ferdinand at Gratz, and he had long resided as Spanish ambassador at Vienna. He knew Germany well, and on that account, as Khevenhüller points out, his death was a great loss to Spain, "for people here seem to know very little, and the 'Confidant' nothing at all, about what is going on in Germany or about the country itself." Olivares was, however, thoroughly trusted by the King,

who, on Zuñiga's death, ordered all that minister's papers to be handed over to him, because he confided in his great common sense and sound understanding. Once the Count got the reins in his hand, he would go ahead with a rush, and rise to greater power than ever, for Zuñiga had been keeping him back a good deal. He stood well with the King of England, and had taken the line of using James' friendship as a means for putting pressure upon Zuñiga, although his efforts in that direction had met with but little success. However, moralised Khevenhüller, a few disappointments would make him wiser. *Munich, Geh. St. Arch. K. Schw.*, 292-4, Khevenhüller to Maximilian, 19 October, to Eggenberg, 7 October, 1622.]

Such were the two influences which had been contending for the control of Spanish policy during the dog days of 1622, for Zuñiga represented the ideas of a generation which was fast passing away, whilst the younger eyes of Olivares in some measure saw Europe as it really was. It was Zuñiga who, in all probability, induced his master to endeavour to secure Tilly's support against Mansfeldt by agreeing to the Transfer of the Electorate. In the middle of September a despatch from the Emperor reached Madrid to announce that he had decided to admit Maximilian into the number of the Electors at the Diet which was to open at Ratisbon upon the first of October. It would be well, therefore, that the King should undeceive the English ambassadors once and for all if they still cherished any hopes that the Electoral Dignity would be given back to the Palatine. As, however, the Emperor was desirous of keeping upon good terms with England, he might also tell them that Ferdinand would submit to the Electors and Princes, who were to assemble at the Diet, some proposals for the restoration to Frederick of a portion of his dominions. [*Munich, Geh. St. Arch. K. Schw.*, 292-4, Frankenberg to Philip IV., 25 September, 1622.]

The day before the Emperor's letter reached Madrid, Zuñiga, by the King's orders, had paid a visit to Khevenhüller, whom he requested to ask the Emperor to consult the Infanta and the Electors of Mainz, Treves, and Saxony during the approaching meeting of Electors, and not to take it ill if they advised him not to proclaim the transfer of the Electorate officially.

After delivering the King's message, Zuñiga, raising his voice and speaking in an angry tone, said in so many words that the Emperor wished to plunge Spain into a war with England, and

to "throw upon her shoulders the whole burden of the contest in Germany. His Imperial Majesty never bethought himself for one second of what Spain had done for him and took it as a mere matter of course that the King should leave his own country and people to go to wrack and ruin and hasten to his help." Not a soul at Vienna had said a word to the King about the Investiture till they were on the point of granting it, and yet they should remember that the King was the head of the House of Hapsburg even though Cæsar was his near kinsman, and went on in the same style till he had talked himself hoarse.

Scarcely had Zuñiga left the Embassy when the Emperor's letter with the news that he was going to create Maximilian an Elector arrived. In his own mind Khevenhüller had thought all along that Zuñiga's outburst was a mere piece of stage play for Bristol's benefit, as some of the English Embassy were standing near him. The more he turned the matter over, the more certain he felt that he was right in his opinion, even though Zuñiga had shown his teeth at him about German affairs, in the first place because the moment he tried to put in a word, Zuñiga had refused to listen and gone straight off to the King, in the second, because he had flown into a passion when Khevenhüller had handed him the memorandum as to the Emperor's decision and H.I.M.'s last letter to himself, and lastly "because he was angry when I went over their contents to him. I could not make out why he snarled at me when we met next day, and would not let me say a word in reply on the subject: however, one could not but suspect that all this was merely to throw dust in the English Ambassadors' eyes, or to get out of his promise to support them. I told him that I could not but inform Y.I.M. although, I said, you could not fail to be greatly hurt by it, and it was for him to look to it that they did not throw over Cæsar, for they would rue the day they did so. I was going to say more, when he took me by the hand and said with a smile, I ought not to write a long history about all this. He had had the best of reasons for acting as he had done, and the King and all his ministers were heartily glad to see the Duke of Bavaria get the Electorate. However, if it was true, as they were told, that Saxony was so much against it that he would go over to the enemy sooner than consent to it, Y.I.M. should consult the Electors of Mainz and Treves, and the Duke of Neuburg, and should then issue a proclamation against him, as it would be so much to Y.M.'s interests to secure

such support. I have gone so thoroughly into the subject he discussed with me that I shall add not a word to the note which I mean to hand the King to-morrow, for if the English Ambassadors were to get an inkling that the King has written, as he has done, in favour of the Transfer, it would create great difficulties in the negotiations. As I have now given them all particulars as to the decision at which Y.M. has arrived, and as it will be quite sufficient if the King and Zuñiga are aware of it, I will keep the matter a profound secret from the other ministers." Khevenhüller begged the Emperor not to let anything transpire as to Zuñiga's outburst of temper, as he was most touchy on the subject, but he had been forced to tell him that it would be contrary to his duty to hush the matter up. He would inform H.I.M. at once of anything the King might say next day, as a good deal depended upon his reply, and he felt sure that Zuñiga had already prompted Philip as to what he was to answer. [*Munich, Geh. St. Arch. K. Schw.*, 292-4, Khevenhüller to Emperor, 19 September, 1622.] Khevenhüller's anticipations proved correct, and he had good reason to be satisfied with his audience, for the King, after hearing his report, said, "I am delighted at the Emperor's decision, which, I think, is a very wise one. I will have a reply drawn up and will send it by an express." Khevenhüller could see that though the Spaniards pretended to be surprised at the Transfer, they approved of it in reality, and that Zuñiga had only made the scene to gull the English. [*Munich, Geh. St. Arch. K. Schw.*, 292-4, Khevenhüller to Duke of Bavaria, 25 September, 1622.]

Zuñiga's "stage play" seems to have produced the effect he had sought to obtain. Tarantaise, at all events, thought that his anger was real. A gentleman who had been in the next room whilst Khevenhüller and Zuñiga were conversing, told him that he had heard Don Baltasar speaking in a very loud tone and uttering bitter complaints against the Emperor. He had said amongst other things, "This is a grave matter. The Emperor knows how much he owes to this crown, and how much he needs us. Yet he shows us so little respect that he only informs His Catholic Majesty of everything after it has been done. He played us this trick about his marriage and now about this business. The gentleman did not know what the business was but it can only have been this Electorate affair." As Tarantaise was intimate with Digby and Aston, this report, which was, on the whole,

fairly correct, no doubt, soon reached their ears. [*Turin, Spagna*, 18 Tarantaise, 20 September, 6 December, 1622.]

Zuñiga's good or ill will was not destined to be for much longer a matter of importance to the Emperor or to Bavaria. Within three weeks after his conversation with Khevenhüller he was dead, "heart broken," of a tertian fever and of an uncontrollable melancholy. He died on the seventh of October and the German climate was, in a great measure, the cause of his death. The King felt his loss deeply, but at once handed over his papers to Olivares, who, as has been said, stood very well with James I. [*Munich, Geh. St. Arch. K. Schw.*, 292-4, Khevenhüller to Eggenberg, 7 October, 1622.] Such was Khevenhüller's account which he sent to Prince Eggenberg at the time, but in his *Annales Ferdinandei*, writing many years later, he adds some further particulars which he would scarcely have cared to entrust to the mercies of the post from Madrid to Vienna. He says that when Zuñiga first took to his bed he pointed to a bundle of papers which was lying near it, and told an attendant to carry them to the Council of State. Amongst them, however, he had placed by an oversight the memorial on the subject of the Transfer of the Electorate which Khevenhüller had submitted to the King in his audience of the twentieth of September. This memorial was submitted to the Council, and was read to the members, who could not hide their indignation at the deception which Zuñiga had practised upon them, and rebuked him in the bitterest terms. Their reproaches cut him to the heart; he was already ailing, grew rapidly worse, and, within a few days, was dead. Such a death was, perhaps, not unworthy of a great nobleman of Spain.

"What boon is there in life,
If Honour's soul is dead?"

Zuñiga paid dearly for his duplicity, although his actions were due to his regard for what he believed to be his master's best interests. But, to use the words in speaking of a Spanish Wolsey of that Spanish Shakespeare, Calderon, he had forgotten that if his King was the master of his wealth and life, his Honour was the inheritance of his soul, and his soul was God's alone. [*S. R. Gardiner, "History of England," Vol. IV., p. 377, quoting Khevenhüller, "Annals of Ferdinand," IX., 1780-1784. Calderon de la Barca, Pedro, "El Alcalde de Zalamea," Act I., Scene 11, Act II., Scene 17.]*

Maximilian in his letter thanking Khevenhüller for his information about his interview with Zuñiga, wrote sarcastically that he hoped that the Infanta of Brussels and Marquis Spinola, who were so fond of him, would be satisfied at the outcome of the representations which they had been so good as to make at Madrid. He was also grateful for the particulars as to the desire for peace which had been shown at Brussels and as to the mission which had been sent there by his brother, the Elector of Cologne. It was possible, of course, that the only reason for the Infanta's suggestion as to exchanging the places held by the Spanish troops in the Palatinate, was her wish to employ the garrisons elsewhere. If the Spaniards asked Khevenhüller what the Duke's views upon the subject were, he must impress upon them that to hand these places back to the Palatine would be a grave injury both to Spain itself and to all Germany. [*Munich, Geh. St. Arch., K. Schw.*, 292-4, Duke of Bavaria to Khevenhüller, 10 October, 1622.]

The change of government at Madrid boded no good to the Bavarian cause. Scarcely had Zuñiga been laid in his grave when Khevenhüller learnt that Oñate had been instructed to inform the Emperor in confidence that Philip IV. neither could nor would support the "Transfer" by force of arms, and that, as it was solely on account of England that he kept a fleet at sea, he could not afford to do so that year. In other words, for the time being, Maximilian would have to whistle for his Electoral hat, although Khevenhüller took care to add that he could not see why the King should let the season pass without doing something about it. After all, Spain had more at stake than any one else, and they would always have to be on their guard against intrigues even though people at Madrid chose to think that they increased their strength by remaining at peace. [*Munich, Geh. St. Arch. K. Schw.*, 292-4, Khevenhüller to Duke of Bavaria, 19 October, 1622.]

Three weeks later, almost at the moment that the Infanta Isabella was coming round to the Bavarian side, it became known that Spain was making representations against the Transfer "in two places." This was entirely due to the fact that Zuñiga had kept the negotiations upon the subject secret from everyone except the King and Father Hyacinth. Since they had taken place, the Infanta and the Electors of Mainz and Saxony had laid their heads together, and for the sake of peace, of which

Spain was so sorely in need, had persuaded the King to send off fresh instructions to Oñate on the fifth of November. The Duke must not, however, imagine that the King was opposed to his obtaining the Electorate. On the contrary, he was most anxious that he should do so. Many people thought, however, that both the Protestant and Catholic princes would oppose the grant, as they were afraid of getting involved in the war in the Netherlands, and believed that none of the Electors, except the Elector of Cologne, had appeared at the Diet at Ratisbon, although Khevenhüller had assured the Spanish ministers that they would all have done so.

Another great object with Maximilian was to prevent Philip IV. from ratifying the armistice which had been arranged by the Infanta and England. Mansfeldt and Brunswick were ravaging the Bishopric of Münster, which was a dependency of Cologne, and the Catholic Princes would have to send forces to protect it, so that the ratification should be delayed until the armistice had been considered by the Diet.

Despite all the obstacles which the change of Government at Madrid had thrown in his way, Khevenhüller persevered in his efforts to induce Philip IV. to follow his own line, and to inform the Emperor that he wished the question of the "Transfer" to be brought before the Diet, and that if he did not then give Maximilian the Electoral Hat, he would take the refusal as a slight to himself. The Spanish ministers kept repeating that they were powerless to assist the Emperor as their finances were so exhausted by the wars in Italy and in the Netherlands that they dared not run the risk of being drawn into another contest in Italy or elsewhere. Despite Zuñiga's death, they would gladly see the Duke obtain the "Investiture," if he could do so without causing a war of which the whole weight would fall upon Spain. They were convinced, however, that Saxony would oppose the grant. Both the King and Olivares saw that they must avoid a fresh war at all costs, and Olivares was persuaded that the "Transfer" would entail one, although down to the very hour of Zuñiga's death, his "fancies" had been a great trouble to his uncle. In any case it was certain that Spain could not refuse to come to the assistance of the Emperor, if he were in any great danger, and her help might mean all the difference to him between victory and ruin. If, however, Ferdinand were to involve himself in a war for the sake of gratifying Maximilian, the Spaniards

would say that it was his own fault and would not be so willing to aid him.

In the end, thanks chiefly to the exertions of the Nuncio, Olivares gave way. In the middle of February, 1623, an express was sent to Oñate with fresh instructions as to the "Transfer" and a categorical statement in writing that Spain would recognise the Duke as Elector. Olivares asked his own terms for the recognition, and demanded that Maximilian should furnish him with seven thousand troops, a request, which, Khevenhüller thought, would be refused, as the Emperor could not be left defenceless, though the Spaniards argued that this arrangement would facilitate the conclusion of a separate peace in the Valtelline. [*Munich, Geh. St. Arch., K. Schw.*, 292-4, Khevenhüller to Maximilian, 10 November, 10 December, 1622; 23 February, 1623. Maximilian to Khevenhüller, 21 November, 1622.]

Olivares' change of mind came too late for his own interests. Scarcely had his courier left Madrid, when, on the twenty-third of February, 1623, Maximilian was solemnly invested by the Emperor himself at Ratisbon with the Electoral Hat in the presence of the Electors and of the Diet. [*Krüner*, op. cit., p. 76.]

Maximilian of Bavaria was not a man whom any statesman could flout with impunity and, by his palterings, the "Favourite of Spain" had lost the confidence of the real ruler of Germany. The Duke was a pupil of the Jesuits and knew how to conceal his feelings, but his pencilled notes throw a vivid light as to his sentiments about Spanish policy.

His comments upon the translation of a letter from Olivares to the Nuncio at Madrid upon the subject of the Transfer are sufficiently illuminating.

In this letter Olivares said that he was doing his utmost at Ratisbon to bring about the Transfer and had instructed Oñate to support his efforts. He then went on to say, "Notwithstanding His Majesty's wish to do everything in his power for the Duke, he is just as anxious to satisfy the King of England, as it is only right he should do, for that King has thrown over his son-in-law for the sake of the Emperor, and of the close friendship and brotherhood, which he proposes to contract with the Catholic King. His Majesty sees himself, likewise, bound to procure satisfaction for the Duke of Saxony, not only because all these princes wish to keep on friendly terms with the Emperor and himself, but because in the whole course of this business,

that Duke has shown himself such a zealous and useful friend to the House of Austria."

Maximilian noted upon the margin of the paper opposite the reference to Saxony, "Just like Maurice and Charles V.: in the end, we shall see this." At the end of the letter he wrote, "Words, words, words." He might well recall the betrayal of Charles the Fifth by the Prince whom he had made Elector of Saxony. It is curious that Maximilian's jottings should be in Italian. [*Munich, Geh. St. Arch. K. Schw.*, 292-4, Olivares to Nuncio, Madrid, January; Khevenhüller, January, 1623. For Maurice's betrayal of Charles the Fifth in March, 1552, cf. *Times*' "Historians, etc.," op. cit., Vol. XIV., pp. 308-311.]

Olivares' conduct with regard to the Transfer of the Electorate was the chief reason which induced Maximilian to turn his thoughts to an alliance with France, for he believed that he really owed his Electoral Hat to the exertions of the French at Ratisbon, and it is also beyond all doubt that he never forgot the attitude of the Infanta Isabella in opposing the "Transfer." Even when, in 1640, Don Diego de Saavedra was making some proposals unofficially for an alliance between Spain and Bavaria, the Duke reminded him that his purpose had been crossed by Spain and Austria out of jealousy, and that the Spaniards had gone as far in their opposition to the Transfer of the Electorate, "as if it had been going to be given to the Dutch." [*Munich, Reichsarchiv*, 30 *Jahr*, 195. "A memorandum presented by Count Frankenberg to Olivares, and his answers, 14 October, 1626." *Munich, Geh. St. Arch. K. Schw.*, 292-5. "To be put into cypher for Khevenhüller," 18 September, 1629, *do. K. Schw.*, 377-48. "*Spaniens Procedere gegen Bayern.*"]

But his feelings were soon to have an opportunity of displaying themselves in a way which was to have lasting effects upon the history of Europe, for it was, in a great measure, due to his efforts, and to his alliance with the Jesuits, that the proposals for a marriage between Charles, Prince of Wales, and the Infanta Maria of Spain, failed at the eleventh hour. Charles set out on his journey to Madrid almost at the same moment that pealing bells and thundering cannon were announcing to the Munich burghers that their Duke had been received into the number of the Electors. But the fact that the Nuncio had co-operated with Khevenhüller in his efforts to bring about this result, showed that both the Pope and the Jesuits were willing to ally themselves

with the greatest of the German Catholic leaders in opposition even to the dearest interests of Spain. They saw, indeed, that with the alliance of England the position of Spain in Europe would be almost unassailable. It was a few months later that they for this reason set themselves to thwart Charles in his efforts to secure the hand of the Infanta Maria, and that they, in the end, succeeded, was largely owing to the diplomatic skill of Khevenhüller acting under the direction of Maximilian of Bavaria.

CHAPTER LVII

BOTH to Spain and to England the question of the marriage of Charles, Prince of Wales, had long been one of great importance, for if Spain looked upon an alliance with England as the surest means of retaining her position in Northern Europe, James I. equally regarded it as the best way to secure his position in his own kingdoms. Both at home and abroad he was a firm believer in the principle of the Balance of Power. Even before he ascended the English Throne he had sought to assure his claims to the succession, which was still unsettled, by intriguing with the English Catholics. Anne of Denmark had, with his consent, sent Edward Drummond to Rome to arrange for an understanding between her husband and Pope Clement VIII., and for her own reconciliation with the Roman Church, giving her written promise to bring up her children as Catholics. One of James' own letters to the Pope had fallen into Elizabeth's hands. She had threatened to exclude the Scottish King from the succession to the English Crown, and he had with difficulty removed her suspicions as to his dealings with France and Spain by sending Lord Mar to London on a mission of apology rather than of explanation. When, a few months later, he arrived at Whitehall, James' wish for a close matrimonial alliance between his family and that of some Catholic reigning prince was still further increased. He would, indeed, and with good reason have welcomed a daughter-in-law, in the veins of whose children would flow the blood of the House of Austria, and whose dowry would replenish his exhausted treasury. Moreover England and Scotland had not yet forgotten their ancient enmity, and, although the Stuarts had worn the Crown of Scotland for over two centuries, the proud English nobles looked down upon their new king as the beggarly scion of a race of upstarts, and many of these nobles were at heart Catholics. Nor could he count upon the loyalty of a Puritan middle class who hated the State Religion of which he was the head on earth, and who at the same time had strong ties of sentiment with the Dutch republicans. He thought, therefore, that if he could win the hand of a Catholic princess for his son, he would gain the support both of the Catholics and

of Spain. By granting liberty of conscience he could keep one party in hand to balance the other, and would thus be rendered perfectly safe in his southern dominions. [*London, S.P.O. Roman Transcripts, Barberini, CVII., 5, 11. Bibl. Vat. Anne of Denmark to Pope Clement VIII., 1602. Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. Mar and Kellie, pp. 47-48. James VI. to Lord Mar, Holyrood House, 5 February, 1601. Do. Preface, p. IX. James I. to Lord Mar, Greenwich, 17 May, 1603, for Anne of Denmark's letter and Drummond's mission. Brussels, E et A. 363, Angleterre, Misc. 176. "Considerations as to the English Alliance," circa 1622. London, S.P.O. Calendar of State Papers, Venetian (1621-1623), pp. 493-494. Ranier Zen to Doge, Rome, 5 November, 1622. Do. pp. 626-627. "Considerations as to the English Marriage," drawn up by the Curia for the Nuncio in Spain, 12 April, 1623. F. de Jesu. El Hecho de los Tratados del Matrimonio del Principe de Gales. [London Camden Society, 1869.] Pp. 3-5, Duke of Savoy to Philip III., 1612.]*

The efforts which James I. made to secure the hand of the Infanta Anna, who was afterwards to be the mother of Louis XIV., for his eldest son Prince Henry, and his subsequent negotiations for a marriage for him in Savoy have already been described. The Spanish Court had refused to listen to his proposals unless the Prince became a Catholic, but Philip III. had not scrupled to suggest that his brother-in-law Charles Emmanuel should bring forward his daughter Catherine as a candidate for the English Crown Matrimonial, although she was, through her mother, in the line of succession to the throne of Castile. He even went so far as to consult a Junta of Theologians upon the subject, and, by their advice, induced the Duke to refer the matter to Pope Paul V. Although a cruel persecution against the Catholics was raging in England, the Vatican does not seem to have raised any insuperable obstacles to the marriage, which, but for Prince Henry's sudden death, would undoubtedly have taken place. [*London, S.P.O. Rom. Trans. Bibl., Vat. Barb. CVII., 5. John Cecil to Bishop of Politiano, Nuncio at Paris, 14 April, 11 June, 1611. No date, November (?), 27 November, 1612. F. de Jesu, op. cit., pp. 3-5.]*

With regard to the question of such a marriage, the attitude of the Roman Pontiff was, indeed, the decisive factor. There could be no doubt that the Church had power to permit one between a Catholic and a heretic. It might, in certain cir-

cumstances, be of advantage to the Church to grant a dispensation, for it would thus gain the power of controlling the education of the future offspring, and it might even be possible for the wife to bring about her husband's conversion. Marie de Medicis had turned Henri IV. into a zealous Catholic. [*Turin, Spagna*, 18, *Tarantaise to Duke*, 12, 18 April, 1623. Cf. also papers in *Turin, Raccolta Mongardino, passim.*]

It was for the Pope, however, to determine the conditions upon which a dispensation should be granted, and no Spanish statesman would have dared to propose that such a marriage should be celebrated without one, at least in the days of Philip III. Moreover, even from the Spanish point of view, such a situation was not without its advantages, for they saw in their obligation to refer the matter for decision to Rome a ready means of breaking off the negotiations, should it become expedient to do so, without giving offence to England, and, though many members of the Council of State might hold very advanced views as to the relations between religion and temporal politics, yet there was a large party to whom the thought of a marriage between a heretic and a Catholic princess was profoundly abhorrent, and who, at the slightest hint from the Curia, would do their best to prevent it.

Thus it came about that whilst the relations between Spain and the Netherlands depended, in the last resort, upon the goodwill of the Emperor and of the German Catholic League, her relations with England were equally dependent upon the goodwill of the Supreme Pontiff, whose interests certainly would not lead him to favour the growth of an intimate friendship between the two powers, whilst they led him, on his own side, to cultivate a close connection with that pupil of the Jesuits, Maximilian of Bavaria. As Bristol wrote to Zuñiga, at the very moment when Philip IV. had consented to approve of the transfer of the Electorate, "The Pope seems so opposed to a closer alliance between the two crowns, as I have always suspected, that he demands many things that are impossible." Yet Gregory XV. was looked upon at Madrid as a friend to Spain.

The Pope might well ask himself what he had to gain from an alliance which would go far to make Spain the arbitress of Europe.

He was an Italian Prince and those Italian powers which still retained a vestige of independence, as a rule, regarded Spain

as a cruel enemy. By the re-conversion of England, even if such a re-conversion were to be secured by a marriage between a Spanish Infanta and the heir of the House of Stuart, the Papacy as such would gain but little. The sufferings of the English Catholics might inspire Cardinal Ludovisi, as a man, with the deepest feelings of compassion, and if England were once more to become the "Dower of Mary," every church throughout Catholic Christendom would echo with *Te Deums*. But experience had shown that from a worldly point of view the re-conversion of England might well bring neither political nor economic advantages to the Curia. Not seventy years had elapsed since Philip of Spain, the heir to the great Empire of Charles the Fifth, had married Mary, the most devout and Catholic Queen of England. The Protestant heresy vanished from the land, and England seemed once more restored to the bosom of the Church. Yet the very Parliament whose members, on bended knees and with streaming eyes, had been reconciled by Cardinal Pope to the ancient Faith, had obstinately refused to restore the Church lands, whilst at the very time when his master's name was figuring at the head of English Acts of Parliament, Alva had threatened Rome with the horrors of another sack. Thirteen years later when Alva's cruelties had driven the Netherlands into rebellion, the tidings were received without disapproval by Pius V., and Catholics as well as Protestants had fought against his pikemen in the ranks of William the Silent. Even if the speculations of the Spanish statesmen were fulfilled and James I. succeeded in assembling a packed Parliament which would restore the Catholic Faith, it was improbable that Peter's pence would once more be paid by England to the See of Rome, or that the English nobles would hand over Woburn Abbey or Hatfield to the friars and bishops who had held them before the Reformation.

Moreover, the English Catholics were at bitter feud amongst themselves. The Jesuits were even more hostile to their opponents amongst their co-religionists than they were to their heretic oppressors. Elizabeth had fomented the feud, and much of the ill will which James I. displayed towards the Catholics was due to Jesuit intrigues. The Company were, in his eyes, the champions of rebellion. They waged bitter war against the oath of supremacy, and, as they knew themselves to be so hated by the monarch, that they could only hope to gain admission

into England by violent measures, they did not hesitate to stir up the people and even the Puritans against him, even at the risk of insuring the destruction of the last remnants of Catholicism. In the heat of their strife against the seculars, they did not scruple to attempt to betray the Bishop of Calcedon into the hands of a Secretary of State. Nor were they less hostile to the Spanish Government which had already expelled them from the Indies and was on the point of exiling them from Naples, and, at that very moment, Father Arnoux was doing his utmost to secure the Premiership of France for Richelieu, even though it was certain that the appointment would be followed by the outbreak of war in Italy. It was, therefore, improbable that the Pope and Jesuits would favour any policy which might prove to the advantage of Spain, even if, by doing so, they might ensure the return of England to the Faith. [*London, S.P.O., Cal. of State Papers, Venetian* [1621-1623.] Pp. 525-526. *Alvise Valaresso to Senate, London, 16 December, 1622, enclosing a copy of a letter from Lord Digby to Zuñiga, Madrid, 17 September, 1622. Do. pp. 449-450, quoting Ven. Arch. Senato. Relazioni, filza 17. Relation of England by Girolamo Lando, 21 September, 1622. Historical MSS. Commission Reports. Earl Cowper's MSS., Vol. I. "Sir John Coke's papers," passim, as to the attitude of the Jesuits towards the Bishop of Calcedon, etc. For the expulsion of the Jesuits from Flanders and Naples, 1622, Symonds, J. A., "The History of the Renaissance in Italy," "The Catholic Reaction," Part I., p. 322, Note 1.]*

We have seen that, after Prince Henry's death, the Duke of Savoy had endeavoured to secure the hand of the new Prince of Wales for one of his daughters, and in 1613 the question of Charles' marriage with a sister of the Grand Duke of Tuscany was also discussed by the theological advisers of Pope Paul V.

The instructions given by Charles Emmanuel I. to his envoys in London show that the Duke believed that the Curia would readily assent to a marriage between a Prince of Wales and an Italian Princess. They were conceived in a very tolerant spirit. The Infanta of Savoy was not to change her religion, and all her household and servants were to live as Catholics. Upon the other hand, she was not to attend Divine Worship in public, was only to be allowed a plain and inconspicuous chapel inside the Palace, so as not to excite ill will amongst the people, and was to have only those priests who were absolutely necessary. It was dis-

tinctly laid down that the word "Household" was not to include the children of the marriage.

As it was impossible to trust the English Councillors, James himself would have to be asked whether he wished that Spain should act as mediator in the negotiations, in consideration of the fact that the Infanta was grand-daughter of Philip II. and that the suggestion that a Savoyard Princess should marry the Prince of Wales had originally been made by Spain.

The Duke's motives for entering into the negotiation were founded on his relations with Geneva and the Swiss Cantons, as he thought that if the King of England would act as arbitrator in the matter, Geneva would acknowledge his claim as suzerain, and Bern would restore to him the Pays de Vaud, which, in the first days of the Reformation, the Bernese had wrested from his ancestor, Charles III.

It is evident from the details of the Instructions that the proposal to renew the marriage negotiations had been made, in the first instance, by some "friends of Savoy," at the English Court, and from the draft it would appear that these "friends" were Lords Nottingham and Rochester, and Sir Thomas Lake. They had not delayed long in deciding to approach the Duke for Prince Henry had only died on the sixth of November, whilst it is clear from the instructions that Villa, the envoy from Turin was expected to reach Holland whilst there was still floating ice in the Maas. At the same time the Duke had approved a suggestion which had been made by Sir Henry Wootton that a marriage should be arranged through the mediation of England between his eldest son the Prince of Piedmont and one of the Elector Palatine's sisters, who was, of course, like her brother, a Calvinist, but as he struck out a paragraph which the compiler had inserted in the draft, it is uncertain whether he wished the latter marriage to be looked upon as a means to secure the election of himself or his son as King of the Romans, or merely as a step to secure the return of Vaud or Geneva.

It is noteworthy that the compiler of the draft seemed to think that the question of the dowry and not that of religion would give rise to the greatest difficulty in the negotiations. He suggested that the Spaniards might be asked to contribute towards it although they were quarrelling with the English about Virginia. Otherwise the Venetians might help. In

any case, the terms of the alliance which James I. had already offered to Savoy would have to be defined.

The Duke set down in detail the arguments which Villa was to use with the English Government if he found that the marriage negotiations were going forward favourably. It was true that Charles was only thirteen, but the Infanta was seventeen, and would, therefore, have children sooner than her sisters, who were still very young. This was a matter of the greatest importance to the English, as there was now only one heir to their throne. As far as the interests of England itself were concerned, a match with Savoy would be by far the most advantageous. A Spanish Queen would always be trying to use England as an instrument to protect Flanders, to revenge Spain upon the Dutch, and to control English trade. A French Queen would be suspected of wishing to insure France against those old claims which were still vividly remembered by the English, and therefore would be accused of making trouble in England. Both one and the other would never cease conspiring with the nobles and the Catholics, as the King and Prince were now the only males in the Stuart family. Savoy, on the other hand, would have every reason for wishing to see England great and prosperous as an effective counterpoise to both of those powers.

It would have been impossible to state in clearer terms the policy of maintaining the balance of power by an alliance between England and the Secondary European states, and it is possible that this paper furnishes an additional proof that the design of bringing the Italian and German princes to act in union was originated by Sir Henry Wootton. Scarnafaggi, as has been seen, was instructed to treat for an offensive and defensive alliance between Savoy, England, the Swiss, and the Venetians, and to push on the Savoy Match "bearing in mind what the King had said to him about it," but Charles Emmanuel's matrimonial schemes were destined to fail, and eventually the Infanta Maria took the veil and spent her life in convents at Bologna and Rome, where she gave many proofs of her liberality towards the Church. [*Turin, Ing.* 1. "Minutes of the Instructions from Duke Charles Emmanuel for M. de la Ville to take to London with him." *Do. Materie Politiche*, 7. "Instructions to Count Scarnafaggi," 1613. *Sclopis, Federigo. Delle Relazioni Politiche tra la Dinastia di Savoia ed il Governo Britannico* [1240-1815] [*Turin, 1853.*] Pp. 10-11, 14-16.]

The chief importance of these transactions consists, however, in the light which they throw upon the policy of the Papal Court, for it is plain that Charles Emmanuel was convinced that Pope Paul V. would view a marriage between the Prince of Wales and an Italian princess with indifference if not with satisfaction, even though that Pontiff and his successors did not hesitate to use every power which they possessed in order to prevent one between the English prince and an Infanta of Spain.

At the beginning of 1623, however, the long drawn negotiations for the Anglo-Spanish match appeared at length to be drawing to a satisfactory conclusion.

Bristol was sanguine that he would succeed. He and his colleague Aston, who was a near kinsman of Buckingham's brother-in-law Denbigh, gave splendid entertainments to those Spanish statesmen, Fernando Giron, Gondomar, and the Jesuit Father Florentia, whom they believed to be working in their favour. Except, however, from Florentia, they received no return for their hospitality. Tarantaise told Bristol that he believed that the Spaniards were very much inclined to the match but that, in the last resort, everything depended upon the Pope's approval. The Archbishop could not, in reality, make up his mind what to think, and was aware that great efforts were being made in favour of the Emperor's son. He knew that Olivares wished to give satisfaction to the English, and hoped that by carrying through the marriage he would obtain liberty of conscience for the English Catholics. He did not know, however, whether the fact that some of the gentlemen of the Extraordinary Mission went to the churches and heard Mass was a trick to make the Spaniards believe that it would be granted. Bristol's own stepson, a fine lad of about eighteen, "handsome and modest as an angel," was particularly noticeable for his devotion. He not only heard Mass at the Capuchin's Church, but also received the Most Blessed Sacrament every Sunday. The Madrid world already reported that the marriage had been arranged, and Sir Walter Aston had himself assured him that the marriage articles had been settled. The only thing left to be done was to obtain His Holiness' approval, and this the King of Spain had undertaken to do. As the Pope had already allowed it to be understood that he would give his assent, and that it would be a good thing for Christendom if the marriage could be carried through, Tarantaise remarked that, supposing all his

visitors had told him was gospel, he could only believe the report was true.

According to Aston, the concessions which had been made to the Catholics were more than ample. The Infanta was to have a church of her own which anyone might attend without incurring a penalty. A complete agreement between England and Spain would speedily follow. The King of England and the majority of his subjects were neither Puritans nor Protestants but members of the Established Church, and the difference between them and the Catholics was very slight. Such an agreement would be much to the interests of Spain, for if the two countries were united they would be the real masters of the Mediterranean, and still more real ones of the ocean. Tarantaise ended his despatch by saying that he thought that some agreement had actually been arrived at, but "as the old saw says, to talk at one's fireside is all very well, but I want to see you at work."

A few days later Philip IV. wrote to urge the Pope to forward the dispensation as soon as possible.

Scarcely had Tarantaise sent off his letter, when news reached Madrid which more than proved the soundness of Olivares' views.

Ormuz, that great fortress of the Persian Gulf, where all the riches of the East were gathered, had fallen into the hands of Shah Abbas of Persia, with the aid of some English and Dutch adventurers, many of whom were in the employment of the two India Companies. Neutral onlookers saw that the tide had turned against Spain, and that the Spaniards must inevitably lose little by little their African and Asian lands to the Arabs, to the Persians, and to the Dutch. For the moment it seemed as if the marriage negotiations would have to be postponed until such an arrangement as might be possible had been come to by the English and the Spanish governments about this wanton outrage. [*Turin, Spagna*, 18. Tarantaise 6, 12, 31 December, 1622; 28 March, 1623. *London, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS.* 36,446. Philip IV. to Pope, 30 December, 1622. *Mantua, Archivio Patrio Gonzaga, Esterni*, E. XIV., 3. *Spagna Busta* 616. Nerli to Duke of Mantua, Madrid, 1 January, 1623. *Complete Peerage* by G.E.C., Art. Denbigh.]

Olivares might be well disposed to an English alliance, but he knew that it was not absolutely indispensable, if a settlement could be arrived at as to that question of the Valtelline which was the chief cause of dissension between France and Spain,

whilst by bringing about a good understanding between the two powers, he would gain the goodwill not only of the French but of the Queen of Spain, who, as a Frenchwoman, was most anxious to avert a war with her native land. He, therefore, paid long visits every evening to the Nuncio, and remained closetted with him for hours discussing Italian affairs. [*Mantua, do. Nerli*, 1 January, 1623.]

In England, on the other hand, many powerful interests were in favour of a good understanding with the Dutch, at least in the West Indies. Some "Considerations as to the West India Voyage" set down by Conway but a few months later, supported the arguments for a filibustering expedition against the Spanish possessions in America, by reasonings which would not have been out of place in the year after the Armada. Many of the nobility and gentry would, he said, bear the charges of such an expedition if the State would pay the "coat and conduct" money of the soldiers, until they reached the port of embarkation. Thus England would be cleared of dangerous vagabonds, and the enemy be weakened without expense to the crown, whilst, if the venture succeeded, both the royal and private coffers would be filled to overflowing. The Dutch might be sent first into the field so as to give time for the English "to make their preparations, and to take precautions against the intrigues of the sectaries at home." As Conway was Buckingham's faithful henchman, and as Buckingham was Lord High Admiral and at the head of the Navy, such "suggestions" might speedily be carried into effect, if anything occurred to disgust the "Favourite of England" with the Spanish Match. In the meantime a zeal for the King of Bohemia and for the Protestant Religion might serve many a bold sea-rover as a welcome pretext for foraging the Spanish Indies. [*London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom.* James I. Vol. 157, No. 64. "Considerations as to the West India Voyage," in Conway's handwriting.]

Under such circumstances a settlement in Italy was of the first importance to Spain, and as such a settlement could not well be reached unless with the approval of the Pope, the question of securing the goodwill of the Court of Rome was a determining factor in the marriage negotiations.

At the beginning of January, 1623, a League, which was known as the League of Avignon, was concluded between France, Savoy, and Venice, with the object of recovering the Valtelline and

supporting the United Provinces and the Protestants in Germany. It was agreed that England, the Swiss Cantons, and the German and Italian princes, including the Pope, should be invited to accede to it. [*London, S.P.O., Cal. State Papers, Venetian* (1621-1623.) P. 539. "Conclusion of the League between the King of France, etc., etc.," 7 January, 1623.]

As a counterstroke to this alliance, Olivares began to consider a scheme for organizing a Defensive League amongst the Italian Princes. In order to bring it into existence, he proposed to induce all parties to accept the first or the second Treaty of Madrid, otherwise styled the Convention of Aranjuez, or even the French counter-project, so that no difficulties might arise as to the Restitution of the Valtelline. He was most anxious that the forts there should be deposited in the hands of the Pope, who would be indemnified by Spain for the expenses which he might incur by the occupation. He was, indeed, sanguine that His Holiness would willingly accept such an offer, though the Nuncio expressed great doubts as to his doing so. [*Mantua, do. Nerli to Duke, 26 January, 1623.*]

By the middle of February, however, Olivares had induced both the Curia and the French to agree to his proposal, and it was decided that the expenses of the occupation should be borne equally by France and Spain, that the passage over the Grisons Passes should be free, and that the garrisons should be composed solely of Papal troops. By effecting these arrangements he saw that he would secure himself the goodwill not only of the Queen but of the Pope, who was already flattering himself that, despite the ill will of Spain, his good offices had secured the Electorate for Bavaria. As His Holiness was still eager that the Bishop of Chur should recover the rights of his see, he could not but feel gratified if the Valtelline was placed in ecclesiastical hands. It was, possibly, to please the Pontiff, that Maximilian, despite his preoccupations as to the necessity of securing the position of Bavaria in the Palatinate, had instructed Father Hyacinth to inform the French ministers that he thought himself bound in honour to secure the restitution of the Valtelline. [*London, S.P.O. Venetian Calendar cit. Pp. 550-551. Ranier Zen to Doge, Rome, 21 January. Do. p. 552, F. Z. Pesaro to Doge, Paris, 21 January, 1623. Mantua. Do. Nerli, 17 February, 1623. Chur, Mappa 53. Nuncio in Switzerland to Bishop of Chur, 23 January, 1623.*]

Up till that moment it had been generally believed at Rome that the Spaniards did not want the English marriage, and that they were only negotiating upon the subject in order to keep James I. quiet. When, however, the Curia found that Olivares eagerly desired its conclusion, and had even employed his confessor and other divines to convince the Infanta that the marriage would be a most holy act, and that, by sacrificing herself, she might bring back England to the true Faith, they began to change their tone. Cardinal Ludovisi told the Venetian ambassador that the Congregation would agree to grant the dispensation upon condition that the Catholics enjoyed liberty in Great Britain, that they should have one church in every town, that the Infanta's household should be entirely composed of Catholics, and that her children should be brought up in the Catholic Religion. He added that the King would come round to many of these points, but that the Kingdom would not consent. The Pope, whose health was fast failing, said that the English marriage was a matter which required very serious consideration. The King's own inclinations were good. He was uneasy in his conscience and would have liked them to have sent him some distinguished men of learning, some Cardinal du Perron or the like, who might convince him. His Holiness ended by saying, "Bad as this business is, it is not yet so bad, as he is wavering. May God give us His Hand." The Infanta herself had declared that, for the King her brother's sake and in God's service, she would submit to anything. Aston was on intimate terms with Mgr. dei Massimi, and from his words to Tarantaise it is evident that the change in the views of the Pope and the Cardinal nephew was known at the English Embassy at Madrid. Probably all those who were directly concerned in the negotiations were glad to throw the responsibility for rejecting the marriage upon the English Parliament.

In reality, Ludovisi was at his wits' end. As he complained to the sympathising Nuncio, he might toil and moil for ever without satisfying Philip IV. and Olivares. He should be a diviner and not a diplomatist, and trust to luck rather than to statecraft. His difficulties were enhanced by the fact that some of the Nuncio's despatches were missing, and so he could not make out how he should act, for, in one of his letters, Massimi had said that the Spaniards did not wish to have any difficulties made about the dispensation, and yet wrote at the same time

that he was sending letters to the contrary effect. As the Nuncio's letters had been sent off on the fourth of January, when the indignation in the Spanish Council of State at the loss of Ormuz was at white heat, it is plain that they had confided their doubts as to the line which they should take about the marriage to the Bishop of Bertinoro. [*London, S.P.O., Ven. Cal. cit. Pp. 493-494, 540-550. Ranier Zen to Doge, Rome, 5 November, 1622; 7, 21 January, 1623. Do. pp. 497-498. Corner to Doge, Madrid, 8 November, 1622. Do. Roman Transcripts, Barberini, 8,630 (12), Ludovisi to Nuncio at Madrid. 18 April, 1623, alluding to the Nuncio's letter of 4 January, 1623. Turin, Spagna 18. Tarantaise, 12 December, 1622.*]

Despite Olivares' leanings towards England, those who were anxious to bring about a marriage between the Infanta and the Emperor's son never for a moment relaxed their efforts, and rumours were also current that she was to marry Charles Emmanuel's second son, Emmanuel Philibert, and that they were to be sent to Flanders to succeed the Infanta Isabella. Tarantaise could only say that he had never been spoken to upon the subject. [*Turin, Spagna, 18. Tarantaise, 21 August, 6 December, 1622. London, S.P.O., Venetian Cal. cit. Pp. 498-499. Corner, Madrid, 8; 18 November, 1622.*]

In the course of the winter of 1622 a far more serious proposal was made for her hand. In the middle of February, 1623, the Inter-nuncio of Poland arrived at Madrid on a mission from King Sigismund. His arrival made Bristol and Aston not a little uneasy for they thought and, as it proved, rightly so, that he was instructed to arrange a marriage between the Infanta and the Prince of Poland, Wladislaus, a gallant soldier and a zealous Catholic. Nor was the heir to Poland a despicable rival to the heir to England. Poland in the Seventeenth Century was by far the most important power in Eastern Europe. The Dutch were enriched by their trade in Polish corn and Polish naval stores, whilst Polish Cossacks were amongst the most valuable of the light cavalry in the armies of the Emperor and of the Catholic League, and of these, according to the Inter-nuncio, his master could put five hundred thousand into the field. The chivalry of Poland had saved Central Europe more than once from being submerged by a flood of Tartar or of Turkish invaders.

It so happened that Tarantaise was an old friend of the Polish

envoy, and, to draw him out, mentioned the matter to him. The Pole replied that if he had really come upon such a mission the Infanta would have been delighted, but that his errand was a very different one. However, he allowed it to become known that the Emperor had thought of giving his daughter to Prince Wladislaus, but that as the Archduchess was not only a hunchback but hideously ugly, the proposal was not a tempting one. He went on to make various inquiries as to the princesses of marriageable age at Paris and Turin, and expressed a great desire to see the portraits of the Savoyard Infantas of which Tarantaise had, fortunately, a complete collection in his gallery. To please his friend, he also persuaded the Spanish ministers to give him a seat in the Royal Chapel, although he had only succeeded in doing so by retailing to them some very wild fictions as to the wealth and military power of Poland.

The Inter-nuncio, however, despite all his assurances to Tarantaise, was not long in broaching the subject of the marriage to the Spanish Councillors, who replied that they had gone very far with the Prince of England and that, if this match fell through, they had given some sort of a promise to the Emperor's eldest son.

The news of the Inter-nuncio's journey and of his matrimonial proposals had already reached England. Valaresso, the Venetian envoy, had taken an opportunity to point out to the King's favourite, Lord Hamilton, that the mission, which had excited great alarm amongst the other powers, had probably been suggested by the Austrians. In any case, the moment the envoy reached Madrid, Bristol despatched the news of his arrival to London, and within a very few days after the tidings had come to their ears Charles Stuart, Prince of Wales, and George Villiers, Marquis of Buckingham, were galloping down the roads of Picardy on their way to Paris and to Spain. [*Turin, Spagna*, 18. Tarantaise, 18, 26 February; 10 March, 1623. *London, S.P.O.* Venetian Calendar cit., p. 474. Pietro Vico, to Doge, Naples, 11 October, p. 484. Senate to Valaresso, 28 October, pp. 509-511. Valaresso to Doge, London, 25 November, 1622. p. 587. Corner to Doge, Madrid, 11 March, 1623.]

CHAPTER LVIII

THE journey of Charles, Prince of Wales, to Madrid is one of the most fascinating episodes of English history. It is one which has not as yet perhaps been thoroughly explained, but it is to be hoped that the evidence contained in the Archives of Turin, of Mantua, and in Sir Walter Aston's correspondence, may serve to throw some fresh light upon a subject which will always interest the historical student.

As early as May, 1622, Gondomar had written to Philip IV. to say that Charles had made him an offer in the greatest secrecy to go to Spain incognito with two servants, should Gondomar on his return to Madrid advise him to put himself in the King's hands. Little notice appears to have been taken of this offer at the time it was made, and it may well have been unknown to Olivares, who before Zuñiga's death seems to have taken but little interest in foreign affairs. However, when the Prince had really arrived, Gondomar could not resist giving mysterious hints to his friends as to the part which he had played in bringing about the journey, and though Coloma, his successor in London, complained that he had not been given the slightest inkling on the subject, people at Madrid from the first inclined to believe that he had told the Government what was in contemplation and that Charles had come to Spain with Philip's consent. A fortnight afterwards it was made known that the Prince had not come out of caprice but that this consent had been previously given, and on this announcement it was taken as beyond all doubt that the marriage would take place. This evidence does not, however, settle the question as to whether the plan was suggested by Charles or by Gondomar. [S.R. Gardiner, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV., p. 369, Note 2, quoting Arch. Simancas, leg. 2603, p. 35. Gondomar to Philip IV., May 6-16, 1622. *Turin*, Let. Min. Spagna, Mazzo 18, Tarantaise to Duke March 31, April 6, 1623. *London*, Cal. S.P. Ven., pp. 576-578. Valaresso to Doge, London, 3 March, 1623. *Mantua*, E.xiv. 3 Spagna B. 616. Nerli to Duke, March 18, 1623.]

Many well informed persons thought indeed that James himself had been the prime mover in the matter and that Charles, whose one wish was to please his father, had consented to undertake the expedition. "It was done," wrote Valaresso, who, however, was no friend of Buckingham's, "without the advice of anyone, being arranged between the King who proposed, the prince who agreed and the marquis who pressed it." The reasons for the King's actions were utterly unknown in England. Rumour asserted that Gondomar had once said that the marriage would take place if the Prince went to Spain. It was thought, however, that he had spoken in irony and meant that it was impossible. The Nuncio at Madrid, on the other hand, believed that James had agreed with Philip that Charles should take this step in order to force the Pope to consent to the marriage. He went so far as to question Olivares on the subject and all but expressed his annoyance openly. The Count met him as he did Khevenhüller with an absolute denial, and gave him his word that he would never concede anything beyond the articles which had already been transmitted to Rome. Possibly he thought that the Prince by visiting Spain had given positive proof that he would consent to anything which might be asked of him. [*London, Cal. S.P. Ven.*, P. 451. *Relation of England* by G. Lando, Sept. 21, 1622, as to Charles' attitude to his father; pp. 581-584. Valaresso to Doge, March 10, pp. 634-636. Do. to do., April 21, 1623. "I concluded the audience by speaking of the Marquis of Buckingham and the honour shown him in Spain. I thought it might not be amiss by making the most of these honours to foment the jealousy of him which I understand they have aroused in the King. Certainly so long as the Marquis maintains his favour he will prove a deplorable instrument against the public good, but the more beneficial his fall would be the more difficult it is to effect." *Mantua*, E. xiv. 3, B. 616, Nerli to Duke, March 18, 1623. *Munich*, Geh. St. A. Kast. Schw. 292-4. Khevenhüller to Elector, 20 March, 1623. Olivares and the Nuncio both assured Khevenhüller that neither the Spaniards nor the French had the slightest notion that the Prince was coming to Madrid.]

In February, 1623, James the First was engaged in one of those periodical flirtations with the Catholic Church which did so much to injure his reputation as a serious politician. A certain Capuchin Friar, Brother Antonio Rafaele da Racconigi, one

of those Northern Italians who played such a part in the secret diplomacy of the Church, and who managed at the same time to render considerable service to their native sovereigns, had been preaching with great success at the chapel of an Embassy in London. The King desired to learn some particulars of his sermons, and through one of his chamberlains induced the friar to compile a book for his edification, which he studied with attention. He then commanded the author to wait upon him at Theobalds for the purpose of some conversation on religion. However, as Racconigi wrote to Rome, all this went for very little. James had a natural aversion to the Catholic faith. He never showed the slightest kindness to any Catholic except out of fear or from some political motive, and his actions proved but too plainly that his one wish was to gain time, and that he cared nothing as to what might happen to England after his death. He would at any moment throw over the Catholics to please the Puritans, and directly afterwards fondle and caress the Spanish Ambassador to keep his good graces. The Prince of Wales had just dismissed two or three of his private musicians because they had sung Mass on Christmas Day in Coloma's Chapel, and Racconigi was convinced that the marriage would never come off. [*London, S.P.O. Roman Transcripts, Vol. 347, p. 153, 1623, Feb. 24. Racconigi to the Prefect of Propaganda. The title of his work was "Chiave Reale di David."*] Buckingham, on the other hand, had his own anxieties to contend with. If the Venetian accounts are to be believed, he was detested by the Prince, and his enemies had but a few weeks before made an attempt to supplant him in the King's favour by putting forward Arthur Brett, a stepson of Lord Treasurer Middlesex, and through his mother first cousin to Buckingham himself. [*Cf. London, Cal. St. Papers Venetian (1621-1623), p. 261. Lando to Doge, March 11, 1622, p. 461. Lando Relazione, 1622, Sept. 22, op. cit., pp. 529-550. Valaresso to Doge, December 23, 1622, and note. Cf. Mr. A. Hind's Remarks in Preface, pp. xxii.-xxiv.*] In short, the moment seemed hardly propitious for the favourite to set out for Spain, on an errand where success could only be attained by securing the goodwill of the Catholic Church, and where failure might spell ruin to the counsellor who had advised it, and who might easily, even if he succeeded at Madrid, find himself supplanted at Whitehall during his absence abroad.

Brett, however, was sent out of the way to France early in January, [Birch, Court and Times of James I., Vol. II., p. 555. Mead to Stuteville, 14 January, 1623, quoted by Mr. Hinds as above.] and by the end of the month both the Marquis and the Prince were at Newmarket busily occupied in the study of Spanish. [London, S.P.O. Spanish Transcripts, Series II., No. 27, Embajada de 1622, No. 58. Buckingham to Gondomar, Newmarket, 30 January, 1622. Buckingham says the Prince had taken his first lesson the day before, although Lando in his Relation says Cal. S.P. Venetian (1621-1623), p. 452, "The King has made him learn Spanish with a view to the marriage."]

Such was the position of affairs when the news reached England that the Prince of Poland had come forward as a candidate for the Infanta's hand. James I. subsequently told Valaresso that he had urged the Prince to go to Spain in order to put an end to delays which paralysed his action and thus become once more his own master, and during the first few days of their stay at Madrid the travellers certainly thought that they had achieved his object. [London, Cal. S.P. For. Venetian (1621-1623), p. 635. Valaresso to Doge. London, April 21, 1623. Do. Brit. Mus. MSS. Harl. 6987, Charles and Buckingham to James, April 4, 1623.]

As, however, he added at the same time that the Duke of Savoy praised the step highly, it is probable that the Venetian Senate gave little credence to the royal asseverations, as they learnt from their Envoy at Turin that Charles Emmanuel had been almost dumbfounded at the tidings, and had commented with great bitterness on the harm which would be done to the opponents of Spain in Italy. [London, S.P. For. Ven., p. 590. Morosini to Doge, March 14, 1622.] The Duke, however, in writing to Tarantaise treated the matter as one of little concern, and seemed, indeed, to think that the marriage must have already taken place. [Turin, Let. Min. Spagna, Mazzo 17. Duke to Tarantaise, Turin, March 12, 1622.] He knew, moreover, that compliments were never unwelcome at Whitehall.

Possibly the real explanation is that Charles made up his mind to undertake the expedition in a fit of pique. He was aware that a strong party at Madrid were in favour of a marriage between the Infanta Maria and the Archduke Ferdinand, and must have known also of the rumours respecting Charles Emmanuel's second son, the Prince of Oneglia.

The appearance of a third candidate upon the scene may have led him to believe that if he was to secure the Infanta and her still more coveted dowry, he could only do so by going in person to the Spanish Court. He had reason to suppose, when he set out, that he would meet with a warm welcome there. The friendship of Olivares for England was well known at Whitehall, and English statesmen who knew that Oñate had been taking active steps at Vienna to induce the Emperor to restore the Palatinate to the Elector's children if not to Frederick himself, were inclined to believe that Spain when talking of intervention contemplated effecting this object by force of arms. As the Infanta had pointed out to her nephew, it was absolutely necessary to convince them that these promises referred strictly to diplomatic measures. [*Turin*, Let. Min. Spagna, Mazzo 18. *Tarantaise* to Duke, Dec. 6, 1622. *Brussels*, Etat et Guerre 188. Infanta to Philip IV., 6 November, 1622.]

Such being the case it is perhaps natural that Charles should have acted on some suggestion from his father that he should follow his example in going to Denmark to take his wife, and different though the circumstances were, should have risked the journey to Spain. [*London*, Cal. S.P. Ven. (1621-1623), p. 575, Valaresso to Doge, 1 Mar., 1623.]

In Paris people were convinced that James I. was getting anxious lest Spain, if pressed, should come to an understanding about the Valtelline, by giving satisfaction in a manner which would make the recovery of the Palatinate more difficult. The French were consequently preparing to send embassies simultaneously to Spain, England, and the Netherlands. [*Ib.* p. 576, Pesaro to Doge, Paris, March 2, 1623.]

The King had reasonable grounds for thinking that all these difficulties could be solved by the presence of Charles and Buckingham at Madrid. He knew that Spain had secured Buckingham's goodwill, and was aware that his favourite possessed no inconsiderable talents for diplomacy. Charles had already been declared of the Council, and had been given much to do in the Government. His father may have thought that his good sense, silence and sobriety of speech fitted him to deal with the statesmen of Madrid. [*Ib.* pp. 412-414, Ranier Zen to Doge, Rome, 10 September, 1622, speaking on the authority of George Gage. Pp. 450-452, Lando, op. cit. Pp. 591-593, Valaresso to Doge, March 17, 1623. Cf. "Romance of George Villiers,

Duke of Buckingham," by Philip Gibbs, *Times Literary Supplement*, April 30, 1908.]

Had the travellers set out in the late autumn of 1622, at the moment when Philip IV. and Olivares seemed half inclined to throw over the Emperor to win the alliance of England, they might have succeeded in their errand. By the middle of February 1623, however, Olivares, under pressure from the Nuncio, had as has been seen, agreed to support the transfer of the Electorate to Bavaria, and by so doing had rendered it all but impossible for Spain to support England in the policy which she ostensibly professed to follow with regard to Germany. He could not do otherwise if the question of the Valtelline was to be solved in accordance with the interests of Spain rather than at the dictation of the signatories of the League of Avignon.

Olivares, knew that if Spain tried to settle the affairs of Italy by herself she would be baffled by France, even if the Emperor interposed his authority, and that a settlement could only be arrived at between the two Powers through some neutral mediator like the Pope. Even Genoa was slipping from his grasp, and it had been necessary to assure her fidelity by arranging a loan with a group of Genoese bankers in which the property of private gentlemen, ladies, and even pious foundations and artisans, had been invested on the security of Spanish good faith. The Valtelline question had it is true been settled for the moment by the deposit of the forts in the valley in the hands of the Pope who was to restore them to the Grisons when satisfactory arrangements had been made to guarantee the liberty and the religion of the inhabitants, but this arrangement was secured at the price of his support of the transfer of the Electorate. The tidings that Maximilian had been solemnly invested with the electoral hat by Ferdinand in person at Ratisbon on 23 February, 1623, reached Madrid on the very morning of the day when Charles arrived in that city, and Khevenhüller was at once able to assure the newly made Elector that the Spanish Ministers approved of the step. [*Munich*, Geh. St. Arch. Kast. Schw. 292-4, Khevenhüller to Duke of Bavaria, 10 Nov., 10 Dec., 1622, 19 Feb., 20 March, 1623. Duke of Bavaria to Khevenhüller, 21 Nov., 1622. *Turin*, Let. Min. Spagna, Mazzo 18, Tarantaise to Duke, Jan. 7, 1623. *Mantua*, E. xiv. 3, Busta 616. Nerli to Duke, 1, 9, 26 Jan., 17 Feb., 11 March, 1623.]

But a few days after Charles' departure from London, Calvert

who was busied in negotiations with the commissioners from Brussels for the deposit of Frankenthal in the Infanta Isabella's hands, was dumbfounded by the tidings from Ratisbon. He saw how deeply James would be offended by the affront which the Emperor had offered him, and hurriedly wrote to recall his master from Royston. Had that despatch arrived but a little earlier would Charles ever have crossed the Channel? [*London*, S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 139, No. 50. Secretary Calvert to Secretary Conway, March 6, 1622-3.]

Yet Philip had, at the same time, done something to meet James' wish about the Palatinate. He felt that some satisfaction was due to him for the consideration which he had shown for the authority of the Empire, and he knew that the English Catholics would have to pay dearly for any insults which Ferdinand might offer to their King. He therefore urged the Infanta Isabella to secure the deposit of Frankenthal in her hands, with a guarantee that it should be restored to Frederick if he had not made peace with the Emperor within a year, and when assuring the Emperor that notwithstanding all Oñate had said, he had never been opposed to the Translation of the Electorate to Bavaria, he had entreated him to restore the Palatine's states to the Electoral Prince. James, who was furious because the Emperor had three times broken his faith to him, learnt as early as the middle of March that Philip was anxious for a match between his grandson and the Emperor's daughter, and merely pointed out to Buckingham that under the circumstances the King of Spain must arrange it himself. Indeed, his chief anxiety was that his favourite should feel the pulses of the Spanish ministers as to the "matter about Holland," in other words as to that joint attack upon the Dutch which had so excited his imagination in the summer of 1620, and which he thought might be undertaken when the business of the match had been finally concluded. Buckingham, as a Lord Admiral whose income in some degree depended upon the prizes taken from the Dutch, was, indeed, eminently fitted for the proposed task. [*London*, Brit. Mus. MSS., Harl. 6987.. James I. to Charles and Buckingham, 17 March, 1623. *Brussels*, Etat et Guerre 189. Philip IV. to Infanta, Feb. 11, 1623.]

Frankenthal was accordingly deposited in the Infanta's hands in the middle of May for a term of eighteen months, and admitted a Spanish garrison under D. Diego Verdigo. [*Brussels*, ib.

Infanta to Philip IV., May 11, 1623. *Mantua*, Arch. Patr. Gonzaga, E. xiv. 3, Busta 616, Nerli to Duke of Mantua, Madrid, Feb. 20, 1623.]

Digby and Aston, who had got wind of Philip's letter to Vienna, were furious that he should have assented to the transfer of the Electorate, for they had imagined, though erroneously, that he had pledged himself to oppose it by force of arms. They stormed and blustered, threatening that England would break with Spain once and for all, an assertion which the politicians at Madrid who knew that James was lending a willing ear to Olivares' suggestions conveyed to him through Brussels, for the settlement of the Palatinate question, received with polite incredulity. [*Mantua*, E. xiv. 3, Busta 616. Nerli to Duke, March 11, 1623. D. Giovanni Gonzaga to do., March 10. *London* Brit. Mus., Harl. 6987, James to Charles, March 17. *Turin*, Let. Min. Spagna, Mazzo 18, Tarantaise to Duke, March 10.]

Olivares, indeed, was showing himself a very apt student of those German affairs, of which but a few months before Khevenhüller had found him so profoundly ignorant. He had rejected a very specious proposal that France and Spain should through their ambassadors at Rome form a Board to examine into the Valtelline question under the mediation of the Pope and that it should be decided in accordance with their report. He did so upon the grounds that as such a decision would have the effect of a legal one it would derogate from the Imperial authority, as the Imperial Courts were already inquiring into the matter, and would at the same time cast a slur upon the Emperor's impartiality. Moreover, no really capable man would consent to serve upon a purely consultative commission set up merely to find a basis for a bargain between the parties. Olivares must have realised what the value of the Imperial authority might be to Spain both in Italy and in the Netherlands, and might well doubt whether England could offer her equal advantages. [*Mantua*, E. xiv. 3, Busta 616, Nerli to Duke, March 11, 1623.]

On March 1 mysterious rumours began to be whispered in London that Charles and Buckingham with a single servant had left Royston by post on the previous evening and were then crossing the sea on their way to Spain, whither Cottington and Porter had orders to follow them. At the Venetian Embassy, to which the tidings were carried by a great noble, they were at first looked upon as incredible.

When Valaresso was persuaded of their truth, he at once sent off the news to Venice by express regardless of the expense. As the ports were closed he gave his despatches to a gentleman of Friuli, and the French Ambassador Tillières also despatched one of his servants post haste to Paris.

The step was indeed one of evil import to the confederates of Avignon, although it was impossible to gauge the full consequences at once. "God grant," writes Valaresso, "that this action be not the seal of the worst that can happen. One may say that England is now in the hands of Spain."

A few days later, however, he took the matter more coolly. If the English, he wrote, thought they would by taking this step force the Spaniards to consent to the marriage, they were being blinded by their desires and had entered upon a design full of perils and of doubtful success. "Meanwhile the Spaniards will have the only prince, the sole heir of the three kingdoms, and with him they will hold the reins of all negotiations." [*London, Cal. S.P. Ven. (1621-3), p. 575, Valaresso to Doge, March 1; pp. 576-8, do. to do., March 3; pp. 591-2, do. to do., March 19, 1623.*]

Riding post and masked through Kent, Charles and Buckingham met the Royal coaches which were conveying Boisshot from Dover to Gravesend, as the bearer of proposals from the Infanta Isabella for an armistice in the Palatinate and for placing Frankenthal in her hands. She, at least, still wished to keep up the hopes of the English and to thwart Bavaria. James, however, seemed to attach but little importance to Boisshot's mission, and declined to put off his hunting and his dotterel luring at Newmarket to receive him in state at Whitehall. [*London, Cal. S.P. Venetian (1621-1623), pp. 576-578, Valaresso to Doge, March 3, 1623.*] It was easier, however, to keep negotiations secret in Cambridgeshire than in London. [*Ib. p. 577, let. cit.*]

Meanwhile the Prince and Buckingham after landing at Boulogne were galloping through Picardy in disguise at the imminent risk of being arrested by the French authorities. The Privy Council were in the greatest dudgeon and Lennox and Hamilton remonstrated strongly with the King for his folly in allowing the journey. Rumours were indeed in circulation at the Hague, to the consternation of the Queen of Bohemia, that the travellers had been assassinated in their coach, but by the fifth of March Cottington was able to write to James from Paris

that they had so far passed unrecognised. [*London, Cal. S.P. Venetian*, pp. 581-584, Valaresso to Doge, March 10, 1623; pp. 588-589, Surian to Doge, Hague, March 13, 1623.]

At Paris they spent two days lodging in the upper story of an inn, and on March 2 were given places by a gentleman of Louis' bedchamber to see the King dining in public at the Louvre. To prevent themselves from being known they put on very large hats, but when Louis had finished dinner he happened to see the pair and began rapping on the table with a large key. [*London, Cal. S.P. Venetian* (1621-1623), pp. 585-587, Giovanni Pesaro to Doge, March 12, 1623. *Turin, Let. Min. Spagna*, Mazzo 18, Tarantaise to Duke, March 20, 1623.]

After dinner they were present at the rehearsal of a masque given by Anne of Austria, whose beauty made the Prince even more eager than before to see her sister. That same evening they left Paris but a few hours before the news of their departure from England reached the Court. Louis XIII. was furious when he heard that they had been at the Louvre without being discovered. For a moment he thought of sending orders to Bayonne to detain them, possibly, in order to force the Prince to marry his sister Henrietta Maria, but the idea was soon laid aside. [*London, Cal. S.P. Ven.*, pp. 585, 587, 589, Pesaro to Doge, March 12-14, 1623. *Mantua, E. xv. 3, Francia B. 673*, Priandi to Duke, Paris, 9 March, 1623. *Turin, Raccolta Mongardino*, 364, Relatio, etc.] At Orleans Buckingham hurt his leg by a fall from his horse, but the travellers pushed on, and in three days reached Bayonne, where the Governor nearly arrested them offhand for carrying gold and jewels out of France. A few hours afterwards they were upon Spanish soil. [*London, S.P. Cal. Ven.*, pp. 585-589, Pesaro to Doge, March 12-14, p. 598, Padavino to Doge, Ratisbon, 22 March, 1623.]

On they sped, through the most barren country in Europe, scattering gold doubloons in place of farthings amongst the beggars, paying at the inns "like those they were," so that every one said they must be great princes, never grumbling at the bad beds and worse food, and got safe to Madrid in a royal mood. [*Turin, Rac. Mon.* 364, Relatio cit.]

Late at night on Friday, March 17, two travellers knocked at the door of the English Embassy at Madrid. [Buckingham says that they arrived at five o'clock in the evening and that they did not send for Gondomar till the next morning, but it is

impossible to reconcile his dates with those in any other account. [*London, Brit. Mus. MSS., Harl. 6987, Charles and Buckingham to James I., Madrid, 10 March, 1623.*] The servants were just going to bed, but they told them that they were English gentlemen who wished to speak to their master upon important business and begged them to call him up. They were requested to go upstairs but saying that they were utterly worn out, they asked that Lord Bristol might come down to them. He was at once awakened and went into his study, to which Buckingham was conducted. The moment he entered the room Bristol recognised him, and in his surprise and confusion said, "What has Your Excellency come here for?" Buckingham replied, "I am come for little enough, but our Prince for a great deal. He is here in the hall." Bristol rose and taking a large candlestick in his hand, ran downstairs and threw himself at his master's feet, weeping for joy. Count Gondomar was at once sent for. The good old man came immediately and, with the Prince's consent, hastened to the Palace to inform Olivares of their arrival. The favourite was asleep, but Gondomar got the valet to awake him, saying he had come upon some most important English business. Directly Olivares saw him, he said in a jesting tone, "Well, has the King of England come here?" "No," replied Gondomar, "not the King but his son." Olivares went straight to the King's room and gave him the news. His Majesty who, "as any other sensible man would have done," thought that the Prince had come to Spain in order to overcome the difficulty about Religion, was infinitely rejoiced. He went up to a Christ which was at the head of his bed, and speaking in the spirit of Charles V., when he found a crucifix on the banks of the Elbe which the heretics had shot at as a target, said, "Lord, I swear to Thee by the Divine and Human Union crucified which I adore in Thee, on Whose Feet I press my lips, that not only shall the coming of the Prince of Wales not suffice to make me overstep in what concerns Thy Catholic Religion by one line what may be agreeable to the decision of Thy Vicar the Roman Pontiff, but that I will not do so even if I were in danger of losing all the kingdoms which by Thy mercy and compassion I possess." Then, turning to the Count, he said, "As to that which is temporal and which is mine let the Prince have what he will, seeing the obligation he has placed us under by coming here." Olivares loved to repeat in later years that this oath

was one of the only two which he ever heard the King take. Philip IV. might be frivolous and dissolute, but at heart he was the King of Spain, and in his veins ran the blood of that Charles the Fifth who had seemed the instrument of God's vengeance upon earth, whether on an impious Pope or upon unbelieving heretics. Late as it was, Olivares, on going back to his apartment, at once drew up an elaborate plan with his own hand for the reception and entertainment of the Prince, and when the Council of State assembled next morning to discuss the business, they found the preliminaries already settled. [*London, S.P.O. Roman Transcripts, Archivio Particulare Di Madrid, 20 March, 1623. The writer was in the service of the Nuncio. Turin, Raccolta Mongardino, No. 364, Relatio Itineris Srmi Principis Angliæ in Hispaniam. "Written on the Monday after they came." London, Brit. Mus. MSS., Add. MSS. 25,689, fol. 65. "Fragmentos historicos de la Vida del Conde de Olivares," by the Conde de la Roca, pp. 325-326. This work was written, however, as late as 1659. As regards Charles V., the Palace and Armoury at Madrid were full of his pictures and relics, amongst which were the arms which he had won at Mühlberg. Cf. London, Brit. Mus., Harl. 3,822, Itinerario Chorografico de las Españas por Diego de Cuelbis passim. The writer was a native of Leipzig and travelled in Spain in 1599 and 1600. Cf. Catalogue of Spanish MSS. in the British Museum by Señor D. P. de Gayanges, Vol. I., p. 187. The picture by Titian of Charles V. at Mühlberg is in the gallery of the Prado. Buckingham says that Gondomar only informed Olivares of their arrival on the morning of March 18, and adds that Olivares saw him at once and returned with him to visit the Prince. London, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6987. Buckingham and Charles to James I., March 10, 1623. As to the view which the Italians took of the Sack of Rome by the Spaniards, cf. Pietro Aretino "La Cortegiana," Act I., Sc. 23.]*

Writing many years later the biographer of Olivares represents his hero as dumbfounded by the unexpected tidings. He foresaw all the evil consequences which might ensue from the ill-timed visit both to himself and to the negotiations, and was only consoled by the thought of the gain which would accrue to the Catholic religion were the marriage brought about. [*Ib. Roca, op. cit. p. 325.*] At the time, however, he appeared delighted at the news and a day or two afterwards told the Mantuan

Agent that the marriage would certainly take place. He even went so far as to tell the Prince and Buckingham that if the Pope could not give the dispensation for a wife he would give the Infanta to Charles as his wench, and wrote to Cardinal Ludovisi that the King of England had laid such an obligation upon Philip by sending his son to Spain that he must beg him to hasten the dispensation as he could deny him nothing that was in his kingdom. Every one, indeed, was convinced that the Prince would certainly become a Catholic, and, even the Nuncio, who had believed the journey was a trick of Olivares, when he learnt that he had come unexpectedly professed himself delighted. Massimi however, did not cease to work against the match as actively and maliciously as he could, but possibly, did not know that the English were fully aware of his intrigues. [*Turin, Raccolta Mongardino, No. 364, Relatio op. cit. Mantua, E. xiv. 3, Busta, 616, Nerli to Duke, March 19, 1623. London, S.P.O., Roman Transcripts, Arch., Part., Madrid, March 20, 1623. Mantua, ib. Nerli to Duke, March 19, 1623. London, Brit. Mus., MSS., Harl. 6987, Charles and Buckingham to James, March 20, 1623.*]

Gondomar's joy at meeting the Prince was wholly unfeigned. When he entered the room, he threw himself at Charles' feet, crying, "Son, son of my heart, what a joy your Highness' Grace's coming is." He might well be proud, for he saw the reward of many years of patient toil. [*Turin, Rac. Mong. 364, op. cit.*]

By eight o'clock on Saturday morning the Council had met in Olivares' private room to discuss the whole business without reserve. Mexia, Montesclaros, Giron, the Bishop of Segovia, Gondomar, and Antonio de Sotomayor, the King's Confessor, were summoned to the Board. In the first place they issued a proclamation for Public Prayers in thanksgiving for the Prince's arrival, and then commissioned Gondomar to sound Buckingham and Cottington as to his object in coming, which as yet they could only surmise. Accordingly Gondomar went to see Buckingham and arranged with him that he should meet Olivares privately in the Palace park.

Between four and five in the afternoon Buckingham drove in a closed carriage with Bristol, Aston, and Gondomar to the Prioress' Gardens on the hill slope now covered with shrubberies which leads down from the Palace to the banks of the Manzanares. Olivares walked down to meet them and after great compliments

and courtesies had passed between the two favourites they went for a drive together in the Park. When they came back at nightfall Olivares took Buckingham up into the Palace through the Stags' Gallery to the new drawing room, where they found the King waiting for them and were received with the greatest kindness.

From the Palace Olivares went to visit the Prince, who stood leaning upon a card table during the interview. By Philip's orders Olivares addressed him as the Earl of Ross, and despite his urgent request would neither put on his hat nor even raise his head. The tact and prudence which he displayed were praised by all and by none more warmly than by Buckingham and Charles, who entreated their dear Dad to write the Count the kindest letter of thanks and encouragement he could. [*Turin*, Rac. Mon. 364, Rel. cit., *London*, Brit. Mus., *Roca* op. cit., pp. 325-326, Harl. MSS. 6987, Charles and Buckingham to James, March 10, 1623. *Genoa*, Let. Min. No. 2433, Serra to Doge, March 23. *Brussels*, Etat et Guerre 132, "Account of the Entry, etc," printed in Cruzada Villamecil, Rubens Diplomatico Español, pp. 21 et seq. *Mantua*, E. xiv. 3, Busta 616, G. Gonzaga to Duke, March 10-20. *London*, S.P.O. Roman Transcripts, Arch. Part., Madrid, 20 March.]

If he could have done so, Charles would willingly have remained incognito, but the English ports had been opened too soon, the posts were speeding fast after him, and he did not wish a postillion to be the first to publish his arrival to the world. Despite the denials of the Ambassadors the news had, indeed, already spread rapidly through the city and everywhere excited the greatest joy. Men congratulated themselves that the marriage was now assured, and that a firm alliance with England would relieve Spain of the charges of supporting a fleet to guard the high seas against their ancient rivals and to protect the Straits of Gibraltar. It seemed certain, moreover, that the English in their own interests would do their best to put down the Dutch trade and to destroy their power at sea, whilst there would no longer be any reason to fear the encroachment of English traders in the East Indies. [*London*, Cal. S.P. Ven., pp. 613-615, Corner to Doge, Madrid, April 4, 1623, reporting a conversation with D. Agostin Mexia. Do. Brit. Mus. Harl. 6987. Let. cit., March 20. *Mantua*, ib. Nerli to Duke, March 24.]

The comments on the journey were very various. Some praised the Prince's decision, others blamed it, and called it a romance which might be classed with *Amadis de Gaul*, and all the more deserved to be so if the marriage did not take place. No one knew what the intentions of the Spanish Government really were, although it was thought that had they intended to refuse their consent they could never have received the Prince with such demonstrations of welcome. Shrewd Italians who knew the world saw, however, clearly that there were great obstacles in the way. They could not believe that the Prince would turn Catholic and grant freedom of Religion to his Catholic countrymen as by doing so he would risk a revolution at home. If again he wished to obtain the restoration of the Palatinate as well as the hand of the Infanta, he would find that he could not do so with the support of Spain alone but must obtain the consent of others interested, such as the German Princes. It was possible, indeed, that even the Emperor, in the existing condition of affairs, did not know what he could or could not do about the matter. It is true that within a very few days, after the Prince's arrival, the Spanish Government had given up all hopes of effecting his conversion, and were chiefly occupied in finding out excuses for his unwillingness to accept the true Faith, and for allowing the Infanta to marry a heretic. To the sanguine lover success seemed assured. [*Turin*, Let. Min., Spagna, Mazzo 18, Tarantaise to Duke, March 18, 1623. *Mantua* E.xiv. 3, B.616, Marchese G. Gonzaga to Duke, March 10, 20. *London*, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6,987. Charles, etc., to James I., March 27.] In London, Boisshot, who as the Flemish Ambassador, could speak more freely than a Spanish Minister, where Religion was in question, was assuring James that Philip IV. was so pleased by Charles' visit that he meant to bestow his sister upon him, whether the dispensation came or not, for there were numbers of Catholics and Protestants in the world who had married without one. [*London*, ib., James I. to Charles, etc., April 1, 1623.]

So far as the Emperor and his favourite Eggenberg were concerned, they had no reason to dislike a marriage which was in many ways advantageous to their interests, and Massimi went so far as to tell the Venetian Envoy at Madrid that Ferdinand had advised its conclusion, a statement which Bristol did not contradict. [*London*, Cal. S.P. Ven., pp. 610-612, Alvise Corner to Doge, Madrid, April 1, 1623.]

The feeling amongst the German Catholic Princes was, however, very different, for the reinstatement of the Palatine would deprive them of the spoils which they hoped to obtain from his territories. But Frederick could not be restored without their consent, and Ferdinand II., whose son was still too young to be elected King of the Romans, could not afford to defy the Electors by violating the Constitution of the Empire. Nor could Spain disregard this consideration. The territorial disputes in Italy and in the Valtelline, which so closely concerned her interests, must be settled by the Imperial Courts, and were another than a Hapsburg to be elected King of the Romans, those Courts might at Ferdinand's death pass into very unfriendly hands.

The Princes of the Catholic League were, therefore, the masters of the situation, and if as every consideration must lead them to do, they acted in conjunction with the Papacy, it was all but certain that, in the long run, Spain would be forced to comply with their wishes. It is probable that even before Charles' arrival at Madrid, these features of the situation had been recognised by Olivares, but no leading English statesman seems to have been equally alive to them. [*Mantua*, ib. G. Gonzaga to Duke, March 10-20, 1623. *London*, Cal. S.P. Ven., pp. 630-631, Valaresso to Doge, London, April 14.] James and his advisers would, otherwise, have refrained from giving mortal offence to Bavaria by insisting upon the deposit of Frankenthal in Isabella's hands, thus proving both to Maximilian and to the Catholic League that their friendship with Spain rested upon a very unstable basis. From that moment Maximilian began to seek the support of France, although Father Hyacinth, his agent at Ratisbon, told the Elector of Mayence that the English match could prevent much evil and that it gave good hopes of the conversion, not only of the King and his son, but also of the Palatine's sons. [*Riezler*, op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 243-245. *W. Goetz*, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., p.22, Elector of Mainz, etc., 20 March, 1623. *London*, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6,987, James to Charles, 17 March.]

The Duke was certainly a most devout Catholic, but he was, probably, inclined to set greater store upon the 12,000,000 florins [£1,000,000] which he had already expended in supporting the Catholic League, than he did upon the chance of converting England, a country which he had studied with the greatest attention. Moreover, his spiritual advisers, the Jesuits, were by no

means devoted to the interests of Spain. His only hopes of repaying himself for his sacrifices lay in retaining the Upper Palatinate, as were he to foreclose his mortgage on Upper Austria, he would draw upon himself the undying enmity of the Austrian House. Maximilian, therefore, never ceased to oppose the marriage underhand. [*London, Cal. S.P., Ven., p. 615, Padavino to Doge, Ratisbon, April 5, 1623.*]

But though statesmen might grumble at Munich and Cardinals might whisper mysteriously in the ante-rooms of the Vatican, where Gregory XV. lay dying, Charles' prospects of carrying home the Infanta as his bride can never have looked fairer than they did upon the morning of Sunday, the nineteenth of March, 1623.

Both the Spanish and the English statesmen had been greatly perplexed as to the manner in which the ceremonial of the meeting between Charles and Philip IV. should be arranged, especially as Charles had at first desired to remain incognito during his stay at Madrid. Buckingham, however, had at his first audience at the Palace suggested that the Prince might see the Infanta as if by a chance meeting, whilst she was taking a drive through the city. [*London, Brit. Mus., Harl, 6,987, Charles, etc., to James I., March 10, 1623. Turin, N. 100, Corti Stran. Spagna. Mazzo 1, No. 31, Rel. dell' Intrata del Prin. di Galles in Madrid, 1623.*]

Accordingly, on the afternoon of Sunday, March 19th, Philip IV. set out from his palace to attend vespers at the Church of the Recoleta. Before his coach went the flower of his nobility, and after it followed the ladies of the Court in all their splendour of brocades, lace, and jewels. With Philip sat the Queen, the Infantes Carlos and Ferdinand, and the Infanta Maria, whose sunny face, bright red cheeks, untouched with rouge, and fair hair quickly won her lover's heart. Were we to judge her only by Velasquez's portrait, we should deem her a merry, laughing girl who set but little store by the severe etiquette of the Spanish Court, and who thought of little but the enjoyment of the passing hour. Those who approached her most nearly knew, however, that she had another side to her character. In March, 1623, she was only just sixteen and a half years of age, but in Spain, a girl of sixteen is already a woman. Few Spanish ladies are tall, and the Infanta used no artificial means to increase her stature. Her features were comely and her expression was not only extraordinarily sweet but betrayed her high birth, by which, however, she set no great store. To all she was kind and gentle. The close-

fitting ruffle and ruffs worn by the great did not become her, for they hid her shapely neck and arms ; her hands, like those of all her race, were exquisite.

Her mind, however, possessed far greater beauties than her body. She was very pious and devout, spending two or three hours daily in private prayer, and communicating every Wednesday and Saturday. Like her brother, she had a particular devotion to the Blessed Sacrament, and to the Immaculate Conception of the Blessed Virgin. Her leisure hours were occupied in working for the poor, even in making lint for the hospitals, and nearly the whole of her allowance of £100 a month was spent in charity. She was a girl of few words, although she chatted merrily in private with her ladies. Her courage had been signally displayed when a fire broke out in the theatre at Aranjuez. The scaffolds and boughs took fire and sparks were falling everywhere. Whilst the courtiers were rushing out in terror, the Infanta called Olivares, and bidding him keep off the press, walked away at her usual pace and without showing the least discomposure. An enemy to scandal and evil speaking she plainly showed her dislike of those who spoke ill of others, and would remind the gossippers that it is well to hear both sides.

Her intellect, indeed, was far wider awake than those who did not know her believed, and she was very sensible to any real unkindness, although she never expostulated but only grieved. She was very careless, both of her person and of her dress, and put on whatever her attendants brought her without remark.

The King was devoted to her, and not only never failed to visit her every evening, but would sit with her whilst she was dressing, and was always offering her presents which she as constantly refused. Nor did she even ask him a favour for any applicant, unless she had ascertained beforehand that he was well disposed to them, for, as she used to say, " I know how much the King my brother desires to give me gust, and it is not reason because he desires to give me gust, I should suffer myself to be persuaded to give him disgust."

With public business the Infanta never meddled. Yet Olivares, looked upon her as a dangerous rival, and spared no pains to remove her from his path, even sending his own confessor to induce her to marry Charles. There can be no doubt but that before the Prince's arrival she had made up her mind rather to go into a convent than to marry a heretic, but her feelings changed

during his stay at Madrid, and before he left she was deeply in love with him, and spared no pains to assure Buckingham of her goodwill, although by his own misconduct he eventually forfeited her favour.

That Charles would have been happy with a woman of the Infanta's disposition it is difficult to believe. She would have felt his inability to carry out his promises to protect the English Catholics most keenly, and she would have been unwilling to seek distraction in the amusements of an idle court. In the end she might well have shared his scaffold at Whitehall, unless indeed, her counsels had aided her husband to get the better of his Parliament. The niece of the Infanta Isabella, the sister of Anne of Austria, must have been a woman of strong will and of no mean talents, who, had her lot been cast elsewhere than at Vienna, might well have rivalled her sister's fame in the annals of the world. [*London*, Cal. S.P. Ven., pp. 610-612, Corner to Doge, Madrid, April 1, 1623. *Turin*, Let. Min., Spagna, Mazzo 18, Tarantaise to Duke, 5 Jan., 1623. *Mantua*, E. xiv. 3, B. 616, Nerli to Duke, March 24. *London*, Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep., University of Edinburgh, Vol. I., Laing MSS., pp. 163-165, 1623, June 28, Madrid, Donna Maria, Infanta of Spain. This description is anonymous, but may possibly be by Antonio or Endymion Porter. The best portrait of D. Maria is that by Valasquez in the Prado Gallery, Madrid. For her allowance from her brother, cf. *London Brit. Mus.*, Eg. 335, Order to First Lord of the Treasury, June 30, 1623.]

Nor to all outward seeming was her admirer unworthy of her. The Nuncio's secretary in writing to Rome after seeing the Prince in his carriage, that "invisible coach of which nobody was supposed to take any notice, though seen by all the worlde," described him as of a pleasing aspect, fair complexion, and somewhat inclined to stoutness. His eyes were bright and flashing, and the first down was just sprouting on his ruddy cheeks. The common people were charmed with him at first sight, as they thought him much fairer and ruddier than he really was, but a few days after they were grumbling at his olive coloured complexion for which Tarantaise was forced to account by saying that he had been bronzed by the weather and by his long journey. The good Archbishop, who knew that his master still looked upon the Prince as a possible son-in-law, added, however, that he looked like a young man who would have the great-

est possible success, for he was of a good complexion, a good height, and very strong.

"In truth, the reason why the popular eye is not satisfied with him is that the Prince is always going about with the King, who looks like an angel, so handsome is he in his person, and so richly and beautifully dressed, whilst the Prince wears a riding suit, that is a doublet and cloak of bright yellow cloth lined with plush of the same colour," which may well have seemed mean beside Phillip's black dress. [*London, S.P.O., Roman Transcripts, Archivio Particolare, Madrid, 20 March, 1623. Turin, Let. Min, Spagna, Mazzo 18, Tarantaise to Duke, March 28, 1623. London, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6907, Charles, etc. to James, March 10.*]

The stage on which the pageant was set was perhaps not worthy of the performers. In honour of Charles' visit the sumptuary edicts which regulated every detail of daily life were suspended, and the streets were thronged with gaily-dressed crowds, in which great nobles and ladies jostled with burghers and artisans. Madrid was not a stately city. The mean chimneyless two-storeyed houses were built of brick, plaistered, or white-washed, but the streets were straight and wide and astonished visitors fresh from the winding allies of Paris or Venice. They were paved with small flints, and reeked with the stench of the dirt thrown profusely from the latticed windows, which told of the harem life from which Spain was but just emerging. Inside, however, these hovels contained apartments which were commodious and even magnificent with their tapestries, rich in fantastic birds and beasts, or in histories from classic poets, and panelled with velvet or satin pilasters embroidered with silver. The heavy gilded furniture was covered with bright damasks—crimson, green, and purple—the tables with writing desks of ivory, ebony, or Portuguese tortoiseshell inlaid with silver flowers, and the sideboards were loaded with richly embossed or chiselled plate, or with splendid candlesticks and vases, embossed with garlands and figures, sometimes of English work, like those at the Legation of Savoy, which had been the gift of James I. to a Spanish Ambassador. Everywhere Eastern embroideries, portières, and Oriental stones told of the Indian trade of Spain; canaries sang in gilded cages, and parrots, paroquets and lories screamed on their perches in halls hung with stamped leather, the work of Cordovan artists, and heated, as wood was very dear, with charcoal glowing in great silver braziers. In the throne rooms of the Legations were

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canopies, such as that belonging to the bankrupt Tarantaise, of Persian work, supported upon columns with gold or silver grounds, and adorned with nymphs dancing or playing upon musical instruments, which were so lovely and beautiful that it was hard to tell whether they were most valuable for their materials or their workmanship. Before the larger houses were walled-in courtyards with beds of fragrant plants, whose perfume rendered the stench of the streets in some degree supportable. No sanitary contrivances existed, but the arrangements for scavenging were good.

Above the red-tiled roofs rose the many-windowed domes of churches with pillared fronts overloaded with sculpture or festoons of plaister in that heavy style into which the architecture of the Italian Renaissance had degenerated in Spain. In that of Santa Maria, the portraits of those who had died by a sentence of the Inquisition, depicted amid dancing devils and leaping flames, preserved the memory of their crimes and of their punishment to perpetuate the infamy of their descendants.

The Royal Palace was an ancient pile, but except for its furniture, it had little that was answerable to the greatness of the sovereign. It was composed of two pavilions of very irregular architecture; behind were two courts, one of which was bordered with wide terraces raised upon arches and adorned with balustrades and statues, like that which may still be seen at Versailles. There were several entrances through porches leading to a wide staircase from which the state rooms opened out. These apartments were crowded with statues and pictures, most of which were family portraits by Titian or by Flemish artists. On every side were to be seen memorials of Charles the Fifth and of his victories over the heretics of Germany. Both the tapestry and the furniture were incredibly rich. The windows were framed in marble, and on every storey opened on to gilded balconies, from which the eye ranged across the Manzanares and the oak-woods of the Palace park to the snow-clad heights of the Guadarrama Mountains towering in rugged grandeur over the Escorial. In front of the palace was a large green from which the Calle Mayor, the best street in Madrid, ran through the town to the Gate of Alcala. [*London, Brit. Mus, Harl. 3822, Tesoro Chorografico, op. cit., gives a drawing of such a picture in Santa Maria. "L'Espagne au XVI^e et au XVII^e Siècle," par Alfred Morel-Fatio, pp. 176-180. Diario di Camillo Borghese da Rome*

in Spagna, 1594. Nugent, *Grand Tour*, op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 240-244. *Turin*, ib., Let. Min., Spagna, Mazzo 19, "List of the most valuable furniture of Mgr. the late Archbp. of Tarantaise, 1627."]

Wealthy as Spain was supposed to be by the northern nations, there was little evidence of her riches to be seen in the streets. Both men and women dressed in black. Men wore trunk hose, a jacket, a short cloak like a student's gown, and a hat or woollen bonnet. Their dress would have been a handsome one had not their hose as a rule been cut too long. Some few wore tight trews like those used at Seville. The women either muffled up their heads and faces in their mantles, or else wore collars with very large tabs. The great ladies used pattens of Venetian fashion, which were so high as to make them look very tall. All classes painted so thickly that they looked like pictures, and were so shameless in their manners that they shocked even a Siennese like Borghese [cf. *Dante D.C.*, passim for the morale of the Siennese]. Ladies, when they took the air, went in coaches, or were carried in covered seats like those used in Genoa. Poorer women rode on asses, taking a man with them, or walked.

The grandes and gentry, who were generally bad riders, seldom mounted a horse, but walked about attended by grooms and pages, and their chief amusements were to stroll up and down in the Calle Mayor, or to romp through a summer's night with ladies in the open air eating-houses, which lined the promenade of the Prado.

To an Italian noble their entertainments seemed miserable. The waiting was very bad and nothing was brought to table punctually. The meat was very tough and the other dishes far too sweet. Forks were not in use, but the guests cut their food with carving knives.

The personal habits of all classes, even in public, were filthy in the extreme, although perhaps not worse than those which prevailed in London in the days of Queen Anne.

Living, although not luxurious, cannot be said to have been dear. In 1627 the Mantuan Envoy reckoned the expenses for himself and his household including his rent and the wages and board-wages of his fifteen attendants at £2 16s. 0d. a day, or 112 Mantuan lire. The ordinary diet for three persons was estimated at 10s. a day, water at 1s., charcoal at 4s., corn and straw for four horses 11s., and the liveries came to £90 a year. The board-wages

allowed varied from 1s. 6d. a day for the steward to 3d. for a groom, whilst the cook got 2s. For his house he paid 2s. 6d. a day. Bread cost 4d. a pound, mutton 10d., and beef 7½d., whilst a capon could be had for 5s., a couple of rabbits for 3s., and a pair of fat fowls for 2s. 6d. A large fish cost 3s. 4d. a pound, a middle-sized one 2s. All fruits were excessively dear. A small donkey-load of wood was 3s., and wax candles 5s. 4d. a pound, whilst stuffs such as velvet, cloth, bombazine, and cotton varied in price from 5s. to 14s. a *vara* (35 inches), and a hat lined but without a band, cost 11s. Most manufactured articles had to be imported from abroad.

Court life at Madrid was dull in the extreme. The grandees and ambassadors attended His Majesty every morning to the Royal Chapel, where he sat in a covered pew under the gallery, and from thence walked before him with their hats on, back to his rooms. About two in the afternoon they followed him on his ride and were then free to return to their dearly-loved Calle Mayor for three hours or so before nightfall, unless a comedy was being represented at the playhouse or at Court.

Such was Madrid when Charles gazed upon its streets for the first time. [*Morel-Fatio*, op. cit, pp. 177-180, *Diario di Camillo Borghese. Mantua*, ib., Spagna, Busta, 617, A. Striggi to Marliani. 2 November, 1626. Do. to Chancellor, 17 July, 1627. Olivares' tapestries are in the Museo Nacional at Madrid.]

The afternoon of Sunday, the 19th of March, was bright and sunny. Charles, attended by Gondomar, Bristol, Aston, Buckingham, and Cottington had already driven from the Embassy in the Duke of Zea's coach, and the heavy gilded vehicle, with its eight mules in jangling harness, guarded by six alguazils in black and red, had taken up its place at the Guadalajara Gate facing the lawn before the palace. The curtains were drawn up, and Charles, who was in disguise, looked out whilst the Royal coach, attended by equerries and a long train of footmen in splendid liveries, drove slowly by.

The King looked at the Ambassadors, took off his hat to them as he usually did, without any further show of courtesy, and drove on. By her brother's wish the Infanta leaned forward that she might be more easily seen.

According to Khevenhüller, she had even at that moment shown how greatly she disliked the marriage. He told Corner at the Legation of Savoy on the day of the Prince's public entry, that

when the coaches met, the King was laughing with the Infanta and said to her, "Here stands your gallant; your beauty must have great power to have drawn him from such distant lands for such a weighty purpose." She replied, "Is he a Catholic?" The King answered, "I do not know, but I hope so." She rejoined, "I will never take a heretic for my husband—but to safeguard Your Majesty's interests, I would rather take the veil at the Barefooted Carmelites."

Whilst the King drove on down the Calle Mayor past the house where Francis the First had been kept as a prisoner, the Prince's carriage went by another street to the Gate of Alcala, through which the royal coach had to pass on its way to the Recolets. So thick was the crowd that the alguazils had hard work to force a way through the throng and had not a detachment of halbardiers been sent for who kept back the eager mob who were pushing and fighting to see him, the party might easily have been suffocated. All distinctions of class and rank were forgotten, and great ladies had not disdained to lay aside their pattens and walk the streets like common folk. "In truth," wrote Tarantaise, "it was a marvellous sight, what with so many gentlemen on horseback, and the throng of coaches, for I have never seen so many together in my life." The Nuncio and his suite were amongst the crowd, and when Charles' carriage crossed theirs he opened his curtains and saluted Mgr. dei Massimi, conspicuous in purple robes and flashing cross, with the greatest courtesy. His action did not escape notice, and murmured whispers were heard that he was about to turn Catholic. The Prince was in the greatest delight and everyone was as pleased as he was.

Night had fallen when their Majesties had ended their devotions, and drove back past the Prince's coach down the great street of Alcala. They were attended by a throng of link bearers carrying waxen torches, who lighted both the royal coaches and those of the ladies and made a very brilliant show, for the Queen, Infanta, and their attendants were all magnificently dressed and jewelled, and the Spaniards, who were no mean masters of stage effect, knew well that everything looks better by torch-light. Their Majesties got back to the Palace rather late and the Prince returned to his Embassy by the road which he had come by and shortly afterwards was visited by Count Olivares, who wished to arrange for his meeting with the King. [*London, Cal. S.P., Ven.,*

pp. 610-612, Corner to Doge, April 1, pp. 628-629, do. to do., April 14, 1623. Khevenhüller may have received a report of the conversation from the Infante D. Carlos, who was bitterly opposed to the match. Tarantaise does not mention it. *London, S.P.O.*, Roman Transcripts, Arch. Part, Madrid, 20 March, let. cit., do. *Brit. Mus.* Add. 36,447, Aston Papers, Vol. IV., Aston to Calvert, 22 March, 1622, O.S. Add. 10,276 Account of the Entry, written by D. Gaston de Torquemada, do. *Roca* op. cit. *Turin* ib, Tarantaise to Duke, March 20, 1623. *Genoa*, Let. Min., No. 2,433, Serra to Doge, March 22. *Brussels, E. et G.*, 132, Account of the Entry, etc. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl, 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, 10 March.]

It was arranged that this should take place in the Prado, which was close to Bristol's house, at eleven o'clock at night, for though the King had wished to visit the Prince privately at the Embassy, it was found that this would be impossible.

The Count, after a short conversation with Buckingham, who had asked to speak with him, went with him and Antony Porter, who had been in both their households, as interpreter, to the Palace to attend the King to the interview. Whilst they were waiting in the Prioress's Garden they saw a man coming down one of the walks by himself with his cloak thrown over his face. The Count said to Buckingham, "This is the King." The Marquis replied in joyful surprise, "Is it possible you have a King who can walk about like this! 'Tis wonderful." He quickened his pace, and went and threw himself upon his knees at his Majesty's feet, asking for his hand, which, after using some gentle violence, he kissed. His Majesty, attended by the three gentlemen then drove to the Prado just in time to meet the Prince, who drove up in a two-horsed coach, attended by his two Ambassadors, Gondomar and Cottington. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, MSS. Dept. *Roca*, op. cit., Harl. 6987, Charles, etc., to James, 10 March, 1623.]

Great had been the discussions in the Council of State as to the etiquette which should be observed in this interview. Finally it had been decided that His Majesty should allow himself to be addressed as "Your Highness" should the Prince use this title in speaking to him, as it was thought likely that he would do.

However, as the King addressed the Prince as "Your Highness," the Prince used "Your Majesty" in replying to him, and

they exchanged compliments which gave both of them much pleasure. Under great pressure from Philip, Charles agreed to get into his coach first and to take the right hand. Lord Bristol took his place with them as interpreter, and they stayed chatting together until two in the morning, when they took leave of one another after embracing warmly. The Prince, after some hesitation, agreed to lay aside his incognito, and so it was arranged that on the following Sunday he should make his State Entry into Madrid. [*London, Brit. Mus., Roca, op. cit. Turin, Tarantaise to Duke, March 20, 1623, let. cit. Genoa, Serra to Doge, March 22, 1623, let. cit. Brussels, Account cit.*] Corner, after giving a brief account of what had passed, grimly remarked that everyone was astonished that a prince of such quality should be welcomed in such an extraordinary fashion, and added that the Senate would justly marvel at receiving the news that His Majesty had consented to parade his sister through the town for Charles to see, but that everyone at Madrid was equally amazed. To the Venetians an understanding between Spain and England was gall and wormwood. [*London, Cal. S.P., Ven., Corner to Doge, March 28, 1623, id. Brit. Mus., Add 36,449, Aston to Calvert, 20 March, 1623.*]

On the following day the King and Don Carlos, attended by all the grandees, dignitaries, and the rest of the nobility, rode in great state to attend a service at the Church of the Misericordia in honour of the festival of Saint Joachim, the father of the Blessed Virgin. All, including Don Carlos, were beplumed and bejewelled. Olivares came to bring the Prince to see the riding, and took him to the palace of the Count of Monterrey, but as they found it was on fire, they went on to a notary's a little further on, from which he saw it very well. In the afternoon he drove through the town in Aston's carriage, which was kept open. Strict orders were given that whilst His Highness remained incognito, no one should visit him without the King's permission.

The Nuncio had already written to Rome to announce the Prince's arrival. By the same express Olivares, as we have seen, had written to Cardinal Ludovisi saying that Charles had placed the King under such an obligation to him by coming into his dominions that he could deny him nothing, and that he must request him to send the dispensation as soon as possible. Most observers thought the marriage certain, as if it were now broken

off Spain and England would be left upon the worst of terms, but yet there were whispers that there would be great difficulties in obtaining the dispensation, as France and Venice would leave no stone unturned at the Vatican to oppose it. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, March 10, 1623. *Genoa*, ib. Serra to Doge, 22 March.]

All business had been laid aside, and both courtiers and statesmen could think of nothing but vying with one another in the stately festivities prepared for a welcome to their guest. Orders were sent to Fera to place Bormio and the Valtelline as a deposit in the hands of the Pope. Herbert, the English Ambassador at Paris, who, however, was an opponent of the Spanish match, even expressed his fears that France would wholly throw aside her previous policy, that she could treat the Valtelline as a matter of no account, and could, in close alliance with Spain, everywhere wage war against heresy and free government, especially in Germany. The triumph of the House of Austria seemed at hand. [*Mantua* ib., Nerli to Duke, March 24, 1623. *London*, Cal. S.P. Ven., p. 610, Pesaro to Doge, Paris, March 31.]

Philip IV. seemed in greater delight than he had ever been in his life and passed his time in Charles' company. The Prince professed himself enchanted by the Infanta's beauty and said that she was far lovelier than she had been represented to be, either in her pictures or by his Ambassador's letters. Olivares in his own interest, was using every means to hasten on the marriage. [*Mantua*, ib., Nerli to Duke, let. cit. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Buckingham to James, 10 March, Charles and Buckingham to James, 17-27 March, 1623.]

It had been arranged that the Prince should make his State Entry into Madrid on Sunday, March 26, and accordingly at nine-thirty on the morning of that day he was escorted by a deputation of Councillors of State from the English Embassy to the State Apartments in the Royal Monastery of San Geronimo, to which the Spanish Kings retired when in deep mourning.

Gondomar, who had been sworn a member of the Council of State, as a reward for his successful diplomacy, but who was reported to be but ill satisfied, as he thought that he should have been invited at the same time to "put on his hat" as a Grandee of Spain, superintended all the arrangements. The rooms allotted to the prince were magnificently fitted up and in them were hung the portraits not only of the King and Queen of England but of

Mary Queen of Scots and of the principal English peers and officials. The day before orders had been issued to release all prisoners who were condemned to the galleys, and to reduce the sentences of all those who had been banished. Proclamation was made that the King would satisfy the debts of all insolvent debtors who were in prison. At noon Gondomar gave a magnificent dinner in the Prince's honour. [*London, Cal. S.P. Ven.*, pp. 604-605, Corner to Doge, March 28, 1623. *Turin, ib.*, Tarantaise to Duke, March 28. *Brussels, ib.*, Report cit. *Genoa, ib.*, Serra to Doge, March 22.]

After dinner, by the King's special orders, all the Councillors of State rode down in a splendid procession to San Geronimo to do homage to the Prince. Those for the Inquisition and the Bull of the Cruzada did not appear, but the Grand Inquisitor, the Bishop of Cuenca, had visited him before dinner and received a gracious reception; the Prince would not, indeed, listen to a word he said before he had put on his hat. The Prince welcomed the Councillors most courteously and took off his hat to them but did not give his hand to anyone. Many people professed to be scandalised at the Grand Inquisitor's conduct, but others seemed much annoyed at the Nuncio, who muttered that it seemed strange that such honours should be paid to one who was not only a heretic but a personal enemy of the Pope. [*Turin, ib.*, Tarantaise to Duke, March 31, 1623. *Munich, ib.*, Khevenhüller to Elector, April 12, 1623. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Eg. 335, Royal Order, 23 March, Add. 10,236, Torquemada cit.] Cardinals Zapata and Spinola, in the first instance, refused to wait upon the Prince, but a few days later they were forced to do so by His Majesty's orders.

After the Councillors had paid their homage, the Magistrates of Madrid presented their respects with the same ceremonial as they did when they received a King on his State Entry.

About four o'clock in the afternoon Philip IV. arrived at the Monastery in a closed carriage attended by Olivares, Infantado, and some lords of the bedchamber. He was received by the Prince in the courtyard, and they at once mounted their horses and the procession got under weigh amid the roll of drums, and the crash of cymbals. The Prince was dressed in pink satin flowered with black, and a cloak lined with plush of the same colour. At the King's request the Prince rode a little in front of him, but the onlookers were astonished to see that whilst Philip was radiant

with smiles, Charles looked bedazed, as if overwhelmed by the splendour of his reception.

The King rode a grey jennet with a white blaze with that grace and perfect horsemanship which live for all time on the canvasses of Velasquez. He wore a suit of dark tawny tabby, embroidered with gold flowers and pearls. His cloak was lined with peach-coloured cloth of gold. The buttons were of gold set thick with diamonds, and he wore a collar of very large diamonds and a hat cord of pearls and diamonds clasped with a lily of splendid stones. Twelve of the Police Magistrates of Madrid in full robes of cloth of gold and black velvet caps with white plumes, red stockings and gilt swords, carried over their heads a canopy of white cloth embroidered with gold flowers. Before them rode the Grandees with plumes matching their rich clothes followed by long trains of servants in liveries which in some cases struck Tarantaise as tasteless and gaudy.

Olivares, as Master of the Horse, and Buckingham, walked directly behind the King and Prince; next came Digby between two of the Council of State, and then Aston between two others. Olivares, glittering with jewels and splendidly dressed, was, said the newswriters, a sight in himself, and his long train of attendants in new and costly liveries was also admired. Behind the Ambassadors rode the Archer Guard in their full dress uniforms, with glittering armour and waving red and black plumes. The whole of the road leading from San Geronimo to the Palace was lined with the Spanish and German guards on foot who had hard work to keep back the surging and excited crowds. All the houses were hung with flags and tapestries, and the windows and balconies were crowded with ladies.

It had been raining nearly all day, but just as the long train of courtiers was coming out of San Geronimo the sky cleared up so much that not one drop of rain fell whilst they were on their way to the Palace, and as the good Archbishop remarked, "We might adapt to this what Virgil wrote of Augustus, '*Luce pluit tota, redeunt spectacula serò Divisum imperium cum Jove Phœbus habet.*'"

During the two previous evenings any attempt to illuminate the city had been prevented by torrents of rain. This accident had, however, made the populace welcome the Prince's coming, to which they attributed the breaking up of a drought which had lasted since the previous April and during which the wells had run nearly dry.

Stages on which comedies by Lope de Vega and ballets were being performed were set up in the squares, and lamps ready for the illuminations were ranged in every window.

Madrid had no gates, and it had, therefore, been arranged that the Municipality under their banners should welcome the procession at the Monastery of the Friars Minor and ride thence in its train to the Palace.

On their way through the Calle Mayor the King and Prince passed the Legation of Savoy, where the balconies were filled with a splendid company consisting of the Imperial Ambassador with his wife and some other ladies, and the Ministers of Poland, Venice, and Urbino, and graciously took off their hats to salute them. They little knew the bitter sneers which Khevenhüller was exchanging with his colleague Corner, in his anger that the Infanta should have been bestowed upon the Prince of Wales instead of upon the Emperor's son. It was thought indeed not unlikely that the English marriage might break up the friendship between the two branches of the House of Austria. [*London, S.P.O., Roman Transcripts, Archivio Par., Madrid, 1 April, 1623. Cal. S.P. Ven., pp. 604-606, Corner to Doge, March 28, ib., pp. 601-612, April 1, 1623, pp. 612-613, April 3, 1623. Turin, Let. Min., Spagna, Mazzo 18, Tarantaise to Duke, March 28, 1623. Mantua, E. XIV. 3, B. 616, Nerli to Duke, March 24, 1623. Genoa, Let. Min., No. 2433, Serra to Doge, March 22, 1623. Brussels, Etat et Guerre, 132, Report cit. There is a picture of the State Entry in the gallery at the Prado at Madrid.*]

The Polish Ambassador, although he had already been shown the door, yet felt the Prince's coming very deeply. Khevenhüller, who felt it yet more deeply, was doing everything he could to prevent the Spanish ministers from deciding in favour of the marriage, even if the Prince should consent to become a catechumen and declare himself a Catholic. The Ambassador could adduce many instances, as Tarantaise remarked, of gentlemen who had feigned themselves Catholics in order to secure the object of their desires, and who had then gone back to their vomit. [*Turin, Let. Min., Spagna, Mazzo 18, Tarantaise to Duke, 28 March, 1623.*]

However, at the moment when the procession halted at the palace gate, Charles may well have thought that he had attained the purpose of his journey. All dismounted, and the King went up with the Prince to visit the Queen, who with the Infanta Maria

had been watching the entry from behind the blinds of her window, and who was waiting for her visitors under the canopy in her throne room.

Both the King and the Prince were adepts at Court etiquette, and the on-lookers watched their progress through the Palace with admiring awe. When they had to enter the doors it was a wonder to see the courtesies which they exchanged with one another and their contest as to which of them should pass them first. Finally, His Majesty, like one who well knows how to do his duty as a king, "said to the Prince of Wales, 'Come, Sir, go on,' and put his hands on his shoulders as if to constrain him to do so. On this the Prince made as if he would embrace His Majesty, threw his arms around him, and then used the same constraint to him, so they went in side-by-side."

When the Queen heard the King and Prince coming she came out of the door of her apartment to meet them, and made a very deep courtesy to the Prince. "After he had bent both knees and made as if he would have taken her hand," they walked under the canopy, seated themselves upon three chairs which had been placed there and conversed for half an hour. The ladies and gentlemen of the household stood round the Queen ranked in order of precedence and wearing their full dress and jewels. From the Queen's throne-room the King escorted the Prince to his apartment, which was that formerly belonging to D. Balthazar de Zuñiga, and which after his death, had been given to the Countess of Olivares. Several rooms which had been used for the sittings of the Council were also assigned to him. They were received at the door by the King's brothers, Carlos and Ferdinand, who bent their knees to the ground when they greeted the Prince, and then preceded him to his bedchamber, where they took their leave of him, and went back with the King to their own apartments.

The Prince, not to be outdone in courtesy, addressed the King as "Your Majesty," although eldest sons of kings were not accustomed to use this term to reigning sovereigns, and by doing so gave great pleasure to Philip and his Court. The grandees, however, were annoyed that by Philip's express orders Charles used the word "Vos" in speaking to them, as if he had been the King of Spain, for they had expected "Your Lordship" from him at the least. They knew that they would be ruined if he made a long stay, for after they had been forced to incur ruinous

expenses for masquerades and other displays during the previous winter, they had now to procure fresh clothes and liveries, and saw before them an endless perspective of costly joustings, balls, and tournaments. Yet they were all so deep in debt already that they had scarcely enough to eat. Khevenhüller in writing to Maximilian, who was as fond of "savoury" writing as any Cromwell or Harley, remarked that the Almighty must have meant to punish the Spaniards for their pride by the Prince's coming, whilst Tarantaise found sweet consolation for the fresh charges which had been thrown upon his depleted purse, in the thought that Charles must have been given some glimmer of hope by Monterrey or Olivares to induce him to prolong his stay and that he, too, would have to bear his share of the burden, yet in the end be forced to leave without having any of his overweening desires gratified. His numerous purchases and his drafts on the Madrid bankers were already the talk of the town. A regular household was formed to attend upon him, with Gondomar as Lord Steward. The King's richest furniture and priceless hangings adorned his rooms. The Queen loaded him with presents of perfumery and amber gloves; a large coffer of massive gold, in which was a dressing-gown of worked cloth, was specially noted amongst her gifts.

For four nights the whole city was illuminated, the bells pealed till midnight, concerts of drums and kettle-drums were given in the streets amid showers of rockets, and flights of fiery dragons, eagles, and lions. On the last night the Destruction of Troy was represented in the Square before the Palace; a large horse was drawn into a theatre of cloths painted to represent walls and filled with fireworks; it was set on fire and burnt to ashes.

In the light of coming events the subject seems to have been an ominous one, but in Charles' life omens were destined to be numerous. His days were spent in running the ring, in riding at the Quintain in the Park, and in long audiences with ambassadors and officials, at which Digby acted as his interpreter. In the meantime, Buckingham entered upon the real business of the visit. [*Brussels*, Rel. cit. *London*, S.P.O., Roman Transcripts, April 1, 1623. *Munich*, Khevenhüller to Elector, April 12. *Turin*, cit., Tarantaise, March.]

CHAPTER LIX

PHILIP was entertaining his guests with true Castilian courtesy, but Buckingham, who had the negotiations for the marriage in his hands, was soon to find that a grandee of Spain could be a cunning and unyielding diplomatist.

Olivares was most eager to see the Infanta removed from his path, but he was probably the only Spaniard who was sincerely in favour of a step which he saw might bring great advantages to his country as well as to himself. Gondomar never wearied of telling his cronies that he was the man who had brought the Prince to Madrid by a well-timed hint to the English King, that nothing but good could come of such a visit, but Gondomar was wavering. He took an opportunity of telling Tarantaise that unless His Highness turned Catholic the marriage could not take place without a dispensation from the Pope. The Infanta had fallen sick of a low fever, which, said Rumour, might be traced to the agitation of her mind.

She was firmly resolved that she would not marry a heretic, and was supported in her resolution by her brother Don Carlos.

Such was the position of affairs when Buckingham for the first time entered seriously upon the business.

He began by begging Olivares to bring the marriage negotiations to a conclusion without delay, as this was absolutely indispensable now that the Prince had come to Spain. Olivares replied that the King was only too anxious for the marriage, but that everything depended upon the Pope, who would be far more likely to give his consent if James had previously granted Liberty of Conscience to the Catholics, or rather, had offered to do so upon such lines as His Holiness should lay down. Buckingham could only answer that as such a concession would at once cause the outbreak of a rebellion, they could only be given, in the first instance, the right of worshipping in private, but that after the Infanta's arrival their liberties would be extended gradually.

Olivares reported the conversation to the Committee of the

Council and, with their approval, approached the Nuncio and begged him to induce the Pope to grant the dispensation as soon as possible, for James did not wish his son and Buckingham to remain long absent from England.

Notwithstanding the Prince's courteous greeting Massimi was by no means prepossessed in his favour, and pointed out that though the Pope would willingly do everything in his power to oblige Spain consistently with his honour and conscience, he had referred the question of the dispensation to a congregation of Cardinals, who certainly would not advise His Holiness to grant it, unless the Catholics were given Liberty of Conscience. It was impossible for the King of England to make such a concession without the consent of his Parliament. Whatever promises James might make on his own account, he would never keep them once he had the Infanta in his power. Massimi therefore strongly advised that Philip should break off the negotiations at once as he could gain nothing by the marriage. Olivares replied that it was certainly not in James' power to force his people to change their religion, but that the matter had been thoroughly discussed in the Royal Council. All that he had therefore now to do was to ask the Nuncio to secure the dispensation as soon as possible. The Nuncio, however, once more repeated that the application would be utterly useless unless they could offer some advantages to Religion. If the King of England could not do this, he might offer the Catholics some fortress like the Huguenots had in France.

Buckingham on learning from Olivares what had passed, said that any such proposal would be the ruin of the whole business. On this the Count promised that he would write to Rome again to ask for the dispensation to be sent without delay, and the Nuncio, when forwarding his report of the interview, also impressed upon Cardinal Ludovisi that the Spaniards were most eager for it. Corner in his despatch to Venice remarks that he would not venture to affirm that the Nuncio did not advertise his opposition as a blind, for it seemed wholly impossible to him that his reverend colleague should ever oppose anything seriously.

As Olivares was expecting to receive the Pope's ratification of the deposit of the forts in the Valtelline in his hands at any moment, he could afford to use very plain language to the Nuncio so far as the Pope and Spanish interests in Italy were concerned. [*London, S.P.O., Venetian Calendar, pp. 616-618, Corner to Doge,*

April 6, 1623. *Turin*, Tarantaise to Duke, March 31. *Mantua*, Nerli to Duke, April 1, 1623. *London*, *Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6987, Charles and Buckingham to James, March 15, April 22.]

The case, however, as regards Germany was somewhat different. Khevenhüller, as has been said, was doing his utmost to break off the negotiations in the hope, as he confessed, that if the English match fell through, he could arrange for the Infanta to marry the Emperor's son. He had quickly made up his mind to speak out to Olivares, and told him in so many words that he was most anxious to learn the whole truth about the business, as he wished to be in a position to inform his master, the Emperor, what line of conduct it would be best for him to follow. When the Emperor knew for certain that the Prince of Wales would hit the mark, he would negotiate in France to get Madame Henrietta for his son. Such a proposal was by no means to Olivares' taste, and he told Khevenhüller to have patience, for as yet they had not come to any final decision. In any case, nothing would be concluded without a dispensation from the Pope. [*Turin*, Tarantaise, March 31, 1623.]

If the Nuncio was merely opposing the marriage as a blind, Khevenhüller, on the other hand, was in deadly earnest. In his eyes the interests of Bavaria seem to have outweighed those of his other employer, the Emperor, who, if Massimi was to be believed, wished the marriage to be carried through as soon as possible. Maximilian must have been a better paymaster than Ferdinand. (*London*, Venetian Calendar, Corner to Doge, April 1, 1623.)

The Imperial ambassador was acting on sound grounds. In December, 1622, Olivares, who was beginning to see that James would probably break any agreements he entered into as to the Catholics, and that the Infanta's repugnance to the marriage was real, had bethought himself that in point of fact the question of the Palatinate touched the interests of the Catholic Religion and of the Emperor far more nearly than it did those of Spain. He, therefore, suggested to Philip IV. that Charles might be married to the Emperor's eldest daughter, and Charles Louis, the Palatine's eldest son, to his second, the hideous hunchback, whose hand had been offered in vain to the Prince of Poland. The boy was to be sent to the Emperor forthwith to be educated in the Catholic Religion, and the Palatinate would be restored to him when the marriage was consummated. [*F. de Jesus*,

op. cit., pp. 47-48.] Thus England would be satisfied even if the Emperor granted the Electorate to the Duke of Bavaria.

Later in the winter Spinola and Cardinal de la Cueva had induced the Infanta to submit a somewhat similar scheme to the Emperor and the Elector of Mainz. They proposed that the Palatine should make a proper submission and apology to Ferdinand, that he should then be restored to the possession of the Palatinate and that after Maximilian's death his children should receive back the Electorate without any reservation. It should, however, be guaranteed that the Palatine's eldest son should be brought up at the Imperial Court, and that the chief places in the Palatinate should be held by Imperial garrisons and placed under the direct administration of the Emperor for a certain term.

It is easy to see that this proposal might well prove agreeable to James, if, as was the general belief, he dreaded, and not without reason, the Palatine's influence with the English Puritans. In any case, he did not evince the slightest disapproval of it when it was brought before him by Coloma, who accordingly wrote to Oñate on the subject. As England would not hear of the Electorate being left in perpetuity in Bavaria, Coloma suggested that Maximilian should retain both the Palatinate and the Electoral title for his life, and that after his death, the Electorate should be held alternatively by the two branches of the House of Wittelsbach. Khevenhüller in his despatch on the subject to Munich, said that he believed that the King, his Ministers, and Olivares were acting in perfect good faith in bringing forward this proposal, as they thought it would prevent the Emperor from allowing his decision as to the Transfer of the Electorate to be carried into effect. The Nuncio said that Digby spoke very coldly about the matter as the plan had not been originated by his master, and that no further steps had been taken in it since the Prince's arrival.

If we may believe Schwarzenberg, the representative of the Emperor at Brussels, he had been told by Spinola himself that his chief object was to keep James busy with negotiations, so that he might mark time until it became clear what course to take. The politicians at Brussels always kept an eye on their own affairs whilst dealing with those of the Empire. The Elector of Mainz was of the opinion that the Emperor might show some consideration to the Palatine's children, as he had expressed his willingness

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to do so, but that if the Palatine himself were restored there would never be tranquillity in Germany. The question of the ultimate disposal of the Electorate might remain open until after Maximilian's death. In his reply, Ferdinand wrote that he would take time to consider such a momentous proposal, and that he could do nothing without consulting the Electors present at Ratisbon, for, by taking this course, he would avoid prejudicing the Elector of Saxony, and would leave the door open for peace negotiations. [*London*, Venetian Cal., pp. 610-612, Corner, April 1, 1623. *Munich*, Khevenhüller to Maximilian, 12 April. *Goetz*, op. cit., P. II., Vol. I., pp. 102-103. Schönburg to Elector of Mainz, March 25, pp. 117-118. Schwarzenberg to Emperor, April 8, pp. 122-123. Emperor to Schwarzenberg, April 24. Elector of Mainz to Schönburg, 14 April, 1623.]

Khevenhüller had informed Eggenberg of these proposals early in the previous December, and added that Gondomar would go to Germany to carry them through. When, however, after the Prince's arrival, it seemed a certainty that the marriage would take place, he claimed some credit for having prevented the despatch of the mission. Gondomar, he wrote, was slier than any other Spaniard, and was working hand-in-hand with the English. Olivares was greatly upset because he thought that Bavaria had received the Investiture through the intervention of France, and had thus been lured aside from Spain. Oñate had sown ill-will between Ferdinand and Philip, and therefore, said Khevenhüller, he found it very difficult to negotiate at Madrid.

In his letter of the same date to Maximilian, the Ambassador took a somewhat different line. Olivares had talked a lot of nonsense to him about the Emperor and Spain, which could only be based upon Oñate's letter. Oñate wrote that he had spoken to the Emperor as to the advisability of getting the question of the succession to the Imperial throne settled during the present session of the Diet, but that people could not be made to see that the very existence of the House of Austria was involved in it. It would be well, Khevenhüller thought, that the Emperor should notify Spain officially of the Transfer of the Electorate, for the Ministers seemed to wish it, and they might add some friendly compliments, but it must be for Maximilian to decide whether or not he could broach this subject to the Emperor.

"I have been in so far successful with Count Olivares that he

is now not quite so well pleased with the English as he was, and he is giving up the hope that they will turn Catholic, so they gave Gondomar such a talking to upon the matter last Saturday, that he took to his bed the same night, and for a time his recovery was despaired of." It was plain enough that Digby had not had a hand in the Prince's journey to Madrid, and he let the Spaniards see that it was none of his doing. It was all but impossible to reason with a young King, a headstrong favourite, and inexperienced Ministers, and to treat about German affairs with a nation and government who thought of nothing but their own interests. Gondomar acted as the Chief Agent of the English in their opposition to Bavaria, and could turn the Council round with his little finger. The Spaniards were really honestly desirous that the Emperor should delay the Translation of the Electorate.

Khevenhüller, however, thought it very doubtful whether the marriage would take place unless the Prince turned Catholic, and even in that case, it seemed improbable that Spain, merely to please England, would side with the Palatine against Bavaria. "On the whole, it looks as if the Almighty means either to chasten the pride of Spain by the Prince's arrival, or to work some wondrous miracle for the good of Christendom." The English, like the Spaniards, were thinking over the business most carefully, and were beginning to see that their much-longed-for allies were inexperienced, ruined, and lacked the means to do what they wanted them to. It seemed beyond all possibility of belief that a Prince, who was the heir to the English throne, would have come to Madrid unless by a previous understanding with the King, and it was even harder to conceive his object in doing so. His father and his predecessors had been far better advised. [*Goetz*, op. cit., P. II., Vol. I., pp. 22-23. Khevenhüller to Eggenberg, 9 January, 1623, p. 123, 12 April, 1623. *Munich*, Khevenhüller to Elector, 12 April, 1623, cf. *do.* to *do.*, 20 February, 1624.]

As according to their own account Charles and Buckingham had told Olivares from the outset of their conversations that it was out of the question for them to come over to Catholicism, and as Olivares had notwithstanding this, consented to allow preparations for their return to England to go forward as if the Dispensation had already come, it is probable that he did not share the feelings of the other Councillors with regard to

Gondomar. [*London*, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6987, Charles to James, March 18, 27, 1623. Buckingham to James, 23 March.]

Matters, however, were still unsettled in the Valtelline, and he was doubtless, therefore, not ill-pleased when the Infanta consulted her confessor, Father Juan de Santa Maria, and other priests and devotees, who did their utmost to confirm her in her decision to resist the marriage. Time, indeed, was needed to enable him to reconcile his policy of an alliance with England with that of conciliating the Papacy and the German Catholic Princes. "However, as she is a woman with but little will of her own (although they say that she is intelligent and quick-witted) she will finally give in through the persuasion of the King, her brother, and comply with his wishes. And she will do this all the more readily as Count Olivares is extremely anxious for the match, possibly because he thinks that the marriage may be of great advantage to this Crown, possibly to get her out of this Court, for Her Royal Highness is, as I said before, a clever woman for her age, and carries weight with her brother the King, who is very fond of her and esteems her greatly. The Count may, therefore, be afraid that in time she may do him some ill offices with His Majesty, which may be the cause of his falling out of that great friendship and intimacy with him, which he at present enjoys.

"It does not seem there is a thought of the Prince turning Catholic or declaring himself one, or even of their granting the Liberty of Conscience, but the Spaniards certainly expect that all those who are Catholics or who wish to live as Catholics in their own houses, shall be neither punished nor molested, on condition, however, that they refrain from all intrigues against the public peace or the Royal persons." [*Turin*, Tarantaise to Duke, April 6, 1623.]

It was now Holy Week. Every bell was silenced, not a coach nor a horse were to be seen in the streets; the nobles laid aside their jewels, their embroideries, and their swords, and walked about unattended in sober black. Every confessional was crowded, and Catholic feeling was at fever heat.

It was expected that the Prince, who had given four thousand ducats for the poor, would perform the ceremony of washing the feet of thirteen representatives of those who took part in the Last Supper upon Holy Thursday.

On the previous day a long procession of penitents passed before his windows. In it walked more than two thousand

persons robed in black and bearing white tapers in their hands, followed by many others in white, who were scourging themselves till the blood streamed down their backs.

"On Good Friday, as also on Thursday, besides the other processions of Flagellants, there was a general procession of all the Orders of Reformed Mendicants, namely those of St. Francis, the Barefooted Carmelites, the Augustinian Recollets, the Misericordia, the Trinitarians, and others who appeared in divers Mysteries, for in some of the groups all wore crowns of thorns on their heads in imitation of Christ; others were bound to the Cross, others had their eyes blindfolded, others, again, were beating their breasts cruelly with stones, in imitation of Saint Jerome, others had very large stones hung from their necks which made them stoop very low, others held enormous bones in their mouths, and others were got up in various ways, but nearly all were sprinkled with ashes. This served the Catholics as a very good example and lesson on self-mortification, but though some of the heretics approved, others disapproved, of it, saying that they could go to Paradise without performing such heavy and severe penances.

"On the day before yesterday, which was the first of Easter (Holy Saturday), the Queen dined in public, a thing she has never done before, with great pomp, expense and show; and, in my belief, she did it to let the English see her greatness. After dinner the Prince of Wales went with the King to wish the Queen and the Infanta a Happy Easter; they came forward a little way to meet him, and then went back under the canopy, and the Prince stood facing the Queen, and the King the Infanta.

"Towards evening that same day, at the suggestion and expense of the Council of Castile, thirty couples of the principal gentlemen of the Court walked in procession: the King and the Infante Don Carlos both took part in the entertainment, His Majesty walking with Count Olivares, and the Infante with the Marquis del Carpio, as was done on Carnival Sunday, but all four were masked. They first went to the Palace, and from there on to the Carmelites and the Plaza Mayor. All carried lighted torches in their hands for it was eleven at night before they retired. The Prince of Wales with the Admiral and two others stood at their windows looking on." [*Turin, Tarantaise to Duke, April 18, 1623.*]

Charles had been holding several conferences with Father

Florentia, a Jesuit, and was thought to show a great inclination to Catholicism. His object was believed to be to influence the Infanta, who still persisted in her refusal to marry anyone but a Catholic. The King had got the Nuncio asked whether the marriage might take place if the Prince abjured his heresies privately and practised the Catholic faith in secret. [*Mantua*, ib. Nerli to Duke, April 16, 1623.]

No one now felt any doubt that the Pope would grant the dispensation.

There was, however, a strong feeling of opposition to the marriage, especially amongst many of the ecclesiastics, who were not under the influence of Olivares. Several of the religious had, during their Lenten sermons, spoken of the Prince's presence at Madrid in very unseemly terms and had endeavoured to awaken the suspicions of their hearers as to the reasons for his coming thither. Philip, seeing how necessary it was to avoid a scandal, ordered his confessor to summon the superiors of the convents to which the preachers belonged to his lodgings, and remind them in the severest terms that they must keep within due bounds as to such matters. He, however, added that if they had any observations to make upon the subject they were to bring them privately before his Confessor, who would submit them to himself. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Eg. 335, Philip IV. to His Confessor, 13 April, 1623.]

On the same day the King informed the President of the Council that although a Committee of Council had already been formed to consider all the questions connected with the marriage, especially those concerning Religion, people were talking so freely, that in order to stop their criticisms, it would be necessary to assemble the Committee of Theologians at once in his apartment in order that they might discuss the reasons which could be put forward to justify the marriage on the supposition that His Holiness granted his dispensation for it. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Eg. 335, Philip IV. to President of Council, March 24, April 13, 1623.]

The Committee of the Council was formed of four Councillors of State, including Olivares and his Confessor, the King's Confessor, and Iñigo de Brizuela, Bishop of Segovia, a Dominican friar who had been Confessor to the Infanta Isabella. All the best theologians in Spain had been summoned to Madrid to assist them with their advice. So far as can be seen the Committee,

as originally constituted, included many persons who were not opposed to the marriage and also some who, like Olivares' Confessor, had worked to bring it about.

On Holy Saturday one of its most important advisers reached Madrid. Brother Zaccaria Boverio of Saluzzo, of the Order of Capuchins, was by birth a Piedmontese, and therefore a subject of the Duke of Savoy. He was of such high repute and was held in such esteem that although he was upon the staff of the Father General of his order and was at the moment accompanying him on a tour of inspection of their convents throughout Europe, the Nuncio had by the Pope's express orders sent his cupbearer by post to summon him to Madrid. The Capuchins were under a vow to travel only on foot, but, despite all his objections, Boverio was obliged to return with the cupbearer in his coach. Though the General was greatly annoyed at losing so valuable a coadjutor, he was forced to bow to His Holiness' pleasure.

The Capuchins were indeed the order which furnished the best secret agents of Catholic diplomacy. Unlike the Jesuits, they were accustomed in a great measure to act upon their own initiative, and were under no obligation to put the interests of their society before those of their employers. Boverio appears to have been very intimate with his fellow countryman, Tarantaise, and it is for this reason that the Archbishop's despatches are of such value for the history of Charles' visit to Madrid.

As the Junta formed a very numerous body, an inner secret committee, consisting of five of its members, was named to control its decisions.

"There are some hopes of a conversion, but it seems that the Prince says that if he turns he will not do so for the sake of the lady, but that he may be a real Christian and Catholic, and this makes it indispensable that he should do so, as they have convinced him by well-grounded arguments. It seems, too, that they will never allow the marriage to take place unless Liberty of Conscience is granted, and they are also given securities that this grant will be observed, and the security is to be some seaport and a fortress on land." [*Turin*, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, April 18, 1623. *Mantua*, ib., Nerli to Duke, April 22, 1623.]

In other words, the Spaniards would not be contented unless the Catholics had the right of meeting when they would in one centre, namely, in the Infanta's church, although both Charles and Buckingham warned them that such public gatherings would

make their number seem far greater than it really was and thus increase the popular suspicions against them, and said that James had neither the mind nor the power to grant what was really "Liberty of Conscience." Thus the intervention of Parliament became necessary, as the Spaniards could not be satisfied by the King of England's bare word, for though James might ensure the Catholics the liberty of private worship by suspending the Penal Laws, he could not repeal them without the assent of the Legislature. Under such conditions the Catholics would enjoy their liberty by a very precarious tenure, which would become even more precarious were they to parade their religion in public. It is true that many of the Spanish statesmen thought that a Parliament could be packed by the King at his pleasure, but Philip's question to the Nuncio as to the possibility of allowing Charles a dispensation to hold the Catholic religion in private shows that he did not share their views. It might, indeed, well be doubted whether a freely elected parliament could even grant the hated Papists the free exercise of their religion in their own houses. [*F. de Jesu*, op. cit., Preface, pp. 9-10. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl., 6,987, Buckingham and Charles to James, April 22, 1623.] Yet on their first arrival in Spain, both Charles and Buckingham had imagined that if James would acknowledge the Pope Chief Head of the Church under Christ, the match would be made without the intervention of Rome. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl., 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, March 10, 1623.]

On the other hand, from a worldly point of view, the Spanish statesmen were certainly warranted in raising their demands. In the first place they wished to be able to give way with a good grace when Charles asked them not to insist upon the fresh terms which Rome was putting forward with regard to the education of the children of the marriage and to the modification of the Oath of Supremacy; in the second place if Parliament refused to agree to their conditions, it would be Parliament that would be responsible for the failure of the negotiations and thus no breach need ensue, whether between the two crowns or between Spain and the Vatican. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, 22 April, 1623, *F. de Jesu*, op. cit., pp. 19-21.]

On the twentieth of April Charles left Madrid with the King and Olivares to spend a week amid the lovely gardens of Aranjuez. Neither the Queen nor the Infanta accompanied them. The Infanta was depressed and downcast, and kept repeating that if

the marriage must take place, her only comfort was that she would lay down her life in the cause of God. The gossips whispered that when the Prince was presented to her, she had not even changed colour.

Meanwhile matters at Rome were not going smoothly. Gregory XV. had, indeed, accepted the deposit of the Valtelline in his hands in the belief that the King of France approved of the measure. No sooner had he done so, however, than the Venetian and French Ambassadors waited upon him and complained bitterly that he had acted without the French King's consent, so he was forced to send an express to Paris to ask for it.

"A great minister," writes Tarantaise, "who is a very sensible and moderate-minded man, and who has never approved of what the Duke of Feria did and is doing in the Valtelline, told me plainly that if the Prince's marriage comes off it will be the doing of the Venetians, if not directly at least indirectly, and to their very great hurt. They may well thank their own folly, for they must have known that coalitions are very short-lived, especially when the principal ally is dragged in by force. They are convinced here that the French King would never have thought of doing anything of the sort had he not been worried into it by the ceaseless begging and importunities of the Venetians, but, as I said before, they will soon find out that they have made a rod for their own backs. Your Highness must know whether this is true and whether the French King acted of his own free will or not. I cannot think he did." [*Turin, Tarantaise to Duke, April 23, 1623.*]

If through the intrigues of the confederates of Avignon Spain lost the control of the passages of the Rhoetian Alps, she could not hope to retain Flanders unless an alliance with England gave her the control of the road thither by sea.

Much to the annoyance of Olivares, six more members, including the Infanta Maria's confessor, were added to the Junta of Theologians which now numbered forty-nine persons. It was generally and rightly thought that the Committee had only been called together because the marriage had been decided upon and that they wished to show that they were not acting out of caprice, but with the assent of a body of such learned and religious men.

"They have appointed Brother Zaccaria da Saluzzo to draw up a treatise in the form of—or I ought to say one on—the Reasons for embracing the Catholic Religion, with a view of opening the

Prince's eyes to his present errors, as they have had a hint that when he has been made to understand them clearly he will mend his ways and turn Catholic, and they cannot find anyone more suitable for this task than Father Saluzzo, as he is deeply learned and fully versed in the dogmas of both one and the other law.

"The Prince has been to visit both the Queen and the Infanta. The Council of State set down in writing what he was to say to each of them, and they were given the formula for their replies. It is quite true that after the King and Prince had left, the Queen told the Infanta that the Prince had said two words more than had been set down for him, but I have not yet heard what the two words were." [*Turin*, ib. Tarantaise to Duke, April 23. *London*, *B. M.*, Harl. 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, April 4. *Cal. S.P. Ven.*, pp. 628-629, Corner to Doge, April 14, 1623.]

In Germany also things were not looking well for the marriage, if the marriage was to depend upon the settlement about the Palatine. The Elector of Mainz was pressing the Kaiser to restore the Bergstrasse to his see. That rich district had been wrested from his predecessors a hundred and forty-seven years before by one of Frederick's ancestors, and had since formed a part of the Lower Palatinate; the Bishop of Spire was also advancing claims to Germersheim. Schwarzenberg, in his letters from Brussels, vainly warned Ferdinand that it would be most injurious to the interests of the House of Austria if he complied with their demands, which were not prompted solely by religious motives, and Schwarzenberg's protests were strongly supported by Oñate. But Ferdinand had no mind to quarrel with the Catholic League and the Bergstrasse was handed over to Mainz. [*Goetz*, op. cit. II., 1, pp. 101-103, Schwarzenberg to Kaiser, April 8, 1623. *Riezler*, op. cit., Vol. V., p. 239.]

At Rome the chief thought of men in power seems to have been a wish to throw all responsibility for the negotiations upon other shoulders than their own. It cannot be said that the Pope wished that the marriage should not take place, yet at the same time he saw that it was his duty to safeguard the interests of the Church. There was, so it was urged, no precedent in existence for the grant of such a dispensation, and it was difficult to grant one for a mixed marriage, unless with the view of obtaining some notable advantage for the Catholic religion. Moreover, as has been seen, Cardinal Ludovisi had found it difficult to understand the Nuncio's

letter of the fourth of January, and so could not make up his mind as to the real wishes of the Spanish Court.

When he learnt of Charles' arrival at Madrid the Cardinal decided that it would be well to leave the responsibility for coming to a decision to Philip IV. and his advisers, as they might possibly think themselves pledged to the Prince now that he had come to Spain. He had also learnt that Albuquerque had meant to send certain conditions which "he had picked up somewhere or other," to Madrid, and he feared that the Spanish Government might on the faith of them engage themselves further than they ought to do. It was conceivable indeed, that now they saw that they could gain great advantages by bringing off the marriage, they would not let the chance slip, but would conclude it without any reference to Rome. Many people, he wrote, were of this opinion, although he did not share it himself, and so he had thought it best to send off the dispensation to the Nuncio. As it would certainly become known in London through George Gage or Father Diego, that it had been despatched, he allowed Massimi to say publicly that he had received it. He must, however, make every possible difficulty as to the terms upon which he was to hand it over, and must keep them secret in order that if he saw a chance of doing so he might better them. It would be, therefore, in his power, if Philip asked him to spin out the negotiations, to comply with his wishes. The Cardinal at the same time sent a letter to be shown to the Spanish Ministers in which he said that the Pope would require the public exercise of the Catholic Religion as a condition for granting the dispensation, and that he ardently desired the Prince's conversion. This, however, could not be made a condition for granting the dispensation, which, if the Prince became Catholic, would be no longer necessary. The Nuncio was to meet the King's wishes in every way.

"It looks to me indeed as if Providence has ordered everything. No one can now say that we have refused the dispensation, so that we shall not have given the King of England any pretext for persecuting the poor Catholics or for saying that His Catholic Majesty will not go forward with the business. The whole responsibility now lies with the English themselves, and if they comply with these requests, no further difficulties will be made. If the Nuncio thought that by doing so he could get better terms, he might make any fresh difficulties he chose within the bounds of reason, but the conversion of the Prince would be the best thing

he could achieve. [*London, S.P.O.*, Roman Transcripts, Scr. I., No. 134 (Barb. cvii., 17), Bibl. Vat. Barb., 8630 (12), Card. Ludovisi to Nuncio, 18 April, 1623. Do. *Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, do. to do., 30 March, 1623 ; also in *Cal. S.P. Ven.*, pp. 625-626, from Ven. Arch. Misc., Cod. 520.]

It is uncertain whether some undated instructions to the Nuncio in Spain, which are preserved amongst the Barberini Papers, were written at this time. The writer states that the majority of the Spanish Ministers were opposed to the match, because the reports of Van Male, the Flemish agent in London, proved that James I., despite all his promises, was still persecuting the Catholics. Once the Infanta was married and in England, neither he nor Charles would observe their pledges. If, however, she was allowed to reside in Spain or in Flanders for a time after the marriage, Charles might take a liking for the Catholics, and part of the dowry might be kept back as a guarantee for the fulfilment of his engagements to them. As the Pope could not treat with Charles himself, he was forced to ask the Catholic King to act for him.

According to another version of these instructions, possibly that sent by Albuquerque to Madrid, the Nuncio was allowed to deliver the dispensation to Philip IV. if the Infanta were given absolute guarantees as to the security for her personal religious freedom, and that she might nominate Catholic servants. He might waive the conditions as to Liberty of Conscience for the Catholics, and that the education of the royal children should be left in their mother's hands until they were twelve years of age.

The Brief of the Dispensation was forwarded to Mgr. de Massimi with these despatches.

About the same time Gregory XV. addressed a letter to James I. In it he urged the King to use every effort to bring back England to the Faith as the only means of restoring a lasting peace, such as it is the office of the Holy See to ensure. He also asked him to allow his Catholic subjects to worship God in peace and not to regard them as children of wrath. The Holy See would at all times exhort them to render Caesar his due. The Pontiff expressly states that he is writing in answer to a letter from James. [*London, S.P.O.*, Roman Transcripts, Bibl. Vat. Barb. 8,630, Instructione a M. de Maximis, etc., undated. It is printed in *Cal. S.P. Ven.*, pp. 623-626, from Misc. Cod. No. 520, Ven. Arch., do.

Brit. Mus., Add. 37,028, f. 42, Instructions to Mgr. Massimi, 12 April, 1623, f. 42, Gregory XV. to James I., 2 May, 1623.]

Under these circumstances both the Nuncio and the Spanish Ministers might feel at liberty to act as they pleased about the match. The Pope, in reality, had refused to assume any responsibility as to a business which, in his opinion, could have but small results from the point of view of the interests of Religion.

The dispensation reached Madrid at the end of April, and its conditions soon became known. Most people thought, however, that the Nuncio would have to hand it over whether they were complied with or not.

After their first meeting the members of the Committee of Theologians decided that they would draw up their opinions in writing and that the President of Castile should report on them to the Secret Committee. Some of them thought that the marriage should not be contracted except upon the conditions laid down at Rome, and should not be consummated for a further two years. During that time the Infanta, and possibly the Prince, ought to remain in Spain. As, however, it was thought that Charles had decided not to stay more than two and a half months longer, difficulties might arise upon this point.

Father Zaccaria had been asked by the Junta to answer four questions, of which some had been drawn up by the English.

Tarantaise was for the moment in very ill odour at Madrid, where it was said that the Savoyard Ambassador at Rome had united with the French and Venetian envoys in urging the Pope to refuse his sanction to the marriage, and in pressing that the King of France should declare war about the Valtelline.

This, however, Louis XIII. was very loth to do. Mirabel and the peace party in his cabinet had little difficulty in showing that such a declaration would show that he mistrusted the Pope and that he would thus drive His Holiness into the arms of Spain. The Italian Princes would forthwith take the opportunity of forming a league for the defence of Italy.

Neither the Archbishop nor his Venetian colleague troubled their heads about these accusations, so long as they felt they were doing their duty to their own masters, whilst it was certain that the Pope would allow the forts to be deposited in his hands for all the clamour of the Venetians.

At this moment, therefore, it seems unlikely that Corner would

have been treated as a confidant by the Court of Spain on such delicate subjects as the instructions sent to their agents at Rome.

Tarantaise was, as usual, in financial straits. He was paying usurious interest on borrowed money, all his best plate was in pawn, and he saw no likelihood of redeeming it. [*Turin*, ib., Tarantaise to Prince of Piedmont, April 23; do. to Duke, April 28, May 3, 1623. *Mantua*, ib., Nerli to Duke, April 29, May 6, 16, 1623. *London*, *Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, April 25, 27, 1623.]

Charles, who had returned from Aranjuez, was now diligently attending bull fights and church ceremonies. He looked on through a window at the consecration of Cardinal Spinola as Bishop in the Royal Chapel, and sat with the King in a balcony of the Plaza Mayor, whilst eighteen bulls were run in the presence of the Queen, the Infanta, and crowds of grandees, who were attended by long trains of servants in liveries distinguished rather by their tastefulness than by their cost. But the festival was spoilt by rain. [*Mantua*, ib., Nerli to Duke, May 5. *Turin*, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, May 5, 13, 1623.]

Meanwhile Buckingham by his blundering, and Khevenhüller by his intrigues, were doing their best to destroy the Prince's hopes of success.

By the beginning of May the Imperial Ambassador felt able to write to Vienna that Olivares would yet live to thank him for having warned him against the match. He already saw the matter in another light and thought that the Prince must either turn Catholic or at least grant complete freedom of Religion. He was choosing an envoy to send to Munich to congratulate Maximilian upon the transfer of the Electorate. [*Goetz*, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., p. 154. Khevenhüller to Eggenberg, May 5, 1623.]

Olivares had been much disturbed by the Infanta's dislike of the marriage, but was yet more interested in the Valtelline question in which he felt his reputation and his position at stake, for the King was keenly anxious to get the forts deposited in the Pope's hands. He would deeply resent a failure, yet the Count had to avoid any appearance of acting under pressure from the League of Avignon. It was not until the end of June that the Pope by accepting the deposit, left him free from any necessity to fawn upon Khevenhüller and the Nuncio. [*Cal. S.P. Ven.*, pp. 628-629. Corner to Doge, April 14. *Mantua*, Nerli to Duke, June 30, 1623.]

Buckingham had already had some sharp passages of arms with both the Nuncio and Olivares.

Popular as the English had been on their first arrival they were now "getting themselves thoroughly hated, not only by the populace, but by the greater part of the nobility, especially as some of them had been the cause of some women and men being put in the Holy Office; the former because they allowed themselves to be persuaded that simple fornication is not a mortal sin, the latter because they have come to approve the heretics' dogmas in many respects, especially as regards their being free to eat flesh on whatever day they will and also that Auricular Confession is not necessary, it being sufficient to confess one's sins to God, and other things of that sort. This has been the reason why the Confessors here have exhorted not only those who confessed these errors, but others likewise not only not to consort with them any longer, but even, if they meet them at night to knock them on the head.

"It so happened on the Feast of the Invention of the Holy Cross, May 3, that whilst the King was at Chapel, as is the custom, four of the English came in, two were bareheaded, one of them had his hat on, and the fourth was without his hat, but was wearing a little blue satin skull cap, trimmed with gold passementerie. They were, however, allowed to stand there, but when the Gospel was read and all knelt down at the words where the Evangelist says: 'At the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, of things in Heaven, of things on Earth, and of things under the Earth,' they did not budge an inch. When the Creed was being sung and when, as Your Royal Highness knows, they bow and kneel down at the words: 'Who was born of the Virgin Mary and was made Man,' the Englishmen did not make a single sign of reverence. Monsignor the Nuncio seeing this, sent to tell the Patriarch of the Indies, as Chaplain-General, to have the English put out or to stop the Mass. The Patriarch, fearing that it would displease the King if he did so, said they would wait yet a little. Meanwhile it came to the Elevation, and they remained bolt upright, but, however, they were so pulled by their cloaks by the gentlemen round them that they were forced to kneel down.

"The King, who had seen something of this, but really did not know who they were, asked what had happened. He was informed what had passed, and of the message which the Nuncio had sent to the Patriarch. When he heard this he said that the Nuncio

had acted very well, and that he would see that such things did not happen again. The Prince of Wales, on learning what had taken place gave strict orders that none of his attendants were to presume to enter the chapel in future."

A day or two before the Nuncio had happened to meet Buckingham and Olivares in one of the corridors at the Palace, and as he saluted the Marquis he could not but return his greeting. "He added that he wished that His Reverence would exert himself to get the marriage brought about. The Nuncio replied that he wished that it might be, but that he could do nothing without orders from His Holiness. To this the Admiral (Buckingham) replied, I assure you that if this marriage is not concluded what little is left of Catholicism in that Kingdom will be utterly rooted out, and they will proceed against the Catholics with the utmost rigour. The Nuncio answered, 'Well, the more His Majesty rages against the Catholics, the greater will be the glory for the Church of God, which will shine yet more brightly in this world and in Paradise when the number of the martyrs is increased.'

"It is said that by the Pope's orders the Nuncio has visited the Prince of Wales, but this is not true, as he has not yet spoken to him. I am convinced, however, that our Father Zaccaria da Saluzzo had done so, for although up till now he will not confess it to me, yet he has not denied it. He has asked me to pray and to get others to pray the Goodness of God that he may have access to the Prince, for if he obtains it, he hopes to convert him to our holy faith. But, as I said before, I think he has spoken to him and has found him fairly well disposed, for I have been told on good authority that it is really true that two Capuchin fathers have spoken to him. As the English saw and heard that their arguments have made a great impression upon His Royal Highness, they have given orders that they are not to be admitted to him in future.

"The saying goes that the Prince of Wales is well disposed, but ill-advised, and that the King his father is ill-disposed and worse advised.

"Just as I am writing this, I have received further particulars as to what passed between the Nuncio and the Admiral. After much other talk the Nuncio said, 'Your King has only got to turn Catholic.' To this the other replied, 'Up till now he has not come to any decision of the kind, but, perhaps, he may do so

with God's help.' The Nuncio thereupon said, 'If His Majesty wishes it, His Holiness can send him men who are trained to that sort of work and are very good at it.' The Admiral answered, 'I accept your Reverence's offer and can assure you that they will be very well received and treated, honoured and respected.'

"From this it may be gathered that the King has some inclination that way, either through a real love for Religion and wish to save his soul, or for the sake of his own interests, so that he may gain the assured friendship of this crown, by whose help he can resist the arts and machinations of the Protestants, his chief enemies, as Your Royal Highness must know well.

"People here also see, though rather late in the day that they have made one mistake for from the very moment the Prince arrived, they should have got the Infanta to say that the marriage was not even to be mentioned unless the Prince turned Catholic or granted Freedom of Conscience in the Kingdom, for if the Catholic King did not choose to agree to the marriage it would be an excellent excuse for him to say that he ought not, could not, and would not force his sister into it, and in that way they would remain friends, but if they were to make her say it now, the English could reply that she had been talked into saying it, and so the enmity between them would be perpetual.

"They have, therefore, thought that it would be a good means of retrieving this blunder if the Prince will not declare himself a Catholic, or if his father will not grant Freedom of Conscience that the Infanta should say that she would rather take the veil at the Carmelites than have a heretic by her side, but as I have hinted above, the Prince seems to have a strong inclination towards turning Catholic, and the best proof of this is that when he heard that Father Zaccaria had orders to compose the Instruction, he showed great pleasure at it. If they do send theologians and men who are versed in dogmas and controversies to England, Father Zaccaria is to be one of them.

"The Marquis of Inojosa left for England to-day with the usual Spanish swagger, for he drove out of Madrid with seventy livery servants, but will he keep them beyond the first stage? These must be some of the relics of his government at Milan." [*Turin, Tarantaise to Duke, May 14, 1623.*]

A day or two later Tarantaise writing to correct his first account remarks, "I mentioned in my last that the Marquis of Inojosa had set out that day with seventy post horses, but, including

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himself, the party only numbered forty-two, all of whom were dressed in a very rich and beautiful livery trimmed all over with wide strips of gold embroidery, with the holsters, cushions and cloak bags of velvet; all wore gilt spurs and very large plumes. The footmen's staves were gilt. As the King wished the Prince of Wales to see the party start, he took him to see a game of pelota, the great game here (it is a kind of tennis), and made the Marquis and his men ride past the court."

The Marquis had not taken a single gentleman with him as he was too stingy to give the usual travelling allowances, but some English were to join him on the road and more were being sent away to get rid of the scandal which they were making by distributing tracts and endeavouring to effect conversions. (*Turin, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, May 16, 1623.*)

Buckingham was now getting impatient at the delays and bluntly told Olivares that they were treating the Prince with great discourtesy by keeping him waiting so long. The Court replied with great good sense. He said that as between King and Prince the King would always treat him with the respect and courtesy which were his due. When, however, Religion came into the question, their devotion to it would not permit them to abate one jot of their demands on any grounds whatsoever.

As a rule people at Madrid were less anxious for the marriage than they had been, although the great lords who were the only persons who really counted were still in its favour. Everyone was remarking that the Prince was looking very melancholy and showed in a thousand ways that he was by no means entirely satisfied. He would not, however, promise a single thing more than his ministers had already done. [*Mantua, ib., Nerli to Duke, May 16. London, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6,987, Charles, etc. to James, April 22, 27, 1623.*]

Both he and Buckingham had just before, however, as time was destined to show, given mortal offence both to the King and Olivares by their insolent action with regard to the Spanish interests in the East Indies, and the insult was not forgotten. [*London, Brit. Mus., Eg. 335, Philip IV. to Juan de Ciriça, 27 April, Eg. 318. Council of State, 19 August, 18 Sept., 1 Oct., 1623.*]

All through May and June the Marriage Negotiation was "like the sea; for it is now calm, quiet, and unruffled, and in an hour, rough, tempestuous, and driven to and fro by the storms, and

the business is now taken as settled, and now despaired of." [Turin, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, June 14, 1623.]

By the end of June, as we have seen, the Pope had accepted the deposit of the Valtelline, though the French grumbled that Chiavenna still remained in Spanish hands. [Mantua, ib., Nerli to Duke, June 30, 1623.]

Matters in Germany, however, still continued in a very unsatisfactory state. As Oñate pointed out to the Kaiser a settlement on satisfactory lines was indispensable. If he could without delay come to a secret arrangement with England, an armistice could be concluded and a Congress convened to restore peace. This the Infanta Isabella might be given full powers to arrange. As to the repayment of the twelve million florins expended by Bavaria, the Palatine could only find six millions, so the other moiety must fall upon the House of Austria, which, however, might expect contributions from the ecclesiastical members of the League on whose behalf so much of the debt had been incurred.

Under such conditions the Kaiser would find himself still more at the mercy of the Catholic League than ever. Ferdinand, however, approached Maximilian and asked him to satisfy the Spaniards by withdrawing from Heidelberg and Mannheim. This the Duke positively refused to do, as he would in that case have no guarantee for the repayment of his expenses and his unfriendly feelings towards Spain were increased, when the Infanta Isabella refused a joint request from the Kaiser and from himself that she would allow Cordoba to follow Mansfeldt and Halberstadt at least as far north as Lingen. Spinola, who entirely agreed with her views, explained that she thought that Cordoba had enough to do in covering Mannheim and the Electorate of Cologne, until it could be seen whether Halberstadt intended to attack North or South Germany. [Goetz, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., pp. 148-149, Oñate to Eggenberg, May 1, 1623. Do., p. 184, Tilly to Elector of Cologne, May 30. Infanta to Cordova, June 14. Morroës to Maximilian, June 19. Do., pp. 185-186, Maximilian to Kaiser, May 30, 1623.]

Isabella was, indeed, powerless. It was almost impossible for her to pay her troops, and small mutinies were already taking place. Denmark and the States of the Circle of Lower Saxony were arming, and she was forced to decline a proposal from the latter that she should remain neutral. Mansfeldt and Halber-

stadt refused to sign the suspension of hostilities, and James I refused to be bound for their good behaviour as he said that neither he nor the Palatine had anything to do with them. [*Brussels, E. et G.*, 189. Infanta to Philip IV., May 11, June 2, 1623.]

Under these circumstances the Kaiser decided to think only of his own interests. He agreed to a suspension of hostilities for fifteen months which was also signed by England, but not by the Palatine, and arranged to summon a Congress at Frankfort to discuss the terms of peace. By so doing he hoped to escape the responsibility for arranging about the succession to the Electorate at the risk of offending Bavaria. The opportunity was lost. Maximilian protested that it would be a serious danger both to his own family and to the Catholic Faith if the Electorate were either restored to Frederick or held alternately by the two branches of the Wittelsbachs. At most it might be given after his own death to Frederick's nearest innocent relations, in other words to Neuburg. The Elector of Saxony, he thought might be asked to arrange for the assembly of the Congress. Both Spanish and English influence would thus be eliminated and the German princes would be left free to decide the destinies of Germany. [*Goetz, op. cit.*, Part II., Vol. I., p. 257. Imperial Council to Dr. Mandl, the Bavarian envoy, 2 Aug., *Brussels ib.*, Infanta to Philip IV., June 2, 1623.]

Even Maximilian, however, had not got a wholly free hand. Before he could comply with the Emperor's demand that he should withdraw from Heidelberg and Mannheim, he had been obliged to consult the great opponent of the Spaniards, the Elector of Mainz. Ludwig von Schweikhardt, whose one wish was to secure the Bergstrasse for his see, was by no means anxious for the restoration of the Palatine or to oblige Spain, even though the Infanta Isabella had at last consented to allow Cordoba to join Tilly against the Protestant freelances, only suggesting that the latter should be stationed near Cassel to watch Mansfeldt's movements. [*Goetz, op. cit.*, Part II., Vol. I., pp. 266-268. Father Hyacinth to Maximilian, 12 August, *Brussels ib.* Infanta to Philip IV., June 2, 1623, *let cit.*]

Thus even if Maximilian, in order to secure peace, had been willing to give way about his own claims, and to hand back Upper Austria to the Kaiser without receiving an equivalent guarantee elsewhere, he would still have to defend the interests

of Mainz, Spires, and the other members of the League as against Frederick.

If then the question of the Palatinate came to be mixed up with the negotiations for the marriage it might well involve their failure. Yet England, which was asked to make such far-reaching concessions to the Catholics could not come to terms for a bagatelle. James, indeed, wished the two questions to be kept apart, but as early as April, Charles in writing to his father to request him to refuse the leave of absence which Bristol asked for, said that he did so because, were it granted, he himself would have to stay on in Spain after the marriage was perfected, "until the ends of friendship be so likewise, which may last God knows how long, for that business of the Palatinate alone is a chain of so many links, that no man yet knows the end of it, besides the many other things which will take up a long time to treat." If these matters, he added, remained unsettled, the Spaniards would have just grounds for saying that they had come only for the marriage and not for an alliance. He had, therefore, begged James to send Bristol instructions to follow his and Buckingham's directions.

A few days later Charles and Buckingham wrote separately requesting that the King would send them a warrant promising to perform whatever his son promised in his name, in order to avoid delays. It cannot, therefore, be said that Charles failed from the outset to see how absolutely the marriage negotiations depended upon the affairs of Germany, although as James at once sent him the full powers which he had asked for, he may, perhaps, be blamed for not raising the question of the Palatinate far earlier than he eventually did. [*London, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6987, Charles and Buckingham to James, April 22. Charles to James, 29 April. Buckingham to James, 29 April. W. Goetz, op. cit., pp. 266-268, Father Hyacinth to Maximilian, Spa, 12 August, 1623.*]

Buckingham and Bristol had, indeed, made far-reaching promises which they might well be unable to perform. After protesting that the Catholic King ought to have secured the dispensation without any conditions, they had agreed that the English, Scotch, and Irish Parliaments should not only repeal the laws against the Catholics, but that they should sanction the Marriage Articles by special acts. After they had made this promise the negotiations again came to a deadlock because they

would not accept the other conditions laid down in the Papal dispensation, "at which," so Tarantaise heard, "the Prince of Wales was so annoyed that he burst into tears.

"Father Zaccaria da Saluzzo has been so much interrupted by continual visitors that he has not been able to get on very well with the completion of his treatise, which is 'A Pædagogy' or 'De Ratione amplectandæ veræ fidei,' which he is compiling for the use of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, and so has been obliged to go back to the Prado without having given the finishing touch to it. He is to be back in ten or twelve days and is to send the work to the Press the moment it is finished. The Prince is most anxious to see it. It is true that the Father had a conversation with the Prince and that his arguments made a great impression upon him, and so orders were given that he was not to be admitted to speak to him." [*Turin, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, May 14, 26., 1623.*]

Father da Saluzzo had, indeed, as he spoke French, acted as spokesman at the first meeting of the theologians, at which Charles and Buckingham were present. The Prince was seated in an armchair, the favourite on a low bench. Saluzzo quoted our Lord's words to Saint Peter, "Simon, Simon, Satan hath desired to have thee that he may sift thee as wheat, but I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not." At the Prince's request he repeated it twice in French.

Charles showed that the words had made an impression upon him, and told Buckingham so in English. At this the favourite flung out of the room in a fury, and subsequently refused to allow Olivares to arrange another conference. His annoyance was put down by those present to the fact that the Prince had shown such interest in Boverio's arguments. [*F. de Jesu, op. cit., p. 58.*]

The Pope had already despatched "a most beautiful brief to the Prince of Wales. In it His Holiness exhorts him to embrace in every act and deed and with pious affection the Holy Catholic and Apostolic Faith, and to imitate all those kings, his predecessors, who not only brought about the introduction of our holy religion into Britain, but propagated it abroad and cherished it, so that it could be truly said that that Kingdom held the first place for piety and religion and in zeal for Divine worship and the service of God." It was hoped indeed that this brief might bring about the Prince's conversion. Charles, in a

letter to his father, dictated to Buckingham, said merely that the Pope had written him a courteous letter to which he had ventured to reply without the King's leave. [*Turin*, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, May 26, 28, 1623. *F. de Jesus*, op. cit., p. 58. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6987, Charles and Buckingham to James, June 6.]

Savoy, France, and Venice were still in the worst of odours at Madrid, where Charles Emmanuel was reviled as the greatest enemy of Spain. [*Turin*, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, June 10, 1623.]

So far, however, as Savoy was concerned, this accusation was unfounded. The Duke's Minister at Rome wrote that it was the Sovereign Pontiff who had insisted upon the insertion of conditions in favour of the Catholics in the Dispensation, and that they should be guaranteed by Spain, as he would not leave them "to the good faith of those who are of a different rite in religion. The Spaniards did not expect to get such a dispensation so quickly, as they had thought they would meet with much greater difficulties and delays here, and that, in the meantime, they would have to keep the Prince of Wales in Spain and in hopes. When they saw it appear so quickly, they were quite caught out. Count Olivares is the person who is encouraging the marriage and who is anxious for it, but there are great differences of opinion about it in the State Council. There are some who oppose it, and they form a strong party, whilst a great many theologians write against it and say that it ought not to take place. In fact, the negotiation is meeting with great difficulties, and we must wait and see what will come of it." [*Turin*, Let. Min., Roma, Mazzo 33, Alessandro Scaglia to Duke, May 21, 1623.]

The Spaniards were very angry that the Pope should have insisted that the fulfilment of the concessions should be guaranteed by the King of Spain, and the theologians stated that he was not bound to take any such oath.

Buckingham told them plainly that it would be impossible for James to carry out any such engagements offhand, and it was rumoured that the English had made up their minds to leave Madrid. Just at that moment, however, the Nuncio had presented the Pope's Brief to the Prince. When he heard that Mgr. dei Massimi had arrived, Charles came out of his room to meet him, and after some compliments had passed, the Bishop handed him the Brief, which he took with the greatest reverence,

saying that he could have no greater pleasure than to receive a letter from the Pope.

The storm, however, was by no means over. Philip had forbidden Buckingham to attend the Council again on account of the difficulties which he had raised at its first meeting. The favourite was extremely annoyed, and it once more looked as if the negotiations were broken off. Count Olivares, however, said that he would see everything was put right, and so to make the Admiral jealous, paid visits to the Imperial Ambassador and the Polish Minister, and also circulated a report that Prince Victor, the heir to Savoy, "had gone to a better life, and that they would give Prince Philibert the Infanta, as this Crown valued the friendship of your Royal Highness and the Serene House of Savoy far beyond that of England and the Emperor."

The English, however, agreed that the concessions should be carried out within three years after the marriage, but as this proposal was not accepted they resolved to send Sir Francis Cottington to England that he might work upon the King and get him to carry the whole thing through within a shorter time if he could possibly do so, and so the whole negotiation remained suspended.

"The Prince of Wales, both on account of the love which he really feels for the Infanta and for the sake of his own and his father's reputation, could not leave here without her. They are now debating as to whether the marriage is to be celebrated and whether she is to be sent to England, and I think that I have already written that it would be concluded *per verba de presenti* but not consummated. The Prince wants both one and the other, and the 'Yes' or 'No' will depend upon what his Secretary brings back." Other difficulties had cropped up as to the custody and education of the children, "but the English will certainly agree to all these conditions as the Prince is so anxious for the marriage, and so they will carry it through, no matter upon what terms.

"When Buckingham was talking to the King about State affairs, His Majesty replied with true prudence and piety, 'Let us settle everything about religion and we shall soon come to an agreement about political matters, for if you do not do what I wish, I will do what you wish.'"

The Prince had gone with the King at Whitsuntide to congratulate the Queen and the Infanta, and had been allowed to

converse freely with them. Corpus Christi was approaching and it had been arranged that Charles, who was very anxious to witness the procession, was to take off his hat and kneel down a little before the Blessed Sacrament came up. [*Turin, ib.*, Tarantaise to Duke, June 14, 1623. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6987, Charles, etc. to James, April 22nd, 27, June 6, 1623. *Mantua ib.*, Nerli to Duke, May 16, June 30.]

Charles' diplomacy was now to be put to a severe test. After consulting numerous advisers, "some of whom were not English," he delivered a memorandum to Philip IV., in which he asked the King to allow the marriage to take place at once, and that they should trust to his honour that the concessions to the Catholics should be carried out. He pointed out that he would be running a great risk if he allowed the marriage to be celebrated but not consummated, as there were numerous precedents to show that in such a case it could be annulled by the Pope. He might have reminded the Spaniards, indeed, that Maximilian, the great ancestor of the Hapsburg House, had lost the hand of Anne of Brittany on similar grounds. He suggested that some member of the Junta might propose a simpler plan for allowing the marriage to take place forthwith. In short, he wished a matter, in which religion played such a prominent part, to be settled upon purely political grounds, and those but ill understood. [*F. de Jesu, op. cit.*, p. 79.]

The King out of courtesy referred these proposals to the Junta, who considered them on June 20, but they were forced to reply that the proposals were inadmissible. They advised the Prince to consent to the postponement of the marriage for a year, during which time the concessions to the Catholics could be carried out, but they would not shorten this term by a day, as they had, in compliance with his wishes, already reduced their demands, but without producing the slightest effect. Charles, who had been convinced that Olivares could force "those beastly divines" to reverse their opinions and had, therefore, urged his father to begin to put the concessions in force as soon as possible, was bitterly disappointed, though he hoped that favourable news from England would speedily put an end to their delays. [*F. de Jesus, op. cit.*, pp. 79. *Do., London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6987, Charles and Buckingham to James, June 6, 21, 1623.]

Many people at Rome thought indeed that Pastraña, now the Spanish ambassador, had been instructed to press the Pope

to release the King of Spain from his obligation to swear to ensure the fulfilment of the marriage articles, with the object of throwing difficulties in the way of the conclusion of the marriage. It was not, however, clear what the feeling in Spain really was. [*Turin*, ib., Roma, Mazzo 33, Scaglia to Duke, June 17, 1623.]

By the beginning of July it was known at Madrid that a church was being fitted up for the Infanta in London, and that a fleet, under Buckingham's brother-in-law Denbigh, was on its way to fetch her. It was evident that the statesmen at Whitehall supposed that the marriage treaty was far nearer its conclusion than was really the case. [*Turin*, Tarantaise, July 7, 1623.]

An important turning point in the negotiations was, however, at hand.

(NOTE 1)

KHEVENHULLER'S VIEW OF CHARLES' VISIT

The very important despatch addressed by Khevenhüller to Maximilian on April 12, 1623, in which he gives his first impressions as to Charles' visit to Madrid, and to which he refers with satisfaction in his despatch to Maximilian of 20 February, 1624, in which he announces the failure of the negotiations, is in cypher.

The decyphrement is written on the margin and is far from clear in places, especially as to the foreign words which are printed in italics.

The passage relating to Gondomar runs :

"Digbi der zur frankfortischen cronung Embaxador gewesen lässet Ihro maisterhaftlich sehen und ist zu beweisen sei ganz ohne ihn (i.e., The journey to Madrid). Sintemal sei mit einem jungen Könige mit einem weing chonigen *Precipitirten* Privado und wenig *Practisirten* sondlich nit *razoniren* und in Teutsch Sach und mit ainer Nation die Kain anderes als aigenes Etat annimbt Ministris zu thun hat dasz Instrument dardurch des Engelland opponiren ist Gondomar und ist geschlagener als alle die andern und wais die Råde ganz wohl zu treiben . . . Ich hab an Conde Olivares ermacht dasz er mit den Engelländern mit mehr wol zufrieden und schön die Hoffnung dasz sie Catholisch werden verlassen will, so hat man dem Gondomar vergangenen Samstag auch so starckt zugeredet dasz er selbe nacht

also erkrankte dasz man an seinem aufkommen erzweifelte doch was besser." [*Munich*, Geh., Staats Archiv, *Kast. Schw.*, 292-4, Graf von Khevenhüller, Berichte aus Madrid, 1620-1634. Khevenhüller to Maximilian, 12 April, 1623, Cf., Do. to Do, 20, February, 1624. As to Olivares' attitude regarding Charles' conversion, cf. *London*, *Brit. Mus.* Harl 6987, Charles, etc. to James, 27 March, 1623: "They were likewise in hope of a conversion of us both, but now excuses are more studied than reasons for it, though they say their loves shall ever make them wish it."

CHAPTER LX

WHILST waiting for his father's reply Charles continued to amuse himself at Madrid. He paid several visits to the Queen and to the Infanta, and addressed to her an epigram upon his loves, which was probably in Latin, as a copy of it was sent to Mantua, and which Nerli described as "worthy of such a great prince." He also studied Spanish and acquired some proficiency in the language. The Infanta, indeed, seems to have liked him personally, even if she was not actually in love with him.

Time, however, was hanging heavy on his hands and both Buckingham and Digby never ceased murmuring at the long delays. Buckingham indeed had his own reasons for wishing to return home. James might write to his "dear Steenie" in phrases of maudlin fondness, but "Steenie" had learnt that in his absence his "dear dad" had cast eyes upon a possible favourite, and his health was suffering from the climate of Castile. The Spanish dentists were even more unskilled than the Spanish surgeons. A tooth badly extracted had given him great pain, and he had fallen into an ague for which he was let blood, and for which he was still under treatment some months after he had returned to England.

Consequently both Charles and his favourite were eager to quit Spain, and were fretting at the ceaseless postponements which Spanish policy cast in their way. The Council were determined, and with good reason, that they would not come to a decision until they had learnt from James himself what concessions he was prepared to make to his Catholic subjects.

As early as the sixth of June they had heard that Coloma, out of respect to the Pope, was to present the articles to James as they had come from Rome. The ambassador was, at the same time, instructed to request the King to permit the Infanta to defer her arrival in England until the following spring. Although they thought that Coloma, in accordance with his instructions, would be satisfied if the terms to which they had agreed in Spain were accepted, they yet not only begged James

to confirm the articles without delay but pressed for their speedy return. Charles added a postscript to the despatch to the effect that he thought it would do some good if James would tell Coloma that if his son did not come home speedily he would send for his grandchild, the Palatine's eldest son, to whom in the event of his son's death without issue, the throne would eventually fall. Lord Rochford, the bearer of the letter, was also instructed to give the King full information as to the position of affairs at Madrid.

James might profess that this letter had stricken him dead for he did not know what excuse he could make to the Council for detaining the fleet which but for a contrary wind would have sailed for Spain a fortnight before, but he did not hesitate to comply with the wishes of "his sweet boys." He had been suffering severely from gout and wrote with emphatic solemnity, "As for my advice and directions that ye crave in case they will not alter their decree, it is in a word, to come speedily away if ye can get leave and give over all treaties, and this I speak without respect of any security they can offer you, except ye never look to see your old dad again, whom I fear you shall never see if you see him not before winter. Alas! I now repent me sore that I ever suffered you to go away. I care for matche nor nothing, so I may once have you in my arms again. God grant itt, God grant itt. Amen, Amen."

James' assurances and asservations were at a discount amongst European statesmen, but his summons could not but disturb the politicians at Madrid, who at that moment had every reason "to dread a breach with England until the affairs of Christendom once more smiled upon them," a consideration which would be their guide at all times and in all things.

His Majesty's exhortations were enforced by a letter from Buckingham's faithful confidant Secretary, Conway, who to his colleague Calvert's disgust held in his hands the secret threads of the negotiations. Conway, informed Aston, who was now a favourite of the Prince, that the greatest service which he could do to his master and to the nation was to hasten their return home.

The prospect that the negotiations might be broken off made Philip IV. and the Council of State somewhat more compliant. They expressed their approval of Charles' reply to the advice of the theologians, but, at first, refused to give him an answer in writing.

Olivares, indeed, had complicated matters by putting the articles after they had been approved of by the Prince into the hands of "a wrangling lawyer," who was a favourite of his, to be drafted. This man slipped in a number of new conditions, apparently with regard to the Catholics in Scotland and Ireland, which, despite Gondomar's opposition, Olivares wished to have referred to the Committee of Theologians. When, however, Charles and Buckingham objected to these additions, the Council were forced to withdraw them "with blushing faces." The eager wooer complained bitterly of these delays. Olivares assured them that he had converted many of the Council, but told them in plain words that he would not give them hopes of anything until the business spoke for itself. [*Mantua*, ib. Nerli to Duke, June 30, July 6, Sept. 12, 1623. *Munich*, ib. Silsdon to Elector, 19 May. *Turin*, ib. Tarantaise to Duke, 14 June, 1623. *Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.* University of Edinburgh, Laing MSS., Vol. I., pp. 163-165, "Donna Maria, Infanta of Spain, 28 June, 1623. *London, Brit. Mus., Harl.* 6987, Charles and Buckingham to James, June 6, 21, 26, O.S., 20 August, 1623. James to do., 14 June. Do. to Buckingham, undated. Add 36,446, Aston Papers, Vol. III., Conway to Aston, 25 June, 5 July, 1623. *Eg.* 318. *Consultas del Consejo*, p. 4, *F de Jesu*, op. cit., p. 80. *D.N.B.*, Vol. II., p. 213, Aston, Sir Walter by S. R. Gardiner.]

On June 26 (July 6 N.S.), Sir William Croft arrived at Madrid, bringing with him letters from James which, as Charles wrote, were to their hearts' desire. Next morning they sent for Olivares, and with sad countenances informed him that they had received peremptory orders to return home, and begged him to give them his advice as to how they might comply with them without completely breaking off the negotiations. He replied that there were three ways of doing the business, two of which were good and one bad. The two good ones were that either Charles should announce his conversion or that the Spaniards should do everything on trust and put the Infanta freely into their hands; the bad one was that they should bargain and stick upon trifles as long as they could. The first both the Prince and Buckingham absolutely rejected; as to the second the Count confessed that if he were King he would do it, "and, as he is, if it lay in his power to do it, but he cast manie doubts least he should hereafter suffer for it; if it should not succeed well, the last he confessed impossible since your

Matre's command was so peremptorie, to conclude he left us with a promise to consider of it, and when I your doge conveyed him to the dore he bade me chere in my hart and your babie." According to Aston, who was present at the interview, both Charles and Buckingham roundly told Olivares that if any more delays were made they would comply with their orders from England by coming away without treating further. In their letter to James, however, they merely said that both their opinions were that the longest time they could stay in Spain would be a month, "and not that neyther without bringing the Infanta with us. If we find not ourselves assured of that, look for us sooner. Whether of these resolutions be taken you shall hear from us shortlie that you may in time accordinglie give order for the fleet.

"We must once again," they added, "intreat Your babie. to make all the hast you can to return these papers confirmed, and, in the meantime, to give order for the execution of all these things, and to let us here know so much. So lett the worst that can come we make no dout but to be with you before you end your progress." [*London, B. M., Harl. 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, June 27, 1623. Do. Add. 36,447, Vol. IV., Correspondence of Sir W. Aston, pp. 110-117, Narrative of Sir W. Aston's Proceedings from 26 June, 6 July, 1625 to 12-22, July, 1624.*]

Late at night on June 28 (July 8) the Prince again sent for the Count and informed him that he must leave shortly and therefore wished for a definite answer as to whether the Infanta might accompany him or not. The Count replied that the Theologians would decide this question upon the following Monday, June 30 (July 10) and that upon the Tuesday or Wednesday at furthest Philip would send them his final answer. As he saw that both Charles and Buckingham seemed very sad, he added that "he would doe his best and bad us be of comfort, for he was in no doubt himself, but that all would end well."

Olivares had some solid grounds for this assurance. Both the King and the Council of State had, as has been said, highly approved of Charles' answer to the first note from the Committee of Theologians, and thought it couched in very modest terms, and, at Philip's request, Father Francisco de Jesu drew up a second memorandum upon the subject which was considered by the Committee of the Council of State upon the first of July. [*London, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6,987, Charles, etc., June 29. Add. 36,447, Aston Relation cit., F. de Jesu, op. cit., p. 80.*]

The object of this memorandum was to controvert the arguments advanced by Charles as to the possibility that a marriage which had been celebrated but not consummated could subsequently be set aside upon this ground by pointing to several instances both in Spanish and in English history in which such marriages, if for political reasons they had not been consummated, had been held valid by the Pope. Thus the Prince's chief objection fell to the ground, although several instances might have been brought forward which pointed to the opposite conclusion. [*F. de Jesu*, op. cit., p. 80.]

Another very unexpected advocate now entered the field upon Charles' behalf. At the time when he arrived at Madrid the Nuncio, like the Imperial and the French Ambassadors, had been one of his bitterest opponents, and as Aston wrote, had been ready to burst with vexation when he saw Philip salute him on his first appearance in the streets. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. 36,449, Aston to Calvert, 20 March, 1625.]

On the second (twelfth) of July, however, Mgr. Massimi sent his secretary to invite Aston, with whom he seems to have been upon very friendly terms, to meet him about eight o'clock in the evening upon that hill by San Geronimo, which is now crowned by the picture gallery which enshrines those canvasses in which Philip IV. and his courtiers still live before our eyes. The two diplomats met accordingly and the Nuncio opened the conversation by saying that the Pope was most anxious for the consummation of the marriage and complimented the Prince. Aston replied with truth that the Prince was extraordinarily satisfied with what the Pope had done. The Nuncio was equally frank in his disclosures and took advantage of the latitude which had been left to him by his instructions.

"The substance of his discourse was that the calling of the divines had been for two reasons, ye one, the whole kingdom being ill affected with the match, that by this meanes devines being called from all parts of this kingdom and giving consent unto itt, there was none that could find themselves greeved or speake with dislike of itt; ye other was ye respect of ye Conde of Olivares to his own safety that in respect ye match was to be made betwixt those of separate religion he might have so good a justification for his actions as ye opinion of ye devines and yt whatsoever was done was by ther advice and ye Council of State. Upon this he concluded a necessitie of ye prince conforming himself to ye

opinion of ye devines or yt would be a breach of ye match. To this I having given him divers reasons against what ye devines had resolved amongst ye which was yt yt was an unnoble proceeding given to delay ye consummation of ye match to a triall whether ye King was able to comply with his promise since yf ther wer doute which they imagined yt by performing thes capitulations he might putt his Kingdomes in rebellion, he had reason to look yt they should give him the Infanta presently to be married to ye Prince as a securitie yt they would upon all occasions assist him in repayring any inconvenience which he might suffer in performing what this King had desired for ye good of ye English Catholics. I besides told him that ye desyre to delay of delyvering ye Infanta untill March could not be upon yt reason which they pretended which was to see ye performance of ye capitulations and whether ye King was able to putt it into execution, since ye Conde of Olivares had both to ye Duke of Buckingham and myself offered yt in case ye Prince would agree to ye delay of ye delivery of ye Infanta untill ye spring, whether ye capitulation was executed or no, they would bind themselves to an infallible delivery of her at yt time, so yt ye reason of this delay could not be to see ye execution performed but some mystery and secrett reason in ye same.

"Ye Nuncio seemed so satisfied with my reasons yt he answered nothing, but concluded desiring me to intreat ye prince to consider ye great conveniences of this match, he would not brake it for ye indiscretion of one man in which he pointed to ye Conde of Olivares, who, he sayd, for his own safety (so he imagined itt) would adventure the business upon this streight, and here I pressing him, if he had any latitude yt he would use itt, he protested yt he had none, but returned to say that he humbly beseeched His Highness yt he would not suffer one man's error to overthrow the business; and this in substance what passed betwixt us at this conference."

We have seen that the Nuncio was speaking the absolute truth when he explained to Aston the reasons for which Philip had assembled the Committee of Theologians at a moment when it was of importance to him to get public opinion upon his side, as he was anxious to induce the Cortes of Castile to effect drastic changes in the system of taxation. He had also correctly stated Olivares' own position, as explained by the Conde himself but a few days before to the Prince and Buckingham. All that he

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had kept back was a fact which he could not have disclosed without stultifying the whole attitude of the Spaniards, namely that the Pope had given him leave to deliver the dispensation for the marriage if he could insure that the Infanta should be given absolute guarantees for the exercise of her religion and that she might name Catholic servants, and that His Holiness had added that neither "Liberty of Conscience" for the English Catholics nor the right of the mother to direct her children's education until the age of twelve need be insisted upon. [*London, Brit. Mus., Add. 36,447, Aston's Rel., cit. Harl. 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, June 6, 1623. Add. 37,028 f. 62, Instructions to Innocencio Massimi, Bishop of Bertinoro to treat for the Dispensation, 12 April, 1623, Cf. S.P.O., Roman Transcripts, Barb. col. cit., Eg. 355, Orders issued by Philip IV. to the Presidents of the various Councils. To the President of the Council, March 24, April 13, 1623, Add. 36,449, Aston to Calvert, etc., March and April, 1623, passim.*]

It is possible, however, that the draft containing these instructions is that which had been sent by Albuquerque from Rome without any authority from the Cardinal Secretary of State, and, in fairness to the Nuncio, this fact must not be left unmentioned.

Mgr. Massimi had, as will be seen, very good grounds for taking up the cudgels upon Charles' behalf.

On the day following this conversation Olivares came to visit the Prince and communicated to him the substance of the reply from the Theologians, which was to the effect that they saw no way of complying with his representations. As the Count saw that Charles was working himself up into a passion, he pointed out to him that he had two objects in view, the first being to secure the Infanta's hand, the second to have the marriage celebrated as soon as possible. "As your Royal Highness cannot get the latter object accomplished as speedily as you might wish, you should carry yourself so as not to fail in your main object. If you think you can make us pay for your disappointment by sending your fleet to take Cadiz, Lisbon, or Corunna (which, as a matter of fact, you would certainly do), I must remind you that the more you set your mind upon such a course, the more uncertain must be its outcome."

On the fourth (fourteenth) of July, Olivares gave the Prince Philip's reply in writing. It was to the effect that he referred him to the resolution which the divines had already taken and

which they had not since modified. The Prince again asked the Count to press them to alter it, but Olivares replied that he had already done his best with them and could do no more. In vain Charles argued that if the Spanish Ambassadors certified that his father was putting into execution his promises with regard to the English Catholics, it might be possible that the Pope would drop the idea of insisting that Philip should take an oath to assure the fulfilment of the marriage articles. In vain, through an unnamed agent, he attempted to persuade the Council to reverse their decision, pointing out that as his father was advancing in years it was necessary that he himself should have heirs, and by his marriage satisfy his people, nor did he omit to glance at the charges to which the English Exchequer had been put that year. His arguments fell upon deaf ears. In vain he urged the Infanta's love for himself, "which will seem to take off the blame of the act from the Conde of Olivares, if the people should dislike it which he seems much to fear and for which we find he hath little reason, but because he gives so ill and so unlikely a reason, we philosophise upon the worst on his part." Finally he told Olivares in plain words that, in view of the reply of the Junta, he would not consider himself any longer bound by the negotiations, and asked him to arrange that he might see the King on Sunday the sixth (sixteenth). After Buckingham had spoken to the same effect in very excited tones, the Count took his leave without further discussion, as he considered that there was nothing more to be said. [*F. de Jesu*, op. cit., p. 80. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Charles and Buckingham to James, 15 July, 1623. *Do.*, Add. 36,447, Aston rel., op. cit.]

As Charles wrote to his father, whilst he was waiting for the answer from the Junta, "We do not know whether this will take effect or not. If it doe not we will be the sooner with you, if it doe wee know you will thincke that a little more time will be well spent to bringe her with us when by that means we may *upon equaler terms* treat with them of other things, doe your best there and we will not faile of ours here. You shall doe well to see the ambassadors' letters, and send them in your one packetts, of this we must intreate you to speake nothing for, if you doe, our labor will be the harder here, and when it shall be hoped there and not take effect, they will be the more discontented."

From the outset Charles had always borne in mind that the marriage in itself was not the sole object he had to achieve by his

journey but that it was to be the means by which a firm alliance was to be brought about between Spain and England. His task, therefore, would not be accomplished until such questions as those connected with the Palatinate, the relations between England and Holland, and the positions assumed towards the Spaniards by the English traders in the East, which last had assumed such importance since the capture of Ormuz, had been finally and satisfactorily settled.

Perhaps the Prince's greatest mistake had been that he had not from the very first made it perfectly clear to the Spanish Government that his marriage with the Infanta was in its very essence connected with, if not dependent upon, an arrangement about the Palatine.

On the other hand it would have been impossible for him to comply with the demands of the Theologians that he should return home and proceed to carry out the concessions to the English Catholics, whilst the Infanta was to remain in Spain until the end of the year, for his father had definitely forbidden him to adopt this course, and had indeed ordered him to give over all further negotiations without even discussing any proposals which the Spaniards might make as to guaranteeing the fulfilment of their engagements, unless they would withdraw those conditions. [*Mantua*, ib., Nerli to Duke, 18 July, 1623. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6987, Charles to James, 22 April. Cf. *Eg.* 335 cit., Royal Order to Juan de Ciriça, 27 April; James to Charles, 14 June; Charles, etc., to James, July 15; James to Buckingham, July 22, 1623.]

The Prince had already requested Bristol to draw up for him a memorandum in which he explained the reasons for his departure, so that he might make use of it when he went to take his leave of Philip. [*F. de Jesu*, op. cit, p. 80.]

However, on the morning of Sunday, July the sixth (sixteenth), he again sent for Olivares and told him that before he spoke with the King he would communicate to him what he intended to bring forward so that he might have his assistance. "The substance of what His Highness was to desire of His Majesty was that he would please to use his power to find some good opening in this business, and that whereas the divines propounded that the Prince should betrowth the Infanta upon advertisement that the King of England had received, approved, and confirmed the capitulations, and that the marriage and delivery of

the Infanta should be in March following, His Highness offered that he might presently be betrowthed and that he might be married when the advice came that the capitulations were accepted by His Majesty, and that the Infanta should stay until the Embassadors had advertised that execution. The Conde desired he might have this in wrighting to see what he could negotiate upon it; whereupon he desired that His Highness should defer his speaking with His Majesty, which he was content to doe. The same day, during the play, the Duke (of Buckingham) went to the Conde of Olivares with whom having made many trials to discover the utmost that would be yielded to of His (Spanish) Majesty's part, the Conde, with many protestations affirmed that itt was that the Prince should be betrowthed upon advertisement of His (English) Majesty's acceptance of the capitulations, that His Highness should be married at Christmas, and that the delivery of the Infanta should be in March as was expressed in the paper of the devines; my Lord (of Bucks) seeing ther was no hope of procuring cheaper conditions sayd he would use his uttermost power that the Prince might agree unto itt." [*London, Brit. Mus., Add. 36447, Aston's Rel. cit.* It is fully confirmed by his letters of July, 1623, in *Add. 36449, Vol. VI. Sir Walter Aston's Correspondence, 1620-1625*, most of which are addressed to Secretary Calvert. Buckingham, did not learn of his creation as Duke until the end of July, 1623. Cf. his letters to James, and others from his mother and his sister, Lady Denbigh, to himself in *Harl. 6987.*]

"On the seventh (seventeenth) His Lordship (Buckingham) having all the night laboured with the Prince to bring him to accept of thes conditions, and in the morning took me along with him unto the Count of Olivares to whom he gave an account of the resolution of the Prince that he would accept of no other condition but to marry the Infanta when the advertisement came out of England of the ratification of the Capitulations, ther beeing much sorrow exprest of both sides, the Duke offered two means of accommodation as conceyts of his owne which if the Conde did lik of he would worke all that he could that the Prince might agree with itt. The one was that the King should tell the Prince that notwithstanding the devines had putt such a condition upon him he would trust his honor and conscience and all that concerned him in his hands, upon which the Prince in the like courtesie should not to offer violence to His Majesty's

conscience agree to what the devines had obliged His Majesty unto. The other meanes which the Duke propounded was that the devines should put it absolutely into His Majestie's hands, His Majesty into the Prince's, and so the Prince in courtesy should conforme himself to what was desired, which my Lord thout a nobler and more obliging way of proceeding ther by obligation. The Conde said if My Lord Duke would try whether the Prince would agree to this after advertisement from His Lordship, he would doe what he could that it might take effect.

"In the afternoon about two of the clock I returned to the Prince and found My Lord Duke debating with His Highness upon the resolution which he would take for a finall answeare to the business, to which discourse they pleased to admit me, which being discoursed of the conveniences and inconveniences that might happen on both sides untill almost five of the clock. His Highness told My Lord that nothing could satisfy his reason, but his affection was such to the Infanta that for her respect only he was content to accept of the conditions which were offered by the devines, and also found the propositions which had passed betwixt My Lord and the Conde artificiall, and resolved cleerly that he would accept of the offer as aforesaid which was to be betrowthed when the capitulations were ratified, that the consummation of the marriage should be in the end of December, and that the *entregar* (the handing over of the Infanta) should be in March. The consummation offered in December, though it be not an offer of the devines, it was propounded by the Conde of Olivares and accepted by His Highness, and with this message he sent My Lord Duke and myself to the Conde of Olivares, and about an hour after this the King and the Prince met with the greatest expression of joy which could be exprest." [*London, Brit. Mus., Add. 36, 447, Aston Rel. cit.*]

The Prince appeared in Philip's presence attended by Bristol, Buckingham and Aston, and to Bristol's amazement told the King that he accepted his conditions. Speaking with every sign of deep emotion, he said that he had left England solely and only to show his love for the Infanta. As then, he saw that she wished him to accept the conditions which had been proposed to him, he gladly did so in order that he might give her a first proof of his affection for her. He added, although he might have found some difficulty in proving his statement, that he was acting in accordance with his father's final decision, for though

the difficulties which surrounded the matter were almost insurmountable, they had thought it best to comply with the demands in their entirety so that they might secure such a tie of close relationship with Spain.

"Upon this the King and the Infantes, his brothers, took the Prince in their armes with the greatest joy that they could express, upon which the Gentlemen of the Chamber and the Nobility that then attended His Majesty (understanding the language of that signe as a conclusion of this business that hath hung so long in suspense) came unto us that attended the Prince giving us lyke embraces with demonstrations of the greatest alacrity and content that I have seen. Within two houres the newes was blown over all the town and receaved by all with a generall applause as was expressed by thousands of blessings bestowed upon the English who were after seen in the towne."

In conformity with this agreement the papers were sealed by the King and Prince a few days later, and on July 29 (August 8) the paper as to the consummation at Christmas was delivered to Aston to be given to the Prince. [*F. de Jesu*, op. cit., p. 80. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. 36,447, *Aston Rel. cit.*, Add. 36, 449, *Aston* by Lord Andover to Calvert, July 8, 1623, *O.S.*, *S.P.O. S.P. Dom.*, Jas. I., Vol. 148, No. 125, Endymion Porter to his wife, Madrid, July 17.]

Charles had, so it was believed, only arrived at this decision after going through a severe mental struggle. He had all along thought that he would cast a slur upon his honour if he took this course, but his feelings were at stake, and his intercourse with Boverio had greatly influenced his sentiments towards Catholicism. Moreover, his father had hinted in his letter of June the fourteenth that if he did not return to England before the winter he might not find him alive. Should James die during his absence he knew that a Puritan rising in favour of the Palatine, or rather of his wife, was far from improbable. In such an event the goodwill of the English Catholics and the support of Spain would be all-important to him. [*F. de Jesu*, op. cit., p. 81, Harl. 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, June 27, July 15, 1623. James to Charles, June 14, let cit. The Prince had received this letter by Sir William Croft on June 27. *Turin*, ib., Tarantaise, July 18. *Mantua*, ib., Nerli, July 18, 1623.]

For the moment everyone appeared to be delighted at the engagement.

As Aston wrote to Calvert, who was no friend of Spain, "I cannot forbear to tell Your Honor that all things goe extraordinarie well here; ye King, ye Prince, and ye Infanta extraordinarie well contented, and ye whole Court, Town, and Kingdom much pleased with ye conclusion of this match."

Charles, who, precocious statesman as he was, was not yet twenty-four, wrote a few days later to his father with boyish glee, "I your babie have sins this conclusion bine with my mistris and she sitta publicklye with mee at thee playes, and within this twoe or three dayes she shall take place of thee Queene as Princes of England." [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, July 15, 1623. *S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I.*, Vol. 149, No. 72 (Conway Papers), Conway to Calvert, July 27, 1623.]

Between nine and ten o'clock on the night of the seventh (seventeenth), Tarantaise, who was already in bed, was aroused by one of Bristol's gentlemen, who brought him the news that the marriage was arranged and that the wedding day would shortly be announced. "To speak frankly," wrote the Archbishop, "I am far better pleased that the marriage has been settled with the Prince than if it had been made up with the Emperor's son, and this for two reasons. Firstly, if through any accident the succession to this monarchy were to devolve upon the Infanta Maria, or upon her descendants, your sons, their Royal Highnesses, would have a far better chance of being favourites here than if the Crown were to pass to the House of Austria; secondly, since the Emperor's marriage with the Mantuan, I have never had a very kindly feeling for him." [*Turin, ib.*, Tarantaise to Duke, July 18, 1623.]

On the afternoon of July the twenty-first (thirty-first), Lord Andover, who carried the despatches with the news that the marriage was arranged, stole into Whitehall "like a ghost" at the very moment when James was getting into his coach to drive to the Spanish Embassy and swear to the observance of the private conditions after swearing to the public ones, which made no mention of the Catholics, with great ceremony in his own chapel in the morning. The King could only write that as no better terms could be got he must be contented and went on to bewail the expense to which he would be put by sending two separate fleets for Charles and the Infanta. The Spanish Ambassadors consoled him by saying that they looked upon the delay in sending the bride as senseless, and that they would press their

government to alter their decision. The fleet would, he added, be in Spain as soon as wind and weather would serve.

Before Andover's arrival it had been settled between Inojosa and Cottington that Charles and Buckingham should be sent powers to sign an alliance between England and Spain. Apparently it was in consequence of this arrangement that James forgot his resolution not to mix up the negotiations about the Palatine's affairs with those about the match. He accordingly enclosed in his letter of congratulation powers for Charles "to treat for the Palatinate and the matter of Holland," ending his letter with the words "Sweete babie goe on with the contracts and the best assurance you can gette of sending her the nexte yeare, but upon my blessing lye not with her in Spaine, except ye be sure to bringe her with you and forgette not to make thaim keep their former conditions anent the portion; otherwayes my babie and I are bankeroutis for ever."

These instructions show that James on his side wished to have it in his power to have the marriage declared null and void should any attempt be made to detain the Princess of Wales in Spain.

The news was received in London with surprise rather than with satisfaction. It was rumoured that the wedding day was fixed but that the Infanta would not leave Spain till March. If, however, the Prince returned home before her it was thought that he would bring with him the Infantes Ferdinand and Carlos as pledges for the fulfilment of the contract. "I must tell you with what acclamations of joye the newes is sent from Spain, where all things being brought to extremities and His Highness' thoughts wholly sett upon his departure, the King sent for him by the Conde d' Olivares, where instead of bitter expostulations which were expected, they found nothing but embracements either by way of congratulation or acknowledgment of what you have formerly represented."

Madrid, meanwhile, was ablaze with illuminations and bonfires, though bankrupt grandees and ambassadors whose salaries had been in arrears for years rather than months shrugged their shoulders when they thought of the debts which they would have to incur for new liveries and for splendid entertainments.

Tarantaise, whose own experience fully enabled him to enter into their feelings, and who could not forget his long and fruitless labours on behalf of the penniless Maria of Savoy, wrote in rueful

tones to urge his master to congratulate the fortunate wooer. Bursting into Latin he said, "The thing is settled, and as the old saw runs, 'Quod retinere non possumus gratisse relaxamus'" (Let go and keep smiling). So far as words went Charles Emmanuel was very near to the heart of his English friends, and his silence upon this occasion might have been misconstrued at Whitehall.

The Madrid world was, however, greatly surprised that the Prince should have altered his mind so completely within such a short time, and the loungers in the Calle Mayor whispered to one another that it might perhaps be as well if they knew for a certainty which were His Highness' feigned sentiments and which were his real ones. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, James to Charles, 22 July, Charles to James, 15 July. Add. 36,449, Aston to Calvert by Lord Andover, 8 July. Eg. 2,080 f. 251a, Précis of Inojosa's Despatches to Spain, 16 July, 4 August, 1623, Do. *Despachs*, 24 July. For James' orders to Bristol not to mix up the question of the Palatinate with the marriage negotiations, Cf. *Gardiner*, op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 146-156, quoting James I. to Bristol, March 4, 1622. *F. de Jesu*, op. cit., pp. 80-81, 88-94. *London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom.*, Jas. I., Vol. 149, No. 30, Sir R. Younge to Lord Zouch, 23 July. Do., Vol. 151, No. 27, Calvert to Conway, 21 Aug., 1623, Vol. 149. No. 23 (Conway Papers), Conway to ———, July 22, 1623. *Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.*, Lord Bath's MSS., Vol. II., pp. 71-72, Thos. Larkin to ———, July 21, 1623. *Turin*, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, July 18, 1623.]

Had they been able to glance over Philip's shoulder, as he sat at his desk some five days before, they might not only have found the answer to these questions, but might possibly have understood why the Nuncio had taken such a friendly and unexpected interest in the affairs of the Prince of England.

The reasons were almost certainly unknown to Buckingham and to Bristol, if not even to Aston, although the first-named may possibly have entertained some vague suspicions, for when, in the following spring, the question of impeaching Bristol was being mooted, Buckingham seems to have feared that he himself might be called to account for his conduct whilst in Spain, and his fears seem to have been, to a certain extent, shared by Charles. [*Harl.* 6,987, Buckingham to James, undated but before 6 April, 1624; Charles to Buckingham, April 26, 1624].

Even before the end of April, 1623, Charles' own letters show

that Bristol had completely forfeited his confidence, for he writes of him as being a hinderer rather than a helper, nor can he have been unacquainted with the very dubious part which he had played whilst on his mission to Vienna with regard to the negotiations for an armistice in Germany. [*Harl.* 6,987, Charles, etc., to James 22 April, 29 July, 1623.]

"Honest Wat," to use the Prince's name for Aston, may, on the other hand, have known something of his master's relations with Boverio, for it is difficult to see upon what other grounds the Nuncio can have chosen him as his confidant. As, however, the Astons were an old Staffordshire family, who had been friends of Mary, Queen of Scots, it is possible that he was secretly a Catholic, for many of the gentry in that country still belonged to the ancient faith. The year before James, indeed, had thought of sending him as his Minister to Poland, because he stood so high in the estimation of the Catholics.

We have seen that the Prince was taking a deep interest in the book which that eminent theologian, Fra Zaccaria Boverio da Saluzzo, was drawing up to instruct him in the Catholic Religion, and that he was in constant though secret communication with the good friar.

Charles had finally selected the title for this treatise, and the license for publishing the "*Consultatio Orthodoxa*" was signed by Philip on the third (thirteenth) of July, 1623, although its actual publication was not authorised by the Court Notary, Hernando de Vallejo, until August the twenty-first (thirty-first). The price was fixed at 336 maravedises, or at the rate of four maravedises a sheet, and so came to a little over five shillings for the volume in English money.

The beautifully printed little quarto, with its elaborate frontispiece and delicately engraved tailpieces, is still to be seen in the British Museum. Until it was rebound in 1906, its original cover of olive leather still bore the impress of "C. P.," which had been transformed with a stamp into "C. R.," after Charles had ascended the English throne. [This book is entered in the Catalogue of the British Museum Library as "*Boverius, Zaccarias, Consultatio Orthodoxa de Religione, Matriti, 1623.*"]

In despite of the usual rules, the manuscript, on the advice of the Council of State, was licensed for publication without being submitted to the Censors. The author, however, being a Capuchin, was obliged to secure the permission of his General, who was then at Paris, before he could allow it to appear.

The treatise is divided into two parts, the first of which deals with the nature of the Catholic Faith, whilst the second gives the reasons for embracing it.

The dedication, fulsome as it is, had been submitted to Charles and had been formally approved of by him, although it is couched in language which could hardly be addressed with propriety to any but the most saintly of Catholics. To judge from some phrases in Tarantaise's despatches, it is possible that the Archbishop may have assisted Boverio in its composition, and it was evidently retouched by someone who was acquainted with the preface to the Authorised Version of the English Bible.

Boverio begins by expressing his wonder that the Prince should have journeyed to a country with which he had no ties of either blood or friendship, and with an object which he had no real grounds for thinking that he would achieve. Everyone in Spain, however, had rejoiced at his coming and even "the ignorant vulgar were awaiting the result with minds wavering betwixt hope and fear." In the end Father Zaccaria decides that his journey must be attributed to the direct inspiration of the Deity, and men must, therefore, believe that his mission will succeed. The Heavenly Voice had called this new Samuel, this second Abram to Spain, that he might hear God speaking more clearly to his heart in a land where He was known to the faithful sons of the Catholic Church. The outcome will be the restoration of England to the bosom of the Church. [*Boverio, Consultatio Orthodoxa*, pp. i-iii. *Turin*, *ib.*, Tarantaise to Duke, June 14, 1623. Some phrases in this despatch greatly resemble those in the Preface as to the attitude of the vulgar.]

"For the rest, Most Prudent Prince," he continues, "if thou feelest thyself called by the Highest Deity working in thee to that true and Catholic Faith and Religion, through which alone when thy mortal life doth set thou canst secure that which is immortal, withstand not the Divine Summons, but go whither the Grace of God going before thee doth gently draw thee, and follow without wearying the guidance of that Heavenly Light by which that abounding mercy which is so evidently of God, is ready to bring thee now rescued from darkness into His marvellous light. And may God (if I may use the Apostles' words), who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, shine in Your Royal Highness' heart, to give thee the light of Faith and of the knowledge of the Glory of God. [2 Corinthians, iv., 6]."

Such was the Preface which the friar dated from "my cell at Madrid" on July the second (twelfth), 1623.

The frontispiece shows Charles in cloak and sword kneeling at a desk which is placed upon an island covered with churches. The Blessed Virgin, attended by Saint Peter, St. Gregory, and St. Francis, is gazing down upon him from between the cherubim.

Prefixed to the work are some Latin verses with the heading.

"THE AUTHOR'S

most happy presage and anagram, drawn from the name and surname of His Most Serene Highness, the Invincible Charles, Prince of Wales.

"CHARLES STUART

Christ (the) Saviour.

Who is this new Christ? Tell us from what shores
This Saviour riseth for us. Is, perchance,
The world's salvation born of English blood?
The royal anointing is what makes the King.
'Tis sure the true Faith, soon to be restored,
Will give salvation and two Kings in one
A monarch and a Christ. But, haste, break off
The chains of sloth, garner the seed of life
Great Prince, thee too Salvation now assured
Will bear to save us. That race famed of old,
God's offspring, springs once more to life, and longs
To hail him who with eager hand will lift
The weights which long have held them down groaning.
To this the fates are calling thee, if thou
Canst break the iron bonds of dogma. Thou
Wilt be a Saviour where thou soon shalt reign
A King anointed. Give the palm to Christ
Cherish Christ's seed for both thy names foretell
Thou may'st be Christ the Saviour and Charles Stuart."

In reading this dedication we must not forget that Charles had not only sanctioned the publication of the work, but had also taken a close interest in it during its composition.

Tarantaise says in so many words that Friar Zaccaria had

originally intended to call his book, *Pedagogia*, but that as Charles disliked both this title and that of *Cathechesis*, he had selected that of *Consultatio*. The author presented the work to the prince on the day before his departure from Madrid, and it was thought that it would then have been issued to the public, but at the last moment it was apparently withdrawn from circulation.

As has been said, the copy of the "*Consultatio*," in the British Museum, was in Charles' private library as Prince of Wales. It is, therefore, of some interest to inquire whether anything in the "*Icon Basilike*," seems to show that its author was acquainted with this work.

Without going into a detailed discussion it may be suggested that Section 24 of the "*Icon*," entitled, "Upon their denying His Majesty the attendance of his Chaplains," has a passage on the subject of the possibility of uniting the sacerdotal and regal offices in the same person which is all but a paraphrase of one upon the same subject in the Seventh Rule of the First Part of the "*Consultatio*." [See note 2]. The wording of the passage in the "*Icon*" would seem indeed to suggest that it is a reminiscence of a discussion on the subject between Charles and Boverio. A passage in Section 17 "Of the difference between the King and two Houses on the point of Church Government" has a great resemblance with some points in the same Rule. Such coincidences can hardly be fortuitous.

If the author of the "*Icon*" had such a knowledge of the "*Consultatio*," is it possible to assume that Charles the First, when in the hands of the Parliament, would have placed himself at the mercy of anyone, however trustworthy, by showing him a work, which had it become known to the English public, would have at once brought utter ruin upon his cause? He knew what the consequences of the publication of his private papers which had been taken at Naseby had been, and bitter experience had taught him that he might be betrayed even by his closest friends. Surely, therefore, parts of the "*Icon*" must have been written and not merely revised by Charles.

A person who could approve of the dedication of such a work in such terms to himself was not likely to let any sectarian prejudices stand in his way in any question in which the gratification of his personal feelings was concerned. For the moment at least Charles was in love with the Infanta, and there is no

reason, therefore, for surprise that when he had to make his choice between complying with the demands of the theologians and breaking off the match, we should find him prepared to do all that they required of him rather than lose her. It is clear that the Nuncio would never have come forward unasked to support the Prince unless he had been aware of what had passed between him and Boverio, and it is possible that Charles' conversation with Buckingham upon the afternoon of July the seventh (seventeenth) was nothing but an elaborate piece of play acting, perhaps with the view of throwing dust in the eyes of the "English favourite." We cannot know for certain whether Aston was in the secret of the Prince's relations with Boverio or not.

In any case Olivares, whose whole future seemed at stake in the negotiations for the English match, evidently thought that the Prince's promises were sincere. Two days after the marriage had been determined upon, the Count Duke wrote to Pope Gregory XV. with his own hand to say that all the arrangements as to the temporal matters connected with it had been settled, and that they were now only waiting for His Holiness' sanction to proceed to the celebration of the nuptials. He trusted that no difficulties would arise at Rome and that the Pope would be satisfied with the measures which had been taken to insure the fulfilment of the stipulations in favour of the Catholics. "May God," ends the letter, "prosper Your Holiness and preserve you for a thousand years for the well-being of Christendom."

But at the very moment when Olivares was penning his ill-spelt letter, the Pope to whom it was addressed was lying dead at the Vatican, and five days later Madrid was plunged into mourning by the tidings that the Supreme Pontiff had departed to another life.

NOTE 1 (CHAPTER 60)

THE VERSES FOLLOWING THE DEDICATION OF THE "CONSULTATIO ORTHODOXA"

The verses following the anagram run,

"Carolus Stuartus.
Christus Salvator."

" Quis novus hic Christus ? Quibus hic Salvator ab oris
 Surgit ? *An ex Anglo nascitur orbe salus ?*
 Unctio dat Christum Regalis, certe salutem
 Bisque dabit Christum mox renovanda Fides.
 Ast age, rumpe moras (Princeps), lege semina vitæ
 Salvantem pariet te quoque certa Salus.
 Gens antiqua, Dei suboles, rediviva solertem
 Te expectat, longo ponders pressa gemens.
 Huc te fata vocunt ; si quæ aspera dogmata rumpas,
 Tu Salvator eris, mox ubi Christus eris.
 Da palmas Christo ; Christi fove semen et ut sis
Christus Salvator, nomen utrumque dabit."

NOTE 2 (CHAPTER 60)

THE "CONSULTATIO ORTHODOXA" AND "ICON BASILIKE"

As the existence of the copy now in the British Museum, which bears Charles' stamp as Prince of Wales, shows, the work must have formed a part of his private library.

It is, therefore, of some interest to inquire whether it has any connection with the "Icon Basilike."

The style of the "Consultatio" is dry in the extreme in the argumentative portions, and the arguments are supported by constant references to both Scripture and to the Fathers. The quotations from the New Testament are generally given at length.

Charles' personal predilections are carefully kept in view. Thus in the section upon the Apostolic Succession (Part I., p. 120) he is addressed as "Magne Carole, divini numinis simulachrum," a clear reference to the Theory of Divine Right, whilst the verses quoted in Note I show that the writer knew that he had been delighted by the Papal Brief, in which Gregory XV. had styled him "Orbis Christianæ florem." [*Turin, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, June 14, 1623.*]

A passage on the impossibility of uniting the Regal and Sacerdotal offices in the same person, would appear to have been known to the author of the "Icon Basilike."

This passage is in the "Consultatio" (Part I., Rule 7, pp. 105-106, "In qua Ecclesiæ Principatum, etc."), and runs :

"Ex his facile eorum objecta diluuntur, qui Regiam ac Sacerdotalem dignitatem ipso naturæ jure conjunctas esse contendunt, eo quod ante legem Christi et Moysis, cum jus tantum

naturale servaretur, üdem in populo Dei essent Reges et Sacerdotes nec Sacerdotium a Regno distinguuntur, ut palam est de Melchisedech, Abraham et reliquis Patriarcharum primogenitis, qui simul Sacerdotium cum Regno assequebantur, ex quo tandem inferunt Regnum ipso jure naturæ cum Sacerdotio conjunctum est."

In Section No. 24 of the "Icon Basilike" [Ed. 1648, p. 147], "Upon their denying His Majesty the attendance of his chaplains," the writer says:

"Indeed I think both offices, Regal and Sacerdotal, might well become the same person (as in the case of David, Solomon, etc.), as anciently they were under one name and the united rights of primogeniture . . . or enjoying neither."

The Section in the Icon (Ed. cit., pp. 102-115), "Of the differences between the King and the two Houses in point of Church Government also resembles the Rule 'In qua Ecclesiæ Principatum, etc.,"' quoted above."

It seems hardly probable that Dr. Gauden should have been acquainted with a work of which it would seem that only one copy, that in Charles' private library, was to be found in England. Had the book been known to the English public, it would most certainly have been alluded to during the course of Bristol's impeachment, whilst the gossipers who charged Buckingham and the Prince with poisoning James I. would have found food for insinuations in such verses in the dedication as

"Tu Salvator eris, mox ubi Christus* eris."

NOTE 3 (CHAPTER 60)

THE DATES IN THE NARRATIVE

As Charles and Buckingham usually dated their letters in the Old Style, which was in use in England until the new Gregorian Calendar was introduced in 1752, I have used the Old Style for all dates in Chapter XLIV. after June 21, except in my citations from Italian sources in the Notes.

The difference between the two Calendars was in 1623 of ten days, thus June 26-July 6, 1623, or Dec. 31, 1623-Jan. 10, 1623-4.

* "Christus." For the use of this word in reference to an "Anointed" King cf. *Lament*, iv. 20 (Vulgate) "Spiritus oris nostri, Christus Dominus" with A. V. "The anointed of the Lord"

CHAPTER LXI

GREGORY XV. may not have been a great Pope, but, upon the whole, despite his intrigues about the Valtelline, he had been a good friend to Spain. His death at this critical moment proved to be the turning point of the marriage negotiations. Everything came to a standstill. Philip had pledged his word not to act without the consent of the Pope, and many theologians held that the marriage could not be celebrated until it had been sanctioned by the new Pontiff.

The tidings of the Pope's death were received with sorrow at Madrid. To set a good example to the Prince the court went into mourning. [*Turin*, Tarantaise, July 24. *Mantua*, Nerli, July 28.]

The delay thus occasioned was most inopportune. Although the Infanta had put on the pattens worn by married women, and was styled Princess of Wales, she was not yet formally betrothed. It was still unsettled whether she was to accompany her bridegroom to England or not. Charles was determined that, whether they were contracted or not, "marriage there shall be none, without her coming with us." He flattered himself that he had convinced Olivares that she ought to leave Spain with them before winter.

He believed that the Count was working underhand with the divines to secure their assent, and that under colour of preparing for the King's and Prince's journey to the coast, he was secretly making arrangements for her to accompany them, and was settling her household. To use Olivares' own words, he would throw them all out of Spain as soon as he could. As the King, without counting extraordinary expenses, was paying eight thousand ducats a month for his visitors, he had good reason to hasten their departure. Charles himself begged his father to send him peremptory orders to return home with all speed. "We desyre this," wrote Buckingham, "not that we fere we shall have need of it, but in case we have that your sonne (who hath exprest much affection to the person of the Infanta) may press his coming away

under the color of your commands without appereing an ill lover." [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Charles and Buckingham to James, July, 1623. Undated, *London, S.P.O.*, S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 149, No. 72 (Conway Papers), Conway to Calvert, 27 July, 1623. Vol. 150, No. 106, Conway to Lord Brooke, Aug. 14, 1623. He mentions that Clarke had brought the news that "the Contract was not." *Turin, Tarantaise*, July 24.]

Charles had good reasons for his attitude. Since the fall of Richard II., disputed successions to the Crown had been the rule in English history, and the civil contests which they had occasioned were still remembered with horror. If James had ascended the throne without opposition his success was due to the speedy action of his supporters. Should any obstacle be placed in the way by the Spaniards to the Prince's hopes of legitimate posterity, the issues which had brought about the matrimonial disputes between Henry VIII. and Catherine of Aragon would be at once renewed in an aggravated form. It was not impossible that a large faction of the English Puritans would in such an event combine to place Elizabeth of Bohemia or her son upon the throne in preference to one whom they would not unnaturally look upon as a friend of their opponents.

It is true that Olivares, if he could succeed in effecting a marriage between the Palatine's eldest son and the Emperor's daughter as the price of the restitution of the Palatinate, might regard such contingencies with equanimity. On the other hand he was not in a position to force the divines to sanction the Infanta's departure for England unless they were convinced that James was able to carry out the Marriage Articles in their entirety. In the Netherlands the policy of the Spanish Government was now actuated by temporal rather than by religious motives, but the Church was still most powerful in the Peninsula and Olivares dared not defy it or an issue which raised even the slightest scruple as to Religion. Only a few days before an incident had occurred which must have opened his eyes to the realities of the situation. A friar had informed the King and himself that he had been commissioned by the Duke of Lerma, who was still pining to be recalled to Madrid, to persuade D. Antonio de Beaufort, the Lieutenant of the Archer Guards, to join in a plot to assassinate the Count. Beaufort was condemned to exile for life in the African fortress of Peñon, but it was clear that Lerma had still supporters

even amongst the ecclesiastics and in the royal circle. [*F. de Jesu*, op. cit., p. 82. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. 36,449, Aston to Calvert, 8 July, 1623, O.S.] Many of the Members of the Council of State were at heart no friends to the English match, and, not it is true without some grounds, were inclined to attach more credence to the reports sent from England by Inojosa and Coloma than they would give to Buckingham's most honied words. Inojosa, whose wife was supposed to be Philip's mistress, was no friend to the favourite, and roundly abused him to Carlisle, to the indignation of James, who described him to Buckingham as a "slimme" (deceitful) man, whilst, in his turn, Charles accused him of "gugling" and of writing to Spain in direct contradiction to his professions. [*F. de Jesu*, op. cit., p. 82. *London, B.M.*, Harl. 6,987, James to Charles, etc., August 5, 1623, Charles, etc., to James, August 20, 1623. *Turin*, ib., Tarantaise to the Duke *passim*, Dec., 1623, Feb., 1624, for Philip IV. relations with the Marquesa de Inojosa.]

Nor were causes of ill feeling lacking between Buckingham and Olivares, who, indeed, had in some degree grounds for displeasure against the Prince himself.

The reasons for the first quarrel between the two favourites are differently related.

According to Rusdorf, who was the purveyor of society carrion to half the Protestant Courts of Europe, Buckingham, who was renowned as a gallant, had essayed to win the good graces of the Countess of Olivares. She was greatly displeased by her suitor's advances and, with the sanction of her husband, vowed vengeance against him. A worn-out and diseased old street walker was accordingly decked out with the splendid armaments of a grandee's wife, and was introduced into his bedroom. If London gossip may be trusted Buckingham carried away with him a remembrance of the interview, which necessitated his undergoing medical treatment for some months after his return to England. [*"Der dreissigjährige Krieg,"* 3 Bde. (Paderborn, Schönigh, 1893) Von O. Klopp, Vol. II., pp. 361-362, quoting Rusdorffi *Concilia*, 184, Carew in Roe, 250.]

It is certain that Buckingham was seriously ill of a fever and ague during August, 1623, and that James in the early winter warned him to be as wary as he could "with droguis and phisitions, for they are but for cakis of necessitie," but there is no reason to believe that the account of his illness which the Prince

wrote to his father from Madrid, is untrue. Indeed, James' own very indelicate letters might be quoted as a proof to the contrary. Were Rusdorf's story correct, we should hardly find Buckingham employing the Countess of Olivares to convey most intimate messages about Charles to the Infanta after his engagement. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Charles to James, Aug. 20, 1623, James to Buckingham, undated, but in October or November, 1623, Buckingham to James, 30 July, 1623.] Clarendon, who knew Madrid well, laughs at the rumour on the ground that the Countess was "an old, abject woman, so crooked and deformed" that she was little likely to excite the desires of a gallant of thirty-one. [*Clarendon, History of the Great Rebellion* (London, 1702), Vol. I., p. 38.] He, on the other hand, traces Buckingham's hostility to the marriage to a quarrel with Bristol. Philip IV. had invited Bristol to take a place in his carriage to act as interpreter when he was driving in the Prado with Charles and the Infante Carlos, and had left Buckingham to accompany Olivares. Buckingham was furious at an insult which he supposed had been contrived by Bristol, and abused him roundly in English. Olivares did not understand the language, but hearing the Ambassador's name, guessed what had happened and sent an equerry to beg the King to stop. It was then arranged that Buckingham should take his place with the King and that Don Carlos should drive with Olivares. From that moment, says Clarendon, Buckingham vowed that he would do all in his power to thwart a plan which had been originated by Bristol. [*Clarendon, op. cit.*, Vol. I., pp. 36-37.] As, however, we know that as early as April Charles had asked his father to order Bristol to follow "Steenie's directions and mine," and that James had done so accordingly, we have no reason to believe that Buckingham could find in this incident any reason to upset the negotiation. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, 22 April; James to Charles, etc., 11 May.]

If we can believe Olivares' speeches in the Council of State, the original cause of the ill-feeling was a widely different one.

From the first, Italian observers had foretold that the capture of Ormuz by the Persians, aided by English freebooters, and the attacks which had been made upon Spanish and Portuguese traders by the English East India Company's ships would arouse bitter resentment at Madrid. [*Turin, Tarantaise*, Dec. 31, 1622, March 28, 1623. *Mantua, Nerli*, Jan. 1, 1623.] Buckingham,

as Lord High Admiral, had an interest in all prizes, and James did not disdain to occupy himself during his favourite's absence in forcing knavish and unthankful sea-captains to disgorge for him the booty which they had shared amongst themselves. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, James I. to Buckingham, 17 March, 1623.] He had, therefore, good reasons for not caring to inquire too closely into the doings of English skippers in African and Asiatic waters.

Moreover, there are grounds for believing that the East India Company, under pressure from the King, had paid His Majesty and the Lord Admiral £10,000 each to "sweeten" them after the capture of Ormuz. [*Encyclopædia Britannica*, Vol. XIII., p. 693, Art. "Hormuz," quoting "State Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies," by Sainsbury, Vol. III., *passim*, especially pp. 296 and 329.]

When, however, the Prince of Wales and Buckingham were his guests at Madrid, Philip IV., or his advisers in the Council of Portugal, asked them to write to the English governors in the East Indies and the merchants trading thither to urge them to refrain from attacking Spanish shipping. The Prince and the Duke complied with his request, but their letters were couched in such terms that the Council refused to accept them and the King was forced to call upon Secretary Juan de Ciriça for a further report on the subject. [*Brit. Mus.* Eg. 335, Philip IV. to Ciriça, 27 April, 1623.]

Olivares did not forget the incident. Nor was Buckingham likely to forget that he had been forbidden by Philip's orders to attend the meetings of the Junta of Theologians, because he had flung out of the room when, at the first conference, Charles had shown that he was impressed by Boverio's arguments. [*Turin, ib.*, Tarantaise to Duke, May 26, May 28, June 14, 1623. *F. de Jesu*, op. cit., p. 58. *Mantua, ib.*, Nerli to Duke, May 16, June 30, 1623.]

Possibly this occurrence had opened his eyes to the risk which he was running by pressing forward the marriage negotiations in defiance of the English Puritans, for he knew that if Charles were to become a Catholic he himself would be in very great danger. [Cf. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Charles to Buckingham, 26 April, 1624.] Within a few days of the issue of Philip's order Charles and Buckingham were writing to James to ask for his commands to return home, and Buckingham had, through Sir

Francis Nethersole, entered into a correspondence with the English Envoy at the Hague, Sir Dudley Carleton, who was the chosen friend of the Palatine and Prince Maurice, and a deadly enemy of everything Spanish. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Charles and Buckingham to James, June 6, 1623. Add. 36,446, p. 153, Carleton to Buckingham, Hague, Aug. 25, Sept. 4, 1623.] It is certain, however, that Olivares was in favour of the marriage.

All Spain went wild with delight when the engagement was publicly announced. The Cortes received the announcement with the utmost joy, and, despite their previous opposition, made the King a grant of two million ducats a year and a gift of four millions. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. 36,449, Aston to Calvert, 28 June, 8 July, 1623.]

Buckingham, Bristol, and Aston went to congratulate the Infanta and had the honour of kissing her hand, "my Lord Duke having, by this means, already introduced the fashion of the English Court." At the same time Buckingham delivered to her a letter from her future father-in-law. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. 36,449, Aston to Calvert, *let. cit.*, Harl. 6,987, Charles to James I., July 15, 1623.]

On July 21, James I. and his Council had sworn publicly to the marriage articles with great solemnity, although the King felt some scruples at doing so, and by the fifth of August, Sir Francis Cottington had reached Madrid with the news. [*London, Brit. Mus.* Add. 36,449, Aston to Calvert, 13 Aug., O.S. Harl. 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, July (undated) 1623.]

The messenger had arrived at a very opportune moment. Inojosa was greatly trusted by the Spanish Government and, so at least Charles and Buckingham believed, had promised to support the marriage. On his arrival in London, however, he seems for the first time to have realized how very strong the opposition to it was in England, and to have seen that many officials were throwing difficulties in the way of the fulfilment of the King's promises to the Catholics. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Charles etc., to James, 20 Aug. *London, S.P.O.*, S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol., 150, No. 105. Calvert to Conway, 14 Aug. Do. Vol. 151, No. 8. Do. to do. 18 August. Do. No. 27. Do. to do. Aug. 21, 1623. Don Carlos Coloma was very angry at the delay and threatened to complain to Spain.]

He seems also to have been influenced by the Flemish resident, Van Male, who had always disbelieved in James' friendship and

who through the agents of the Government at Brussels in Holland was well acquainted with the tortuous intrigues at the Hague. [*F. de Jesu*, op. cit. P. 80.]

Acting upon Buckingham's suggestions, James had insisted that Inojosa should allow Calvert to see his despatches which the King found were "leaner and drier" than he expected, although it is hardly probable that he had perused those which excited the keenest interest in the Spanish Council of State. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987. Charles, etc. to James, July 15. James to Charles, August 5, 1623. *London, S.P.O.*, S.P. Dom. Jas. I., Vol. 150, No. 113. Conway to Calvert, 16 Aug., 1623.]

Writing on July the sixteenth (N.S.), Inojosa said that the King of England had been greatly annoyed by the delay in the marriage, which had made him very suspicious, and, therefore, he lent an ear to what Buckingham, who was said to be against it, wrote. Buckingham's hostility was the work of the Dutch, who had paid him eighty thousand ducats to make someone "they wished for," probably Conway, Secretary of State, and to settle the differences between England and the Provinces about Indian affairs. Should the Match fall through, war, Inojosa thought, was certain, and there would be a terrible persecution of the Catholics. Buckingham must be kept in good humour at all costs.

On the following day the envoy wrote that James was now heartily sorry that he had ever allowed his son to go to Spain and was urging him to return home. It looked very much as if the Prince would do so, and it seemed equally likely that he would marry in France, though, as Inojosa explained, his father was quite honest in his intentions towards Spain. He also sent a memorandum pointing out Buckingham's reasons for breaking off the marriage so as to make friends with the Puritans. He begged to be furnished with a large sum of money, without which he could not gain any supporters in England. Coloma confirmed his statements.

On July the twenty-fourth, the Marquis wrote that the King had quite laid aside his feelings of mistrust, when the courier from Madrid arrived with the papers containing the arrangements, which had been made with the Prince, and which the King and the Council would have to swear to. It had been arranged that the articles should be ratified on the thirtieth of July. It was believed that Buckingham was doing Spain some ill-turns. The

King had been so much annoyed at the proposal to celebrate the marriage *de rato* and to defer the consummation, that negotiations had been upon the point of being broken off, as His Majesty thought that this showed that Philip distrusted him though he should have been more influenced by the Prince's coming to Spain. Inojosa urged that Charles should not leave Madrid before his marriage had been confirmed, as it would be necessary that the lands and quitrents, which, according to the English fashion, were to be settled upon the Infanta as her dowry, should be specified before the settlements were made to ascertain if they were of the value at which they were set down in them.

Cottington and he had arranged that the powers for signing an alliance should be sent to Madrid.

Coloma added that the Palatine had not signed the Peace preliminaries and that as he had told the Ministers, until he did so, the Congress at Cologne could not be opened.

All the English lords were making great preparations to receive the Infanta, and if the Spanish Envoys appeared in less splendour than they did, it would cast a fearful slur upon them, but, if they received no money, they could do nothing. [*London, Brit. Mus. Eg. 2,080. Précis of Inojosa's and Coloma's despatches to Philip IV. from 16 July to 4 August, 1623.*]

As Bristol, but a few days before, had told Charles that by the French Ambassador's means the Spanish Ambassador had seen all the letters which he and Buckingham had written to the King, and that "he was betrayed in his bedchamber," there is little difficulty in accounting for Inojosa's knowledge of James' most secret thoughts. He may, indeed, have expressed his ill opinion of Buckingham to Carlisle on purpose, and, like the Venetian Ambassador, have thought it politic to foment James' jealousy of his favourite on every occasion. But both Inojosa and Valaresso underrated the strength of the royal dotard's affection for his "sweet Steenie." [*London, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, Aug. 20, 1623. James to Charles, etc., let. cit., Aug. 5, 1623. London S.P.O., Cal. Ven., S.P., pp. 634-636. Valaresso to Doge, April 21, 1623, let. cit.*]

Before Inojosa's despatches could reach Madrid, Buckingham whose interest for the moment certainly was to bring about the marriage, made another attempt to come to an understanding with Olivares.

With Charles' approval he took advantage of the opening

made by Philip's frank expression of delight that the Prince had accepted his offer that he should contract the marriage and stay on in Spain until the Infanta could accompany him in the Spring. They thought it therefore "a fitt time in the heate of these expressions to try their good natures, and press the infanta's present going." The Duke accordingly went to the Count, and after once more going over the familiar arguments which must now have grown somewhat threadbare, as to the whys and wherefores which rendered the Infanta's speedy advent in England so desirable, he bluntly asked whether Olivares had any reason of State for the delay which he hoped to gain in the Spring, for in that case he could prove that it would be much better for him to compass it then, as any delay would only serve to breed mistrust between the two kingdoms. Taking a leaf out of Olivares' own book he went on to work upon the Count's better feelings, entreating him to "think of my poor particular, who had waited upon the Prince hither and in that distasted all the people in general, how he laide me open to there malice and revenge, when I had brought from them there prince a freeman, and should return him bound by a contract and so locked from all posteritie till they pleased here, how I would not think of this obligation if he would beleieve me in it without horror and fere, if I were not his faithfull frend and servant and intended thankfulness," Olivares interrupted this pathetic appeal to his better feelings "with manie grumblings, but ut last sayde I had bewiched him, but if there was a wych in the companie I ame sure there was a divell too."

The Spanish Intelligence Service was by no means inefficient and Olivares was probably already aware that Buckingham's chief reason for wishing to have the Infanta in England was that "by that means we may upon equaler terms treat with them of other things" of which "things" Buckingham discreetly reminded him. This advantage was one which no Spanish statesman could wish to put into James' most irresolute hands.

Buckingham then took a step which had Clarendon known of it would have served him as a crushing argument to refute Rusdorf's malignant gossip.

"From him I repaired to his ladie, whoe I must tell you, by the way is as good a woman as lives, which makes me think all favorits must have good wives whom I tould what I had done, she liked it verie well and promised her best assistance, some

three or four days after the prince sent to intreat him (Olivares) to settle her (the Infanta's) house, and to give order in other things for the journie, he asked what day he would goe away, but himself named the nine and twentieth of your August (Sept. 9, N.S.), which the Prince accepted of; some two days after the goode Countess sent for me the most afflicted woman in the world, and tould me the *Infanta had tould her* ' the prince meant to goe away without her, and for her part she tooke it so ill to see him so careless of her that she would not be contracted till the day he was to take his leave,' the Countes told me the way to mend this was to go to the Condie and put the whole business in the King's hands with this protestation that he would rather stay seaven years than goe without his mistres he soe much esteemed her, and if I saw after that this did not make good effects, that the Prince might come off without her upon your Maties' commands at his pleasure.' " "

With this offer Buckingham went back to the Conde, who received it " but doggedly," and the next day he had an audience with the Infanta, " to test her pulse." His excuse was that James had sent him to explain the difficulties, which he had met with in persuading the Council to agree to the marriage at all, and that he himself had done so merely for her sake. He assured her that the Prince had never spoken of leaving except in order " to get away " the sooner, but that in future he would take no further steps in this matter, as he was subjected " to so ill offices," except she would take this for granted that he would never goe without her, which she liked verie well of." Buckingham then went on to say that since she was the Prince's wife his one thought was to gain her the love of the English people, and explained that the articles were only promises for future performance, but that as many Catholics were fined in the Exchequer the Prince, if she asked him to do so, " would beg his father to remit there fines although at a loss to himself. He asked James to believe he had not done ill in doing so," for " what with this, and that news of the sending the four shippes to Leith," to rescue the Ostend galleon which was blockaded there by the Dutch, " this morning the Condie hath sent the Prince this *recautho*, otherwise could message, that the King, the infanta and the Condie are the best contented that can be and he should not now dout his sure going away and to carie the infanta with him." [*London, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6,987, Buckingham to James, 30 July, 1623. Do. to*

Conway, 30 July, 1623. Charles, etc., to James, 15 July, 1623. *Turin*, ib. Tarantaise to Duke, August 8, 1623. *London*, S.P.O. S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 150, No. 106, Conway to Brooke, Aug. 14.]

Both sides, indeed, were marking time. The Spaniards were waiting for the news that James and his Councillors had confirmed the Marriage Articles, and, in secret, were watching the course of events in Germany with an anxious eye. Buckingham, although in appearance he had thrown himself heartily into the cause of the marriage, had yet to learn the result of his correspondence with Carleton. The Nuncio had done his best to bring about the marriage, and, in doing so, had considered alike the interests and the wishes of Gregory XV. From the Pope's point of view, indeed, an alliance between Spain and England would facilitate the task of bringing the Valtelline under the control of the Church. If Spain was able to send her troops to Flanders by sea, she would have less cause to concern herself about the passes of the Eastern Alps. His Holiness felt that it would be useless to raise the question of "Liberty of Conscience," for the English Catholics in connection with the Marriage Articles. At most, he hoped to be able to persuade James to allow them to worship God in peace, "and no longer to look upon them as children of wrath." In return the Holy See was always to impress upon them the duty of rendering Cæsar his due. [*London*, *Brit. Mus.*, Add. 37,028. Instructions to Massimi, etc., to treat for the Dispensation, 12 April, Gregory XV. to James I., 2 May, 1623, *let. cit.*]

The Spanish Council knew that there was great alarm in Italy at the armaments which were being made both at Milan and by Archduke Leopold, and it was evident that neither Feria nor Pastraña, now Spanish Ambassador at Rome, wished to relax the hold which Spain had upon the Chiavenna and the Valtelline. The Council accordingly rebuked both Leopold and Feria. [*London*, *Brit. Mus.*, Eg. 318. Council debates Nuncio's representations, 28 Aug. Pastraña's proposal to return Chiavenna till the settlement, 13 Sept., 1623.]

Seeing themselves assured of the English alliance, the Council felt strong enough to make concessions both to the Pope and France. They knew that the French had been urging the Dutch to hold out against a Truce with Spain, and, indirectly, at least had given every encouragement to Mansfeldt and to Halberstadt to continue in arms in Germany. Elizabeth of Spain was the

sister of Louis XIII., and in her anxiety, had written to him early in June that a war between the two Crowns would be her death. Thanks to her earnest pleadings, and, possibly, to the announcement of Charles' engagement, which seemed to put an end to all hopes of an alliance between France and England, the French Ambassador formally declared before the Council of State that his court was not in alliance with the Dutch and had not supported Mansfeldt. This declaration gave them great pleasure. In return Pastraña had been instructed to leave the settlement of the Valtelline in the Pope's hands, as the one wish of Spain was to please the French. In writing to his brother-in-law to announce the conclusion of the English marriage, Philip IV. said that his alliance with England would make no change in his friendship with France. But that friendship had undergone a strain sufficiently severe to give a point to Buckingham's argument to Olivares, that a marriage alone without a friendship based upon a just settlement of all differences was not a sufficient bond of union between two great powers. [*Turin*, ib. Tarantaise to Duke, August 5, 1623. *Mantua* ib., Nerli to Duke, July 18, 19, 1623. *London*, *Brit. Mus.*, Eg. 318. Council of State on Manuel Sucyro's Report from Flanders, 13 Sept., 1623. Do. Harl. 6,987. Buckingham to James, 30 July, 1623, *let. cit.*]

But though Gregory XV. had been in the Spanish interest, the politics of his eventual successor were altogether uncertain. Intrigues ran high in the conclave and both the French and the Spanish factions were working hard for the success of their respective candidates. [*Turin*, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, Aug. 5, 1623.]

In German and Dutch affairs the Council were showing themselves equally inclined to peace. Mme. de Tserclaes had returned from the Hague without an answer to the last paper which had been given to her by the Infanta, and so Cardinal Cueva recommended that remembering the temperament of the Dutch, negotiations ought not to be pushed on too quickly. The Council decided that in order that they might not lose a single chance, they would comply with his advice and sent instructions to Brussels accordingly. They added that they did not give up their hopes that the Infanta would succeed in bringing about a Conference, as the negotiations with England had now reached a point which was "giving the Dutch anxiety," and this would make it somewhat easier to arrange one with them.

At the same sitting they discussed a despatch from Oñate of the fourteenth of June, requesting instructions as to the Spanish claims in Alsace. In reply, they pointed out that if Spain took possession of the province she would give umbrage to all the neighbouring German princes, and that if she allowed the Archduke Leopold to do so, he was such a restless spirit that he would be a constant source of disturbance. It would be well, indeed, to keep a careful eye upon him, lest he should try to get it into his hands. They thought it best, therefore, that Oñate should persuade the Emperor to unite the province with his own patrimony, and that, instead of carrying out his promise to hand it over to Spain, he should find some compensation for them elsewhere. If the Emperor could not do this, he might, at least, exchange the lands he might eventually obtain in Alsace for those held by the Archduke Charles. He would thus at least prevent it from falling into the Archduke Leopold's hands.

In any case by their orders to Oñate, they were doing their best to carry out their promise to Bristol that they would urge the Emperor and the Infanta Isabella to promote a settlement in Germany. [*London, Brit. Mus., Eg. 318. Council of State, July 14, August 4, 10, 28, 1623.*]

But the very fact that the Emperor was in treaty with Spain for the cession of German territories, and more especially of Alsace, was certain to arouse the jealous suspicions of every German prince and more especially of the new Elector of Bavaria, who knew that a settlement in Germany could only be effected at the expense of the Catholic League, and more especially of himself.

Khevenhüller, indeed, as Maximilian's representative at Madrid was now the only diplomat who persisted in his opposition to the Marriage.

He was sadly handicapped by want of money. Out of economy the Imperial Ministers now no longer lavished upon their Spanish colleagues those German and Flemish jewels and trinkets which they had formerly given them every three years, whilst Philip IV. was offended that an invitation which he had sent to the Archduke Charles to visit Madrid had remained unanswered. Thus the two branches of the House of Austria were daily growing more estranged, and "the mill wheel did not work well." Khevenhüller did not see whom amongst the Spanish courtiers he could justly blame for this. The Queen was French, the Infanta

English, the King, who had the English every day before his eyes, very seldom went to see the Infanta Margaret who more than anyone else had encouraged the Infanta to hold out against the marriage. Those who still held by Germany "are looked upon as dung." [Goetz, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., pp. 250-251. Khevenhüller to Maximilian, 1 Aug., 1623. Memorandum by Dr. Jocher, undated.]

It was known that the Catholic League could not afford to carry on the war; the Rhenish towns were holding back, no help could be expected from the Kaiser, even at Munich people saw that the army would have to be disbanded, Bavaria by herself was powerless. [Riezler, op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 251-252.]

Cottington had travelled from England in such haste that he fell into a violent fever and was thought to be at death's door. At his earnest request he was admitted, so said the Madrid gossips, into the Catholic Church by Fray. Don Diego de la Fuente, the well known *Padre Maestro*, but after being twice let blood, he was soon out of danger, and, thereupon, again became a Protestant. [London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,449. Aston to Calvert, 13 Aug., 21 Aug., 1623. O.S. For Cottington's conversion Cf., *F. de Jesu*, op. cit., pp. 82, 84.] As, however, Cottington continued to be regarded by the Spaniards as their best friend in England, Father Francisco's story may be untrue. [Cf. Brussels. *E. et G.* No. 208, l'Infante Isabelle, concernant Rubens, 1628-1629, *passim*.]

He had brought with him the letter of the twenty-second of July in which James announced that he consented that the Infanta should remain in Spain after the celebration of the marriage. Philip and his ministers were "extraordinarily satisfied" that everything "had been so fully and clearly despatched according to their desires," and Aston wrote that he would shortly be able to "advertise" Calvert of the celebration of the *Desposorios* (betrothal), "which stayeth upon an answer from Rome, which is now howery expected." [London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,449. Aston to Calvert, 13 Aug., 1623, O.S.]

On August the ninth, the paper of the "consummation at Christmas" was delivered to Aston to give to the Prince. [Add. 36,447, Aston's Report cit. London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 151, No. 92. Francis Webley to Sir Dudley Carleton. London, Aug., 1623.] It was rumoured in London that the Infanta "was to be handed over in March."

But shortly after Cottington's arrival Buckingham, who had just heard of his creation as a Duke, received tidings from the Hague which changed his outlook as to the position of affairs. He knew that he was assured of James' favour and, at the same moment, he learnt that he had secured the goodwill of the Queen of Bohemia, through whom he was able to count upon the support of the English Puritans. [*London, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6,987. James I., Lady Buckingham, Lady Denbigh to Buckingham. Buckingham to Queen of Bohemia. Undated. From Madrid.*]

We only know the contents of Elizabeth of Bohemia's letter from Buckingham's reply. He, despite his previous communications with Nethersole, was evidently surprised at the extraordinary favour which she had shown him, especially as he had hitherto been unable to send her anything but "obscure words, professions and protestations, for as yett for manie respects which most concerne yourselfe, I must doe no other." He went on to say that whatsoever he might do in the future in her service, his enemies would say that her extraordinary favour had been the cause of it, although he knew that he was doing but his duty. "I will conclude with telling you what an unnaturall brother you have, who when he had most cause of confidence in the good success of his marriage, protested he would not be ingaged till he might iudge what could become of your business, it being one of the chiefest causes of his iournie." [*London, Brit. Mus., Harl., 6,987. Buckingham to Queen of Bohemia. From Madrid, undated, cit.*]

The new Duke of Buckingham had good reasons for wishing to stand well with the Queen of Bohemia. Charles, it is true, appeared to be devoted to him, and took "extraordinarie care" of him during his illness, but one who, within twelve years, had risen from the garret of a Cambridge college to a Dukedom, might well doubt whether he could wholly rely upon the friendship of a lad whom even a Venetian Envoy had reported not to be his friend at heart. [*London, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6,987. Charles, etc. to James (Postscript in Buckingham's handwriting), 20 August, 1623. Cal., S. P. Venetian, p. 451. Lando to Senate, Rel. Cit.*] James within the previous twelve months had seemed inclined to lend an ear to those who wished to impose another favourite upon him, and the fate of Somerset must have often been present to his eyes. [As to Arthur Brett, cf. *supra London, Cal. S.P.*

Ven., pp. 529-530. Valaresso to Doge, Dec. 23, 1622 and ib. Preface pp. XXII.-XXIV.]

Under such circumstances Buckingham might well wish to feel assured of the support both of the great Puritan party and of the woman who at any moment might become the heiress to his master's throne. If he could feel certain that he had gained the favour of Elizabeth of Bohemia he knew that he had a free hand to deal at his pleasure with the negotiations for the match. It depended, therefore, upon circumstances whether he should forward or oppose it.

Apparently at the end of July, Olivares and the Lord Admiral of England were upon the best of terms, but friction between them was only suspended.

Before the middle of August the Council had learnt from Inojosa of Buckingham's intrigues with the Dutch and at the same time had received tidings which showed but too clearly how little advantage was likely to accrue to them from the English Marriage.

A rich ship freighted with the spoils of Ormuz had arrived in London and plundered spices and silks to the value of two million ducats [£500,000], were being sold publicly on the Exchange. Inojosa wrote that he was trying to induce James to lay an embargo upon the vessel, and had suggested that if he could not stop the traffic altogether he might at least seize the cargo as a part payment on account of the Infanta's dowry. James I. had, however, refused to move and the cause of his refusal soon became known. Buckingham, as Lord Admiral, was the person whose courts held jurisdiction in such cases, but as on the thirty-first of July, the King had written to inform him that he had received a payment of £2,000 from the East India Company upon his account, it was impossible to persuade his agents to take any action to prevent the scandal.

The business alluded to in the King's letter was to prove of fateful importance.

To an ambitious and avaricious statesman, if not even to a King, the goodwill of the East India Company was of no mean value. Since its foundation twenty-four years before, its imports had risen to an annual amount of £400,000, and in its trade with the East and with the Continent of Europe it employed about fifteen thousand tons of "great and valuable shipping," and above three thousand seamen. The spices, the indigo, the

benjamin, the refined salt-petre and the silks which they brought to their warehouses at Blackwall were the instruments with which England had dissipated for ever the Spanish dream of universal monarchy. The Spaniards had built up their Empire upon the profits of six for one which they had gained by exchanging the merchandise of Europe and the West Indies for the wares of the East, and those profits were now in great part passing into the hands of the traders of London and of Amsterdam. About a hundred thousand pounds worth of these imports were consumed in the British Isles, and thus about three-fourths of them remained available for re-exportation, whilst it was reckoned that by their calicos alone they saved the Kingdom the expenditure of at least two hundred thousand pounds for foreign cambrics, lawns, and linen cloth. It was true that they were forced to export specie to pay for their purchases in the East to the amount of thirty or forty thousand pounds a year, but, on the other hand, bullion came in from the Continent in return for their dyes and spices, and the Deputy-Governor could inform the House of Commons that in one year he had sent to the mint sixty pounds of fine gold, derived from this source alone. Both Prince Charles and Buckingham had already had dealings with the Company. Buckingham had acted as their agent in arranging their relations with the Dutch, whilst Charles had wearied their Governor with his projects for sending flat-bottomed boats to assist the Great Mogul in his pearl fisheries, and for raising wrecks in Indian waters. Both knew that the friendship, perhaps the fears, of the Directors might in the long run prove of more value than the encumbered dowry of a Spanish Infanta, and the means for gaining their goodwill, if not for putting pressure on the Company were now close to their hands.

As even English diplomatists like Sir Henry Wootton had from the first foreseen, the taking of Ormuz, the news of which reached England early in 1623, was destined to have a profound influence upon the relations between England and Spain. It was an act of piracy for it was farcical to allege that the enterprise had been undertaken as a reprisal for outrages committed by the Portuguese upon the Company. According to the Company's own account indeed, the reprisals, justified or the reverse, which they had made elsewhere had produced over one hundred thousand pounds. Of this amount Buckingham, as Lord High Admiral, was by custom if not by law entitled to receive one-tenth part, and, moreover,

he had been forbidden by the King to receive any reward for the part which he had taken in mediating between the Company and the Dutch. On Sunday the twentieth of July, however, James I. summoned the governor Sir William Hallidaie, the Deputy-Governor Morris Abbott and some others of the Court of Directors to Whitehall. Having ordered everyone else to leave the presence, His Majesty proceeded to say that the Duke had informed him that the Company before he left for Spain had promised "to gratify him," a promise which they had since confirmed. His Majesty, therefore, advised them to do it now in his absence, when the gift will come the more acceptably, "because it would prove that they had been mindful of him." Smiling, as he spoke, he added that the "gratification" had, doubtless, "been held back until the Ormuz business had been cleared up, but that as the ships from the East Indies had now arrived, he doubted not but that they would immediately carry out their promise. The Deputy-Governors could send their reply to him whilst he was in progress." Three days afterwards the Court met and were forced to admit that the Ormuz business "might form a strong opposition," and that the Duke's friendship would be of greater value to them than ever when they were navigating such troubled waters. The rest of the Lords had already received a reward for their share in the treaty with the Dutch and they, therefore, decided to give the Duke £2,000 "as well for favours granted in the late negotiations with the Dutch, as to sweeten him for their future occasions and particularly for that of Ormuz." The King lost no time in despatching the welcome news to his favourite at Madrid.

Buckingham, doubtless, looked upon the £2,000 merely as a payment on account, but he was destined to meet with great difficulties in collecting the balance of his blood-money. Some months after the Duke's return to England, Abbott informed his fellow directors that he had taken an opportunity to sound him as to how the Company stood with regard to their Ormuz business, and as to their reprisals elsewhere in the Indies. Buckingham had evaded the question, but said that he would be willing to meet some of the Directors. On the thirteenth of February, 1624, a Committee was accordingly appointed to deal with the Lord High Admiral. Counsel had already advised that the Admiral's claim was unfounded, and the Court, therefore, instructed their representatives not to enter into any discussion with him upon

the subject, but only "if he shall charge the Company either in point of piracy or otherwise to his advantage," they were to reply that they hoped that it would not fall out to be so, and it was further decided that they should not make any offer of a compromise, "but should stand upon their innocency." Buckingham was not the man to sit down patiently under such an affront at a moment when circumstances had placed the Company at his mercy. By the Common Law it was forbidden to export bullion from the Kingdom without the Royal license, but, in practice, this prohibition was consistently disregarded. The annual fleet for the East Indies was being fitted out, and chests of ryals or pieces of eight to the amount of £30,000 or £40,000 had been packed to be sent on board. A chance reference to the Company in a debate in the House of Commons fired the train. Sir Thomas Estcourt, one of the representatives for Gloucestershire, rose and moved that the ships should be searched for bullion and the House rang with shouts of "Search their books," when he added that £80,000 in gold and silver was being sent out of the realm. In vain those directors who were members strove to defend their Company, the motion was renewed in the Lords by Buckingham himself, and the convoy remained at its moorings off Blackwall. The Court met and named a Committee to interview His Majesty upon the subject. Their reception was a cool one. James I. was well aware that in such cases of dubious conduct the Dutch Company gave five per cent. to the States and five to the Prince of Orange and was determined that both he and Buckingham, whom he had forbidden to compound with the Company, should receive the uttermost farthing of their ill-gotten dues. He told the Committee to their faces that the Company were a set of pirates, ordered his Attorney-General to proceed against them for £15,000, and flatly refused to take less than £10,000 for a composition. They protested their unwillingness to go to law with their sovereign, but their courtly reluctance only inflamed the monarch yet more. They had promised him, he stormed, £1,000 for the business of Ormuz. He was no tyrant to deny his subjects the benefit of the law. By law the matter should be tried. In his turn the Lord Admiral refused to release the ships unless Parliament should order otherwise. Then the King, with rising anger, loaded them with reproaches for their ingratitude. "Did I deliver you from the complaint of the Spaniard, and do you return me nothing?" They had taken £100,000 in reprisals

justly or unjustly; if unjustly they had lost all, if justly they must pay a droit of tenths, and he would not suffer the Lord Admiral to compound. The Committee withdrew, and at once made an offer of £5,000 after a discussion in which Buckingham's conduct was criticised in such terms that it was not entered on their minutes. By the eighth of March the fleet had dropped down to Tilbury Hope, but the final permission for it to sail did not arrive until the twenty-third, after an offer of £10,000 had been indignantly rejected at Whitehall. Finally, in the following July, the Company handed over £20,000 to the King and to the Lord Admiral, and humbly besought Lord Conway to advise them as to the form in which the Acquittances should be drawn up. Two years later when Buckingham's Impeachment was being agitated the matter was brought by Wandesford before the House of Commons, and the "Exactions of the Duke of Buckingham" were not one of the least weighty charges on which that impeachment was founded.

Such was the outcome of an affair which was to have a great influence on the course of the negotiations for the Spanish Match. [*London, Brit. Mus.* Eg. 335, Royal Order, 27 April, 1623, cit. Eg. 318, Council of State, 19 Aug., 18 Sept., 1 Oct., 1623. Harl. 6,987, James to Charles and Buckingham, 17 March, 31 July, 1623. *London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom.*, Jas. I., Vol. 151, No. 87, Chamberlain to Carleton, Aug. 30, 1623, for arrival of an India ship, *Calendar of State Papers Colonial, East Indies, 1622-1624, passim.*]

As soon as the news that the spoils of Ormuz were being sold in London reached Madrid, the Council of Portugal, which controlled East Indian affairs, was ordered to report upon the matter, and the Council of Portugal had already had some experience of the spirit in which the Prince and the Duke regarded Spanish interests in the East Indies.

A few days later a fresh quarrel took place between the English and the Spanish favourites. The occasion was ill-chosen and the incident shows Buckingham's temper and breeding in a somewhat unfavourable light.

On the eighteenth of August the Infanta was to celebrate her seventeenth birthday. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. 8,355. Leonardo Moro, Rel. 1627, cit.]

Charles was to visit her that afternoon in order to present his good wishes accompanied by the King and by the grandees, but according to Spanish etiquette he could not do so unless the Queen was present. The Queen was far advanced in pregnancy

and had kept her bed for two days before, but though both the King and the Courtiers feared that she would miscarry, she had insisted upon getting up to welcome the Prince.

After the visit was over Olivares sent a message through Aston to the Prince to say that a Comedy was to be played that evening in the Queen's apartment, and that a seat would be prepared for him from which he could see the Infanta.

The Prince, after speaking to Buckingham, told Aston to ask the Conde if the King was to be present, when the Ambassador pointed out that this was but a dry message and asked him what he meant by it, the Prince, who from the first moment of his engagement had believed that the Infanta would always sit by him at plays spoke in a more open way. [*London, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6,987, Charles to James, 15 July, 1623.*] "He sayd that he thought that now Sir Francis Cottington was returned and had brought all the capitulations sworn and confirmed, he expected that they should now not use him as a stranger. Therefor if the King would see ye comedy he saw no reason why he should not be admitted thither to accompany ye King and ye Infanta, and commanded me to acquaint ye Conde with as much desiring yt if ye King would see itt yt. he might accompany His Matie. Having delivered this message to ye Conde he answered me yt. ye comedy was to be acted in ye Queene's privat roomes wher no man entered, and yt. ye Queen had risen yt. day on purpose for His H's. sake, and would be glad to see ye comedy att her ease when she might leane upon cushions and take what ease she thowt good, wch. she could not doe if ye prince were ther, and further said yt. itt was a great discomfort to him when he thowt to have served ye prince to have itt so ill-understood and yt. required yt. wch. could not be consented unto.

"I returned ye prince this answer, who after he had again consulted itt with my Ld. Duke, commanded me to tell ye Conde yt. in ye place where he might see ye Infanta he might see ye Queen, and since she desyred to have her ease, he feared she might be as scrupulous to take her liberty when the Prince might privately see her, as when he publicly accompanied her, and therefor without he might bee where the King was, he desyred to be excused, for he would not come up; the Conde seemed much troubled, and said that the King would be very much annoyed at this (*seria muy sentido dello*). He told me yt. ye Queen was to be in a place wher the Prince could not see her and yt. ye Prince

although he were married could not see a play in yt. roome in yt. maner as he deasired itt." With this answer Aston returned to Charles and Buckingham, "and entreated them that they would not sticke upon ye doing what was desyred, which I saw would give a very great distast and much injure ye present estate of ye businesse. I was commanded by His Highness assisted by my Ld. Duke to tell ye Conde yt. without he might have leave to accompany ye King he desired to be excused for not coming up." With this reply Aston acquainted the Count who told the King of it. Thereupon Philip went to the play, and during the performance, Charles stayed chatting with some ladies in an adjoining room.

Some hours afterwards the Count sent for Aston and told him that His Majesty "was sensible of what ye Prince had down, and so was hee as intending itt *cosa del Duque* (as he took it to be the Duke's doing), and desyred me yt. I would tell ye Duke so wch. I did."

"The Duke's answer was yt. he was sory if His Matie. had taken any offence at him, but he hoped yt. he should be as well able to satisfy his Matie. in this as he had done in some other distasts which he had taken against him, yt. he was not the autor of this but reslotution of ye Prince's, but yt. it was trew he had seconded ye Prince's resolution thinking it were grounded and did much wonder why they should deny him this freedome, considering ye present state of ye affayres of ye match, but he saw yt. ye Conde was willing to take all occasions to fall heavy upon him. I carried up this message to ye Conde whose answer was that this would be esteemed a neglect of ye Infanta, and I should understand next day what noyse it would make: for his part he desired yt. ye business might pass over for he would not have any contentions with ye Duke; by ye Duke I was presentlie returned to ye Conde with this answeare yt. he was ever glad to embrace his love and peace with him, and accepted of his offer, yt. it might quietly pass over; ye Prince commanded mee to tell ye Conde yt. what he had downe was only in hope to gain more, and to have sate by his mistris, and whosoever should think itt a disesteem, itt (*sic*), must declare himself his enemy: this as to a friend he advertised ye Conde of yt. he might use ye same language to any yt. he should find made any other interpretation of it." [Add. 36,447. Aston's Rep. *cit.* Mantua. Nerli, 14 Sept., 1623.] According to Nerli, the affair took place about the time when

the Queen's pregnancy was first announced, and, at such times the Spanish Queens did not appear in public. He only seems to have learnt of the incident after Charles had left Madrid.

Although Aston was a humble servant of Buckingham's, and a favourite of Charles', it is clear from his own showing that the Prince was in the wrong, and the incident was destined to have grave consequences in the future.

The quarrel took place at a most unfortunate time. On the following day, the nineteenth of August, the Report of the Council of Portugal on Inojosa's despatch as to the sale of the spoils of Ormuz in London came before the Council of State. The discussion was marked with some bitterness, although, at the instance of Gondomar it was decided that Inojosa should be instructed merely to ask that those connected with the India ship should be punished, and not to raise any question as to seizing the cargo in part payment of the Infanta's dowry. At the same time he pointed out that it would be well if they could come to an agreement with England to protect the Fleets from Brazil against the attacks of corsairs, and to carry out measures to prevent English merchants from trading beyond the line. But, despite the moderation of this resolution, the action of the English rankled in the minds of the Spanish statesmen. [*London, Brit. Mus. Eg.* 318, Council of State, 19 August, 1623.]

On the evening of that same day "the Prince sent for the Count desiring him yt. y ye King had taken any offence att what he had down yt. he would lett him understand yt. yt was an erreure of affection and upon what ground and hope he had down itt, and did further desire yt. if ye Infanta had otherwise understood itt otherways then well, yt. His Matie. would please to lett her trewly understand upon what reason he had don what he did, and yt. nothing could afflict him more that yt Her Hs. should take any offence at him, ther being noe place wher he could see her yt. he would not esteeme fitt for him to be in, and to have honour in itt. The Conde promised he would doe what His Hs. had commanded him.

"The Duke ye same day told ye Conde of Olivares yt. in respect he found yt. all ye actions of ye Prince wherewith they received not content here weare imputed to him he desired to absent himself and therefore he desired to goe away the Monday following. Ye Conde desyred him yt. he would stay until Thursday yt. he might see ye feast yet wch. Duke consented unto, wch

feast was celebrated upon Monday ye 21st August, St. Novo." [*London, Brit. Mus., Add. 36,447, Aston Rep., cit.*]

Neither Charles nor Aston said anything of this quarrel in their letters to England, possibly because they saw upon reflection that Olivares was in the right.

Unluckily for Charles it had been arranged that the meeting of the Junta of Theologians which was to give a final answer to the request which he had made through Buckingham that the Infanta should proceed with him before the winter, should be held on the twentieth of August.

The members of the Junta had for the most part always been opposed to the English Match, and three unfortunate occurrences had lately increased their suspicion that the engagements to the English Catholics might never be carried out.

The report of Cottington's pretended conversion, even if false, had shown them with what cynical contempt the Prince's most trusted servants looked upon any religious obligation. Shortly afterwards, Ballard, an English priest who was held in high esteem in London for his theological learning, and who had been with several of his fellow clergy, summoned by Buckingham to Madrid to assist him with his counsels was sent for to the Prince's apartment to administer the last sacraments to one of his pages who was thought to be upon his deathbed. At the door the priest was met by a crowd of the Prince's servants, headed by one of the most distinguished members of his Household, Sir Edmund Verney. The Priest remonstrated, but was hustled and kicked, and Verney went so far as to strike him on the mouth. Rumour asserted, though probably falsely, that the outrage had been committed by the Prince's orders. Ballard, fearing that he had incurred his patrons' displeasure, went to Buckingham and said that, in accordance with his religious duties, he would, at the call of a dying penitent, have gone to him even in the Palace of Whitehall. Buckingham replied: "You are quite right, no one who really cares for his religion, whatever it be, could act otherwise." Finally one of Philip's gentlemen of the bed-chamber had found a copy of a translation into Spanish of an English Catechism [cf., Note 1], which was richly bound lying upon a sideboard in Charles' room. It was brought to the King who sent it back without opening it to Charles' attendants. The Prince made no remark as to its disappearance and was thought to have shown great dissimu-

lation. [*F. de Jesu*, op. cit., pp. 82-84. *Verney Memoirs*, Vol. I., pp. 82, 83.]

Under these circumstances the refusal of the Junta to allow of any alteration in the conditions which they had laid down as to the marriage was even more decided and from their point of view better grounded than before. They stated that the more they thought the business over, the more clearly they saw that they had taken the right line, and that not only what had happened in the past, but the experiences of every day which passed, fully justified their conduct. [*F. de Jesu*, pp. 82-83, op. cit. *Mantua*, ib. Nerli to Duke, Aug. 26, Sept. 14, 1623.]

Their answer was conveyed to the Prince, and he at once decided to return to England without his bride. Buckingham was just recovering from an ague and fever and the Prince was, therefore, forced to act as his Secretary. It is clear that both were bitterly disappointed at the answer, as they had thought that all difficulties had been finally overcome, and had never supposed that the Spanish Ministers would attach more credence to Inojosa's reports than to James' "reale proceedings," although they now knew that he had seen their own letters to London.

"The cause," wrote Charles, "why we have been so long unwryting to you since Cottington's cumming is that wee would try all meanes possible (before wee would send you word) to see if we could move them to send the Infanta before winter: they for forme's sake called the Devynes and they stuke to their owd resolution, but wee fynd by circumstances that Conscience is not the trew but seeming cause of the Infanta's stay, to conclude we have wrought what wee can, but since wee cannot have her with us that wee desyred, our next comfort is that wee hope shortlie to kiss your Matie's hands." [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl., 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, Aug. 20. *Mantua*, ib., Nerli to Duke. Aug. 26, Sept. 14. *London, S.P.O.*, S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 151. No. 89. Chamberlain to Carleton, Aug. 30, 1623. O.S. Rumours that the Prince would return without the Infanta had reached London before that date.]

Now that the Theologians had pronounced their decision, Olivares must have felt free to consider carefully the advantages of the two lines of policy which offered themselves to him.

It was now open to him to decide whether he would continue to seek the alliance of England or court the goodwill of the German Catholics.

Recent events may well have made him doubt the sincerity of Charles' overtures to the Catholics and have convinced him that if the Prince after all failed to carry his promises into effect, he would by bringing about a marriage between the Infanta and a Protestant, incur the undying hostility of the Church.

He had wished by carrying it through to secure three objects, the protection of the Indian trade, the subjugation of Holland, and the emancipation of the English Catholics. It was evident that his aims might prove far more difficult to attain than he had until that time believed, but he was also aware that he might find in the friendship of the Holy Roman Empire the means to accomplish the second if not the first of them. As he could not secure the support of the Empire without conciliating Maximilian of Bavaria, it was clearly his duty to take steps to renew an understanding which had been rudely interrupted by the reluctance of Spain to recognize the Transfer of the Electorate. He might justify his conduct to himself when he remembered Inojosa's reports that Buckingham was negotiating with the Dutch.

On the morning of the twentieth of August, the whole position of affairs was, if we may believe Khevenhüller, discussed in the Council of State, and the Councillors as was the custom, sent their opinions in writing to the King. The discussion was a long one. Olivares not only spoke at length, but said in so many words in his written opinion, "that even if the Kaiser slapped the King in the face and called him a rascal, the King ought not to throw him over or to exchange his friendship for that of anyone else. It would be all the better if he could retain the brotherly friendship of the King of England as well as that of the Kaiser, but, if he could not do so, he should break with England even if a hundred Infantas were married there. This was absolutely requisite both for the preservation of Catholic Christendom, and for that of the Electoral House of Bavaria. The King well knew what he owed to them." Olivares added that Philip should at all times be prepared to prevent anything which might be to the disadvantage of Bavaria, and to help Maximilian in every way he could. He knew that nothing ought to be done which might displease the Elector. Moreover His Majesty had all along said that Christendom must not suffer for the sake of his own interests. The Council would not overlook the question of bringing about a marriage between the Palatine's eldest son and the Emperor's daughter, but it must be left to the King of Spain to arrange it,

and the lad must be brought up as a Catholic. In the meantime the administration of the Palatine's territories must be left in the hands of the Kaiser and of the Elector of Bavaria, for they would not go a step further than this towards restoring them. The Palatine and his family might receive a pension like that which Charles V. had formerly granted to the House of Savoy.

If, however, it was determined that Bavaria should be given an eighth electorate, the College of Electors should be increased to Nine, and if the ninth was not bestowed upon a Catholic, the Emperor might grant it to the Landgrave Ludwig of Darmstadt.

Such was Olivares' advice to his master.

A large number of Councillors, however, amongst whom were Mexia, Gondomar, D. Pedro de Toledo, and Cardinal Zapata thought that in the interests of peace and concord, the English marriage should be arranged upon the best terms which could be obtained, and supported their views with every kind of argument, none of which, however, appeared to Khevenhüller to be well founded. As Olivares did not allow himself to be influenced by them in the slightest degree, it was not worth while, wrote the envoy to set them down at length "for at this moment, the final decision rests with him alone." If, added Khevenhüller, the Kaiser thought of bringing forward any plan for settling the troubles in Germany, which was likely to prove successful, it would be well for Maximilian to send an agent to Madrid with full powers to treat, or else commission him to do so, although he was by no means anxious for the employment.

Such was the report which Khevenhüller, some days later, despatched to Munich, after expending a large sum of money to get a sight not only of Olivares' report in writing, but also to those of nearly all the other members of the Council. It is only fair, however, to add that no reports of the kind are to be found in the Register of the Deliberations of the Council, which is now in the British Museum. [*London, Brit. Mus., Eg., 318 and 335, contain what are apparently complete reports of the deliberations of the Council of State during August, 1623.*]

So far as Olivares was concerned, the proposals might well have been put forward in good faith. James had from the first thought that the marriage which Olivares himself had been the first to suggest, namely that between the Palatine's heir and the younger Archduchess might be as good a way as any other for settling the troubles in Germany provided it could be brought about by the

King of Spain. Philip had, on the other hand, been equally firm in stating that he would not grant any concessions which might do any injury to religion in order to advance his own interests, although he had not put this plainly to either the Prince or Buckingham. It might, indeed, be a question how the King of England would like the proposals as now put forward, but, it might well be argued that as he had in the end consented to the Marriage Articles, he might also accept an arrangement which would insure that the Crown of England must in all probability, whatever happened, come to a Catholic Prince. Indeed, if we are to believe certain rumours which were in circulation in England in the following year, Olivares may have supposed that Charles would not have children. [*London, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6,987, James to Charles, etc., 17 March, 1623. Charles, etc., to James, 17, 29 March, 29 August 1623. Roca op. cit., pp. 325-326. Munich, Geh. St. Arch, 486-23., K.S. Lorenzo Stefani to Elector of Bavaria, May 29, 1624.*]

Such, according to Khevenhüller, was the position of affairs when Buckingham and Bristol, on the morning of August 22, sought an audience with the Count. In accordance with the instructions which they had received through Cottington, they at once began to treat about the business of the Palatinate.

After announcing to him that James had accepted the marriage articles, they for the first time connected the negotiations for the Match with those for the restoration of James' son-in-law.

They proposed that Frederick should be restored to all his dignities and territories, but that immediately he had been so, he should hand over the administration to his eldest son, who should be brought up at Vienna and married to the youngest Archduchess.

The Kings of England and of Spain were to make a joint request to Ferdinand and the College of Electors that they should allow the Duke of Bavaria to receive the Electoral dignity for himself and his heirs.

James offered that if the Palatine and Halberstadt would not acquiesce voluntarily in these terms, he would unite with Spain in compelling them to do so by force. On the other hand Spain must pledge herself to join England in a war against the Emperor if he refused to agree to these proposals.

Khevenhüller was immediately informed of these demands, and though he thought them absurd, he pointed out, when

writing the same day to Vienna, that though the Spanish Ministers were by no means pleased with them, it must always be remembered that they were very anxious to satisfy the English, and that some of them were utterly without experience in German affairs, whilst others were but ill-affected to the Catholic League. All he could do was to persevere patiently with his negotiations, though others might be as vehement as they would.

He presented a note to Olivares on the subject, which the Count agreed to keep strictly secret. [*Munich* ib., Khevenhüller to Emperor, August 22, 1623. Do. to Maximilian, September 7, 1623. *Goetz*, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., pp. 309-311. Khevenhüller to Emperor, September 7, 1623. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, James to Charles, etc., March 17, July 22, 1623.]

Khevenhüller, with the Nuncio's help, had already succeeded in bringing the Count to take a far more favourable view of German affairs than he had at first done, although he was obliged to move on very gently.

The Bishop of Bertinoro was, indeed, in a difficult position. The Conclave was still in session and until the result of the Papal Election was known it might well seem impossible for him to decide what line of conduct would most commend him to the future Pontiff. Even at Madrid the ecclesiastics were divided, for whilst the Junta of Divines was firm in its refusal to make further concessions to the English, Cardinal Zapata, in the Council, was equally firm in his support of the Match. Massimi, however, as Corner had pointed out, was not a man to oppose anything, and, apparently under pressure from Khevenhüller, he consented to further his efforts. [*London, Cal. Ven.*, J.P., pp. 616-618. Corner to Doge, April 6, 1623. *let. cit.*] He seemed, indeed, to be Khevenhüller's only supporter. The Archduchess Margaret, the saintly nun at the Barefooted Carmelites, no longer enjoyed the influence which she had owed to her wide experience in German affairs, and to her goodwill towards Germany. The Ministers at Brussels, who had formerly supported the interests of Germany, now countered them in every way, whilst, as the Emperor knew only too well, Oñate was always throwing "burning coals" upon everything. He had written home that when he had told the Emperor that it would have been far better if he had kept the transfer of the Electorate dark for the present, His Majesty had replied that it was no use to rake up that old business, but that they had now to see how they could get the Translation recog-

nized. This punctilio had raised a great stir at Madrid and Philip was only too ready to lend an ear to all that could be said about it. It was true that the King was asking for the Emperor's help, but on the condition that the Kaiser should not declare himself before he had given his word that he would settle the questions which were pending in Germany in accordance with the views of the Government at Brussels. It would be absolutely necessary that the Kaiser should keep his knowledge of these matters a secret from Oñate, who might otherwise discover Khevenhüller's informant. Moreover it was now time for the Kaiser to consider very carefully whether it was worth his while to continue to take Spain into account. The Spanish finances were in a far worse state than they had been at any moment during the last two years, thanks to the loss of Ormuz, and to the frightful scarcity of money, whilst the Duke of Feria was clamouring for eight millions for the War in the Valtelline, and "the King of England and his son at Madrid had also their spoons in the soup;" they must bethink themselves therefore that things will grow worse instead of better. They must remember that Spain was growing weaker every day; the Dutch and English were for ever attacking the coasts, and if anything happened to the fleet which was just being fitted out for the Indies, the country would be done for. It was no time for the Kaiser to sacrifice his own interests for the sake of Spain or to count upon her help. It would be best if both the Emperor and the Elector of Bavaria would stop importuning Spain for her assistance for a time, as in the long run they would get far more by doing so than by endless begging. If the Spaniards saw that the Emperor looked to them to defend him they would neither do so nor meet his wishes half so willingly as they would if they found that he could get on without them. Possibly if the Imperial armies gained a victory they would see their way more clearly. In the meantime both Oñate and that Saxon saint the Elector Beery Georgy would go on lying as usual. [*Munich* ib., Khevenhüller to Kaiser, August 22, 1623. As to the necessity of coming to an understanding with England to protect the Brazil Fleets, cf., *London, Brit. Mus., Eg., 318. Council of State, 19 Aug., 1623, Gondomar's speech.*]

Scarcely was the ink of Khevenhüller's despatch dry, when Olivares fresh from his interview with Buckingham and Bristol, sent to invite him and his friend the Nuncio to take a drive with him in the shady woods round the Buen Retiro.

During their drive the three statesmen discussed the English proposals. Olivares was, however, probably unaware that his guests had already arranged between themselves the part which each was to play. The Nuncio accordingly refused to give his definite opinion offhand. Thereupon Khevenhüller began by saying that he should report the conversation to the Emperor. He then proceeded to point out that the first object everyone must have in view was to restore peace, but that if the Palatinate were handed back to Frederick unconditionally, it would be a great injury to the Catholic cause. The Kaiser had already invested Maximilian with the Electorate, and unless Frederick mended his ways, it would be very difficult for the Emperor to wrest the Upper and the Lower Palatinates from the Catholics to hand them back to a rabid Calvinist. Ferdinand's own states had been in rebellion against him; he had been besieged by rebels in his palace, and had run the utmost danger to life and limb. He would therefore and naturally, be very unwilling to concede them anything beyond what they had enjoyed before, and seeing, moreover, that God had favoured him marvellously by restoring to him his lands and power and by overthrowing his foes, it might well be doubted whether the King of Spain could intercede for the Palatine with a clear conscience, and thus lead the Kaiser to take such a sinful step.

Olivares seemed very pleased at what Khevenhüller said and told them what tricks he had played upon the English during his conversations with them. Khevenhüller was, therefore, induced to make further inquiries as to whether the Count was speaking the truth or not. As has been seen he found, he wrote, that Olivares had used the very same expressions which he had employed in the conversation with him in his written opinion at the Council two days before. [*Munich*, ib. Khevenhüller to Emperor, 22 Aug. Do. to Maximilian, 7 Sept., 1623. *Goetz*, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., pp. 309-311. Khevenhüller to Emperor, 7 September, 1623.]

Within a few hours after Olivares had returned from his drive, two couriers arrived at Madrid. One brought the news that Cardinal Barberini had been elected Pope, and that he had taken the name of Urban the Eighth: the other bore the tidings that Tilly had won a crushing victory over Christian of Brunswick at Stadtlohn, a Westphalian burgh, but two hours distant from the frontiers of Holland, and that the hordes of brigands who had

fought under his flag were now in full flight across the Dutch border.

For the first time since Olivares came into power he was now free to act without any thought of England.

NOTE I

THE ENGLISH CATECHISM IN SPANISH.

The Catalogue of the British Museum Library does not give the title of any Spanish translation of an English Catechism dating from the earlier part of the seventeenth century.

The work referred to is, however, evidently that entered in it as "Catécismo, que significa Forma de Instrucion, etc." pp. 271, "En Casa de Ricardo del Campo," *London*, 1596. 16².

This is a reprint of a Spanish translation issued at Geneva about 1559 of a French work by J. Calvin.

The Catechism is in the form of a dialogue with scriptural references noted on the margin, and includes sections on The Articles of the Christian Faith, The Ten Commandments, On Prayer, The Sacraments.

It is followed by Forms for the Conduct of Divine Worship, the Administration of the Sacraments, the Visitation of the Sick, etc., as used in "Church."

The tone throughout is extremely Calvinistic.

Charles' followers had given great offence by their efforts at proselytising [*Turin* ib., Tarantaise to Duke, May 14, 1623.], and may have used this work for the purpose.

Philip, however, may have thought that the Prince was merely comparing it with the "Consultatio Orthodoxa," and therefore have refrained from taking notice of the incident.

CHAPTER LXII

NERLI, the Mantuan Envoy, was with Olivares when the news arrived that Cardinal Barberini had been elected Pope. It seemed to him that the Count, when he heard the tidings, looked as if they were utterly unexpected, and appeared anything but pleased. The Court hangers-on chose to say that the election was the work of Cardinal Borgia, with some of the Spaniards. Massimi, however, told Nerli that, in reality, the Ministers were very well satisfied, and were glad that they had deposited Chiavenna in the Pope's hands before they knew the result of the Conclave. No one could now say that they had done so in order that the new Pontiff might have no excuse for accusing them of wishing to disturb the peace of Italy, but they only partially succeeded in achieving this object. Those of them who, like D. Pedro de Toledo, were in the English interest, grumbled because Pastraña had not prevented Barberini's election, for everyone knew him to be a Frenchman at heart. Others, however, urged that he had been pushed into the Nunciature at Paris by D. Balthazar de Zuñiga, and that he was a great friend of Cardinal Borgia's, but, for all this, he was suspected by most people at Madrid. They hoped, however, that he would remain neutral. [*Mantua*, Nerli, Aug. 24, 26. *London*, *Brit. Mus.*, Eg. 318, Council of State, 28 Aug. 1625.]

Buckingham might be most anxious to leave Madrid, but the Prince was as eager to remain, as it was believed that now that the Pope had been elected, the marriage would take place as soon as they could procure the benediction of the new Pontiff. Both Charles and Olivares, indeed, wrote the Nuncio, told him that they greatly wished that, as Gregory XV. had done, His Holiness would have a Brief, couched in affectionate terms, written to the Prince. [*London*, *S.P.O.*, Roman Transcripts, Bibl. Vat. Barb. 8,638, Madrid, 24 August, 1623.]

The Nuncio, at the same time, asked that Father Zaccaria, who had been recalled to Rome by the General of his Order, might be allowed to return to Madrid, as he would be of great use in instructing the Prince. [Let. cit.]

If the news of Pope Urban the Eighth's election had filled the Spanish statesmen with perplexity, the tidings of Tilly's victory at Stadtlohn fell like a thunderbolt upon the English Embassy at Madrid. Charles' prophecy was fulfilled, and "the affaires of Christendom now smiled strangely upon Spain." [Goetz, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., pp. 309-311, Khevenhüller to Kaiser, Sept. 7, 1623. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, June 26, 1623.]

The events which had led up to the battle of Stadtlohn will be better explained when we come to deal with Olivares' explanations to the Council of State as to the reasons which had influenced him in his change of policy. For the moment we must confine ourselves to the story of the last weeks of the Prince's stay at Madrid.

At first, indeed, the Spanish Council do not seem to have fully realised the importance of the news from Germany. They took one step, however, which was in the end destined to bring about a breach with England, as it made it absolutely impossible for them to comply with James' demands as to the German settlement. Instructions were sent to Oñate to congratulate Ferdinand upon Tilly's success. At the same time Philip IV. reminded the Emperor that the moment was most opportune for him to bring about a settlement. He added that if the German Princes could not agree to one upon fair terms, he would give them all the help that he could in the present state of his affairs. It would be advisable that the negotiations for the marriage between the Palatine's eldest son and the Emperor's second daughter should be continued upon the lines which Olivares had suggested in his report. Finally he agreed that the commissioners whom he was sending to the forthcoming diet should attend it as representatives of the Duke of Burgundy—that was of himself—as a member of the Empire. He also expressed his satisfaction at Oñate's conduct. In other words, Philip IV. now stated his willingness to acquiesce in a settlement of affairs in Germany brought about by the Germans themselves. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Eg. 318, Council of State, Letter of Congratulation to the Emperor upon the Victory of Stadtlohn, Aug., 1623.]

Carleton, in the letter which brought the first news of Halberstadt's defeat to Aston, did not disguise its gravity. Although a part of the horse had escaped with their general into Holland, the foot "were utterly dispersed and lost." Count Henry of

Nassau had hurried to the frontiers to take measures for their defence and to rally the scattered relics of the defeated army, and was to be followed shortly by Prince Maurice himself. In a postscript in his own hand he informed Buckingham that he had received his letter by Sir George Goring and would refer him for the answer to Sir Francis Nethersole, who was coming from the Elector and Electress Palatine to offer their congratulations to the Spanish Court on Charles' engagement. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. 36,446, Carleton "Alla Medesima," Hague, 31 July 10 August, 1623.]

James writing "on that good day, the fifth of August," the anniversary of his escape from the Gowrie Conspirators, had just informed Buckingham that he had anticipated his suggestion by remitting £36,000 of debts due to him from the Catholics, although this came to at least a third part of the Infanta's dowry, and had given orders that his concessions to them should be put into execution at once. His letter ended with such affectionate words, that as Buckingham wrote, they had completely restored him to health. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, James to Charles, etc., August 5, 1623, Buckingham to James, August 29, 1623.]

Under these circumstances the defeat of the Army of the Union might well seem to the Duke a matter of very secondary importance. He may have thought, indeed, that it made him as completely the master of the King and Queen of Bohemia as he seemed to the outside world to be of Charles.

Olivares treated the Prince with the utmost frankness. Under pressure from the Nuncio and Khevenhüller, the Count gave him a clear explanation of the position of affairs in Germany. He said that the Elector of Bavaria would never give up the electoral dignity either to the Palatine himself or to his children, or agree that the Palatine should either be restored to his dominions or allowed to administer them; moreover, he wished it plainly to be understood that Spain would never consent to refrain from assisting the Emperor for the sake of the English marriage. As the Count told Khevenhüller the Prince seemed very much upset at this, and made no answer except that Digby would deal with the matter.

"This is quite enough for me for the moment, and I think we may well be satisfied for the time being with having interested the great man on our side, and it will be our business to keep him on it; the two favourites, Buckingham and the Count, are utterly

disgusted with one another ; and I am not surprised, for Buckingham has been most insolent, and the great man has taken him down a peg or two." [*Munich*, ib., Khevenhüller to Elector of Bavaria, 12 September, 1623. *Goetz*, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., pp. 309-311, Khev. to Kaiser, Sept. 7 ; cf. *Klopp*, op. cit., Vol. II., pp. 362-363, quoting Hardwicke I., 477, Bristol to James I., August 29, 1623. "The relations between Buckingham and the Ministers are so strained that they don't hesitate to say that they would rather thrust the Infanta head downwards into a well than deliver her into his hands." Cf. Calaba 93.]

Urban VIII. fell ill of fever directly after his election and for some time could not attend to business. He was, therefore, unable to send Massimi the Powers for the delivery of the dispensation. The Spanish Ministers, therefore, thought themselves unable, though many were of a contrary opinion, to allow Charles and the Infanta to be contracted before the Powers arrived from Rome. Charles, who seems to have thought the Pope's illness merely a pretence, accordingly decided to leave Madrid upon the day which had been fixed a month before. "They not having used us," he wrote, "with those realities as to encourage us to relie further upon uncertainties, I your babie have thought fitt to leave my proxsie to the King in my lord of Bristoll's hands to deliver it when that power comes from rουμε ; as for the business of the palatinate now that we have prest them hartilie to it, we have discovered these tow impediments, first they say they have no hope to accomodate it without the mariage of your grandchild with the emperor's daughter, which though we know you will like the proposition of the marriage, yet we know not how eyther you or your sonne-in-law and daughter will like it with this condition, that your grandchild be bred up in the Emperor's court, the second is that they are content to restore him to all his lands, and his sone to both lands and honor, yett they will not ingage themselves to restore himselfe to honours, but have it left to their mediation and courtesie, and how the first poynt will be obtained of the father, when they will discontent him in the latter, we leave you to iudge." [*London*, *Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Charles and Buckingham to James, 29 August, 1623. As to Urban the Eighth's illness, cf. *London*, *S.P.O.*, Roman Transcripts, Bibl. Vat. Barb. 8,630, to the Nuncio in Spain, 25 October, 1623, minuted by Mgr. Ciampoli.]

It is difficult to see how Charles can have given his father such a

misleading account of his conversation with Olivares, unless he wished to disguise the real state of affairs from Buckingham. It is evident indeed from his refusal to deliver his sister's letter to the Infanta, for fear that difficulties would be raised as to her title, that he believed she would not be recognized at the Spanish Court even as Electress Palatine. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Buckingham to Queen of Bohemia, undated, from Madrid.]

It is not, perhaps, impossible that Olivares had deliberately misled Khevenhüller as to what passed at his interview with the Prince. If the friendship of Bavaria was of value to him, it was chiefly so because he was anxious to secure the aid of the Empire in his campaign against the Dutch, but there was still reason to believe that the Conference which James I. and the Infanta Isabella were endeavouring to bring together at Brussels or Cologne might lead to a suspension of hostilities both in the Netherlands and in Germany. At this moment, therefore, a rupture with England would have been fatal to his hopes. James I., as Inojosa himself allowed, had more than fulfilled all the expectations of the Spanish ambassadors, by the concessions which he had accorded to the recusants in the Infanta's name. Writing on July 30, under pressure from Lord Carlisle, the Marquis laid great stress upon the satisfaction of the Catholics and said that if the Prince showed any favour to them, there would be so many in a short time that the King would have to take them very seriously into account. During the summer, indeed, the conversions had been so numerous, that all the students who could be ordained at Liege were far too few to supply the English mission. He represented in the strongest terms that the Prince ought not to leave Spain without the Infanta, and ended by asking leave to return home as his work in England was finished. In a letter to Aston, written after he had been with the King at Salisbury Races, he expressed his great pleasure at the happy conclusion of the business. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, James to Charles, etc., 10 August, 1623, do. to Buckingham, id., Eg. 2,080, Inojosa 3^o Despacho, 30 July, 1623. Add. 36,446, Inojosa to Aston, 22 August, 1623. Eg. 318, Council of State Consulta on the junction of the Spanish Armies with those of the Catholic League, 18 September, 1623. Speeches by Olivares and Giron. *Munich*, Geh. St. Ar. K.S. 486-23, Enrico Silsdonio to Elector of Bavaria, Liège, 19 May, 1623. *London, S.P.O.*, S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 150, No. 106, Conway to Brooke, Aug. 14.]

James, too, had written to both Philip and the Infanta in very friendly terms, and the Infanta in her reply had used the language of affection. [*London, Brit. Mus., Eg. 2,080, Inojosa, let. cit., Harl. 6,987, Infanta Maria to James I., August 30, 1623, "de V. M. aficionadisima Maria."*] Doña Maria was evidently in love with the Prince, and Olivares never forgot the influence which she had over her brother. Many months later Aston, in writing to Buckingham, said that he must acquaint him that he had understood "by severale and sure wayes," most probably through the Countess of Olivares, "that the Infanta was much afflicted that the Prince and your Grace receaved not better satisfaction and did perform severale diligences intreating that their might be given you all content, and when she founde that the Prince resolved to retourne and that you had receaved many distasts she used means to have spoken privately to your Grace, before your departure, but could not obtayne leave. I have thought good to advertise this much unto your Grace that you might see how you here stand, and ye offices which I perform with a desyre to serve you." [*London, Brit. Mus., Add. 36,449, Aston to Buckingham, 17 February, 1623, O.S.*] This story tallies well with what we know of the character of the Infanta, who from her infancy had maintained an inviolable resolution never to speak ill of any creature, and had always openly shown her dislike of those who spoke ill of others. [*Hib. MSS. Comm. Rep., University of Edinburgh, Laing MSS., Vol. I., pp. 163-165, "Donna Maria," rep. cit.*]

Possibly there may have been a misunderstanding on both sides. Olivares in writing to Cottington two months later explained that he had always wished to effect the settlement through the intervention of Spain by the marriage of the Palatine's eldest son, as in that case it would be easier to arrange for restoring the Electorate and the states to the lad. Aston and Bristol, however, said that what the Prince and Buckingham thought he meant was that Spain wished to secure the restoration of the Palatine himself, and had indeed written this to James. [*London, Brit. Mus., Add. 36,446, Translation of a letter from Olivares to Cottington, 31 Oct., 1623.*]

The question of the presents which Charles was to distribute amongst the courtiers now became a pressing one.

The English were by this time thoroughly hated by the Spaniards, both on account of their attitude towards their religion and

because they had disappointed the hopes of the common people who had hoped that they would shower gold upon them like water. Charles, indeed, was thought to be very stingy until his lavish gifts at parting gained him great popularity.

They consisted chiefly of jewels, some of them of historic interest, which had been taken from the Tower of London, to the value, said London gossippers, of £200,000, but which were appraised by the English goldsmiths at £80,000. In reality, when they were taken by their recipients to the Court jewellers at Madrid, they proved to be worth far less. The Duke of Infantado had received a diamond said to be of the value of £5,000, which was priced at £125. On the other hand a hat band, once the property of the murdered Count of Villamediana, which Philip IV. had bestowed upon Buckingham in place of sixty thousand crowns (£15,000) was valued at only thirteen thousand (£3,333).

The King sent the Prince twenty-four horses from his famous stud at Cordova, with some brood mares, foals, mules, donkeys and camels, and gave twelve horses to Buckingham. Two splendid coaches which were provided for their journey to the coast were sent with them to England, whither an elephant had already been taken. [*London, Brit. Mus., Add. 36,449, Aston to Calvert, 21 August, 1623, Harl. 6,987, Buckingham to James, August 29, 1623, do. to do., undated. Turin, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, Sept. 12, 1623. Mantua, ib., Nerli to Duke, August 26, Sept. 14, 1623.*] It would be interesting to know, as Charles was a frequenter of Newmarket, whether these horses are amongst the ancestors of the English thoroughbred.

But, before Charles left Madrid, Buckingham was destined to find further reasons for breaking off the match.

A few days after his interview with Olivares, the Prince wished to send a present of jewels to the Infanta but, as he could not obtain permission to do so, he deposited them in the King's hands. However, when he went to take his leave of her, she was allowed to say what she pleased to him. He asked her to accept his journey to Spain as a proof of his devotion to her, and begged her that as she had never yet done so, she would now honour him with her commands. The Infanta replied that she had been greatly pleased by his visit, and entreated him that he should show all the kindness to the Catholics in his dominions which she felt certain that he would shew to herself. She also gave him a letter to the English Catholics of which she told him the contents. In

it, she said, after exhorting them to remain steadfast in the Faith, that when God and her brother allowed her to come to England, she would be their protectress, and that she would share their good and evil fortune. Even if she had to shed her blood with them, she would think herself happy to die for the Catholic Faith.

After the Prince had left her, the principal gentlemen of his suite came to kiss her hand. The Duke of Buckingham paid his court in what seemed to the Spanish onlookers a most familiar manner, and scarcely curbed his natural arrogance. He said that he knew that Her Royal Highness had been told that he was opposed to the marriage, and that it was owing to him that many difficulties had arisen during the negotiations. This, he could assure her, was absolutely untrue, and no one had ever served her better than he had. The Infanta replied that she knew full well that if, as she earnestly hoped, the marriage was predetermined by God, neither he nor any one else would have been able to prevent it, and therefore she had never troubled her head as to whether he was for it or against it. Another incident, which took place at the audience, was much commented upon. Sir Edward Verney, the Englishman who but a few days before had cuffed Ballard, was kissing her hand, when a gentleman who was standing by, said, "Madam, the man who has just kissed Your Royal Highness' hand is the one who struck the priest." She was greatly upset and said in a loud tone, "Had I known it, I would never have let him kiss my hand." [*F. de Jesu*, op. cit., pp. 83-84. *Verney Memoirs*, op. cit., Vol. I., pp. 82-83.]

Most people thought that if the Infanta could write such letters and use such language, the marriage must certainly be coming off. Many, however, especially amongst those who did not wish for it, argued from these tiffs and from the Prince's sudden departure, that it must be broken off. The Spaniards of the lower classes were the first to say so. Diplomats, however, thought that Spain could not possibly risk a rupture at this stage, especially as, in that case, the English might arrange a marriage with France.

It was asserted that the King had been heard to say that he would gladly have paid the Prince a good round sum if he would have stayed away from Madrid, but it was thought that he was only speaking out of annoyance at the expense which the visit had entailed upon him.

On the other hand he had given Charles a very significant hint that he had outstayed his welcome. He told him that if he

wished to stay in Spain for the winter it would be as well that he should send away the greater part of his attendants, for they were very free with their tongues and went about everywhere speaking against the Catholic Religion. The Spaniards were such zealots, said the King, that he feared that their conduct might give rise to some disagreeable incident. The Prince had the good sense and temper to take this hint as it was meant and, as had been arranged a month before, decided to leave Madrid for the coast on Saturday, the ninth of September.

As it had been decided that the marriage could not take place before the consent and benediction of the new Pope had arrived, the Prince, as has been seen, left his Proxy with the King to act in his place. A doubt, however, arose as to the form in which it should be drawn up, and a congregation to discuss this point, at which Father Zaccaria was present, was held at the house of the King's Confessor.

"And as in England they hold (as Your Highness knows well), that marriage is not a sacrament, and that it may be dissolved for the most trivial cause, although according to the Sect of Calvin, such dissolution can only take place for the most weighty reasons, it was settled that in the Procuration which is to be drawn up, the Prince should swear to contract the Marriage according to the observance of the Most Holy Catholic Church, and also that Marriage is indissoluble.

"The day before he left Father Zaccaria presented him with the book which he had drawn up," and the title of which the Prince himself had selected, the "*Consultatio Orthodoxa*." [*Turin, Tarantaise, September 14, 1623. For the conversation between Charles and Philip IV., F. de Jesu, op. cit., pp. 84-87.*]

Charles was thought to be taking his departure in a very bad humour, because he was not "carrying the Infanta back with him."

His English attendants, who believed that the Spanish Court were really anxious for the marriage, were at a loss to account for their conduct, which even Inojosa and Coloma had said was senseless. [*Cf. London, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6,987, James to Charles, etc., July 22, 1623.*]

It so happened that Sir Kenelm Digby, Charles' physician, had, when in Italy, been an intimate friend of Nerli's family. He unbosomed himself freely to the Mantuan Envoy. "I am perfectly dumbfounded," said Sir Kenelm, "and so are all of his

gentlemen who are about the Prince, how these Spanish lords can possibly let him go, for they will see what will happen. They must not trust to his love for the Infanta, for the moment he gets back to England, he will never again give her a thought, and when I made bold to ask him what the English gentlemen thought would be the outcome of the negotiations, he replied: 'There is not one of us who is about the Prince and who knows what his views and interests are, who would not the moment the Prince has left this city, take a thousand doubloons to pay two thousand when the marriage comes off.' It is true that the good doctor is a great talker and that one cannot set as much store by what he says as one would by what anyone else might say who was intimate with the Prince, but I think he spoke with more circumspection than usual."

The "good doctor" was to prove a true prophet, and his views were shared by several of the foreign ministers at Madrid. "The Polish Ambassador," continues Nerli, "already hopes to revive the negotiations for a marriage between the Infanta and his Prince, but as that Kingdom is an elective and not a hereditary one, people think that might prevent it. The Emperor's Ambassador and the Tuscan Minister have still hopes (of securing the Infanta), and they all say they don't yet give up hopes that the marriage may be broken off; the French Ambassador and the Venetian Minister, both of whom have an axe to grind, also say the same thing, and none of them make any bones about telling 'all the world so.'" [*Mantua* ib., Nerli to Duke, September 14, 1623.]

Buckingham, who had also his axe to grind, wrote to his master in the gloomiest terms. "Sir, I'll bring all things with me you have desired, except the Infanta which hath almost broken my heart, because yours, your sones, and the nation's honor is tuched by the mis of it, but since its there falt here and not ours we will bare it the better and when I shall have the happiness to lie at your fete you shall then know the trewth of all and no more." With more truth he wrote to Conway that though Calvert might be angry at not seeing the despatches "its no matter theres manie more though with little reson displeased in this iournie." "We are all well and so much the better that wee are coming home the Prince will or shale not be contracted." [*London, Brit. Mus., Harl., 6,987, Buckingham to James, Sept. 1, 1623. Do. to Conway (two) undated.*]

He would have read with pleasure the words in which Khevenhüller summed up the results of his journey, pointing out that the Prince left Madrid without having achieved anything by his visit for the marriage was not really settled and no arrangement had been come to as to German affairs. [*Munich* ib., Khevenhüller to Elector of Bavaria, 12 September, 1623.]

Certainly the English Puritans had but "little reson" to be displeased with the Duke of Buckingham.

CHAPTER LXIII

ON Saturday, September the ninth, the day which had been fixed upon a month before, Charles left Madrid for the Escorial. He had not, wrote Buckingham, "taken this resolution precipitately, but when we saw there was no more to be gained here, we thought it then time with all diligence to gain your presence. Sir, my hart and verie sole dances for joye for the change will be no less than to leape from trouble to ese from sadness to merthe nay from hell to heven." [*London, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6,987, Buckingham to James I., September 1, 1623.*]

"Before leaving the Prince had forty thousand reals (£1,000), given to the guards, and the day before his departure, he had jewels, to the value they say of five hundred thousand crowns (£125,000), distributed amongst the ladies of the Court, the King, the Queen, and the members of the Council. I always say that in such matters one ought to take off the legitimate discount, and treble it, for we never know the value of jewels, as they are rated and appraised at more or less a price according to the people who give and receive them." [*Turin, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, 14 Sept., 1623.*] This prediction of an archiepiscopal expert in pawnbroking was amply fulfilled.

On the same day an oath was taken before the Council by Charles and Philip that the Marriage Articles should be faithfully carried out. In order that there might not be a pretext for saying that the Prince had acted under constraint, it was arranged that when he was on board the English flagship, he should again swear to them in the presence of the Spanish Councillors who were to accompany him to the coast.

There had again been a violent dispute between Buckingham and Olivares. The Count had tried to persuade the Prince to remain at Madrid, for, as he plainly told him, his departure might be very prejudicial to the success of the marriage negotiations although, in other respects, it might be an advantage. In the course of the conversation Olivares warned him that he ought not always to be guided by Buckingham's advice, as the Duke, in his

own interests, had many weighty reasons for wishing him to return home. Buckingham complained of this in such angry terms to Olivares that they would have challenged one another, had not the King and Prince interposed to prevent them. This quarrel was fresh in Buckingham's mind when he left Madrid, a place where he had liked "neither country, people, nor meat." His one thought was to hasten home, for he was bent only "on having my dear dad and master's legs sone in my arms again, which sweet Jesus grant me." [*Turin*, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, Sept. 12, 1623. *Mantua* ib., Nerli to Duke, Sept. 20. *London*, *Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Buckingham to James, Sept. 1, 1623. Do. to Conway undated. The Duke is writing about Sir A. Apsley but is clearly expressing his own feelings about Spain.]

The Duke seems not to have been aware of the friendly leave-takings which took place on the same day between Charles and Father Zaccaria, who, as the Nuncio saw, had a great influence over the Prince's mind. It was known, however, at Rome that his book had been well received by the English, and copies of it were duly forwarded not only to the Pope, but to the Dukes of Savoy and Mantua. [*Turin* ib., Tarantaise to Duke, Sept. 12, 18, 1623. *Mantua* ib., Nerli to Duke, Sept. 20, 1623. *London*, *S.P.O.*, Roman Transcripts, Bibl. Vat. Barb 8,638, Madrid, 26 August, 1623. Do. 8,630, Report from the Nuncio, 8 December, 1623, received Dec. 28.]

We can see, indeed, from Tarantaise's despatches that Father Zaccaria must have been a man of great personal charm. The Archbishop, when giving him an introduction to the Duke of Savoy, whom the father wished to visit on his way through Turin to Rome, writes: "His book has been highly approved of and praised by all for its great erudition, learning, copiousness, elegance, and clearness, so that it is admired almost as if it were a thing which had come down from Heaven. And happy may we deem him who can know the writer, and speak and converse with him, for he is no less courteous, loving, and broadminded in his private discourse and in his cell, than he is learned, expert, and elegant in his writings, so that he has come to be loved, valued, honoured, and revered here, as if he were not only another Augustine, Jerome, Ambrose, Gregory, or Leo, but almost a new apostle. I hope, therefore, that in the good providence of God, his book will come to be so well looked upon, welcomed, liked, and studied throughout England, that it may be said of him that

he is or will be another apostle in that kingdom." [*Turin*, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, September 20, 23, 1623.]

The good father had won the Infanta's highest esteem, and at her earnest desire Massimi wrote to Rome to ask that he might be allowed to accompany her to England as her confessor or chaplain, for she knew that he was greatly liked by the English, and thought, therefore, that his presence might be of use there. She had been in communication with some Catholic amongst Charles' followers, and had handed him her letter to the English Catholics to take home with him in place of entrusting it to the Prince himself. [*Turin*, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, October 16, 1623. *Mantua*, ib., Nerli to Duke, September 20. *London*, S.P.O., Roman Transcripts, Bibl. Vat. Barb. 8630, Nuncio to Curia, Madrid, 5 December, 1623.]

Had Charles married the Infanta Maria, Zaccaria Boverio might well have played a great part in English history. The Infanta was a woman of far stronger character and greater intelligence than was her successful rival Henrietta Maria, and well knew that during his short residence in Spain, Boverio had acquired the full confidence of those who held the reins of government at Madrid, and that he had sounded their motives and characters to their very depths. The most difficult questions which had arisen during the marriage negotiations had indeed been settled in accordance with his advice.

This was no small achievement, for Olivares was more tenacious of his influence than ever and allowed no application to be granted which did not pass through his hands.

Even Khevenhüller had not dared to give the Queen a letter from the Empress in which she asked for a favour for her near kinsman, the Duke of Mantua, because he knew that the Count wished to exclude her entirely from business, lest she should lessen his hold over the King. The very fact that Olivares should have allowed himself to be guided by a friar, and that friar a Piedmontese, shows in itself that Father Zaccaria must have been a thorough statesman, even though his book may not appear to a modern critic in the same light as it did to an ecclesiastic who had lived in the literary circles of the Rome of Paul the Fifth. [*Turin*, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, September 25, 1623. *Mantua*, ib., Nerli to Duke, September 20, 1623.]

The leading Italian ecclesiastics of that day were well aware that in foreign affairs it was a mistake to identify religious dogma

with temporal politics, and were, therefore, far more tolerant, as were, indeed, many of the Spaniards, than they were supposed to be by the untravelled and bigoted divines of Protestant Europe. The temporal power of Rome could not have existed for a day if Urban VIII. had dealt with foreign statesmen in the spirit of a Puritan lecturer. Charles the First, therefore, might well have found a far more judicious adviser in the broad-minded and keen-sighted Father Zaccaria than he did in Laud. [For the tolerant attitude of the Inquisition in the Canaries to English merchants cf. "English Merchants and the Spanish Inquisition in the Canaries." *London*, Royal Historical Society, 1912. Introduction, pp. IX.-X.]

The King and his brothers with Aston accompanied Charles to the Escorial, a journey of seven leagues from Madrid, and there they spent three nights.

The stately grey stone palace was already styled the Eighth Wonder of the World. It had been erected by the "Prudent" Philip II. in favour of Saint Lawrence on whose feast day he had won the victory of Saint Quentin over the French, and was built in the form of a cradle, or rather of a gridiron, in commemoration of the manner in which the saintly deacon had suffered martyrdom.

In it were contained a Convent of Hieronymite Friars, a Seminary for their novices and for foreign children who were chosen by the King and supported at his expense at a common table, and a sumptuous palace in which Philip II. had breathed his last, and which was the birthplace of the Infanta Maria. Above it the bare jagged peaks of the Guadarama mountains rose against the blue sky, and from them, in winter, icy gusts swept down over the bare cork-tree studded plains, which though accounted the most barren lands in Europe, were rich in honey and were the pasture grounds of the flocks which yielded the merino wool to the cloth mills of Segovia, and of herds of splendid oxen. In summer it was a pleasant place enough for it was surrounded by a thousand gardens and by preserves full of game for hawking and hunting and ponds abounding in fish.

It was said that the whole range of buildings extended for 220 paces from east to west and for 570 from north to south. Round the north and west sides ran a wide terrace paved with small square stones. At each angle rose a many-windowed tower. The monastery lay to the south, the palace to the east. On the

side overlooked by the mountain a great gate opened between two tiers of eight huge pillars, surmounted by four smaller ones. Over its keystone stood a beautiful statue of Saint Lawrence. To the right was a small gate leading to a workshop "for mechanical arts," which was connected with the college, for in Philip the Second's day engineering was still much studied in Spain; to the left two gates led, one to the College itself, the other to the palace. Directly opposite the central gate stood the Monastery Church, the front of which was adorned with six statues of Kings of Israel, each measuring eighteen feet high. In its gallery travellers were shown the seat where Philip II. was kneeling in prayer under the great Christ by Michael Angelo, when the news was brought him that the fleet which he had sent forth to the conquest of England, had been driven back a scattered wreck to Santander whither the Prince of Wales was now journeying as his grandson's guest. Did any of the brilliant company who rode through the palace gate on that brilliant September day realise that Charles' departure without his promised bride was destined to be more fatal to their country than had been the guns of Drake or Howard's fireships?

Under the Church lay the burial place of the Kings of Spain, which but two years later was to be opened to receive the remains of their kinsman the Viceroy of Sicily, Prince Philibert of Savoy.

"He was deposited in the chamber where all the others lie, Charles the Fifth, Philip the Third, and their Queens, wives and children near H.S.H. the late Prince Philip Emmanuel, as that most splendid Pantheon in which the said Kings are to be buried and the other in which the Queens, children and relations are to be placed (I believe without coffins), is not yet finished.

"But I can assure Your Royal Highness I felt death in my heart when I saw that great Emperor Charles the Fifth, and that great King Philip the Second, laid between four boards, covered with plain velvet, for though men are born under different conditions we all die in one way, and no more account is made of an Emperor than is made of the meanest man on earth." [*Turin, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, Dec. 25, 1625. London, Brit. Mus. Sloane 901. Description of the Escuriale. Sloane 3,602 Relacion breve de España, 1611 cit.*]

The solemn surroundings of the Escorial appear to have made but little impression upon the hot-tempered Buckingham. His

last quarrel with Olivares still rankled, and he had made up his mind to tell the Count exactly what he thought of him. Olivares, it is true, had told him that he hoped that their private quarrels would do no harm to the public interest, or prevent the agreement about the marriage being carried out. "They certainly shall not," replied the Duke, "I can assure your Excellency that they shall not prejudice it in anywise, but at the same time I must tell you straight out that I shall never be your friend." Olivares answered, "I gladly accept your Excellency's word, and all the more so because of the condition which you attach to it."

From the Escorial the Prince wrote to the Infanta who handed the letter to the King without opening it, but His Majesty sent it back to her unopened so that she might read and answer it. Charles assured him that he had only decided to leave Spain in the hope of being able to take her with him, but when he found that Fortune had played him a trick, he was forced to set out upon his melancholy journey in order to obey the commands of his King and father and at the same time serve her interests in England. In writing to the Countess of Olivares he asked her to thank the Infanta for a message which she had sent him through his servant Thomas Cary, and also for her own letter. He could do so freely, "as this is no concern of the Junta's with whom I wish to have to do as little as possible." [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,446. Charles to Infanta, 31 Aug.—10 Sept., 1623. Do. to Condesa de Olivares, Madrid (sic), 1-11 Sept., 1623. Turin ib., Tarantaise to Duke, Sept. 12, 1623. Mantua ib., Nerli to Duke, Sept. 20, 1623.*]

It had been intended that Philip should accompany Charles as far as the Wood of Segovia, but when he was at the Escorial he received a letter from the Queen saying that she was seriously indisposed. Charles begged him to return to Madrid at once, and they accordingly took leave of one another at a spot about a league distant from the Palace Monastery. The host and guest parted with every sign of affection, after having exchanged pledges in writing that they would observe their agreement. It was intended that a pillar should be erected at the place to commemorate the event.

The two Infantes returned with Philip to Madrid, but Charles, who travelled in a coach drawn by six mules which had been lent him by the Cardinal Infante Ferdinand was attended to the Coast by Cardinal Zapata, Aytona, Monterrey and Gondomar. Aston who

says that the best account of the journey may be found in the Prince's letters to the King and the Infanta, was in his suite as the Ambassador-in-ordinary. There did not "fayl one day wherein the Prince did not wright unto them both, nor in which he received not one or more letters from his Catholic Majesty." [*Turin*, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, September 18, 1623. *Mantua*, ib, Nerli to Duke, September 20, October 8, 1623. *London*, *Brit. Mus.* Add. 36,447 Aston's Report, cit.] Of these letters Aston has carefully preserved copies. They are written in very fair Spanish, but it is impossible to say whether Charles composed them himself or not.

All these honied words meant, in reality, but little. The Spanish statesmen, who attended the Prince on his journey over the Castilian mountains, were all in favour of the marriage, and Gondomar had long enjoyed his full confidence, at least in appearance. None of them, however, seem to have suspected that Buckingham was now their bitter opponent, and that he had, at times, the power to lead the Prince whither he would. [As to the attitude of Zapata, Aytona, and Gondomar cf. *Munich* ib. Khevenhüller to Elector, September 7, 1623. As to the nature of Charles' feelings for Gondomar, cf. *Ven. Cal.*, p. 453. Lando, *Rel. Cit.*, September 21, 1623.]

Charles, as has been seen, resented his disappointment most keenly. He believed himself to have been tricked, and evidently thought that Olivares, if he had chosen to do so, could have overcome the resistance of the Junta of Divines. It is true that he was, for the moment, in love with the Infanta, but yet there were points in her character which it cannot have been difficult for Buckingham to turn into ridicule. Her silence and shyness, her love for spending long hours at her devotions, her habit of brooding over injuries, her want of care for her person and dress, cannot have appealed to a wooer whose taste was fastidiousness itself, and who had enjoyed but few opportunities of becoming acquainted with her very real talents in private intercourse. [*Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep.*, University of Edinburgh. Laing MSS., Vol. I., Donna Maria, cit. As to Charles' love for the Infanta Cf. *inter alia*. *Munich*, ib., Lorenzo Stefani to Maximilian, 19-29 February, 1624.] Had he taken the Infanta with him when he left Madrid, he might, indeed, have been as good a husband to her as he was to Henrietta Maria. But when he was forced to leave her behind him, and when at the same time he was smarting

under a sense of bitter injustice, it cannot have been hard for his fellow traveller to persuade him to forget her.

Charles may have been a creature of moods, but he was constant in his devotion to his sister, to whom, indeed, he had written but three days before he left for Spain that the marriage would never take place. [*Ven. Cal.*, p. 603. Suriano to Doge. Hague, March 27, 1623.]

Chance enabled Buckingham to play this card at a very opportune moment.

The party halted for the night at Segovia, that ancient city whither the gold and silver of Mexico and Peru were brought to be coined at mills set in motion by the waters of the Douro. In its Moorish Castle were the images of all the Kings of Spain, wrought to the life, and its river was spanned by a lofty bridge, built of mighty stones fitted together, men said, without lime or mortar by the art of a demon called up by a master of the Black Art in the days when the Romans bore sway in Iberia. In Segovia, too, was woven the black cloth, which was famous for its fineness throughout the world, and which was worn even by the mandarins of China and the officers of the Court of the Mogul. [For description of Segovia Cf. *London, Brit. Mus. Sloane* 3,602 *Breve Relacion de España* cit. For the trade in Spanish woollen fabrics with the East Indies, Cf. *Do. Add.* 8,355. *L. Moro, Rel. Cit.*, p. 263.]

Here they were met by a messenger on his way to Madrid, bearing a letter from the Queen of Bohemia to her brother.

Elizabeth had written at the moment when the news of the overthrow of her self-elected champion, Christian of Brunswick, was still ringing in her ears. In words glowing with indignation and despair she besought her brother not to allow the marriage to be concluded, unless it was at the same time stipulated that her husband should be restored to his dignities and possessions. It would appear that by the same messenger, Buckingham received a letter from Carleton acknowledging his overtures and desiring to continue his correspondence with him. From Carleton's letter it would seem that the messenger was Sir Francis Nethersole, Elizabeth's most trusted adviser. Carleton had desired him to give Buckingham further particulars of his commission by word of mouth. [*London, Brit. Mus. Add.* 36,446, Carleton "alla Medesima," let. cit., July 31, Aug. 10, 1623. *Do. to Buckingham*, Aug. 25, Sept. 4, 1623. It is difficult, however, to reconcile

Carleton's letter sent by Sir Francis Nethersole, with Harl. 6,987. Buckingham to Queen of Bohemia, endorsed as "Undated—from Madrid." But the particulars in Harl. 6,987, do not always tally with those in the Aston Collection. Possibly Buckingham really wrote that letter from Segovia.]

The Duke seized his opportunity. Charles proved but wax in his hands, and acting, as it was thought, upon a suggestion contained in Elizabeth's letter, which may have been originally put before her by Buckingham, he sent one of his footmen, Clark, who had come to him from the Duke's household, with a letter to Lord Bristol. In it he enjoined him not to proceed with the Contract of Marriage, even if the Pope's benediction had arrived, until he had received further instructions.

It is possible, however, that Charles only despatched these orders after he had embarked at Santander, for Rusdorff, who had received full particulars of the transaction under promise of secrecy, within a few days after the Prince's return to England, says this in writing to the Palatine. It is to be hoped in the interests of Charles' good name that his statement is correct. [*Munich* ib., Rusdorff to King of Bohemia, 16-26 October, 1623.

"Oultre cela i'apprens aussy pour certain mais fort secretmt que le Prince montant et s'embarquant en Espagne, envoya le Sieur Clerc avec expres commandement au Conte de Bristol de ne passer oultre avec le Contract du mariage, non obstant que la benediction du Pope seroit venüe mais d'en attendre ultérieure resolution." *London, Brit. Mus.* Harl., 6,987. A letter from Buckingham to Conway is endorsed, "Brought by Mr. Clark, the Footman, the 26 July, 1623." He had returned to Spain with James' letter of 5 August, Cf. James to Charles, etc., 5 August, 1623. *F. de Jesu*, op. cit., P. 88. *Clarendon*, op. cit., Vol. I., pp. 37-38. Cf. also *London, Brit. Mus.* Add. 36,447, Aston, Rel. Cit., 9 Dec., 1623.]

As a justification for these instructions Charles alleged the wrongful seizure of the Bergstrasse by the Elector of Mainz, and the occupation of Germersheim by the Bishop of Spire, at a time when the suspension of arms in Germany had already been agreed by the Infanta Isabella. [*F. de Jesu*, op. cit., p. 88.]

It is possible, perhaps, to advance some arguments in mitigation of Charles' conduct. He evidently believed that the Spanish Government clearly understood that if a marriage could be arranged between the Palatine's heir and the Emperor's daughter,

they would have to secure that the Palatinate should be restored to the Palatine himself, and he may still have deluded himself with the hope so cherished at Whitehall in the previous winter that Spain would aid England to effect this restoration by force of arms. Directly after his return to England, he wrote to Aston, asking him to assure the Spanish Government in positive terms that he intended to go on with the match, and that if he was given satisfaction in the Palatinate he "would forget ill-usage and become hearty friends," whilst, as late as February, 1624, he was greatly upset when the Infanta "under another name" sent him the news of the death of Philip's infant daughter, and left the dinner table at once to James' great joy and the Duke's greater chagrin. He may, therefore, have failed to see the far-reaching consequences of his instructions to Bristol. [*London, Brit. Mus., Add., 36,446. Olivares to Cottington, October 31st, 1623, let. cit. Add. 36,449, Aston to Prince of Wales, 17 Feb., 1623-4. St. Vet., quoting the Prince's letter to him of 8 October, 1623. Munich ib., Lorenzo Stefani to Maximilian, 6 March 1624, let. cit.*]

He had, however, no right to blame the Spanish Government for these transactions. In February, 1623, despite the warnings of Schwarzenberg his envoy at Brussels, Ferdinand had handed over those portions of the Palatinate to Mainz and Spire, although this was not made public until May, after the suspension of hostilities had been arranged between himself, the Infanta Isabella and James. Neither Halberstadt, Mansfeldt nor the Palatine had, however, signed the armistice and Coloma had duly warned the English Ministers, that, until the latter did so, the Congress of Cologne could not meet to discuss the terms of peace. Frederick had been deeply annoyed that Frankenthal should have been deposited in the Infanta's hands for the period of the armistice, and had vowed that he had never been consulted upon the subject, and that what Spain and England chose to arrange between themselves was nothing to him. James had refused to stand surety for either Halberstadt or Mansfeldt, because, as he told the Infanta Isabella, they were in no way under the control of either his son-in-law or himself.

The two rebels remained in arms, Mansfeldt, who now styled himself General of the Protestant Union and was receiving seventy thousand crowns a month from the French King, with an assignation of two hundred thousand from the States-General,

held East Friesland, notwithstanding the protestations of its Count and the open resistance of the citizens of Emden. Under the pretext of extending his quarters he advanced upon the territories of Oldenburg, but was driven back by the Count. Halberstadt led his armies into the dominions of his brother the Duke of Brunswick and despite the entreaties of his mother, a sister of Anne of Denmark, refused to disband them in compliance with the Imperial mandate. For a time it seemed, indeed, as if the Princes of the Circle of Lower Saxony would support him as they feared that in the case of the Catholic League being victorious they would be forced to disgorge the Church property which they held. The King of Denmark's efforts to arrange a peace between his nephew and the Emperor proved unsuccessful, and a letter which the Duchess Dowager of Brunswick wrote to her niece the Electress Palatine urging her to bring about a suspension of hostilities remained unanswered.

Tilly was lying near Frankfort and Maximilian was urged to order him to advance northwards against the Circle of Lower Saxony. This, however, the Elector of Bavaria refused to do without the consent of the other members of the League, although he allowed him to remain on the defensive near Cassel to observe Mansfeldt. The Infanta Isabella was, therefore, forced to conciliate the German Catholic Princes at any cost, and, with this object, agreed to recognize the cession of the Bergstrasse to Mainz without having previously consulted the Government at Madrid. When Philip learnt what had taken place he at once sent orders to Brussels that she should see that it was handed back to the Palatine's forces. But the mischief was done. The English Government had already been greatly hurt by the publication of the Transfer of the Electorate at the very moment of Charles' arrival in Spain, nor had they forgotten that Heidelberg and Mannheim, though held by English garrisons, had been seized in the previous year, whilst Weston was negotiating at Brussels. Nor was the Speech from the Throne in which Philip, when opening the Cortes had hailed as a triumph alike for the Catholic Religion and for the Spanish Crown the re-establishment of the Church in Juliers by its new master the Duke of Neuburg, likely to render the Protestants of Northern Europe more willing to see any extension of the territories under Spanish or Catholic influence. The English from their own point of view had, in short, excellent grounds for breaking off negotiations with Spain at any

moment, if it should seem good to them to mix up the question of the settlement in Germany with the treaty for the marriage. [*Klopp, O.*, op. cit., Vol. II., pp. 283-305, cf. pp. 283-285. Frederick's letter to Bethlen Gabor, 3 July, 1623, quoted from "*Camerarii Epistolæ Selectæ 40*" do., pp. 302-305 Maximilian to Kaiser, 31 May, 1623 (*Kriegssachen, F.*, 53). *London, Brit. Mus.* Add. 36,446, Conway to Bristol, May 10-26, 1623. Eg. 2,080, Précis of Inojosa's Despatches, 24 July, 1623. *Goetz*, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., pp. 101-103. Schwarzenberg to Kaiser, Brussels, March 23, 1623. Schoenberg to Elector of Mainz, March 25, 1623. *Brussels ib.*, Infanta to Philip IV., May 11, June 2, 1623. *Munich, ib.* Mem. des Ambs. du Roy de la G.B. au Roy d'Espagne, 29 November, 1623. Réponse au Roy de la G.B. du Roy d'E, 5 Jan., 1624. *F. de Jesu*, op. cit., p. 91. *Villa*, op. cit., pp. 410-412. The Speech at the Opening of the Cortes of Castille was delivered on April 6, 1623.]

From Segovia the travellers made their way to Carrion, once the home of those treacherous Counts who had driven the Cid Campeador into exile amongst the Moors. In its convent now resided a saintly nun, to whom the Infanta had sent a letter beseeching her to receive her suitor, as her prayers and exhortations might have some effect upon him. Charles visited the recluse and treated her with all due respect, but he was fast hardening his heart against the Catholic Religion.

Every day during his journey he received letters from Philip IV., and he wrote to the Infanta from Olmedo, Carrion, St. Yuste, and from on board the English flagship off Santander.

In this correspondence Philip and the Prince renewed their assurances of mutual friendship and their agreement to carry into effect the pledges which they had given to one another. Philip on his side engaged to overcome any obstacles to the marriage which might be raised in Spain, whilst Charles sent him a guarantee signed by himself that his father would take any further steps which might seem necessary to fulfil his promises. Moorish Corsairs were cruising in the Bay of Biscay, and Philip was afraid that the Prince would run great risks if he tried to get to England with the two galleons which had been sent for him, and offered the escort of a Spanish squadron. The offer was at once declined.

Charles' letters to the Infanta breathe the purest affection, and although the copies in Aston's correspondence are not in the

Prince's writing, it is hard to believe that they were drafted for him by a secretary. The Spanish is, however, carefully corrected in another hand.

Writing from Olmedo the Prince says: "Knowing full well what my love for Your Highness is and my devotion for you I comfort myself by reflecting that you are thinking how you can best free me from the sufferings I endure."

After his visit to the nun he writes:—

"This evening I got to Carrion and at once went to carry out your commission. I gave the nun Your Highness' letter with which she was delighted, and I think from the affectionate way in which she spoke to me, she meant to treat me as Your Highness' property, and I can assure you she made no mistake in this. It has given me infinite pleasure that Your Highness should have deigned to give me your commands, and I carried them out as exactly as I could, and if you enjoin upon me something of more consequence you will see how I long to let the world know how much I wish to please you and how I love you."

At Madrid the weather was so hot that it seemed as if summer was beginning again, and Philip gently blamed his guest for injuring his health by travelling in the heat of the day. In every town he passed through he, by the royal orders, met with a splendid reception.

On September 23rd he arrived at Santander, but owing to contrary winds could not set sail for England until September 26. From on board the flagship he wrote to the King to recommend to him the gentlemen who had attended him to the coast, and in his farewell letter renewed his promises of friendship in the warmest terms. He wrote to the Countess of Olivares thanking her for her kindnesses, and begged her to continue to correspond with him "for your writing is very good and I can read it without help," so she can give him the news "I most wish for."

"I am this moment sailing from here," he writes to the Infanta "and feel it just as if I were saying good-bye to you over again, and so I have kept back this letter for the last minute. I am now off home, and I shall get through this winter as best I may with the hope of consolation I miss now, and Spring will seem nearer to me if in the meantime Your Highness will send me plenty of Commissions to do for you." [*London, Brit. Mus., Add 36,446.* Philip IV. to Charles, San Lorenzo, 12 September, 4-14 September, 18-28 September, 1623. Charles to Philip IV. 3-13, 5-15, 17-27,

13-23, 14-24, 15-25, 18-28 September, 1623. Do. to Infanta. 5-15, 18-28, 15-25. Do. to Countess of Olivares. 15-25 Sept., 1623.] Although Charles escaped the Moorish corsairs his voyage was much hampered by contrary winds, and for a time great anxiety as to his safety was felt at Madrid. The expresses from London usually took from eleven to fourteen days to arrive there, and as a ship from England had just reached Seville in two and a half days there seemed real grounds for uneasiness. [*Turin* ib. Tarantaise to Duke. 2 November, 1623.]

On their way the squadron fell in with five Dunkirkers who were hotly engaged with four Hollanders, and on October 4 seventeen days after leaving Santander the Prince landed at the Water Gate in Portsmouth in a shower of rain. [*Birch* op. cit., Vol. II., p. 422, Chamberlain to Carleton, October 11, 1623.]

The news reached London on the same evening and was at once sent by Rusdorff to the Hague. In his letter he added that the Infanta Isabella was sending her General of Artillery, D. Agostino Mexia to congratulate the Prince upon his return, and that her envoy was instructed to make some overtures for an arrangement about the Palatinate, "which I can hardly know whether to believe, or no, for they sound so strange and far-reaching, but I will let you know if I can learn anything more certain about them. One thing which seems to confirm the story is that the Emperor has written to this King to congratulate him on his son's marriage and that he now intends to give His Majesty full satisfaction being moved to do so by the pressing entreaties of the King of Spain. In a day or two I hope to have more light as to this, and I can then write with better grounds, but I must say it looks to me as if the Emperor and the House of Austria were throwing down their gloves to the Duke of Bavaria, and are jealous of him for some reason or other, or else they have some fresh piece of mischief up their sleeves and take this means to hide their plans." [*Munich geh. St. A. K.S.*, 319-8. Rusdorff to King of Bohemia, 5-15 October, 1623.]

Thus another Act opened in the long drawn drama of the negotiations for the Spanish Match.

NOTE I

THE FOOTMAN CLARK

[*London S.P.O., S.P. Dom. Jas. I., Vol. 182, No. 67.*] In a letter from Sir John Ogle to Secretary Conway from Dover on 29 January, 1624-5, it is said "that Mr. Clarke had just returned from Calais with letters from the Duke de Chaulnes." If this is the Footman Clark, Clarendon's story of his death at Madrid must be incorrect. [*D.N.B., Vol. 8, X. 420, Clarke (Edward), f. 1630, may be the Footman Clark.*]

CHAPTER LXIV

BUCKINGHAM's heart may well have beat high as he drove from Portsmouth to London through the Hampshire mud. The Prince's departure from England had occasioned bitter discontent amongst the Puritans, his return filled all hearts with joy. Bonfires blazed before hall and cottage, church bells rang merry peals all the day through, London and its suburbs seemed on fire with the illuminations. Rusdorff, who knew what carousals meant amongst the Dutch burghers and German nobles, marvelled when at five in the morning he saw the streets filled with drunken revellers who had more than proved their loyalty by quaffing to the Prince's health huge tankards of beer from the casks which stood broached before noble doors. Everyone rejoiced that, as the choristers of St. Paul's sang, Charles had come back in safety out of Egypt and from amongst a strange people. A courtier dedicated a chapel, still to be seen at Groombridge, in memory of his deliverance. Buckingham's conduct was generally praised, and he was said to have bravely and resolutely stood up against Olivares. Those, however, who favoured the marriage, muttered that but for the Duke's impatience, it might have been consummated before Christmas Day. [*Munich*, ib., Rusdorff to M. Maurice, 12-22 October, 1923. *Birch*, op. cit., Vol. II., p. 422, Chamberlain to Carleton, October 11, 1623.]

No one was more sincerely glad than James at the return of his "deare boyes." Done were the days of "duling" up and down the Park at Theobalds, and he could once more discuss with his "sweete Steenie" his gardens and his plantations, his melons and his apricots. Again could he enjoy the society of his "daughter," Steenie's "haughty" wife, of his mother and of his sister, Lady Denbigh, who, to judge from her letters, must have been a somewhat gloomy precisian, who looked or professed to look upon her brother of Buckingham as a saintly champion of the Protestant Faith. James had recovered his good spirits, and his letters were more jovial and, if possible, coarser and more indecent than ever. [*London*, *Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6987, James to Buckingham, undated, *passim*, ib., Charles

to Buckingham, undated. Lady Denbigh's letters are in the same volume. "Duling" may be connected with "Doiling," from "Doile," i.e., "dole, grief, mourning." *Murray Eng. Dict.*, Vol. III., p. 585. In South Herefordshire ducks wandering up and down a pasture are said to be "duling." Information from Mrs. Edwards, Much Dewchurch, Hereford.]

On the sixth of October the Prince reached London amid fog and rain, and a few hours later set out again for Royston, where James was anxiously counting the minutes till his arrival. Rusdorff thought Charles much changed; he had grown graver and more manly and seemed to be the better in every way for his journey. Despite his illness in Spain, Buckingham looked much the same as ever, but at heart was completely changed, for he had come back in a fury with the Spaniards and especially with their King. Charles was said to have brought rain with him to Spain: his return brought storms to England; the waters rose so high that when Lord Stanhope was crossing a little brook near Royston in his coach, he had three horses carried away and was all but drowned himself.

On his way to Royston the Prince met a cartload of felons who were being carried for execution to Tyburn; they were forthwith reprieved and released.

When the travellers arrived the King came out upon the stairs to welcome them; both Prince and Duke went down upon their knees, he fell upon their necks, and the three burst into floods of tears. That their joy "might be more full at this happy meeting," Buckingham's wife, mother, and sister were summoned by express to join him, and within a day or two life at Court was going on as if the friends had not been parted for an hour. [*London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom.*, Jas. I., Vol. 153, No. 31 (Conway Papers), Conway to Calvert, Royston, 9 October, 1623. *Do. Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6987, James to Buckingham, undated. *Munich*, ib., Rusdorff to M. Maurice, 12-22 October, 1623. *Do. to Palatine*, 16-26 October, 1623, *Birch*, op. cit., Vol. II., pp. 422-423, Chamberlain to Carleton, October 11, 1623.]

On October the eighth the Prince wrote, as we have seen, to Aston, who was now his confidential agent at Madrid, to instruct him to give the Spanish ministers the most positive assurances that he really intended to marry the Infanta. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. 36,449, Aston to Charles, 17 February, 1623-4, St. Vet.]

A few days later Gresley arrived from Spain bringing with

him the articles as to the marriage settlements, which had not been arranged before Charles' departure. Rusdorff learnt on good authority that Bristol, who, not without good reason, thought that vigorous inquiry would be made into his conduct, was already collecting materials for his defence, and that Buckingham, who was accused by the Spaniards of having sent home accounts of their King's policy, which were absolutely contrary to the truth, was busied in the same fashion. Even before the Duke had sailed from Santander, the Spanish Council of State, at Olivares' suggestion had sent information to Inojosa and Coloma as to his public and private dealings during his visit, "so that they might take an opportunity of mentioning them in the proper quarter." There can be no doubt but that Buckingham as he a few months later told James, felt himself to be in danger, and Charles had some difficulty in dispelling his apprehensions. [*Munich*, ib., Rusdorff to Palatine, 16-24 October, 1623. *London*, *Brit. Mus.*, Eg. 318, Spanish Council of State, 25, 26 September, 1623. Do. Harl. 6987, Buckingham to James, undated, Charles to Buckingham, 26 April, 1624.]

Buckingham's fears, doubtless, made him yet more anxious to obtain the support of Rusdorff, whose value as an ally he well knew.

Since 1621, when Rusdorff had resided as an agent for the Palatine in Vienna, under the protection of Digby's mission, he had been well acquainted with Bristol, whose abilities as a diplomatist he regarded with contempt, even if he did not look upon him as the betrayer of his master. [*Krüner*, op. cit., pp. 69-72, quoting 152, MSS. Cassell II., 114, Rusdorff to the Palatine Councillor Rosel, 24 August, 1621, and letters to Chancellor von Grün, Nos. 155, 156, 157. Cf. Cohn II., 192 in the same Collection.]

Since December, 1622, Rusdorff had been living in London, and after Andreas Pawel's departure in April, 1623, he had been formally appointed by Frederick to be his envoy at the English Court. [*Krüner*, op. cit., p. 75, No. 165, Cohn I., 9.]

He had, at once, distinguished himself as a most resolute opponent of the Spanish Marriage, and had published numerous pamphlets to prove that Spain could do nothing either to secure the restoration of the Palatinate, or to benefit the English Catholics. He was in intimate relations both with Abbot Archbishop of Canterbury and with Lords Pembroke and Carlisle, who were

the chief supporters of the French party in the Council. [*Krüner*, op. cit., pp. 73-84, citing various letters inter alia, MS. Cassel II., 225, Rusdorff to Archbishop of Canterbury, 25 July, 4 August, 1623.]

He also carefully cultivated the society of members of Parliament, who, nominally at least, were his chief informants as to the Foreign Policy of England. One of his most important pamphlets is a summary of his conversations with a member whose guest he was at his country seat during the month of September, 1624, and whose identity he disguises under the name of Stephen Lesury. [*Krüner*, op. cit., pp. 73-84. Cf. Return of Members of Parl., op. cit.]

Under these circumstances it is no wonder that Rusdorff should have received within a few days of Buckingham's return, full particulars of the fateful orders from Charles which Clark had carried back to Madrid. [*Munich*, ib., Rusdorff to Palatine, 16-26 October, 1623.]

It was not until the middle of October that he learnt the contents of the Emperor's letter to James I., and found that Ferdinand was perfectly willing to give a hearing to James' proposals for the settlement of the question of the Palatinate by a marriage between his second daughter and Frederick's eldest son, coupled with the condition that the lad should be brought up at his court. The only difference pending was on the question of religion. He thought the affair one of such importance to his master's interests that he informed him of it at once, although he could not make up his mind as to whether he ought to believe the story or not. [*Munich*, ib., Rusdorff to Palatine, 16-26 October, 1623.]

A few days later he heard that the King had written in very strong terms to Spain and was decided that the marriage should not take place unless the Palatinate were restored at the same time. It was thought that he saw that he had very little to gain by the marriage, and had, therefore, taken this step in order to make people believe that his sole object from the outset of the negotiations had been to use the match as a means to effect the restitution, as he would thus satisfy popular feeling and save his own credit. It could not then be said that he had been cheated all along, or that his proposals had been refused. At the same time the negotiations for the marriage were going on just as usual, and if saying that it would certainly come off would

make it do so, it was a settled thing. Lord Bristol was doing all he could to carry it through, but the political conditions were such that he was sure to fail, and every pothouse statesman in Italy was laughing at the incurable credulity and blindness of the English. The Spaniards at Rome said openly that they had never meant to marry the Infanta to the Prince and never would do so, and alleged this as an excuse for the way in which they had treated him. It was said that a General Pardon was to be proclaimed throughout the kingdom as a sign of the King's pleasure at the welcome which his people had given the Prince, but in reality, he wished to secure their goodwill in order to ensure the return of a Parliament in his own interests. [*Munich, ib.*, Rusdorff to Palatine, 29 October, 8 November, 1623. *London, Brit. Mus. Harl.* 6987, James to Charles, etc., August 5, 1623, certainly grumbles as to his prospects of gaining money by the Infanta's dowry.]

Rusdorff's conduct excited the wrath of James, who on October 29 sent a message to him through Williams, Bishop of Lincoln and Keeper of the Privy Seal, to say that he was indignant that his son-in-law's envoy should be the person who was throwing obstacles in his way, as regards an agreement with Spain. [*Krüner op. cit.*, pp. 73-84, quoting Leon I., 68.]

Consciously or unconsciously the envoy was indeed co-operating with Khevenhüller in his opposition to Olivares' policy of effecting an agreement between Spain and England at the expense of Bavaria, and as copies of all his correspondence are in the Bavarian portion of the Archives of Munich, it would be interesting to know whether or not he had an understanding with Maximilian. [*Krüner, op. cit.*, pp. 73-84, quoting in Note 170. *Khevenhüller, Arm. Ferd. x.*, 90, and in Note 176. *Do. X.*, 78, et seqq.]

Meanwhile the courtiers who had returned from Spain were filling Royston with their complaints as to the country and people. Though the Spaniards were renowned for their taste in dress not a man amongst them had adopted the fashions of Madrid. The stately nobles who had lavished their wealth upon the entertainment of the English were depicted as proud beggars whose manners were as coarse as their fare. Even the Catholics now complained of their former idol, Gondomar, who, they said, had treated them as badly as the rest had done. The attitude of the Prince's attendants, indeed, wrought an unexpected effect for it showed that their journey to Spain in place of strengthening

the ties with England had but served to drive the two countries more widely apart. These demonstrations were, however, only an outward show and made to please the favourite Buckingham. James and his councillors, indeed, were, with the exception of the Duke, as keenly bent upon the marriage as ever. [*Munich* ib. Rusdorff to M. Maurice, 12-22 October, 1623. *London*, S.P.O. S.P.Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 153, No. 81, Sir R. Yonge to Lord Zouch, 20 October, 1623. *Birch* op. cit., Vol. II., p. 426. Chamberlain to Carleton, 25 October, 1623.]

But the key to the situation was not in the hands of either Spain or England.

The Emperor might promise the King of England what he pleased, but he had no power to fulfil his promises without the consent of the Electoral College and of the Diet, and, for all practical purposes, both bodies were at the beck and call of the Catholic League which was in no wise willing to carry out blindly the behests either of the House of Hapsburg or of Maximilian of Bavaria.

It was plain to every German statesman that the "Liberty of Germany," or rather the liberties of the petty German Princes, were at stake, and that, if the army of the League were disbanded, the Spaniards, who already held the three ecclesiastical electorates, would become the masters of the Rhine. Were Bavaria to hand over Heidelberg and Mannheim to the Infanta Isabella, he would drive all the Protestant Princes and Free Cities who had hitherto remained neutral, with, possibly, even a few of the Catholics, into the arms of Denmark, which had for years been scheming to become the mistress of Northern Germany. Every German would cry out that Maximilian had betrayed his country in order to secure the retention of the Electorate for his family. The Spaniards, in their anxiety to gain the friendship of England might even be trying to isolate Bavaria, so that by driving the Elector to rely solely upon their friendship, they might induce him to purchase it by handing over the Lower Palatinate to themselves. They might then propitiate England by restoring the Palatine.

Spain, wrote Count Johann of Zollern, was looking more to her own interests than to those of the public, to the region rather than to the religion.

"They say they are asking for the Palatinate for the good of the Catholic Religion and yet Bavaria is Catholic." Moreover

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if Heidelberg and Mannheim were handed over to Spain before Bavaria had been recompensed for her outlay upon the war, Maximilian would lose the only guarantees for recoupment which he possessed. [Goetz, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., p. 334. Count Johann of Zollern to Maximilian, 28 Sept., 1623.]

Nor was Maximilian free to act without the consent of his colleagues in the Catholic League. His resources were utterly exhausted, and he was in no position to force the Elector of Mainz to restore the Bergstrasse to the Palatine or the Bishop of Spire to evacuate Germersheim. At the same time he was on bad terms with the court of Vienna, because he had refused to give up Upper Austria in exchange for the Upper Palatinate. [Goetz, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., p. 292. Dr. Jocher to Maximilian, Munich, August 28, 1623. ib., pp. 343-344. Note 1, London, Brit. Mus., Eg. 318. Spanish Council of State, 18 Sept., 1623. Do. to Mainz.]

Under these circumstances it is, perhaps, strange that Olivares should for one moment have thought of preferring the friendship of the Emperor and Bavaria to that of England. The explanation of his policy may, however, be found in those old schemes for the reconquest of the Netherlands which had been devised so many years before by Ambrogio Spinola. The victory of Tilly at Stadtlohn opened up the prospect of invading both Friesland and the Betuwe from the territory of the Empire, and thus of striking down the power of the Dutch at a single blow. But to secure this object it was essential that Tilly's army should be permitted by the Catholic League, in whose service he was, to invade the revolted provinces from the east. If, however, the Catholic League were to consent to this, the Dutch would declare war upon the Empire, and would thus give a tremendous advantage to the Palatine and his adherents. As Ferdinand wrote to Maximilian it was impracticable "to attack the Dutch with the forces of the Empire and the League," and at the same time to proceed against the rebels in the Empire. [Goetz, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., p. 275, Note 1. Kaiser to Maximilian, September 4, 1623.]

During the summer of 1623 Maximilian was irritated in the highest degree by the conduct of Spain. Not only had the Spaniards done all they could to prevent the Electorate from being transferred to him, but when Father Hyacinth had been sent to notify the Translation officially at Brussels, and Madrid, he had in vain requested that Cordoba and the Spanish garrison

of the Palatinate should join Tilly in his advance northwards against Halberstadt and Mansfeldt. He had, indeed, been invited to a Council of War at which the project had been discussed by Cardinal de la Cueva, Salazar, Spinola, and Diego Mexia, but no decision had been arrived at. [*Munich* ib. "Wie sich Spanien gegen Churfuersten in Bayen ertragen." *Goetz* op. cit. Part II., Vol. I., pp. 250 et seqq.]

It is true that Spinola may have been aware that Father Hyacinth was looked upon by the statesmen of Munich as an enthusiast who expected that the war would be won by "miracles" and never spared a thought as to the "human means" by which those "miracles" could be brought about, "although our utter incapacity to supply them has been explained to him again and again." [*Goetz*, op. cit. Part II., Vol. I., p. 292. Dr. Jocher to Maximilian, August 28, 1623.]

As soon, however, as he had learnt the news of the crowning victory of Stadtlohn, Father Hyacinth had sent his colleague, Father Alexander to Spinola to urge him to follow up Halberstadt and Mansfeldt whether they were in the United Provinces or in Friesland, and "to break up that nest of scoundrels." Maximilian, he added, would join him in person with the Bavarian forces. In his reply, the Marquis suggested that the Emperor and Bavaria should send envoys to Brussels to discuss the matter, an answer which the Elector recalled seventeen years afterwards with bitter resentment. [*Goetz*, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., pp. 250 et seqq. *Munich*. Do. "Wie sich Spanien u.s.w."] He conveniently forgot that at the time he had not shown any great eagerness to agree to Father Hyacinth's suggestions. He was obliged to confess, indeed, that Tilly's victory must be followed up, but this should be done in such a way as to bring about a peace without delay, and not occasion a new war. If the Empire attacked the Dutch, it would involve them in a war with France as well as with the United Provinces. The proposal to undertake operations against Mansfeldt in Dutch territory had been emphatically rejected by the Diet at Ratisbon, whose decision could only be reversed by a fresh Diet which could not be convened at once, whilst it would be dangerous either to persuade or to compel the Protestants to attend it. Moreover the Turks and Hungarians were on the move and might attack the Imperialists at any moment. Tilly had got Mansfeldt cooped up in East Friesland and might destroy him there as the Spaniards could do if he moved

into West Friesland. It would be folly to allow any Spanish forces to join Tilly unless indeed they would take him into their pay should Mansfeldt or Halberstadt be driven back into the Empire. After all the Belgian provinces had more to gain by their extirpation than any one else.

It might, however, be well to continue to negotiate with England, as the Palatine might now be more tractable. [*Goetz op. cit.* Part II., Vol. I., pp. 273-279. Maximilian to Donnersberg, August 19, 1623.]

He plainly told Father Hyacinth that he would not hand over the fortresses of Heidelberg and Mannheim unless Spain and the Infanta guaranteed that they would aid him to retain the Electorate, and asked that they should pledge themselves to support him if he were attacked by France for giving them these places. He requested that both fortresses should be left in charge of the Emperor's commissioners for at least six months, so that he might not be blamed by all Germany for surrendering them to Spain. Finally he asked that the Upper Palatinate should be left in his hands and that neither the Electorate nor the Lower Palatinate should be given back to "Fritzl or his children," to please England but that they should remain in the Bavarian line despite the objections raised by the Elector of Saxony. [*Goetz op. cit.*, Part II., Vol. I., pp. 278-279. Maximilian to Hyacinth, Aug. 29, 1623.]

Ferdinand, to whom Maximilian communicated this despatch replied as we have seen, that he fully approved of it. [*Goetz op. cit.*, Part II., Vol. I., p. 275. Note 1. Kaiser to Maximilian. Sept. 4, 1623.]

Possibly he was aware of the weakness of Bavaria and thought that he was risking little by complying with the request of his Spanish cousin, and by informing James I. that he approved of his proposals for the settlement of Germany. He could at all times excuse himself should he fail to carry out his promises by alleging the attitude of the constitutional representatives of the Empire.

Such was the position of German affairs when Charles took leave of Philip and set out on his road to Santander with the assurances of Spanish friendship still ringing in his ears.

Scarcely, however, had the King returned to Madrid than he requested Khevenhüller to remind Ferdinand's brother, the Archduke Charles, that two years before he had promised him

the government of Portugal if he would come to Spain. Khevenhüller begged both the Kaiser and Maximilian to second this request. The Kaiser expressed his delight that Khevenhüller had succeeded in preventing the restoration of the Palatine, and in securing him the help of the Spaniards without conditions. Maximilian on the other hand replied that the matter of the Archduke was one which had best be left to Olivares. [*Goetz op. cit.*, Part II., Vol. I., pp. 311-312, Khevenhüller to Maximilian, Sept. 12. Maximilian to Kh., Oct. 9. Questenberg to Do., Oct. 18, 1623.]

Philip, indeed, had already given himself over into the Kaiser's hands by allowing himself to be represented at the Imperial Diet as Duke of Burgundy. It is possible that he may have thought that, by this concession, he would induce the Diet to declare the Dutch rebels to the Empire and as such put them in its ban. But from the moment when he thus appealed to Cæsar, he made Cæsar the arbiter of his fate, and Cæsar's own destinies were in the hands of the Diet and of the Electors. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Eg. 318, Council of State, Instructions to Oñate to congratulate the Emperor on the Victory of Stadtlohn, undated, cit.]

The die was cast, and Olivares was now called upon to defend his new policy before the Council of State.

On the eighteenth of September despatches from the Infanta Isabella were laid before the Council; she enclosed copies of letters from the Palatine to Bethlen Gabor. In them Frederick said that he would never agree to any truce and urged the Prince of Transylvania to help him as France, Venice, and Savoy had assisted Mansfeldt. He added that the Elector of Mainz, who had hitherto been in favour of a conciliatory policy, now seemed inclined to keep the Bergstrasse.

The question as to the expediency of a junction between the armies of the Catholic League and Spain was then discussed.

Olivares said that as the Emperor and Bavaria had now consented to allow the Armies of the League to take part in besieging the fortresses in Holland, there was no longer any reason why their offer of help should not be accepted as His Majesty would not be obliged to give the League large subsidies. He pointed out that England was doing little or nothing to assist Spain in either Flanders or Germany, and was acting just in the same way in India, and begged the King to remember that it would be well that Spain should not make any greater advances to England

than England made to them. Both the English and the Palatine had Bavaria on their hands for the nonce, and Spain had no reason to lose the advantages which she gained from this complication. All the Infanta had done at Brussels had been in the interests of Spain, and she should be informed of this.

The Council ordered that a reply should be sent to the despatches from Flanders in accordance with the Count's suggestions. In it they also pointed out that the King of Great Britain would have no ground for complaint if the Spanish army joined Tilly's for their only object was to destroy Halberstadt and Mansfeldt who were ruining the Obedient Provinces and whom, James asserted, he was not assisting. [*London, Brit. Mus., Council of State 18, Sept., 1623. The Infanta's Despatches were of 25-31 August.*]

On the following day, however, in reply to Inojosa's despatch of August the eleventh, the Council decided to thank the King of England for having remitted the recusants' fines, and agreed that on this ground they would oblige the Prince by shortening the delay in handing over the Infanta. They were as yet wholly unprepared to break with England, for they knew that if they could come to a settlement as to the marriage and as to the German affairs, they would be better able to deal with the Dutch who were being egged on by France to hold out against any proposals for a Truce. They knew also that if they could make the negotiations with the United Provinces turn upon as few points as possible, they would have a chance of success, but they were decided not to treat except upon the basis of the previous Truce, and wished at all risks to avoid a war with France.

By the first of October they had learnt that the Infanta Isabella had instructed Oñate to inform the Emperor that it would be well that Tilly should join the Spanish armies in Flanders and march against Mansfeldt and Haberstadt. Giron moved that they should sanction her proceedings, and was followed by Olivares in a speech in which he showed clearly what the trend of his policy was. The help, he said, of the Emperor and Bavaria must be accepted "for it would be no easy thing for His Majesty to refuse the aid of the Turk were it offered to him, and there was no reason whatsoever why those powers should not declare war against Holland." His Majesty had already done so much for the League that he need not make them any great offers, whilst the Infanta, both before and subsequently to Haberstadt's defeat,

had sent Cordoba orders to support them. Both His Majesty and himself had always been ready to make the utmost sacrifices for the Emperor and the German Catholics "as it is certain that if we had to deplore the final ruin of the Catholic religion in those provinces, it would be a terrible blow to our own interests, and to those of His Majesty's dominions." The Count went on to entreat His Majesty "to direct that we should treat our friends of another religion as they may treat us and not go out of our way to show them any greater goodwill. It would be a misfortune if His Majesty were not to accept the help of the arms of the Emperor and the Catholic League, because the King of England and the Palatine are angry with the Duke of Bavaria, for they don't fail to give us grounds for complaint for they secretly aid, abet, and assist Haberstadt and Mansfeldt, and let all the world know that they are helping the Hollanders. Neither are they ashamed to allow their troops and ships of war in the East Indies to join with the Dutch in attacking all His Majesty's forces, or because they helped the Persians on their own account, and that it was thanks to them that Ormuz was taken, and that this very day the spoils of that place are being sold in London, where everyone is praising those who did the deed to the skies. They won't let us show any annoyance at five of their ships having put three of our Indiamen to the rout, and taken one of them, at the time when the Prince of Wales was at this Court, and up to this very day we have not succeeded in getting the slightest satisfaction for this either in England or from the Prince, for though strong representations were made to him here that he and the Lord Admiral should write letters to their commanders in those parts to instruct them to be upon good terms with His Majesty's subjects and not to injure them in any way, yet nothing could be got from them but letters drafted in such a tone that all His Majesty's Council thought that it would cast a slur upon us if we accepted them, and so we did not do so. His Majesty must remember this only too well, and it must open his eyes and make him reflect that we must use the enemies of our Faith as they use us, and that we must not refuse the help of friends of our own religion even if they are the enemies of the English, provided only that we do not assist them, so that in this we may show ourselves their superiors, for it is a certain fact, and they themselves own it, that they are helping Holland against us. As for the negotiations which are still going on at Brussels,

the Count agrees with D. Fernando Giron that they are being conducted in a way satisfactory to His Majesty." Montesclaros advised that they should continue to prepare for war, but trusted that the Infanta would arrange that matters in Germany should be settled by the Diet of Cologne under the authority of the Emperor, but on a basis which was satisfactory to the German Princes, whilst D. Diego Mexia and the Bishop of Segovia hoped that she would be left with full powers to act as she might think best. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Eg. 318, Council of State, Sept. 18, 22, Oct. 1, 1623.]

On the very day in which this discussion took place in the Council of State, Bristol and Aston had again approached Olivares on the subject of the Palatine. They proposed that he should be pardoned by the Emperor and restored to all his states and dignities without restrictions or reservations. James would undertake to induce his son-in-law to make his submission to the Emperor, and if Spain could arrange a marriage between the Electoral Prince and the younger Archduchess, he would persuade him to sanction it. [*London, Brit. Mus. Add.* 34,447, Terms proposed by Lord Bristol, 1 October, 1623.]

Bristol knew from experience that it would be useless to ask Spain to take up arms on the Palatine's behalf. Eleven months before, acting under that false impression as to the meaning of Philip's declaration, which was destined to prove so hurtful to the interests of Spain, he had asked him to pledge himself to do so if the Emperor proved recalcitrant. He had been met by a definite refusal softened, however, by an assurance that the King would keep his engagement to England, and that the Kaiser was resolved to do his utmost to effect a settlement upon terms which would be satisfactory to James. [*London, Brit. Mus. Add.* 34,447, Bristol to Philip IV., 10 Nov., 1622; Philip IV. to Bristol, 12 Dec., 1622.]

His terms might well have been accepted had he been able to put them forward "whilst Brunswick and Mansfeldt were in reputation and power," but the "affaires of Christendom now smiled strangely" upon Spain, and Olivares was no longer forced to rely solely upon an alliance with England. [*London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom.*, Vol. 160, No. 7 (Conway Papers), Progress of the Treaty, cit.]

The English ambassadors had, however, some leisure for social pleasures. The shooting season was in full swing and the Infante

Carlos was entertaining them at great shooting parties from which the King, owing to the Queen's indisposition, remained absent. Unusual numbers of stags, which were thought to have come from France, were in the royal preserves. Money was abundant at Madrid, for the flota had arrived safely, bringing not only large quantities of bullion, but also a bountiful gift to the King from his American dominions. Connoisseurs of amber gloves were also rejoiced by the new arrivals of ambergrease, for the supply in the market, owing to the large purchases by the English, was quite exhausted. [*Turin*, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, Nov. 2, 1623. *Mantua*, ib., Nerli to Duke, Sept. 20, 1623.]

Philip IV. was talking of sending an expedition against Tunis or Algiers as soon as the Queen's confinement was over, and intended, after it had sailed, to go through Italy to the Netherlands. On his way he wished to have interviews with both the Pope and the Emperor in order to arrange with them for a league against the Turks. Such was the story which Khevenhüller heard from Olivares and to which, so he wrote, he lent an incredulous ear. [*Munich*, ib., Khevenhüller to Maximilian, 1 October, 1623.]

It would have been well, indeed, had Olivares shown himself equally distrustful when Khevenhüller first endeavoured to divert him from the English alliance.

Maximilian, as we have seen, was bitterly hostile to the Spaniards, and was already in touch with the French through Father Valerian, a Capuchin, who had spent the previous winter in Paris to watch over his interests. [*Riezler*, op. cit., Vol. V., p. 244. *Goetz*, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., p. 65, Valerian to Maximilian, 28 Jan., 1623. *Munich*, ib., "Wie sich die Spanier," op. cit.]

The new Pope was equally unfriendly. Though the Infanta and Spinola were most anxious to bring about a truce with the Dutch, Khevenhüller and the Nuncio, who thought, though wrongly, that the King and Olivares were opposed to one, were doing their utmost to thwart them. Khevenhüller said he did so because though a truce might be in the interests of Spain, it would throw the whole weight of the war upon Germany. The Nuncio whispered that His Holiness was anxious to bring about a universal peace, but thought that it would be a great advantage to the other animals if the Spanish lion could be first weakened by a touch of quartan. [*Munich*, ib., Kh. to Max., 26 Sept. *Mantua*, ib., Nerli, 21 Nov., 1623.]

It was true that German statesmen were anxious and with good

grounds for peace, but they were not yet willing to imperil German liberty in order to secure it. Father Hyacinth saw clearly that if Bavaria could be brought to deal directly with the Palatine without the intervention of Spain, an arrangement upon terms compatible with the interests of the German Princes might possibly be arrived at. He made the suggestion to Maximilian who agreed to send to England Father Alexander of Alais, a Capuchin, who had become well-known for his labours against the Huguenots in France, and who might, therefore, prove acceptable at Whitehall, in order to learn how far James could go to meet their views. Father Alexander was to take with him letters from the Nuncio at Brussels in order that he might not appear to be the representative of Bavaria. Maximilian's constant adviser, Johann of Zollern, fully approved of a plan which, as he wrote, "might well be worth trying in Saxony and places of that sort, especially when we remember what Spain is after. Who knows whether the Almighty may not have predetermined this, and if we may not yet be able to say 'our salvation came from our enemies,' for never can I bring myself to believe that God will allow the 'pride' of that people to go unpunished." [Goetz, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., p. 334, Zollern to Maximilian, Sept. 26, 1623.]

Maximilian, however, was unwilling to break openly with Spain. All through September, Hyacinth at Brussels had been striving to induce the Spanish Government to take Tilly's army into their pay. The Infanta, Spinola, and the Nuncio in Flanders, the Archbishop of Patras, were anxious to meet his wishes. The chief difficulty had been that it had been found difficult to secure permission for that army to join in attacking fortresses, such as Emden, where with the aid of accomplices within the walls, success might be hoped for. Winter was the favourite season for such undertakings. Finally Maximilian came round to this idea in so far that he instructed Tilly to join Spinola and either unite with him in an attack upon the Dutch, or in wresting from them some fortress belonging to the Empire which was in their occupation and where he might fix his winter quarters. Otherwise, to avoid ruining Cologne, he was to winter east of the Rhine. [Goetz, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., pp. 302-305. Jocher to Maximilian, 2 Sept. Do., pp. 312-313, Max. to Tilly, 10 Sept. Do., pp. 318-325. Do. to Father Hyacinth, 11 Sept., 1623. Reigersborch, op. cit., pp. 9-10. R. to Groot., 9 Oct., 1623.] The Dutch

were now utterly exhausted. The new imposts upon flour and wine brought in but little ; a tax upon capital at the rate of the hundredth and the thousandth penny proved to be impossible, even when proposed in the form of a forced loan at over fourteen per cent. interest.

They were thoroughly weary of the outrages which the undisciplined hordes of Halberstadt and Mansfeldt were committing in the provinces, and recognised both that the prospects of a Truce were uncertain and that they " had no sure foothold in the war." Their only hope lay in the support of France. [*Goetz op. cit. Part II., Vol. I., pp. 312-313. Maximilian to Tilly, Sept. 10. Reigersborch op. cit., p. 9, R. to Groot, 9 October. London, Brit. Mus., Add. 36,446. Conway to Aston, 9-19 Oct., 1623.*]

Such was the position at the moment when Maximilian opened negotiations with James I. As his adviser Father Hyacinth clearly saw, the Palatine would make every possible difficulty as to coming to an arrangement, yet the best opening for a settlement lay in direct negotiations between the two branches of the House of Wittelsbach. He suggested that Bavaria should retain the Upper Palatinate and the Electorate in perpetuity ; that a new investiture of the Lower Palatinate should be given to the Palatine's children ; that the Electoral Prince should be brought up in Bavaria or at Vienna, and that a marriage should be arranged for him ; lastly, that Maximilian should administer the Lower Palatinate until the boy came of age, but that the balance of the revenue should be paid over to his father who might live where he pleased so long as he remained quiet. Such were the terms which Alexander of Alais might be instructed to propose at Whitehall. He added that the Government at Brussels would not grant the Elector a subsidy unless Heidelberg and Mannheim were handed over to the Infanta, and then only if Spain sanctioned it. The Elector of Mainz who had now come round to the Bavarian interests approved of these suggestions, although he warned Maximilian that if he handed over the fortresses France would be seriously offended. Schweikhardt had been upon a pilgrimage to Hal, and on his way through Brussels had seen the Infanta and Spinola. The Infanta had consented that Cordoba should join Tilly, but Spinola had worried him with proposals that the Army of the League should remain for the present in the Netherlands. He had, however, flatly refused to submit them either to the Kaiser or to Maximilian. Finally Tilly was forced

by want of provisions to fall back into Germany for the winter, much to Spinola's annoyance, but before he had done so Maximilian sent full powers to Father Hyacinth to treat for a subsidy with the Infanta, whose advisers had now given up any hopes of securing co-operation of the army of the League in the Netherlands, and were only anxious that it should not be placed along the Weser as this would leave Liege and Münster open to Mansfeldt's raids. Thus at the very moment when Olivares at Madrid was risking a breach with England for the sake of securing the help of the Kaiser and of Bavaria, the prize for which he was venturing so much was slipping from his grasp. Spinola's one wish now was that Bavaria might avoid a breach of neutrality. [*Goetz op. cit.*, Part II., Vol. I., pp. 319-323. Hyacinth to Maximilian, Sept. 14, 1623. Do. p. 322. Note 1. Do., p. 324. Maximilian to Hyacinth, Sept. 30. Do. to Elector of Mainz, Oct. 2. Do. p. 330. Tilly to Infanta Isabella. Sept. 23. Do. p. 345. Hyacinth to Maximilian, Oct. 8. Do., p. 344. Hyacinth to Maximilian, Sept. 30. Do., p. 339. Elector of Mainz to Maximilian, Sept. 30, 1623.]

Tilly duly followed Mansfeldt to Emden, which was held by a Dutch garrison, whilst strong Dutch forces were lying in the country round. For want of supplies he was forced to retire up the Weser, leaving the forces of the Union in possession of East Friesland, and by Spinola's orders cantoned his troops for the winter in Osnabrück and Münster so as to prevent Mansfeldt from emerging from his fastnesses. [*Brussels ib.*, *Etat et Guerre*. Infanta to Philip IV., Oct. 11, 1623. *Reigersborch op. cit.*, pp. 9-10, R. to Groot, 9 Oct., 1623.]

In the meantime the Kaiser had done his best to bring about a settlement in the Netherlands. He had sent Johann Baptista Gramaya on a mission to the States-General, nominally to inquire as to the rights of the Empire over Overijssel and several of the cities. As however Gramaya's credentials were addressed "To the lieges of the Holy Empire, the beloved Orders and States of our Belgic Dominions," their High Mightinesses refused to consider his proposals. Had they done so they would have acknowledged the Emperor as their Suzerain. [*Reigersborch op. cit.*, p. 10, Note 1, p. 11, Note.] It was impossible, however, for the Dutch to treat with Spain unless they treated with the Emperor at the same time, for if they were at peace with Spain alone they would lose their advantage at sea and would still be

left with a land war on their hands. [*Reigersborch* op. cit., p. 10. R. to Groot, 3 October, 1623.]

James meanwhile was lying ill of the gout, but his sickness was more of the mind than of the body. Buckingham, who was still ailing, and Conway had been hastily summoned to his side, but Charles remained in great retirement in London. Rusdorff heard under seal of secrecy that James, when he was worried to death and did not know which way to turn used to overwhelm everyone connected with the negotiations for the match with violent abuse. Now it was the Prince and Buckingham, now it was Bristol whom he had to thank for their failure, and he vowed that it was owing to them that he had had to give way and make many a concession which they might have prevented had they chosen. "All this makes me see clearly that they will end by making use of that excellent pretext, the Palatinate, in case the marriage business does not go as they wish. I mean the King, the Prince, and all who have had to do with the negotiations will swear that they had never meant to bring the marriage off until they were certain that the restitution of the Palatinate would be carried through and that, too, before Christmas. His Majesty himself told Sir Robert Anstruther this, that he might write it to the King of Denmark, and added that the only object of his mission to Copenhagen had been the settlement of our affairs without further bloodshed, that he was perfectly certain that it had been of use, and that he would now know in a short time how the matter would turn out one way or the other." [*Munich* ib., Rusdorff to K. of Bohemia, 1-11 November, 1623.]

James, as usual, was acting a part. Bristol kept assuring him that the marriage was certain provided that nothing was done in England to break off the negotiations, but he knew that it was absolutely necessary to call a Parliament and he hoped to influence the Elections in his own favour by showing himself to his people as the champion of the Palatine's cause. Buckingham, on the other hand, had now become a thorough-going supporter of the Palatine, as he knew that if the Spanish marriage took place Bristol and his party would retain an influence which he looked upon as a danger to himself. Meanwhile Inojosa was fawning upon him and telling all and sundry how happy the King of England was to have so good and true a subject.

Rusdorff was busily canvassing the English Councillors with regard to the seizure of the Bergstrasse, but whilst some spoke of it

as an outrage others said that the Elector of Mainz was so anxious for peace that he would willingly restore it if requested to do so. [*Munich ib.*, Rusdorff to Palatine, 12-22 November. Do. to M. Maurice do. 1623. *London S.P.O.*, S.P. Dom. Jas. I. Letter Book. No. 214, Conway to Bristol, 13 November, 1623.]

Buckingham was in constant communication with the Queen of Bohemia, and early in November promised that he would send her good news through Dudley Carleton who was returning to his father at the Hague. Carleton also received information indirectly that Charles was very much opposed to the marriage projected for his nephew and scarcely troubled his head about his own, although he was thoroughly determined that it should not take place unless full satisfaction was given as to the restoration of the Palatinate and of the Electorate. According to Carleton: "As for them that say he is in love, I assure your Lp. a Ladie reputed the wisest in England for those businesses saith she cannot possibly discover any trace of that affection in him." [*London, S.P.O.*, S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 154, No. 2. Dudley Carleton to Sir D. Carleton, November 1, 1623.]

Rusdorff urged his master to keep his brother-in-law fully informed of everything which he wrote to his father as to public affairs in order that he might continue to support him as he had promised to do. [*Munich ib.*, Rusdorff to Palatine, 12-22 Nov., 1623.]

During all this time, if the official story is to be believed, James had been carefully going through the whole history of the negotiations, and "foreseeing the inconveniences" in the future, gave orders to Bristol and Aston to suspend the betrothal until the King of Spain had pledged himself under his own hand to give satisfaction as to the restitution of the Palatinate. To please the public it was also stated that the Prince had originally left Spain because he had been asked to secure the withdrawal of English assistance from the United Provinces, and "to aid the King of Spain to subdue them." [*London, S.P.O.*, S.P. Dom. Jas. I., Vol. 155. No. 65 (Conway Papers.) "Relation touching the prosecution of the Match and other affairs with Spain."]

He did not arrive at this decision without great hesitation. The Commissioners for the marriage sat for four hours discussing the business with the King and the Prince. Never had the sittings of the Council been longer nor the secret of their deliberations better kept. Within four days five expresses were sent off

to Madrid. [*London, S.P.O.*, S.P. Dom. Jas. I., Vol. 154, No. 55. Chamberlain to Carleton. Nov. 21, 1623. *Munich* ib., Rusdorff to M. Maurice, 12-22, 16-26, Nov., 1623.]

The King knew full well that he could not continue his negotiations with Spain and at the same time satisfy Parliament, yet he hesitated to throw aside a plan which had for so long expressed his whole thoughts. "The movement of the great wheel remained unchanged," although, in outward appearance, he was inclining to the Palatine's cause. [*Munich* ib., Rusdorff to M. Maurice, Nov. 16-26, 1623.]

He still clung to the hope that the affair might be arranged by a marriage between the Emperor's daughter and the Palatine's heir. Accordingly on the twentieth of November he wrote to his son-in-law advising him to submit to the Kaiser and to agree to the arrangements which had been suggested by Olivares eleven months before.

Plessen in his report to Frederick on these proposals suggested that he might express his willingness to submit to Ferdinand by deputy, so that he might not be forced to go in person to Vienna.

Frederick might remind his father-in-law that on the faith of the hopes held out from the first by Spain, he had several times assured him that he would secure the restitution both of the Electorate and the Palatinate to him in person. This was a very different offer from that now made by the King of Spain that they should be given back to his eldest son after Maximilian's death. Moreover, as both the Emperor and Spain had changed the position of affairs by transferring the Electorate to Bavaria and handing over portions of the Palatinates to Mainz and Neuburg, he would have to be given security that his territories would be restored to him intact before he entered upon the negotiations for his son's marriage. Otherwise they might be given away piecemeal whilst the business was being discussed, and his opponents would be free to break off the negotiations and to put forward fresh proposals whenever they thought fit. [*Munich*, ib., Memorial from M. de Plessen to the King of Bavaria as to the reply to the King of Great Britain's letter of 20-30 November, 1623.]

It is noteworthy that not a word is said by Plessen as to the proposals with regard to the education of the Electoral Prince.

In the meantime Maximilian was continuing his efforts to open a direct negotiation with England. With the approval of the

Electors of Cologne and Mainz, Alexander of Alais was despatched to London under the names of Francesco della Rota, but, as Maximilian had suggested, does not appear to have received any official credentials from Bavaria, though the Duke constantly communicated with him through Father Hyacinth. [Goetz, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., p. 372, Hyacinth to Maximilian, 4 Nov., 1623, ib., p. 292. *Munich*, ib., Lorenzo Stefani to Maximilian, 23 March, 12 April, 1624, 20 June, 1624.]

It would have been unwise to give too much publicity to della Rota's mission. The Spanish Government were bitterly offended because Bavaria would not hand over Heidelberg and Mannheim to their garrisons, and Ferdinand was still grumbling because Maximilian would not accept the Upper Palatinate in exchange for Upper Austria. [Goetz, op. cit., Part. II., Vol. I., pp. 343-344, Note 1.] The Infanta Isabella likewise treated him with the utmost nonchalance and had already given the punctilious Elector deep offence by saying that she would write to Spain about his proposals after her return from Ghent, where five of her ladies were to take the veil. On the margin of Hyacinth's despatch he caustically noted "It is more important to take a nun to a convent than to write to Spain." However, once back in Brussels, Her Highness and Cardinal de la Cueva had written to Madrid for money both for Maximilian and for the Kaiser. Father Hyacinth could only hope that their letters would have some effect upon ministers "who knew nothing of Germany and think that its ruin does not concern them," a fact which was perhaps truer than he would have liked them to believe. [Goetz, op. cit., Part. II., Vol. I., p. 387, Hyacinth to Maximilian, 21, 23 Nov., 1623.]

As the first result of Father Alexander's presence in England, Rusdorff was asked by the Venetian Ambassador whether he thought it would be feasible to suggest a marriage between the Electoral Prince and the Duke of Bavaria's niece, and how James I. could be brought to agree to it. He could only imagine that the proposal had been originated by one of the great powers, but told his master that it was certainly a serious one. At the same time they discussed the question as to whether they could induce James I. to offer some compensation to Maximilian, who seemed almost inclined to come to a settlement with the Palatine. Rusdorff replied that on account of the difficulty about the title it would be impossible for the King to approach him except

through a third party. [*Munich*, ib., Rusdorff to King of Bohemia, 22 Nov., 2 Dec., 1623.] Difficulties as to etiquette were, indeed, almost insurmountable in the eyes of the diplomatic formalists of that day, where Public Law, as applied to the relations between different states, was looked upon as a reality.

France, indeed, had been the first to put forward the proposals as to the Bavarian marriage which had been communicated to the French Ambassador in London through a gentleman who brought credentials from the Nuncio at Brussels, so that the agent might be in a position to discuss matters with him and with the Venetian Ambassador without committing himself. [*Munich*, ib., Rusdorff to K. of Bohemia, 20 Nov., 10 Dec., 1623.] France was once more beginning to see the wisdom of the old policy of Henri II. and Henri IV., who had known how to use the German Princes in her interests.

Rusdorff's despatch was carefully considered by Frederick and Plessen, and Carleton was also called into their councils.

They saw at once that it would be very difficult to come to an arrangement with Bavaria as Maximilian would never consent to give up the Electorate, whilst the King of Bohemia would be disgraced for ever if he consented to the Translation. Bavaria, on the other hand, could not, they supposed, abandon its alliance with the Kaiser without risk to itself, as by doing so it would lose the chance of being repaid for its outlay upon the war, nor could the members of the Catholic League, more especially the Archbishop of Mainz, in justice be parties to anything which would diminish the power of Bavaria. Rusdorff might well say in a jesting way that the King of Bohemia could not set any great store by the promises of France and Venice who had left him in the lurch the year before, and who would certainly not take up arms for the recovery of the Palatinate. He was curious to see whether the French Ambassador would point this out to his King.

On the other hand, continued Plessen, they must see that they did not neglect these overtures, as they might lead to a negotiation which would induce James to write in strong terms to the Kaiser and to Spain as to the restitution of the Palatinate, and at the same time to treat with Bavaria about a settlement by mutual concession.

As regards a note submitted on the letter by Carleton, Plessen

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pointed out that if Frederick made his submission he must not do so in terms which recognised the "Validity of the Ban" as the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg had impugned it and he could not disavow their action. Securities must be taken that he was completely restored to the Imperial favour, so that the Ban could not be brought up against him at any future time. He could not go in person to Vienna to make his submission "as if he were being led in triumph," nor could he risk the fate of the Landgrave of Hesse who had been arrested by Charles V. through an equivocation in his Safe Conduct, and this must be represented to James in the strongest terms. Nor must he in any way recognise the dismemberment of the Palatinate. The Spaniards would never dare to offend the Elector of Mainz and the Catholic League by insisting upon the restoration of the Bergstrasse for, had it not been for the Army of the League, Christian of Brunswick might easily have overrun their territories when he was between the Rhine and the Meuse and they might still need their help against Mansfeldt. Moreover on the Duke of Neuberg's account they would be very unwilling to insist upon the complete restoration of the Upper Palatinate. Nor could they accept the Spanish proposal that the Electoral Prince should administer those territories during Maximilian's lifetime as such a suggestion was not only contrary to the "Golden Bull," but would by implication recognize the validity of the Ban. They hoped that England would find some compensation for Mainz. After all the King of Bohemia could only be recovering a country which had been completely devastated, and whether he submitted to the Kaiser or not, England could not cease to continue to support him.

It was absolutely necessary that the Spaniards should not get an inkling that these negotiations were in progress, so that they might not work upon James' mind. [*Munich* ib. Volrad von Plessen. Leiden, 15-25 December, 1623. "Belangent das von E. Gesandten beygesetz fransosischer Concept an die Kön Mät in Gr. Britt. das von Plessen bedenken bei des Eng. Gesandten Concept an Engellandt."]

Once more the question as to education was studiously avoided.

Rusdorff was by now convinced that the "Duke of Bavaria" was desirous of peace, and that it was to the interests of all who were anxious to prevent the aggrandisement of Spain and Austria to try and reconcile the two branches of the House of Wittelsbach.

Politicians whispered to one another that that house if united in itself would be the best possible curb on the progress of the Hapsburgs, and that as the overthrow of the Liberty of Germany was the first step towards a Monarchy, it was necessary forthwith to strengthen that Liberty by restoring concord amongst the German Princes. If Bavaria gave back the portion of the Palatinate which she held, it would be easy for third parties to induce Spain to hand back the remainder, and, in that case, it would be unnecessary for Frederick either to demolish the fortifications or to admit foreign garrisons into them as he would have to do if he recovered his territories directly from Spain or the Kaiser. It would be easier for the Duke of Bavaria to hand over Heidelberg and Mannheim, the key of the Palatinate, to the Palatine if he were reconciled to him than to give them over, as he was being pressed to do. Spain could not possibly secure their restitution to the Palatine, as it was all to the advantage of the House of Austria to retain possession of them as a means for bringing the rest of Germany under their yoke. After all it was very uncertain, he wrote, if the marriage with a Bavarian princess would prove an indispensable condition for concluding the treaty, as it was not clear that the Duke wished for it. Two straws showed which way the wind was blowing in England. The Prince of Wales had told his father in so many words that the Spaniards had been cheating him all along and begged him to tell them that they had acted in a most unworthy manner by playing upon his good nature, and that they only thought of putting him in a false position. The King did his best to argue him out of this belief, but was driven into a corner, burst into a flood of tears and cried : " How then do you wish to get me into a war in my old age, and make me break with Spain ? " " You may construe this as you please. The second is that the Spanish Ambassador has lately remonstrated very strongly with the King, as people would keep talking to him about the Restitution of the Palatinate. His words were : " Sir, those who are now so anxious to mix up the business of the Palatinate with the marriage, are only anxious to prevent the marriage in their own interests and to force Your Majesty to break with the King, my master ; but if they mean to go to such extremes, we, for our part, shall not wait for Your Majesty to break with us, but shall be the first to do so. They say the King did not reply a single word to this tirade, but called for drink. It is a great pity that such scenes as these are making

the Spaniards see how timid and pusillanimous the King is, and so they are getting the whip hand of him more and more every day." [*Munich* ib. Rusdorff to M. Maurice, 26 Nov., 6 Dec. 1623.]

Ten days later Rusdorff wrote that the envoy from Bavaria was named Francesco della Rota. He said that the Bavarians would restore what they held in the Lower Palatinate unconditionally and that they would also give back the Upper Palatinate had not the Kaiser proposed that the Duke should accept it in place of Upper Austria as a guarantee for the repayment of his outlay on the war. The question was purely one of money and could easily be settled. Their object in asking that one or two of the Palatine's children should be educated at the Bavarian Court was to give a security to the German Catholic Princes that he would not again attack their states, whilst a marriage between the two Houses would ensure that no attempt would be made to convert them. It was thought that this arrangement had been suggested in the first place by some French or Italian statesman and approved of by Maximilian and that the real object aimed at was to prevent such an increase in the power of Spain and Austria as would ensue if the English King's son married the Spanish Princess and his grandson the Kaiser's daughter.

An alliance with Bavaria would be far the best policy for the Palatine to adopt. They could not secure the restitution of the Palatinate from the Kaiser without the consent of the Duke of Bavaria, to whom Ferdinand owed so much and who had such influence in the Empire, especially amongst those who were jealous of the House of Austria. Even if they got the support of Spain they would still have to address themselves to the Duke, and it would be far better for them to go direct to the fountain head. If they made a treaty with the Emperor, they would have to renounce the Crown of Bohemia and place the Crown Prince as a hostage in his hands, so that he would be able to put pressure upon them whenever he chose: they would incur the suspicions of all the enemies of his house, and would find it impossible to enter into any alliance which would be contrary to his interests. In short they would no longer have a foreign policy of their own. On the other hand if they were in alliance with Bavaria they would not only gain friends at once, but would be at liberty to act as they pleased in all other matters and moreover would win

the gratitude of those powers who would have good grounds for anxiety were the young Prince in the hands of their rivals.

An alliance with Bavaria would allow them to induce France, Venice, and others who wished to set bounds to the power of the Hapsburgs, to join in the league and, by this means, they could secure the full restitution of the Palatinate. If they were allied with Spain and the Kaiser, neither power could ensure this, and Bavaria would find plenty of powers who would encourage her to refuse it.

The fact that they were treating with Bavaria would induce Spain and the Emperor to make some concessions to them in order to prevent a closer union between the two branches of the Wittelsbachs, who if united would form a power in the Empire which would stand in the way of the Hapsburgs. If they slighted these overtures they might give mortal offence in quarters now friendly to them, and find that, in consequence, every effort was being made in secret to render the Duke of Bavaria more hostile to them. If they got back the Palatinate from Bavaria, the Emperor would not dare to impose conditions upon them, which would prejudice the status of the princes of the Empire including Bavaria as well as their own. Such were the grounds on which Rusdorff pronounced himself strongly in favour of the Bavarian marriage. [*Munich ib.*, Rusdorff to M. Maurice, 17-27 December, 1623.]

On the following day he wrote to the Hague, giving a further account of Francesco della Rota's mission. The envoy he said was called Father Felice, and was well known for what he had done in France against the Huguenots. He had told James that the Pope knew nothing of these negotiations. The Duke of Bavaria had only told the Nuncio at Cologne that he was inclined to peace and, thereupon, the Nuncio in conjunction with his colleague at Brussels, had taken steps to prepare the way for direct negotiations between England and Bavaria. "Once this is done, the two Nuncios will retire into the background, and never show themselves again so that no one may ever know who really brought the two powers to treat together." Father Felice, said Rusdorff, had told him that he would not remain in England for one moment if the Spaniards knew why he was here "and begged me to keep everything most secret." Maximilian had never proposed anything about an Eighth Electorate, but it had been suggested by James. He, however, would not oppose the

plan, but would urge the Kaiser to adopt it, on the condition that he had not to renounce his place as the first elector in the Empire. There would be no reason for the Crown Prince of Bohemia to fear that the Duke of Bavaria would either give him trouble as to his religion or seek to use him as an instrument of his policy. "The Prince, who is the King's grandson, would not go to Munich as a hostage, but as his wife's husband. This his grandfather would not hear of, and *this is the point which presents the greatest difficulty*, but be this as it may, neither the Duke nor those of his party could content themselves with words alone, but want a substantial guarantee in tangible realities, and not mere verbal declarations. The Duke would give up the states and territories and so must be given an equivalent security." So long as Maximilian was recouped for his outlay, he would return the Upper Palatinate and did not care where the money came from. The question of Bohemia did not concern him at all. "The Emperor," said the man, speaking with every mark of truth, "would not oppose such a settlement, but would gladly ratify it. His Majesty was more anxious for peace than any other potentate and had good cause for being so. He is by no means so devoted to the Spaniards, as people here suppose him to be, although for well-known reasons, he is obliged to appear so, but, in reality, he only wishes they were well out of the Empire and would leave him in peace." The father thought that the negotiations should be conducted by Bavarian and Bohemian envoys. [*Munich ib.*, Rusdorff to King of Bohemia, 28 December, 1623.]

Plessen acknowledged those lengthy despatches in a very dry and short letter. After thanking Rusdorff for the manner in which he had conducted his negotiations with Rota, he said that they would be satisfied with nothing but the full restitution of the Palatinate. The Duke of Bavaria had for so long shown himself their bitter enemy that they might well doubt if his present offers were sincere. He had occupied the portions of the Palatinate which he then held in the name of the Kaiser and not in his own, and, therefore, could not give them back to the Palatine unless with the Kaiser's consent. However, they were so anxious for peace that they wished him to continue the negotiations, but he must do so with the knowledge of the French and Venetian Ministers and also of Conway through whom they had, in the first instance, received the offer of the Emperor's daughter. The King of England could not be allowed to think that the Palatine

wished to negotiate behind his back. All these powers were interested in the matter because it was their object to maintain the Liberty of Germany against Spain and Austria. It would be very unfair if Bavaria was allowed to take the Upper Palatinate in exchange for Upper Austria, especially as the Rheinpfalz was ruined by the war, and the splendid library, plate, and collections at Heidelberg had been carried off. Bavaria must be induced to part company with Austria and to come out into the open as the champion of German Liberty. The negotiations for an alliance between France, Savoy, Venice, and England to accomplish these objects should be carried on in London. [*Munich* ib. Plessen to Rusdorff, Hague, 8-18 January, 1623-4.]

Plessen could hardly have adopted a more arrogant tone had he still been a Councillor at Heidelberg, and not an exile at the Hague who depended for his daily bread upon the calculated generosity of France and Holland.

Events, however, were in progress at Madrid which were destined to bind England more firmly to the Protestant Cause than she had been since the death of Elizabeth, and thus after many weary years, to bring about the fulfilment of Plessen's dreams, although through the instrumentality of a power whose intervention he had never, perhaps, taken into consideration.

CHAPTER LXV

HAD James I. been contented to allow his son's marriage to be settled without insisting upon the restitution of the Palatinate as a condition of the match, he would have found the new Pope quite as anxious to meet his wishes as his predecessor had been. As Cardinal Barberini, Urban VIII. had done his best to bring about a marriage which he believed would be greatly to the advantage of the Catholic Faith in England, and his thoughts were turned to the subject immediately after his election to the papacy. The acclamations of the populace were still ringing in his ears when he had a serious conversation with the Spanish ambassadors about it. The letter from the Prince of Wales to his predecessor was the first which reached him as Pope, and fired him with fresh zeal. The business but for his illness would have been concluded without further delay. In the first moments of his convalescence he requested the Congregation of Cardinals appointed by his predecessor to go through all the papers and report to him upon them.

They raised several difficulties as to the education of the children of the marriage, who, they insisted should be left under the charge of their mother until the age of 12, and as to the guarantees to be granted to the Catholics.

Finally, instructions were sent to the Nuncio that when these points had been arranged, he was to make public the Brief of the Dispensation together with His Holiness' benediction. In accordance with the suggestions of Olivares, he was at the same time furnished with hortatory briefs addressed to the Prince and to his father, which he might present to them or not as he thought best but which, it was hoped, would have a good effect. His Holiness ended by saying that his most earnest prayers would be that through this marriage England might be brought back to the bosom of the faith. [*London, S.P.O., Roman Transcripts. Bibl. Vat. Barb., 8,630. To the Nuncio in Spain, 25 October, 1623.*] It is clear that the Congregation of Cardinals were somewhat more punctilious as to the terms on which the dispensation was to be handed over to Philip IV. than Gregory

XV. had been, but, possibly, their attitude was only a matter of form. [Cf. *London, Brit. Mus. Add.* 37,028. Instructions to Innocencio Massimi, Bishop of Bertinoro to treat for the Dispensation, 12 April, 1623. Do. Harl. 6,987, Charles, etc. to James, 22 April, 1623.]

Within a week after this despatch had been sent off from Rome, Olivares wrote to Cottington, who had now been taken back into favour, if, indeed, he had ever lost it, sending an invitation from Philip IV. to Bristol and Astor asking them to come to the Escorial where a settlement as to the Palatinate would be arranged to their master's satisfaction.

After professing that he was only too anxious to give back the Palatinate and the Electorate to the Electoral Prince, he went on to state that the Ambassadors, Charles and Buckingham were all mistaken in saying that Spain would ever do anything to secure the restoration of his States to the Palatine himself. [Cf. *London, Brit. Mus., Harl.*, 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, 29 Aug., 1623.]

If such a proposal were made offhand to the Emperor, "the persons who are interested in this business would procure to overturn the world, to make complaints to the Pope, and have recourse alsoe to others, exaggerating that which they have done for the restoration of that to the House of Austria which had been taken from it and they would alsoe parade that which concerneth Religion." These exaggerations, "as they well know how to do it," would stir up such feeling that it might prove impossible even to restore the Electoral Prince, which would be a misfortune for all, especially, perhaps, for the Palatine and his children. On the other hand once the Emperor through his daughter's marriage had become personally interested in the affairs of the Palatine, no one would oppose him in anything he might do about them. This would make it easier for him to restore his States to the Palatine himself, and Spain would do her best to ensure that this should be done in a way which would meet the wishes of the Pope and the other powers interested. If Spain put the Palatine's name forward in the first instance, she would be undertaking a fruitless task, for everyone would have a right to say that he was being justly punished for his rebellion, but "they would be deprived of their hopes by placing all upon the son." Anxious as the Spaniards were to satisfy James, they could not do so at the risk of raising even greater difficulties. Cottington must

make this clear to them for Olivares added that if his own plan were adopted, "I hold the Emperor to be in a manner already reduced," but that were he to act upon the English suggestions, "it will grow as ill-favoured a piece of work as that which happened in the Electorate of Bavaria, which we contradicted and then favoured." It was certain that no difficulties would be made as to giving back the States to James' grandchild and it might be possible to induce Maximilian to waive the right of retaining the Electorate for his life in the lad's favour. But on the other hand the Palatine must make proper submission, for as long as the states were not given up, the Emperor would be beset by intriguers anxious to gain possession of them. But his offences against the Empire and the House of Austria had been so grave that they must have security for his good behaviour in the future. Had the Palatine followed James' advice he would not be in his present position.

Olivares ended by saying that he was only a young minister, but he wished to settle this business at the first favourable opportunity. He had told Cottington before by word of mouth what he now wrote, "although the ambassadors affirme that you, as they, yea and the Prince, had mistaken this by understanding that the delivery of the States should be instantly made to the person of the Count Palatine, and not to his son. And I would to God I might see this obtained of the Emperor who so greatly desires the peace of Germany and the repose of the House of Austria." He pledged himself to do all in his power to effect this, and pointed out that James could not now be bound by his promises to his son-in-law, who, after they had been made, had completely altered the position of affairs by intriguing with the Turks and Bethlen Gabor, contrary to his advice, and so could no longer call upon him to fulfil them.

Philip IV., by sending all this in writing, gave evident proof how anxious he was to settle the affairs of Germany as James wished, for he might have equally fulfilled his promise by making a formal representation to the Emperor. [*London, Brit. Mus., Add. 36,446* Translation of a letter from Olivares to Sir F. Cottington, 31 Oct., 1623. *Cf. Munich ib.* James I. to King of Bohemia, 29 June, 1620, etc.]

Olivares was perfectly right to point out to Cottington the reasons for the Spanish attitude in German affairs, but it is plain that Tilly's withdrawal into Westphalia had shown him how

wrongly he had acted in withdrawing his support from the English before he was assured of the assistance of the German Princes against the Dutch.

By the middle of November Olivares had learnt that it would be useless to continue the negotiations for the marriage if the Palatine Frederick was wholly excluded, but that if the Kaiser would let this idea drop, England would pledge herself to induce him to make full submission, to secure the free exercise of the Catholic Religion in the Palatinate, to assist in reducing Mansfeldt and Halberstadt to submission if hostilities continued, and to endeavour to procure the Eighth Electorate for Bavaria. [*Goetz op. cit.* Part II., Vol. I., pp. 389-390. Khevenhüller to Kaiser, 23 November, 1623. Cf. *London, Brit. Mus.* Add. 36,446, Aston to Charles, 27 Nov., 1623. Aston to Buckingham. Do. *Munich ib.* Rusdorff to King of Bohemia, Dec. 28, 1623.]

The Count at once summoned Khevenhüller and the Nuncio to the Escorial and communicated the English proposals to them. Philip IV. requested Khevenhüller to forward to the Kaiser his suggestions for a possible settlement. Ferdinand might in the greatest secrecy send a safe conduct to the Palatine to come to Vienna. On his arrival there Frederick might throw himself at the Emperor's feet and make a full submission to his authority and as a guarantee of his obedience hand over his two sons to be educated at the Imperial Court and marry the Electoral Prince to the youngest Archduchess. He would have to swear to grant full liberty for the exercise of the Catholic religion in his dominions and give satisfaction to the Elector of Bavaria in such a manner as not to prejudice his Investiture. The Kaiser should name a place for his residence and if he continued his good behaviour might restore his lands to him.

It was true that the Dutch might prevent him from going to Vienna as they would rather keep him a prisoner than allow his sons to be brought up as Catholics. It would be best, therefore, that Frederick should go on a visit to England and from there make his way to the Imperial Court, through the Spanish Netherlands, France, Denmark, or Hamburg. Khevenhüller thought, however, that there were objections to this plan, and that, in order to keep the matter entirely in the hands of the Catholics, he should come on from England to Spain. Philip IV. might then receive his submission in the Emperor's name, and act as the intermediary in carrying out the other conditions of the arrange-

ment. He rightly conjectured that Frederick would not consent to place himself in the Emperor's hands. Though many people would say that the Spaniards would gain too much by such an arrangement, their objections would be removed if the King of England himself asked Philip IV. to do this, and it would give peculiar pleasure to the German Princes if Spain professed herself willing, at the Kaiser's bidding, to hand back all that she had taken from the Palatine. [*Goetz op. cit.* Part II., Vol. I., pp. 389-390. Khevenhüller to Kaiser cit., 23 November, 1623.]

These proposals were duly communicated by Khevenhüller to Maximilian, who at once consulted the Elector of Cologne. The latter expressed himself as opposed both to the restitution of the Palatine, and to the creation of an Eighth Electorate in favour of Bavaria, although it might be constituted in favour of the Palatinate, or held alternately by the two lines. In any case, if the Restitution had to take place the Palatine's sons must be brought up at Vienna, the suggested marriage be arranged, and the exercise of the Catholic religion in his dominions assured. Maximilian replied by agreeing in the main with his views, adding that the Eighth Electorate must be held by the Palatinate, and allowing him to communicate his reply to the Elector of Mainz in order that he might use it in his negotiations with Saxony. [*Goetz op. cit.*, Part II., Vol. I., p. 391. Khevenhüller to Maximilian, 23 November, 1623. Maximilian to Elector of Cologne, 9 January, 1624. Cologne to Maximilian, 21 Jan., Maximilian to Cologne, 30 Jan., 1624.]

By this time, however, the Kaiser was beginning to see that there were great difficulties in the way of a peace especially as the Palatine would not agree to it. As he told Maximilian he had, on that account, had a hint from a confidential quarter, to allow the Infanta Isabella to treat with England in the first instance "so that as a more certain guarantee for the ensuing negotiations the eldest son of the Palatine may be placed in our hands." He had accordingly asked the Infanta to do so, as it would be most important to induce England to "give such a material guarantee, especially as it may be hoped, if the proposal is accepted, that we may dispose the Palatine's young son to come over to the Catholic Religion." [*Goetz op. cit.*, Part II., Vol. I., pp. 393-394. Kaiser to Maximilian, 29 Nov., 1623.]

It is noteworthy that Rusdorff, who, as a rule, professed himself the implacable enemy of Rome, had pledged his word to his master

that no attempt to convert his children would be made if they were placed at Munich, but when the proposal to place them at Vienna was mooted, he never mentioned the subject of religion except when alluding to James' objections to the scheme on that ground. Was the Kaiser now bringing forward his plan in deference to the counsels of some secret enemy of Spain, whose bitterest foes were the Jesuits? [*Munich* ib., Rusdorff to Palatine let. cit., 17-27 December, 1623.]

In the meantime the situation in England had changed. On November the twenty-second the news reached Madrid that the Pope had granted the dispensation. Olivares that evening informed Bristol of its arrival. Next morning Ciriça came to acquaint the Ambassadors with the points as to which the Nuncio asked for further explanations, and they at once referred them to London. The twenty-ninth was Charles' birthday and Philip gave a great cane play to celebrate the event. When it was over he took the oath enjoined by the Pope, and Massimi placed the dispensation in his hands. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. 36,446, Aston to Buckingham, 23 December (*sic*), 1623, O.S.]

The marriage now seemed assured. No one doubted Charles' affection for the Infanta, and it was "sacredly" believed that he would honestly carry out his promises. Gossips, however, wondered that James was so tardy in sending her his congratulations, and Aston asked Cottington to tell the Prince as much for the Princess "took infinite comfort in his demonstrations of affection and was infinitely afflicted with the talk about his coldness towards her. She might well be so, as he had not written a word to Madrid since his letter to Aston of the eighth of October. [*London, Brit. Mus.* Add. 36,449. Aston to Cottington, 23 November, 1623. Do., Aston to Charles, 17 Feb., 1624, st.iet.]

Frankness was not generally thought to be a Spanish virtue, but even a Spaniard had yet to learn that he could be outdone in dissimulation by an English prince, in whose veins flowed the blood of the House of Lorraine. Within a very few hours, Bristol received James' letter directing him to retain the Prince's proxy until he might receive an answer to his satisfaction about the Palatinate, whilst though Charles in writing to Aston said that he had never meant to proceed with the match, "and be frustrated of the restitution of the Palatinate," Aston supposed this "not to be wrytten by way of Instruction, neither did your

Highness second it with any command, but in the same letter to use Your Highness' own wordes, you say, 'The King, my Father hath sent a command to Bristol not to deliver my Proxi,' so I shall leave it to your Highness whether I could have justified my proceedings to have oposed my Lord of Bristol upon a despatch singly directed to him." [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,446. Aston to Charles, Nov. 29, Dec. 9, 1623. Quoting Charles' letters of Oct. 8. Add. 36,449. Aston to Charles. 17-27 February, 1624.*]

As usual James had faltered and blundered and his servants were utterly unable to follow his quick mental transformations.

It is obvious that Bristol attached but little importance to the orders which he had received from the Prince before his departure from Spain through Clark, and that the fresh instructions from Whitehall had taken him by surprise. On the first of December he received a visit from Ciriça who after inviting him to meet the Commissioners to make the final arrangements, told him officially from Philip, that the dispensation was now in his hands, and that as he intended to fulfil his engagement with James to the letter, he had resolved to celebrate the espousals within ten days. Both Bristol and Aston used all the arguments that they could to have the ceremony deferred to another day, in order that the English Court might have time to arrange festivities to celebrate the event, but their entreaties were in vain. It is curious that Aston does not seem to have reminded Ciriça that the King and Olivares had on the ninth of August fixed the date for the consummation at Christmas. [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,446. Aston to Buckingham, 23 October, 1623, O.S. Do. Add. 36,447, Narrative of Sir W. Aston's Proceedings from 26 June, 6 July, 1623, to 12-22 July, 1624, cit.*]

Bristol and Aston soon found "in divers ways" that the King and the Infanta "took it very ill at our hands that we should offer to make delayes in that which was expected should be pressed for by us, besides the Conde of Olivares tould mee plainly that if we would deferr the Disposorio beyond the time limited we might, but the Kinge his master would nominate no other day, nor oblige himself to such as we should nominate, but would hould himself free of the Capitulation, and at libertie to doe as he thought fitt." Olivares in the presence of the Committee repeated this to Bristol and Aston and the Councillors added that on no account would their master defer the espousals beyond

the ten days. Thereupon "my Lord of Bristol seriously waying and considering all his Instructions seeing that if he proceeded not forthwith to the disposorios, he should sett this Kinge at libertie for which he had noe order, nor could noe way justify," whilst he dared not throw over the Capitulation at the risk of causing a break with Spain, "being assured here that His Matie. shall have full satisfaction in the business of the Palatinate, resolved to referr unto this King's Matie. the nomination of a day for the Disposorios, who hath chosen Saturday the 29th of this month st. vet." As Aston fully approved of what Bristol had done, and had received no orders to the contrary, he joined in sanctioning this course being taken, and, but a few days afterwards made piteous excuses to Buckingham and Charles for having done so. [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,446 Austin to Buckingham let. cit. do. to Charles let. cit. Narrative cit. F. de Jesu. op. cit., pp. 144-146.*]

But the stars in their courses were fighting against the marriage, and once more the dilatoriness of the Spanish Court proved fatal to the realisation of its hopes.

A purely accidental occurrence had also served to strengthen the hands of those who opposed the match upon religious grounds. On the afternoon of October the twenty-eighth a large number of Catholics had collected to hear a sermon in the upper room of an outbuilding of the French Embassy at Blackfriars. The rafters gave way and many of the congregation were precipitated into the cellars. Some were killed, some wounded and many were buried in the rubbish. A mob quickly assembled and hooted the sufferers as they were being carried away and even insulted the corpses of the dead. The news quickly spread over Europe, and, in Spain, even the greatest nobles were persuaded that the unfortunate event was the outcome of a plot for the destruction of the English Catholics.

All Madrid was still ringing with the news, when the Queen was confined on St. Catherine's Day, November the twenty-fifth. Although the child was a girl, there was great public rejoicing, all the bells were rung, the town was illuminated for three evenings and gala processions were held in which great lords in splendid attire walked through the streets carrying torches in their hands and headed by Olivares and Don Pedro de Toledo.

"It had been arranged that the Christening should take place upon Saint Andrew's Day and that the marriage of the Infanta

with the Prince of Wales should be celebrated at the same time, but Her Royal Highness begged H.M. the King her brother to let it be put off till Friday next, which is the day on which the Conception of the Most Glorious Virgin Mary, whose name the Infanta was given in her baptism, is celebrated. The King consented to allow it to be put off, and it is even supposed that it will be postponed still longer, until the Queen is able to be present at the ceremony. [The Day of the Conception of the B.V.M. is December 8.]

"These delays are, however, not much to the taste of the English Ambassadors, who are always in fear and trembling, lest the match should fall through. They would, therefore, gladly be quit of all this anxiety and uncertainty, as soon as may be.

"Both the ceremonies will take place in the Church of Saint James, which is the Parish Church of the Court, and which is about as far from the Palace as the stairs of San Giovanni are from the Great Square at Turin, [i.e., about a hundred yards]; they are making a gangway to it of boards, between two ranges of columns. It will be roofed in, but left open on both sides, so that the people may see the procession, and it is to be carpetted with rich carpets throughout its whole length" [Turin ib. Tarantaise to Duke, December 6, 1623.]

It was settled that the ceremony should be performed by the Nuncio.

Meanwhile the bride's household was being selected under the careful supervision of the ecclesiastical authorities.

It was arranged that Father Zaccaria, at the Infanta's ardent wish, was to accompany her to England, as he was very popular with the English and might, it was thought, do much good there. As he was then on his way to Rome, orders were sent to meet him at Genoa that he was to return to Madrid. [*London, S.P.O. Roman Transcripts. Bibl. Vat., Barb. 8,630. 1623. Di Madrid, 5 Dec., ricevuta a 28. Summary of Nuncio's despatch.*]

On the fourth of December the English and Spanish Commissioners met to make the final arrangements as to the Marriage Articles, but, as some small alterations in them were made, it was agreed that they should meet again on the sixth.

Aston, in the meanwhile, was doing his best to convince the Ministers that the rumours that Buckingham was doing all he could to prevent the marriage were false. He "desired them to

be confident that Your Grace who hath so often made professions unto ye Princess assuring her that you will ever be, as you have been, a faithful servant unto ye Business of His Matie. and will constantly labour to remove whatsoever difficulties may oppose themselves though others may suggest unto Her Highness the contrary, and that hath made so large professions as you did unto ye King here at yor parting will never doe anything so contrarie unto ye King our master's service and yor owne honor, as to seek to breake ye amitye betwixte these Crownes." [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,446. Aston to Buckingham, Nov. 27, O.S., 1623. Do. Add. 36,447, Narrative cit.*]

Aston requested clear directions as to what course he should pursue, and ended by saying that Bristol and he could justly claim that they had "effected and brought to pass this great business of ye Match, which hath been held of so great importance for the advancement of the affaires and honor of His Maties' Kingdomes, so I hope the blessed effects will declare themselves to all." [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,446. Aston to Buckingham, Nov. 27, let. cit.*]

His hopes were, however, not destined to be fulfilled. On Wednesday, December 5, Gresley, Killigrew and Wood arrived at Madrid bringing James' letters of 14th and 15th November, in which he expressly commanded Bristol and Aston to defer the marriage until the Spanish Government had declared their decision as to the restitution of the Palatinate. "In the afternoon my Lo. of Bristol and myself repayred unto ye Conde of Olivares and acquainted him with ye order, which wee had received who seemed much afflicted with ye Prince's proceeding and directly told us that ther was no hope and no speech to be had, but ye business was dead and buried." [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,447. Narrative cit.*]

It was a sign of the times that Bristol sent the despatches announcing the rupture to Calvert and not to the faithful Conway. [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,446. Aston to Buckingham, 29 Nov.*]

The postponement of the espousals had come as a thunderclap on the Spanish Court.

"I find them here," wrote "Honest Wat" to the Prince, "much startled by this delay, and it hath ministered much occasion of speech in this town, whereupon according to Your Highness' commands by a former letter, I have laboured and do

all that I can to satisfy these principall Ministers here ; that your intention is noe way by this proceeding to break the Match but to settle better ye friendship betwixt these Crownes to which purpose I have used the most effectuall arguments that I could, but I finde what I can say in this kynde hath litel credite with them, the answer which they all fall upon being That whylst yr. Highs. intended ye Match, you never made the Business of the Palatinate a condition of it, whereupon they conclude that Your Highness rayseed this as an impediment upon new resolutions, I shall be glad to receive yr. Highness' direction touching what language you will have me hould unto these ministers who believe that you intend nothing less than ye Match, which I shall, God willing, exactly obey." [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,446. Aston to Prince. Nov. 29, Dec. 9, 1623.*]

Aston must have known that even in the previous April the Prince had seen that the marriage in itself could do nothing to unite England to Spain by permanent ties of friendship unless the differences which had kept them apart were settled at the same time, and also that Buckingham had plainly said so to Olivares in July. He could not however conceal from himself that the Prince had acted wrongly in keeping back the question of the Palatinate until the last moment. [*London, Brit. Mus. Harl., 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, 22 April. Buckingham to James, 30 July, 1623.*]

Two days before Ciriça had written to Bristol to say that Philip had asked his Council whether the Palatine's claims had ever been brought forward in connection with the negotiations for the marriage or not and that they had answered in the negative. [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,446. Ciriça to Bristol, Dec. 7, 1623.*]

In vain Aston went to Olivares and begged him to discuss the question patiently. The Count absolutely refused to do so, and asked him not to mention it again. He pointed out that when the Prince agreed to the Marriage Articles nothing had been said about the Palatinate, and that it was not mentioned in the letters which his King and Charles had written to one another after they parted at the Escorial. The question would never have been raised had not Charles wished to destroy the match, and so his visitor would do well to speak no more of it, for it was not a business to be recovered. [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,447. Aston's Narrative, cit., Dec. 7, 1623.*]

Bristol knew that his whole political future was at stake and, notwithstanding this rebuff determined to persevere.

Accordingly on the ninth of December the two ambassadors went to Olivares in the morning, and, in accordance with their instructions, showed him their memorial on the subject of the Palatinate.

In it they once more went over the old familiar ground. After requesting Philip to explain his intentions as to the Palatinate, they recapitulated their complaints as to the seizure of Heidelberg and Mannheim whilst the negotiations for the armistice were going on at Brussels, they rebuked Spain for giving the Duke of Bavaria the title of Elector, and thus acknowledging the Transfer of the Electorate and lamented the occupation of the Bergstrasse.

Philip was again asked whether he would bind himself to take up arms against the Emperor or Bavaria if they refused to restore the Palatine, although James graciously promised that if Frederick were restored in person, he would induce him to give any reasonable satisfaction, and would himself do something to compensate Bavaria. [*Munich* ib. *Memoire des Ambres du Roy de la Gr. Br.*, 29 Novembre, 1623.]

"This letter somewhat disturbed the King and My Lords his Ministers, but as the Spaniards are accustomed to act coolly in all circumstances, they made a show of not troubling themselves about it." [*Turin* ib. *Tarantaise to Duke*, December 18, 1623.]

Olivares accordingly told them to hand the paper to Ciriça.

"We had presentlie after audience of ye King and delivered him ye prince's letter. In ye evenings we had audience of ye Infanta and My Lo. of Bristoll striving to clear with her ye aspersions yt. was here spread yt. ye prince had revoked ye poderes (proxy) ye same day he granted them, she interrupted him often with asking how ye Condesa his wife did and how his dauter did. I went presently down to ye Condesa de Olivares chamber when finding ther ye Conde I told him yt. he had told me yt. ye prince had not denyed ye revoking of ye poderes being charged with it by them. I told him I knew it was false and he must eyther believe other or I would advertise it to His Hs. He desyred leisure to looke againe over ye despatches and at night wrote mee a billet yt. ye Embassadors did advertice yt. His Hs. had not revoked but suspended ye poderes, and not yt. day he granted ye

poderes but before his departure out of Spain." [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,447. Narrative cit., Dec. 9.*]

On the following day fresh despatches arrived from England. Philip at once sent through Ciriça to Bristol to ask if they contained anything fresh as to putting off the date fixed for the marriage. In reply Bristol wrote: "The King my master has ordered me to tell His Catholic Majesty that it has all along been his intention that a firm and sincere peace and friendship should be established in connection with this marriage, and as these are some points which ought to be settled at once, the King thinks it right that they should be arranged before the marriage takes place, and I will present a note on the subject to His Majesty as soon as possible." [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,446. Bristol to Ciriça. Dec. 1-11, 1623.*]

Upon this Olivares sent for Aston and told him that the King and his ministers "had repayred in three things; the first that ther Embassadors in England with infinite difficultie obtained audience ther of ye King and ye Prince, yt. in point of honor it would oblige them here to hold ye same course yt. they understood yt. all yt. had shewed themselves frends to ye peace and good correspondency were under a kind of persecution which he sayd was a right course if they intended a breach, but would negotiate littell towards a friendship; ye 3rd was yt. he understood my Lo. of Bristoll was revoked and if itt were so they would likewise revoke ye Marquess of Inojosa being resolved to hold on the same force as His Matie. did." [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,447. Narrative cit., Dec. 13.*]

As Aston and Inojosa had just been exchanging letters in which they had been offering one another their assistance to bring the match to a happy conclusion, although "Honest Wat" safeguarded himself by adding that he felt sure his master would receive full satisfaction of his wishes, Olivares' words may have fallen upon somewhat deaf ears. [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,446. Inojosa to Aston, 19 Nov. Aston to Inojosa, 9 Dec., 1623.*]

But the day before Aston had indeed written to assure Buckingham that Philip and his ministers despite all appearances to the contrary were determined to give James full satisfaction, both as to the Match and as to the Palatinate, although the "cross proceedings of the Emperor" might have made their intentions suspected. [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,449. Aston to Lo. Admirall, 12 Dec., 1623.*]

Rumours were soon flying about Madrid that the marriage was broken off. "This report gave infinite disgust to all those who have worked to bring it about, but has, on the other hand, delighted very many who were of the opposite way of thinking, and who have always argued and written against it as a thing which is not agreeable to the service of either God or the King. However, the common opinion is that it will be carried through, but I have not yet been able to find out their real intentions and whether they will engage to get the Palatinate restored, although the deprivation and the translation to the Duke of Bavaria have never been very well liked here." [*Turin* ib. Tarantaise to Duke, Dec. 18, 1623.]

Philip IV. delayed returning an answer to Bristol's note about the Palatinate, and the delay was used to Bristol's detriment by his enemies in England. Conway was now an ardent opponent of the marriage and did his best to induce James to recall both him and Aston. With some injustice he said that Bristol's despatches gave no clue as to the state of feeling in Spain and blamed him for asking explanations of the directions which, owing to Conway's want of clearness, the Ambassador had been unable to understand. [*London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom. Jas. I., Vol. 155, No. 34 (Conway Papers). Conway to Buckingham. Theobalds. 11 December, 1623. Do. Brit. Mus. Add. 36,446. Aston to Buckingham, 27 Nov., 1623. Do. to Prince, 27, 29 Nov., 1623. litt. citt.*]

Bristol's letters were not thought worthy of being submitted to Buckingham, as there was nothing new in them, and Conway sagely remarked: "You will ever have more chaffe then Corne thence, whilst you have that Winnower there."

Conway would not have dared to act as he was doing had he not known that his "Gracious Patron" was in higher favour than ever with his "deare dad." No one could have an audience with either the King or the Prince unless he applied through Buckingham. All business was referred to him, and the King who was drunk from morning to night gave orders and counter orders, pledged his word and withdrew his promises just as his last visitor might incline his mind. Maximilian's agents in London said that the very day before the marriage had been intended to take place at Madrid four couriers arrived there who had been despatched by James within two days. The first brought orders to revoke the proxy. Bristol with good reason flew into a violent

passion and swore he could not speak of such a thing. Whilst the courier and the two ambassadors were discussing the matter, the other messengers arrived bringing directions that nothing was to be said about the withdrawal of the proxy, but that he was to demand the restitution of the Palatinate and suspend the marriage negotiations for six months in order to get this arranged for in the meanwhile. "The Spaniard, however, got wind of the orders which had been sent by the first express, made a show of righteous indignation and swore they might beg him to go on with the marriage on their bended knees before he would do so, and had sent Inojosa and Coloma instructions to this effect." [*London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom. Jas. I., Vol. 155, No. 65 (Conway Papers), Conway to Buckingham, 20 Dec., 1623. Munich ib., London, 26 Dec., 1623.*]

Buckingham, however, was by no means certain that he would succeed in breaking off the marriage. The King was in terror lest he should be involved in a war, and though he would willingly enough have lent an ear to the offers which France, Holland and their allies were only too ready to make him, he would not risk a breach with Spain. If Spain would give him satisfaction about the Palatine, the marriage seemed certain. Its opponents could only hope for success if they could show that the Spaniards would neither restore the Palatine nor fight, and that Frederick would come to his own without any necessity for the marriage. [*Munich ib., London, 22 December, 1623.*]

The favourite, therefore, saw that his best hope of preventing it was through Parliament. The Council at a meeting at which the Prince was present accordingly decided on 20th December to summon one, and it was arranged that answers to such questions as might be raised in it should be carefully prepared. A few days later Calvert wrote to notify Bristol that the opening of the session was fixed for the twelfth of February. [*London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 155, No. 34 (Conway Papers), Conway to Buckingham let. cit., Dec. 20. Do. Brit. Mus. Add. 36,446. Calvert to Bristol, 31 Dec., 1623.*]

Buckingham was now in the hands of the popular party or rather of the extreme Puritans, for he well knew that in the long run Parliament, even though the King might do his best to influence the elections, would force him to comply with their will and would prove to be his master and not his servant. [*Munich ib. Lorenzo Stefani to Elector, 17 January, London, 25 January,*

1624. As to the King and the elections Cf. *London, Brit. Mus. Harl.*, 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, April 22, June 6, 1623.]

Even Olivares stood in awe of public opinion, and the Parliament of England though supported only by a fraction of the Church was far more powerful than was the Cortes of Castile, even when supported by the great body of the ecclesiastics.

Buckingham saw that he had laid himself open to an attack by inducing Charles to go to Spain and set about preparing the materials for his defence. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987. Buckingham to James let. cit., July 30, 1623 and two undated. Charles to Buckingham, 26 April, 1624. *London, S.P.O.*, S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 160, No. 7 (Conway Papers.) "By the Progresse of a Treaty for a Match with Spaine," etc.]

Fortune once more played into his hands.

By the middle of December Philip had decided that he would not comply with the English demand, and on the fifth of January sent an answer to that effect to the Ambassadors. In it he declared however that he was willing to take every possible diplomatic measure at Vienna to secure the restitution to the Palatine within a time to be fixed by the English, on condition, however, that Frederick should duly submit to the Emperor and perform everything else that might be required of him. But he would upon no account take up arms against his uncle to enforce this request. He explained that he had given Maximilian the title of Elector because he was connected with his House by ties of blood and gratitude which obliged him to support his admission into the Electoral College.

Tarantaise thought that it looked as if the Ministers cared little whether the marriage took place or not for they had not approached the Imperial ambassador as to the restitution of the Palatinate, and indeed could not well do so as matters then stood in Germany and Hungary. Nor would it be seemly for the Emperor to open negotiations on the subject, for if he did so everyone would accuse him of acting out of fear of Halberstadt and Bethlen Gabor. [*Goetz op. cit.* Part II. Vol., I., p. 391. Khevenhüller to Kaiser, 22 Dec. Do. to Maximilian, 23 Dec., 1623. *London, Brit. Mus.* Add. 36,447. Phillip IV. to James as to the Palatine's affairs, 6 Jan., 1624. *Munich ib.* Réponse au Roy de la G.B., 5 Jan., 1624. *Turin ib.* Tarantaise to Duke, 23 Dec., 1623 ; 15 Jan., 1624.]

Philip duly communicated his answer to the English demands

to the Infanta Isabella, who had already induced the Emperor to agree to the proposed marriage between the Electoral Prince and his younger daughter, and who might well conduct the details of the negotiations for Frederick's restitution. [*Brussels ib.* *Etat. et Guerre*, 189, Infanta to Philip IV., Dec. 7, 1623. Do. 190, Philip IV. to Infanta, Jan. 3, 1624.]

Whilst Bristol remained at Madrid, there were still indeed chances that the marriage would be concluded, and on reflection the Spanish Ministers came to see that they must work in earnest for the restitution of the Palatinate if they wished to secure peace in Germany. [*Turin ib.* Tarantaise to Duke. Dec. 23, 1623; Jan. 15, 1624.]

Spain had every reason to wish for peace: the Silver Fleet had been forced by contrary winds to put back to Havana and could not leave there till March, so it was feared that money would go up again to 12 or 15 per cent., and that many merchants and brokers would fail. Yet the property of the Church continued exempt from taxation, although the ecclesiastical revenues were so large that those of the See of Seville could support a charge of fifty thousand ducats a year for pensions without much difficulty, at a time when the Queen's Dowry was being drawn upon to meet the subsidies to Flanders. [*Turin ib.* Tarantaise to Duke, Dec. 23, 1623, Jan. 15, Feb. 2, 1624. *London, Brit. Mus.* Add 36,446. July 19, 1622. *Assiento para Flandes.*]

The Council of State instructed Pastraña to secure the Pope's consent to a scheme for forcing the ecclesiastical benefices to contribute to the necessities of the Treasury, and doubtless this was one of the reasons why Olivares had to be so careful to respect the slightest scruples of the clergy. [*London, Brit. Mus.* Add. 36,449. Aston to Calvert, 19 Feb., 1623., O.S.]

Tarantaise depicted the situation in the blackest of colours, for he was deeply in debt to his bankers, Bartolomeo Spinola and Luca Paravicino and lived in daily dread lest an execution should be put into the Legation. [*Turin ib.* Tarantaise to Duke, Jan. 13, 1624.]

Under these circumstances Philip IV. was at the mercy of the Cortes of Castile. That body, which was one of the oldest European Parliaments, was elected by the Municipalities and owing to the system of grouping boroughs for representative purposes, which had been copied by Henry VIII. when he united Wales with England, it now contained but a small number of

members, who, as a rule, were amenable to pressure from the Crown. They, however, retained the right of imposing taxation, and, since their meeting in the previous April had been steadfastly resisting the efforts of the Crown to force them to grant new revenues.

Philip IV., in short, was like James compelled to shape his policy in accordance with public opinion, and, for the moment, public opinion was not in favour of a breach with England.

But the control of events had now passed out of the hands of the two great powers, and on the one side Bavaria and the Pope, on the other the Palatine, were the masters of the situation. Maximilian might be ruined, Frederick might be the prisoner of the Dutch and the pensioner of the French, yet both of them were determined not to yield one jot of what they held to be their rights.

The Elector of Bavaria when transmitting Bristol's proposals of the ninth of December to Cardinal Zollern at Rome complained bitterly of the treatment which was meted out to him in return for all his sacrifices on behalf of the Church and of the Kaiser. He requested his correspondent to ask the Pope in confidence for his opinion as to how the Catholic Religion could be protected and a complete amnesty to the enemy be prevented. It was all very well for the Spaniards to think that they were making a great hit by securing to everyone in the Palatinate the free right to profess the Catholic Faith. But had they any guarantee that the Calvinists would not succeed in making these concessions null and void by some intrigue or other as the Margrave of Baden had done in his States. If such a concession were made the Protestants would in their turn press for similar privileges for their co-religionists in all the Catholic Countries of the Empire with the result that in the long run the Catholic Religion would be everywhere extinguished. By the restitution of the Palatinate they would open the way to a revision of the Treaty of Passau in order to redress the grievances of the Protestants, and this the Duke of Wurtemberg was already urging on him. The Catholic Estates must therefore resist the restitution to the utmost though he could not see how they could succeed in doing so without help from without. He was doing all he could for the cause, but could effect nothing. [*Goetz op. cit.* Part II., Vol. I., pp. 406-407. Maximilian to Card. Zollern, 4 Jan., 1624. The despatch is corrected by Maximilian.]

It is hard to say whether Maximilian was thinking more of the security of the Catholic Religion or of the thirteen million florins which he had spent upon the war, but his adviser, Count John of Zollern, frankly took the worldly view. He had, indeed, never expected that the Spaniards would ever take a better line. Their one object was to reconquer the Netherlands, and this had been their chief reason for treating for the English marriage. As they looked only to their own interests, they cared not a jot what consequences might result from that marriage to the Empire, the Catholic Estates or religion. They desired the restitution of the Palatinate solely for their own advantage, and were convinced that they could secure it by their influence at Vienna where they believed that all their counsels were venerated as oracles. Notwithstanding the news from Madrid, Maximilian should continue his efforts to arrange an interview between the Electors of Saxony and Mainz and in the meantime they might treat about these important matters with the Pope, Cologne, and France through some confidential ecclesiastic. [Goetz op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., pp. 410-411. Johann, Count of Zollern to Maximilian, Jan. 8, 1624.]

On the other hand, the King and Queen of Bohemia were equally determined. Carleton had duly shown them Bristol's letter of the fourteenth of December, and was instructed to reply that though they knew he had the best chance of securing them the restitution, they could not build much upon this, for though the Spaniards had now made much more definite promises than they had done hitherto, yet they could not really intend to fulfil them, as had they done so they would not have haggled so long with Bristol about trifles. If they did not mean to carry them out they would continue to amuse them with trumpery negotiations, if they would allow themselves to be made tools of, "but time is *index veritatis*, and there is no more time left to be drawne out in length, wherefore we shall soon see the issue." [London, Brit. Mus., add. 36,447, Carleton to Bristol, Hague, 19-29 January, 1623-4.]

When both the principal negotiators were in this temper, could it be hoped that della Rota's negotiations in London would produce any result?

In vain Father Hyacinth sent soothing messages to Whitehall through his colleague in London. The Duke of Bavaria would, he wrote, sanction any arrangements that Father Alexander might

come to, and had no wish to detach England from Spain. He, however, pointed out that if England did not negotiate directly with Bavaria all the Spanish promises of assistance would be of no avail. Bavaria could not be expected to give up the Upper Palatinate, which he had taken in exchange for Austria. "Finally, I have told them that if they do not want the Eighth Electorate, that if the other matters are arranged and the boys are handed over, the Pope and others will do their best to induce the Duke to accept the arrangement for the Electorate being held alternately." But he would do so rather for the sake of winning over the Palatine's sons than on account of the father's own deserts. Frederick was hated by every prince in Germany, even by the Protestants, for his intrigues with the Turks would deprive him of all support whilst no Catholic could refuse to assist the Emperor, and everyone, including the King of France was in favour of Bavaria. So Mansfeldt and Halberstadt were in a desperate plight. [*Goetz*, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., p. 400, Note 1, Hyacinth to Father Alexander, undated.]

In a subsequent despatch Hyacinth said that it would be best if the Palatine's two sons could be brought up at Munich. It was absolutely necessary that he should hand them over, as they were the only guarantee for his good behaviour in the future, "and for other reasons." It would be to the Palatine's own advantage if he consented, as his family was so large and his States in such a condition that even if he recovered them that very day only a few of his children could get their daily bread out of them. If they were Catholics they could be given bishoprics, but as heretics they could not find such establishments even in England, where, perhaps, they would not be over welcome if they came as suitors. If James asked what would be done for the "Palatine himself," Hyacinth could reply that he had seen a letter from Frederick to his father-in-law, in which he stated that if his two sons were provided for he would seek his fortune elsewhere. It was ridiculous that they should be suspected "because we wish to have the eldest, just as if, by having the heir in our hands we were looking to the Crown of England." No one had the slightest idea of forcing the lads to become Catholics. "Our thoughts tend in quite another direction. For goodness' sake ask the English if they will keep the heir of the kingdom in their own hands and give the younger children over to us, so that the investiture

and restitution may be made in perpetuity in their persons. In that case we will take care to prove that we are not aiming at that mark." It was most important that the English Court should suppose that these proposals emanated from the Nuncio at Brussels and not from Bavaria. [Goetz, op. cit., Part. II., Vol. I., pp. 401-402. "Points to be laid before the King of England on behalf of the Duke of Bavaria." "Summary of the advices sent to my friend in a secret answer." Undated.]

In the teeth of Maximilian's letters to Cardinal Zollern it is difficult to understand how Father Hyacinth can have ventured to pledge himself to the English Court through Father Alexander that the Elector would make such sacrifices of his own interests for no very tangible return.

Possibly an explanation may be found in the rumours already mentioned as to Charles' physical condition which were in circulation, and which were in due course reported to Munich.

Buckingham, it was said, had been exercising such a bad influence over the Prince since his return from Spain, "that he is no longer the man he was before he went there even in his morals. He is giving himself up to such debauchery that it seems impossible that Spain will not get wind of it, and that if they do they will want to go on with the marriage, and, all the more so, because some kinsmen of Buckingham's, whom "he has thrown with the Prince, are given over to these bad habits, and many people are whispering that he has no prospect of heirs." [Munich, Geh. St. Arch. Kast. Schw., 486/23, Lorenzo Stefani to Maximilian, Maestricht, 29 Jan., London, 3 Feb., 1624.]

It is probable that as these rumours were in circulation at Maestricht, they also reached Brussels, for Hyacinth found that people there were by no means anxious for the English marriage. [Goetz, op. cit., Part. II., Vol. I., p. 416, Note 1, Hyacinth to Dr. Jocher, 12 Jan., 1624.]

A Bavarian agent could not but remember that after the Prince of Wales the Electress Palatine and her children stood next in succession to the English throne, and that it might prove advantageous for Maximilian to make some temporary sacrifice in order to secure control over the future King of England. But unless it was probable that the Electoral Prince would be called to the British throne in direct succession to his grandfather or to his uncle, such a plan could have no attraction either for the Elector of Bavaria or for Spain, as neither had

any reason to wish to see the Electress Palatine mistress of England. The subject had already been canvassed at Whitehall, and it cannot be doubted that Elizabeth was perfectly aware that it was looked upon as an open question whether or not she should be excluded from the succession. The King, it was said, if only he could do so without risk of war, was content to allow the Prince to remain single so that he might be free to marry him to suit his own interests. Buckingham's main object for the present was to stand well with both the King and the Prince, but if Charles were to die without leaving children, he would be quite willing to see the Palatine's son crowned and would then marry him to one of his own relations in order to retain the sceptre in his own hands. [*Munich*, ib. Lorenzo Stefani to Maximilian let. cit. Jan. 29, 1624. *Krüner*, op. cit. pp. 89-91, Note 218.]

But such a policy was little likely to be regarded with favour by the exiled Queen of Bohemia, and her reluctance to consent to any proposals for her son's advancement at her husband's expense, may well have been due to her wish to remain the heiress in reversion of the Crown of Great Britain as well as to her zeal for the Protestant Faith.

In other directions the prospects of the Protestants were also brightening. Urban VIII. had recalled Massimi from Madrid, and Olivares would lose a useful instrument for the Nuncio depended upon him for his hopes of advancement. He had also begun to raise difficulties about the settlement in the Valtelline on the ground that unless Spain put pressure upon the Grisons they would never carry out any conditions which he might impose upon them. [*Mantua* ib., Nerli to Duke, December 3, 1623; Feb. 28, 1624.] But the Spaniards could not make any move in the Eastern Alps without exciting the jealousy of France. On January the first, 1624, Vieuville, who was the partisan of a forward policy in the Grisons, succeeded Sillery as Prime Minister. At the end of April Cardinal Richelieu took his place at the Council Board as his supporter, and from that day it became certain that the old rivalry between France and Spain would once more revive. [*Hanotaux*, Vie du Card. Richelieu op. cit., *Mantua* ib. Priandi to Duke, Paris, May 3, 1624.]

Nor was the position of Olivares altogether secure. The baby Infanta had died suddenly and the King had fallen into that deep melancholy which since the time of his great-great grandmother

the mad Juana, had been hereditary in his house. He had felt his child's death all the more deeply as but for it he had intended to take part in person in the Spring in the campaign in Flanders. [*Turin* ib, Tarantaise to Duke, Dec. 23, 1623 ; Jan. 16, 1624.] To divert his thoughts Philip had gone a good deal into society and had indulged in a flirtation with the Marquesa de Inojosa, the wife of his ambassador to England. The Queen was furious with jealousy, and about the middle of January very angry letters passed between her and her husband, so that both the French Ambassador and the Nuncio had a hard part to play to keep the peace. She declared that she was highly displeased with Olivares, and Cardinal Zapata, Don Carlos and all his private enemies "did their best to increase her displeasure for they are all galled by having to endure such authority." [*Mantua* ib., Nerli to Duke, Nov. 6, Dec. 22, 1623 ; Feb. 28, 1624.] In the first heat of the quarrel, the King decided to make a tour incognito with but a small retinue in the South of Spain. His nominal object was to divert his mind from the loss of his child and to inspect the fortresses and harbours. In reality Olivares who was above all things a Sevillian of the Sevillians wished to let his fellow-townsmen see with their own eyes the favour which he enjoyed at Court, whilst as their procurators in the Cortes took the lead in resisting the imposition of the new taxes, he thought that a visit from the King in person would render them more compliant. [*London, Brit. Mus.* Add. 36,449. Aston to Conway, 6 March, 1624 O.S.]

The King's departure from Madrid, which profoundly afflicted the Queen was thought by most people to show that the negotiations for the English marriage were at an end. [*Turin* ib. Tarantaise to Duke, February 2, 1624. *Brussels.* Etat et Guerre 132. D. F. Giron to Spinola, 24 January, 1624. Polissena Spinola to Spinola, 9 February, 1624.]

James, however, had not yet decided to break with Spain and the Spaniards were far from desiring that he should do so. In the middle of January Aston had received instructions to inform Philip IV. that his master had not propounded the Palatinate as a condition of the match," and received a colourless answer. [*London, Brit. Mus.* Add. 36,447, Aston's Narrative cit., Jan. 13, 22, 1624.] As Bristol told Nerli, no change had been made in the arrangements already made, and there was no question of breaking off the negotiations altogether " words which prove that he is

afraid they may be." Every effort was being made on the Spanish side to keep them going, but they had decided to make no further advances so as not to give the English any opening for a rupture. They were doing what they could to arrange the Palatine's affairs, but this was a very difficult matter as so much of the Palatinate had been restored to the Church, which was the former owner of those territories. To prepare for all eventualities they were collecting large forces in Flanders, for once their hopes of an alliance with England by ties of blood were at an end, they would not trouble themselves further to meet the wishes of the English. [*Mantua* ib., Nerli to Duke, January 25, 1624.]

Olivares was not the man to risk a quarrel with the Spanish Church by forcing Mainz and Spire to hand back to a Calvinist the rich provinces which former rulers of the Palatinate had wrested from their sees. He knew but too well what his master was capable of in a fit of remorse for his misdeeds, and under the influence of the merited reproaches of a Cardinal Zapata. The Easter Communion was approaching and the favourite's support of the Marchioness of Inojosa deprived him of his power to undo the ruin which her husband had wrought to the hopes of Spain by his conduct in England, acting though he had done under the orders of the Council of State. [*Mantua* ib. Nerli to Duke let. cit. Jan. 25, 1624, as to Inojosa's conduct in England. *London, Brit. Mus. Eg.* 318. Council of State to Inojosa, etc., 25, 26 Sept., 1623, cit.]

Philip IV. left Madrid for Aranjuez on the ninth of February, leaving "for form's sake" D. Pedro de Toledo to carry on the negotiations with Aston. The Spanish fleets were being mustered and Buckingham was warned that they might make a sudden attack on the English coasts if they were left unguarded, "there being at present a general distast in this whole nation towards us." The Infanta was far from sharing in that distaste. Through private channels she had sent messages to the Duke to assure him how greatly she regretted that he had received so little satisfaction during his visit to Spain, and Aston pledged himself that he would satisfy the Infanta that Buckingham had done his best on her behalf, and that all the reports to the contrary had been spread by his enemies. Gondomar and Friar Diego de la Fuente, better known as the Padre Maestro, had told the Spaniards under what obligations they were to him. To Charles

Aston used even plainer language. "They did here very much desyre to have hard out of England before his Majesty's setting forth, and I understood then by some of these Ministers, if there had come a despatch from Your Highness desyring to proceed to the match, his Matie. was resolved to have stayd his journey by which Your Highness as now by his departure will understand how much the accommodation of all things is here desyred and how hopeless they are now of itt. and I will assure Your Highness, it is heartily repented here that the Infanta did not accompany you into England." He reminded Charles that he had not withdrawn the instructions which he had given him in his letter of the eighth of October in which he had expressed his anxiety for the marriage and had said that if they would give him satisfaction as to the Palatinate he would "forget all ill usage and become hearty frends; it is now on this part professed unto me that ther is here a resolution taken to procure that His Matie. and Your Highness may receave all satisfaction in that business, notwithstanding haveing not been of late any act of yor. Highs. that hath showed any forwardness to ye Match." I must confess I see not your Highs. intentions clearly." To Buckingham he wrote that the Spaniards knew well enough that they had given him just grounds for offence by their ingratitude. "The truthe is that I finde most of these Ministers infinitely condemn the usage you receaved here, and do desyre that they may not all lose you for one man's sake." As a proof of their sincerity the Padre Maestro was leaving for England at once with orders to give James every satisfaction both about the marriage and the Palatinate. The French Ambassador had told them of the overtures which Buckingham and Carlisle had made for the hand of Henrietta Maria, and said that his master had not listened to them out of regard for his alliance with Spain, but would do as Philip might wish about them. In return Louis XIII. expected that Philip would not proceed further as to the English Match without his consent. [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,449, Aston to Charles, Feb. 17 O.S. Do. to Buckingham, 17 Feb., O.S. Do to Conway, Feb. 17, 1624, O.S.*]

In reality Buckingham's negotiations with the French had given the Spanish Ministers the greatest possible offence, nor did they believe the report that he had told the French King that he was only putting forward an idea of his own.

"They say also that Buckingham abuses the King, Kingdoms,

provinces and gentlemen of this court, more especially Count Olivares for the small account which they have taken of the Prince of Wales. For this I think he has but very small grounds, for they did all they could have done for the greatest prince in the world. As to one particular the English have, perhaps, good grounds for complaint, for the King never once invited them to take a meal with him either in Madrid or outside of it. This gave great dissatisfaction to many Spanish lords and even to some of the Council of State, for when His Majesty was going to such an expense to entertain His Highness, he might just as well have done him the courtesy of asking him to dine with him."

As a proof that the marriage would never take place, the courtiers pointed out that Philip had got the Prince to give him the whole of the month of March in which to have it celebrated, and if the Infanta "is to leave at all she could not possibly get away in March or even in April even if she set out directly after the ceremony." The master who was giving the Infanta lessons in English had also been dismissed, and it was said that both Bristol and Inojosa had received orders to return home. "All the same I think that the English really wish for the marriage, but as hitherto they have been the petitioners, they now want to be courted by the people here, but wish though these ministers may to take such a step they never will do so for it would ill beseem their stately reserve and their ideas of their own greatness, and they will shrink all the more from doing so because they have never really wished for the marriage." [*Turin ib.*, Tarantaise to Duke, Feb. 2, 1624.]

Aston might not be able to see Charles' intentions clearly, but it may be doubted if the Prince himself was in any better plight.

The Elections to Parliament had shown [*Cf. London, S.P.O. S.P. Dom., Jas. I. Conway Papers passim. Returns of Members of Parliament op. cit.*, show that the elections took place in January, and were followed by numerous petitions] that whatever might have been the case in Elizabeth's day, it was no longer possible for a Government to pack a Parliament. But it was well-known that once the Spanish negotiations came to be discussed in Parliament the treaty with Spain would be broken off once and for all. Yet it was clear that a breach with Spain might involve a war, and such a prospect appalled the peace-loving King. He, therefore, clung to the policy which he had in the main followed since his accession to the English throne, not only

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on account of the hopes which were still held out to him by Bristol and by della Rota, but because he thus retained the means of driving a hard bargain with his Parliament. Buckingham, likewise, knew that a struggle with Bristol might easily end in disaster to himself. It was through his influence that Charles had been persuaded to enter into a marriage engagement on conditions which the Prince's affection rather than his reason had induced him to accept. Charles himself could not but remember that he had been in love with the Infanta, and as we have seen it was whispered that he had been so much affected by a letter which she had sent him under a feigned name, and which had reached him when he was dining with his father and the Duke, that to James' great joy and the Duke's greater annoyance, he had rushed away from the table in a flood of tears. Every letter, indeed, which reached him from Aston must have confirmed him in the belief that the Infanta was devoted to him. [Cf. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987 Buckingham to James undated. *Munich ib.*, Silsdon to Maximilian, March 6, 1624. Aston's letters *supra passim*.]

In public, however, the Prince professed to dislike the Infanta, and it had been necessary for the King to speak to him in very strong terms on the subject of his disinclination to the marriage, which he had decided to go on with. A meeting of the Council held before the opening of Parliament had approved of his decision by eight to four votes, those in the minority being the Duke, Carlisle, Mandeville and Conway who was looked upon as the sworn servant of the Dutch. The Prince and his confidants were always in their company, and Buckingham who astonished the world by his insolence, was thought to have bewitched him, a charge of deadly import. It is not impossible that the knowledge of these rumours was one of the reasons which kept Buckingham on the side of the Puritans, the great believers in demoniacal influences. The Prince was said to believe that his father would abdicate in his favour, and those who wished to ruin him in order to bring in the Palatine to be encouraging him in this belief. "The greatest persons in the Kingdom have already written to the Palatine to tell him that the Spanish Match will not take place." [*Munich ib.*, *London*, 3 Feb., 6-16 Feb., 8 March, 1624.]

The supple Conway had now gone completely over to the anti-Spanish party. His report on the history of the negotiations

which was evidently drawn up as a guide to Buckingham in his defence before Parliament, threw all the blame for their failure upon the delays raised by the Spaniards, who had only looked upon the treaty as a means for preventing a match with France. Despite all their promises they had done nothing to protect the Palatine, but had changed their policy "according as it might serve the end of their affaires, which intended the entyer conquest of that they seemed to treat to restore.

"The Treaty of the marriage in Spaine receaved as little Progresse, and for congruities sake, while that was pursued, much was suffered, much forborne, that wisdom and reason of State would have executed. The house of Austria did their business effectually for their ende, and fearfully or daungerously for all those Princes that will not admit a Monarch between them and God."

Conway after speaking in unctuous terms of the "deepe wisdom and resolute courage" with which the Prince had made the journey into Spain to put matters to the uttermost Test, showed to his own satisfaction that the Spaniards had so conducted the negotiations that it looked as if they had either intended "to make the Prince breake or undergoe such conditions as might visibly declare him to have taken up a peece of a yoke."

Even though in the end they had brought the match to "poynte of conclusion," and had promised to allow the Infanta to return with the Prince, and to procure the restitution of the Palatinate, it was "with a remarkable note: That those promises were in the tyme whilst Brunswick and Mansfeldt were in reputation and power."

As the report omitted to point out that but for the refusal of the Palatine to agree to the Truce, the Spaniards would never have occupied either Heidelberg or Mannheim, and that the question of the restitution of the Palatinate had never been connected with the marriage negotiations until after the news of the Battle of Stadtlohn had reached Madrid, these statements may rather be styled ingenious than straightforward.

Conway went on to say that the King of Spain, after the Prince was engaged, had made "new demands and amongst the rest some impious, as the change of the Prince's and Duke of Buckingham's religion, some unjust, as the withdrawing of the assistance from the Lowe Countreyes and to ayde the King of Spaine to an entyer Conquest," but this passage he had the good sense to strike

out. It would have been difficult to prove it in the face of the letters, which had passed between Charles and his father and which Buckingham knew had been seen by the Spanish Ambassador. As regards the postponement of the Espousals, he stated that the Ambassadors had been instructed "not to deliver the powers, untill the Prince should receive satisfaction in poynt of the free delivery of the Infanta," and added that James had subsequently commanded him to suspend them because the Prince after his return had convinced him of "the inconveniences to come." Finally he described Philip's reply to the request that he would aid in restoring the Palatine by force of arms as "in itself, not satisfactory," as not being "reall nor direct to his Matie's. demannde but standing upon contingencyes and accidents, doubtfull, daungerous, impossible, and leaving power in that King to avoyd them with color of honor." His Majesty, therefore, was by no means bound to accept it "as a good answer," but might tell the Spanish Ambassadors, "that he takes noe satisfaction by it, and therefore seeks it not by a letter." [*London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 160, No. 7 (Conway Papers). "Relation touching the prosecution of the Match and other affaires with Spaine."*]

The Duke must have been well satisfied with "his most humble servant's" labours for, a few days afterwards, Conway received a gift from His Majesty of four thousand pounds for "the timely support of his expences," which were to be paid to him in part by the Duke of Lennox and Lord Gray. [*London, S.P.O. S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 160, No. 5 (Conway Papers), Conway to Buckingham, March 1, 1623.*]

Buckingham did not, however, rely solely upon the labours of his faithful henchman to secure himself against the possible attacks of Parliament. After rebuking James for consenting to have a private interview with Inojosa which only made his people distrust him more profoundly than ever, he roundly asked his master, whether if Parliament would vote him six subsidies and fifteenths and promise to assist him in case of necessity with their lives and fortunes he would not accept it "with their counsell to breake off the match." He asked to be allowed to give some of them this assurance "underhand," in order to dispel their fears that the King would dismiss them after he had got their money. "Sir, I beseech you thinke seriously of this and resolve once constantlie to runne one waye, for so long as you

waver betweene the Spaniards and your own subjects to make use of both, you are sure to doe it with neither." He found himself hampered in his efforts to do the King service because James would "go two wayes, and myself onlie one; it occasions so manie disputes that till you be once resolved, I thinke it is more comfort and ease to you, and safer for me, that I now abide away. For to be of your opinion would be flatterie and not to speake openlie mine owne would be traiterie." [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Buckingham to James, undated.]

Despite this outburst of heartfelt sincerity Buckingham was still trying to make the best of two worlds. Olivares told Khevenhüller, with perfect truth, that Buckingham had put it about that England had good hopes of making a separate treaty with the Kaiser, from which Khevenhüller remarks: "it may be seen what nasty tricks these people have up their sleeves." [*Goetz op. cit.* Part II., Vol. I., pp. 421-422. Khevenhüller to Maximilian, Jan. 24, 1624.]

The King and Prince were sincerely anxious that the new Parliament should not recommence the persecution of the Catholics, and Buckingham, though he did not say so openly, was known to be at heart of the same views. [*Munich ib.* Cyphered letter from London, 25 January, 1624.]

Finally though he professed to be acting with such zeal on behalf of the Queen of Bohemia that she acknowledged him to be her most confidential friend, he would not say one word to show that he was in favour of going to war to support Holland, although the United Provinces were thought to be in the utmost danger owing to the naval preparations which Spain was making against them. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl., 6,987, Queen of Bohemia to Buckingham, 8-18 April, 1624. Do. S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 161, No. 49. Dudley Carleton to Sir D. Carleton, 20 March, 1624. *Munich ib.*, London, 6-16 February, 1624.]

Thus prepared for either fortune Buckingham felt himself in readiness for the meeting of Parliament, which took place on the sixteenth of February and which was opened by the King in person. [*Munich ib.*, London, 19-29 February, 1624.]

NOTE I., P. 316.

The passages which show the rumours current in London as to the Prince of Wales' morals are quotations by Lorenzo Stefani of Maestricht from letters from London.

Buckingham, he says, according to accounts from London, had exercised such a bad influence over the Prince since his return from Spain, "che non è più quello di prima." [Cf. *London*. Col. S.P. Venetian, 1621-1623, pp. 461, etc. Lando, *Relazione*, 1622, Sept. 14 op. cit] "ne anche in genere morum, *dandosi talmente al senso* ("underlined in original,") che non par che la Spagna non venga ad aver noticia, et avendone che voglia passar avanti nel casamento, tanto più quanto che dalli parenti del Buckingham delli quali egli n' ha fatto presente al Prencipe, sene hanno dette male pratiche et da molti si va come sotto mano dando voce di sua impotenza." [*Munich Geheim St-A. Kaste Schwarz* 486/23. Lorenzo Stefani to Elector of Bavaria, Maestric, 29 January, 1624. Do. *London*, 3 February. Buckingham's letters to James written in the summer of 1623 are in *London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987 and are well known to historians.]

CHAPTER LXVI

THE King, in his speech from the Throne definitely asked Parliament to advise him as to the course which he should take with regard to the negotiations with Spain.

Strangers were, at that time, rarely allowed to be present at the debates, but Rusdorff secured admission to the opening sitting through the good offices of a gentleman of the Royal Household, whilst very detailed reports of all that transpired during several sessions were furnished to Maximilian of Bavaria's agents in France and Flanders by a person who appears to have been a member of the House, and who may have been Sir George Manners, a kinsman of the Duchess of Buckingham.

These reports are still preserved in the Royal Bavarian *Geheime Staats Archiv*. [*Munich, Kas. Sch.*, 486/23 *Berichte aus England*, 1621-1635. Do. 319/8, "*Acta Anglica*, 1623-4." As to Sir George Manners. Cf. *Historical MSS. Comm. Rep. Rutland*, Vol. I.]

It was known that the Puritans in the Lower House would vote, not only for breaking off the marriage negotiations, but for a war with Spain. They wished to form a close alliance with the French and Dutch and to invade the Spanish Netherlands, although they knew that they would postpone the restoration of the Palatine by doing so. Wiser statesmen than the hotheads of the Commons saw that this latter object could only be attained through an understanding with Bavaria. Kensington, who had gone to Paris to negotiate for the French marriage, was said to have instructions to sound the French King and to ask him to ascertain if Maximilian, on condition of being elected King of the Romans would give up the Palatinate. [*Munich ib.*, Lorenzo Stefani to Elector, 24 Feb. *London*, 19-29 Feb., 1624.]

Nor were the Spaniards less anxious for a peace both in the Netherlands and in Germany. Spinola had urged Philip IV. to continue his negotiations with the Palatine, and the Infanta Isabella through Mme. de Tserclaes and a certain Jean Brant, who was a connection of Rubens, had been trying to ascertain the

state of feeling at the Hague. Olivares, according to Khevenhüller, was opposed to a Truce, but "some of the present Council are so inexperienced in this present business, that they speak about it and give their advice about it, just as if they were not sitting in a Privy Council." They were equally anxious for the English marriage, although, as Olivares said, James I. "deceives himself mightily if he thinks he can separate us from the Kaiser by it, for as long as this illustrious House has one drop of blood, it is bound to stand up for the Kaiser against the world. I was heartily rejoiced at his words for I have been hearing a very different song this last year or more. Our new friends, however, help us to judge of the worth of our old ones." [*Munich ib. Khevenhüller to Elector, 24 Jan., 1624.*]

Maurice had sent an offer to Madrid that he would treat for a suspension of hostilities for six months, and Philip IV. accordingly sent instructions to the Infanta Isabella to enter into the negotiations on condition that the Truce was extended to include the East and West Indies and that the time was employed to negotiate for a permanent peace. A few days later he wrote to her to invite commissioners from England and the Palatine to treat with her for a settlement of Frederick's affairs under the powers which she held from the Kaiser. [*Brussels ib. Etat et Guerre, 190. Philip IV. to Infanta Isabella, Feb. 6, 20, 1624.*]

The comings and goings of the Spanish agents to the Hague had attracted the attention of the French and Mansfeldt hurried to Holland where he was taken into the pay of the Dutch, whilst his supporters at Paris did their best to prevent Louis XIII. from complying with the request of the English that he would mediate with Bavaria. [*Mantua ib. Carteggio di Francia E., No. XV.3. Busta 673 (1621-1625). Priandi to Duke, Paris, Feb. 8, 1624.*]

The advent of Mansfeldt put heart into the opponents of a Truce. "From the very beginning," wrote the Infanta, "the Dutch have been firm in refusing to discuss the question of a Conference and Mme. de Tserclaes has said so all along." She told Father Hyacinth that she thought the Spanish proposals for a settlement were very unfair to Bavaria, and that it would be a disgrace if the Kaiser sanctioned them. Spinola expressed the same opinion. [*Goetz, op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., p. 418. Note 1. Hyacinth to Jocher, Feb. 10, 1624.*]

The Palatine, himself, was only seeking to gain time for it was as yet uncertain how Bethlen Gabor would deal with the Kaiser's

proposals for an understanding. He had allowed Rusdorff to tell Father Alexander that he would gladly treat directly with Bavaria and become connected with him by marriage. It was clear, however, that he would not act without leave from England, and, even at the beginning of January, the Capuchin had been on the point of leaving London because both the King and Ministers had raised difficulties about handing over the Palatine's sons. [*Goetz op. cit.*, Part II., Vol. I., p. 420. Father Alexander to Father Hyacinth, Jan. 5. Hyacinth to Alexander, June 15, 1624, *ib.* p. 418. Kaiser to Maximilian, 7 Feb., 1624. *Munich ib.* Rusdorff to K. of Bohemia, Dec. 28, 1623, *let. cit.*]

A month later Rusdorff told Alexander in so many words that the Palatine would assent to any arrangement which his father-in-law might make, but that James would not hear of his handing over the boys. Upon this the friar had replied that a treaty was impossible, but according to Rusdorff's account went on to suggest that they should not be handed over to Bavaria but to some other Prince. "On this 3,230 (Rusdorff), who had heard that the Duke of Bavaria would not be so opposed to an arrangement, if the Palatine's sons were placed at some other court, especially at the Duke of Neuburg's, said with a laugh, as if he was merely making conversation, why not rather at Brandenburg's or Saxony's or Lorraine's instead of at a Spaniolized prince's. Rota replied that Brandenburg and Saxony were looked upon as suspicious, because they were of the same religion and politics as the Palatine. Neuburg was only a Spaniard because he had no choice in the matter as things stood at present, but if affairs took another course they would see Neuburg side with his own family and not take so much heed for the House of Austria. As for Lorraine he knew nothing about him except that he was a kinsman of the English royal family, but the suggestion might be feasible.

"Rota also said that he had been with the Spanish Ambassadors here at their request and that they had said that the King himself had told them that he was in treaty with him, and that they were by no means best pleased that Bavaria wished to become reconciled with his kinsman without consulting them. He had already remarked that the Spaniards' greatest anxiety was lest the two branches of the Wittelsbachs should become reconciled as this would bridle their progress in Germany." [*Munich ib.* Rusdorff to K. of Bohemia, 17-27, February, 1624.]

Alexander, in writing to Hyacinth, said nothing about his chat

with Inojosa, but warned him that neither James nor his Council believed in the honesty of Bavaria, and would not listen to anything to the contrary. This was the reason why they wished France to take over the negotiations as this would give them some sort of a guarantee. However after his interview with Rusdorff, Rota received a message from the Prince of Wales, that he wished to continue to treat with him. [*Goetz op. cit.* Part II., Vol. I., p. 432. Note 1. Father Alexander to Father Hyacinth, 16 February, 1624.]

The good friar had, probably, his own reasons for not informing Maximilian that the negotiations had come to the knowledge of the Spaniards through James' indiscreet confidences.

But a few weeks before, the Elector of Bavaria had with unctuous rectitude written to inform Khevenhüller that he was astonished that reports that he was dealing with England should be in circulation at Madrid. He could not exaggerate his arrangement "that the wily spirit of Calvinism" should have tried to arouse suspicion against him at the Spanish Court, and have made people believe that he wished to separate himself from Spain and the Kaiser. No idea of the kind had ever entered his head, and he had never given anyone any commission of the kind." Others, perhaps, had brought forward something of the sort, but they had done so without his knowledge, "and, therefore, I am as little responsible for it as I have power to prevent it." [*Goetz op. cit.*, Part II., Vol. I., p. 422, Note 1. Maximilian to Khevenhüller, 27 Feb., 1624 in answer to Khevenhüller, 27 Feb., 1624 in answer to Khevenhüller's letter to him of Jan. 24, 1624.]

Maximilian, however, did not leave out of sight the fact that the marriage negotiations had not been broken off. He thought that the English were only treating with France in order to put pressure upon Spain, or else to have a second string to fall back upon. Their one idea throughout had been to secure the restitution of the Palatinate, if possible without a resort to arms, although the Prince of Wales and the Puritans were quite ready to go to war to obtain it. This was the reason why Mansfeldt had gone to England. However matters might turn out as to the marriage it would now be far more difficult for him to retain the electorate and the Palatine's territories, and the burden thrown upon him and upon the Catholics in the Empire would be too heavy for them to support unless the Pope helped them. Mansfeldt meant to treat with England, Savoy, and Venice, and England

was trying to form a league with Denmark, Sweden and some other Protestant princes to restore the Palatine. [*Goetz op. cit.* Part II., Vol. I., pp. 429-430. Maximilian to Cardinal Zollern, March 7, 1624.]

The opening of the English Parliament quickly brought all the pending questions to an issue.

Heated debates took place in which such reflections were thrown upon the King of Spain, the Infanta Maria and the House of Austria generally that the Spanish Ambassadors were forced to send Rota to James to complain of them privately. A war with Spain was openly spoken of, and members talked gaily "of sending ten or twelve thousand men thither to take Madrid, to which the Ambassadors rejoined "that if they came there they would muster up an army of women to beat them back." When a letter from Bristol was read, in which he praised Donna Maria, the House resounded with a cry of "Infidel." Calvert and Conway were duly despatched to the Spanish Embassy to apologise for these insults, and could only protest that though they were present at the sitting they did not hear the remark, and did not know who the culprits were. Inojosa had also his own personal grievances and complained of a gentleman riding in a coach with a Countess who scorned him "with actions of his hand and jack-nape tricks with his face." As the Ambassadors had been warned that their persons were in danger the Secretaries advised that a Proclamation should be issued forbidding insolencies against all foreign Ministers." [*London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Vol. 160, No. 15. Earl of Kelly to Sec. Conway, March 2, 1624. Do., No. 17 (Conway Papers), Conway to Kelly, March 3. Do. Vol. 161, No. 50. Sir F. Nethersole to Sir D. Carleton, March 29, 1624.*]

Buckingham, who had been severely attacked during the discussion, defended himself with some skill, and whilst endeavouring to throw the blame for the concessions which had been made to Spain upon the absent Bristol, made good use of his belated defiance of Olivares to depict himself as the champion of the liberties of England. No one present was in a position to contradict his statements, and not only did Parliament vote that the negotiations with Spain should be broken off, and a war undertaken to recover the Palatinate but joyously granted their sovereign the anxiously expected subsidy. [*Munich ib. London, 19-29, March, 1624.*]

To Charles, however, this seemed no great matter for a subsidy was but a small sum in comparison with the six subsidies and fifteenths for which the Duke had been scheming. The Commons could not expect the King's indulgence for such a gift, but it would be unwise to discontent them. He was, therefore, of opinion that the session should be allowed to continue provided they did not encroach upon the King's authority by discussing his marriage or a war with Spain. [*London, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6,987 Charles to Buckingham undated.*]

Buckingham, with much greater tact, advised James to receive their advice with gratitude, but to inform them that he did not want them to pledge themselves to the subsidy until he had decided whether he would act upon it or not. If by following it he got entangled in a war, he would not make peace without first consulting them. He ought to allow them to appoint a committee to control the expenditure of the money, and he was to end by pointing out that it was a good opportunity for effecting an understanding between himself and his people, and that he would give them ample proof that he would be in love with Parliament "for making of good lawes and reformeing of abuses." [*London, Brit. Mus. Harl. 6,987, Buckingham. Notes for James I., undated.*]

At the beginning of March Father Alexander went to take his leave of the Prince of Wales. Charles told him that he was extremely pleased with the honest way in which he had conducted the negotiations, "for we had not acted as the King of Spain had done by hiding the difficulties and acting deceitfully, but had said plainly what could and what could not be done in this business." The negotiations were broken off because it was felt that it would be impossible for England to allow the Palatine's sons to be entrusted to a Catholic prince. He again repeated that he was quite willing to come to terms with Bavaria, but that it must be upon fair conditions. In reply Alexander pointed out that if England broke with Spain, the Spaniards would unite with the German Catholics. The Prince said this was by no means certain, and that he himself was not in favour of a war of religion. The King was also much pleased "at the fair way in which we have dealt with them." As soon as the question about the Palatine's sons had been got out of the way, they might conclude a treaty with England. Rusdorff, Alexander added, had told him in so many words that if he went to Holland, the

Palatine would gladly receive him. [*Goetz op. cit.*, Part II., Vol. I., pp. 433-434, Note 3. Father Hyacinth to Dr. Jocher, 23 March, referring to a letter from Father Alexander to Father Hyacinth, 8 March, 1624.]

Father Alexander's position in England had now become impossible, for the object of his mission was everywhere talked about by the public.

The Jesuits, who had not been admitted to the secret, got wind of what was going on, and asked Maximilian to explain whether there was really a friar in England who had been sent there as his agent to propose the restitution of the Palatinate. They professed to have reasons for disbelieving the story. On Stefani's letter is a note possibly in the Elector's own hand. "We must write him something for it is plain that the English are boasting that Bavaria has offered to bring about the restoration of the Palatine." [*Munich ib.*, *London*, 19-29 March; *London*, 23 March; 12 April. Lorenzo Stefani to Elector. Maestricht, 9 April, 1624.]

Father Alexander accordingly left England for Holland on the fifteenth of March. At the Hague he was received with the utmost cordiality by Frederick and Elizabeth who invited him to dine with them and showed him their children. The Electoral Prince was allowed to converse with him for some time in private. They gave him a cypher and asked him not to let the negotiations drop. Their adviser Camerarius made many excuses for what Plessen had done, apparently referring to that minister's attempt to disprove the genuineness of the papers taken from Frederick's Cabinet which had been published under the title of the "Anhaltische Kanzlei" and which had given to the world the whole story of his negotiations with the Turks. At the side of this sentence Maximilian wrote "The foxes," Hyacinth continued: "This much is certain; for the moment we ought not to disarm."

According to Alexander the Palatine had told him that he could not agree to the stipulation about his sons, as it was not in his power to do so. He hoped, however, that the Nuncio at Brussels would continue his negotiations with Bavaria. He could do nothing more himself for the moment, but was waiting for a reply from the Duke of Wurtemberg who was also treating with Maximilian. But Bavaria seemed to have no inclination for a settlement, and he could not consent to humiliate himself before

the Kaiser, as it would disgrace his whole house. The good friar then solemnly warned him not to try to settle matters by fighting and negotiating at the same time, but to choose one course or the other. Camerarius subsequently told him that the utmost concession which they could make was to hand the boys over to France.

Hyacinth ended by saying that "The Venetian Ambassador has written to the Republic of Venice that the Palatine and his wife take this whole business to be nothing but a piece of deceit, and so for all their caresses are making mouths at us." [*Goetz op. cit.*, Part II., Vol. I., pp. 433-434, Note 3. Alexander to Hyacinth, undated. Hyacinth to Maximilian, 20 April, 1624.]

Carleton's account of the episode is doubtless somewhat coloured by his Puritan sympathies. After thanking Aston for his exertions on the Palatine's behalf, he ends by saying, "In conclusion it ends in this that the Prince Elector and Her Hyhs. must turn Catholicke forsooth or have theyre children putt into ye hands of some Catholicke prince for education or else no peace in Israel. And they marvayle how such a point as this should be stooode uppon which they esteem a thing of much indifference." [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,447, Carleton to Aston, 26 April, 1624 let. cit.*]

Hyacinth had hardly believed that the mission could succeed. Now that James had left himself in the hands of his Parliament, he could not accept Alexander's proposals for a settlement which would involve large concessions. At most the English would consent that the Electorate should be held alternately and that Bavaria should be repaid for her outlay on the war by the cession of the Lower Palatinate, which should then be restored to the Electoral Prince as the dowry of the daughter of Duke Albert of Bavaria, to whom he would be married. In no case would they allow the Palatine's sons to be handed over to a Catholic Prince on no better guarantee than the word of the French King or some other of his co-religionists. The Palatine was "so excessively proud that he wants everything and even more." His hopes were set upon the English Parliament "and now more so than ever, because an envoy of Gabor's is at the Hague with old Count Thurn." [*Goetz op. cit.*, Part II., Vol. I., pp. 431-436. Hyacinth to Jocher, March 9-16, 1624.]

At the end of April Father Alexander left the Hague for Cologne and thence made his way to Munich. [*Goetz op. cit.*, Part II.,

Vol. I., pp. 433-434, Note 3. Hyacinth to Maximilian, 20 April, 1624 let. cit.]

The Infanta Isabella still believed in Father Hyacinth, and was anxious that Philip IV. should be guided by his advice as to German affairs and thus secure the help of Bavaria to get leave to employ the army of the Catholic League against Holland. He had suggested to her that as England and the Palatine could agree to nothing but the restitution of the Palatinate which the Kaiser could not secure in the face of the claims of Bavaria and the Ecclesiastical Electors, Spain should throw them over, and agree either to maintain the Electorate in the Bavarian line, or to hand over the Upper Palatinate, Mannheim and Heidelberg to Maximilian and keep the rest of the Lower Palatinate. She also tried to induce him to dissuade the Elector from receiving a French resident at Munich. [*Brussels* ib. *Etat et Guerre* 190. Isabella to Philip IV., April 17, 19, 1624.]

In reply Philip IV. told her that Maximilian had disavowed Hyacinth's negotiations with England to bring about a Truce with Bavaria from which Spain was excluded and warned his aunt to have nothing more to do with him as he was in bad odour with the Nuncio and had written against the marriage in such terms that the Pope had been forced to repudiate him. [*Brussels* ib., Philip IV. to Isabella, May 24, 1624.]

Lorenzo Stefani, voicing the feelings of the Jesuits, rejoiced at Rota's failure, and thought that his mission had been nothing but a device got up by Buckingham in order to make mischief between Bavaria and Spain and by this means to force the Spaniards to take vigorous action in favour of the Palatine. Hyacinth wrote: "I think I now see clearly what I have always thought that we want one thing and God brings about another, perhaps, better than what we wished for." Elizabeth despatched Nethersole to England, and wrote to Buckingham in the most friendly terms. [*Munich* ib. Lorenzo Stefani to Elector, 20 June, 1624. *Goetz* op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., pp. 431-436, Hyacinth to Jocher, March 9-16, 1624. *London*, S.P.O., S. P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 160, No. 89. Dudley Carleton to Sir D. Carleton, March 17, 1623-4. *Do. Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987. Queen of Bohemia to Buckingham, 8-18 April, 1624 let. cit. Add, 36,447. Carleton to Bristol, 19-29, Jan. 1623-4 let. cit.]

The news of the proceedings in Parliament and of the Royal Speech from the throne reached Madrid on the twelfth of March

and on the seventeenth Bristol set out upon his journey to England, taking with him a commission from the Spanish Ministers to make large offers to James which included both the restitution of the Palatinate and the conclusion of the marriage if His Majesty wished it. [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,447. Aston's narrative 10, 12, 17 March, 1624 cit. Do. Add. 36,449. Aston to Buckingham, 17 March, 1624, O.S.*]

"Lord Bristol is leaving this very well content, as he has been given silver plate to the value of twelve thousand ducats in large vessels, braziers, candlesticks, salts, and other similar things, but all of extraordinary beauty. Moreover, as very ill offices have been made against him in England, he was invited, if he liked, to establish himself here, for he would be honoured with titles, dignities, pensions and other revenues, but he has carried himself as a gentleman, and good servant, and most faithful subject of his own prince. He has refused everything except the present which he could accept with a good conscience and without any stain upon his character." On March 25 the Powers which Charles had given for celebrating the marriage by proxy expired and at Madrid it was looked upon as a thing of the past." [*Turin ib. Tarantaise to Duke, March 26, 1624.*]

Buckingham who knew that Inojosa had done his best to make the King believe that "there was no longer a King or Prince in England for the Duke governed the country for his own ends," was unwearied in forcing on the final rupture with Spain. His language to James was a mixture of expostulation at his dilatoriness and of reproaches for the manner in which he still tried to stave off the breach. "All I can say is you march slowe towards your owne safetie and that of those that depend of you. I pray God at last you may attain to it, otherwis I shall take little comforte in wife or childe though nowe I am suspected to louke more to the risinge sone than my maister." [*Munich ib. L. Stefani to Elector, 17 Jan., 1624. London, Brit. Mus., Harl. 6,987, Buckingham to James, undated.*]

Before the end of March James had informed Parliament that he had told the Spanish Ambassadors that he "had given up all treaty with their Master and had resolved to despatch someone to tell the King of Spain this," and the two houses had appointed a Committee to draw up a manifesto to explain to the public the reasons for the advice which they had given the King. [*London,*

S.P.O. S. P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 161, No. 49. Dudley Carleton to Sir D. Carleton, March 28, 1624.]

Even at the last moment, however, he shrunk back from a rupture. He feared that the Houses would not keep their promises to supply him with money and could not ascertain from Charles what their intentions really were. "The shorte and longe is that if I maye be sure that thaire passing of the subsidies will not depend upon my answre to their petition, lette the poste goe haiste poste haste, but if thaye will not move, without firste having thaire will in that, no reason, thaye shoulde breake thaire promise and I still be bownde." [*London, S.P.O.*, S. P. Dom. Jas. I., Vol. 163, No. 30. (Holograph), James I. to Conway, April 22nd (?), 1624. The date is nearly illegible, but it is evidently before the despatches breaking off the negotiations were sent off to Madrid.]

On April 8, Gresley was sent off to Madrid with the fateful despatches, and arrived there on April 19. Aston was commanded to inform Philip IV. that James had communicated to his Parliament the whole history of the negotiations about the match and the Palatinate and that without one dissenting voice they had advised him to break them off, and that he had thereupon consented to do so. On April 25, Aston accordingly had an audience with the King and delivered him the letter. Although a despatch from Inojosa to inform them of the rupture had reached Madrid upon April 14, and orders had been already despatched to recall him, both Philip and his ministers were greatly surprised and troubled at the receipt of the King's letter.

Philip himself appears to have concealed his feelings, but some of the Ministers told Aston "that for the business of this match since they understand that it is not desyred in England they are very well contented that it be no more spoken off; but that they will procure yr. Matie. satisfaction in ye business of the Palatinate and so remain friends as before." [*London, Brit. Mus. Add.* 36,447 Aston's Narrative, April 19, 25, 1624 cit. *Do. Add.* 36,449. Aston to Conway, 12 April, St. Nov. *Do. to James*, 25 April St. Vet. *Do. to Conway*, same date, 1624.]

The Spaniards had, however, done all they could to prevent the negotiations from being broken off. Not only had the Padre Maestro been instructed to promise that the Palatinate should be restored within a fixed time, but Aston's audience with the King had been deferred to that the ministers might have the credit of

making a proposal that Philip could sign an agreement with England without naming the Emperor, the Palatine or Bavaria or any one particularly that he would join arms with James "against whosoever they shall find perverse in conforming themselves to reason and inquiring what they will understand to be reason they tell me that the Prince Palatine make those submissions that were promised and they those restitutions that were required." [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 35,449. Aston to Conway, 25 April, 1624 V.S.*]

Charles had already shown his contempt for the Spaniards in a manner which shows how much his character had deteriorated under the influence of the upstart Buckingham. A few days before Gresley left England, Coloma and Inojosa had brought him a box of oranges, lemons, figs, raisins and some fine hams from the Countess of Olivares. The Prince was unwilling to refuse the present, but at once distributed the fruit amongst his household. The news was carried to Madrid and the Countess heard that her gifts had been received with scoffs and scorn. [*Mantua ib. Priandi to Duke, Paris, April 12, 1624. London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,449, Aston to Prince, 25 April, 1624 St. Vet.*]

Tarantaise, who had never forgiven the English for their refusal of the hand of the Infanta Maria of Savoy, summed up the situation in caustic language.

"The King will be back again at Madrid, sooner than he had intended and will come by Granada and Malaga instead of by Seville, as he gave up the idea of going back there for Holy Week. His Majesty has been thoroughly disgusted with the Seville mob on account of their loose talk, insulting jibes, cartoons, and most insolent pasquinades, which were posted up everywhere, and were directed not only against Count Olivares, but in the plainest terms against the King himself.

"The English Ambassador extraordinary, Lord Bristol, has at last left for England. He is very depressed, sad, and melancholy, as he dreads that some great misfortune may befall him through the ill offices of the favourite the Duke of Buckingham, and, therefore, that his house may not become extinct, he is leaving his son in Spain. Though he took him with him from here, he is to leave him in one of the last Spanish towns towards the French frontier, on the pretext of his learning the Spanish language, so that if the father should lose his life, the son will be favoured, helped, and raised high here in every way.

"As for the marriage it really seems to be quite forgotten, perhaps because they only come into it with a very ill grace, perhaps because Buckingham keeps running down everything Spanish in a way which has produced a great impression upon the English King's mind. He is for ever repeating that in Spain there is only outward semblance and no substance, there is no truth but it is all lies, there are not many jewels and of those most are false.

"If they give a dowry of two million ducats it is not to go into the hands of the Prince of Wales or of his father the King, but is to be left in Spain to pay the Infanta her allowance of eighty thousand ducats a year.

"As for the Infanta herself she is certainly very pretty, but there is no lack of other princesses just as well looking, and as for her good qualities she is so young that it is hard to see what virtues distinguish her beyond those which she shares with most Spanish women.

"As for the Prince they hold him for all the more unprincipled, because they are given to understand that he is treating both with the French King and also with Your Royal Highness for one of your Princesses. If this be so, please God, we may not have the same difficulties as there were in Paul the Fifth's time, for both Gregory XV. and Urban VIII. have granted the dispensation for the difference of religion, although a friend of mine who knows English affairs well tells me that if Y.R.H. should have occasion to negotiate with them you must proceed very cautiously and warily, as the inconstancy of that nation is only too visible.

"The same gentleman added that the King of Great Britain had once told him that he had asked Prince Charles (sic) his eldest son, if he would like to marry one of the King of Spain's daughters, and if he could not get one, if he would marry one of Your Royal Highnesses', for besides being the daughters of so great, courageous and high-minded a prince, they were also the nieces of Philip the Third, King of Spain, and in the line of succession to that throne, and that he had replied he would readily obey His Majesty's orders.

"But when after that Prince's death, the King was talking about it one day with his son-in-law the Palatine, he broke in with "Sire, leave the regretting part to me, for, if you have lost a son, I have lost a brother. He had given me his word that he would never take any woman to wife, but my sister. The King was

dumbfounded and thunderstruck at this, for he had never had a hint of it from him.

"I thought I should tell Y.R.H. this that you may know what is going on and so be better able to arrange matters to your own advantage, dignity and prestige, when it comes to the business of negotiating the marriage, for as the old saw runs: "A man well awake counts for two." [*Turin ib. Tarantaise to Duke, April 7, 1624.*]

Olivares took the rupture of the negotiations with great calmness. He had come to see that in all probability Spain had little to gain from the English Match. If James wanted to go to war with the Spaniards he could do so whether his son was married to the Infanta or not, whilst if he wished for peace he would do his best to secure it even if he had failed to bring about the match. Nor, in that event, would England necessarily take any steps to renew her alliance with her commercial rivals in the Low Countries. As Conway pointed out to Buckingham the rupture of the marriage treaty need not mean war with Spain, until some conflict had taken place between the English and Spanish ships at sea, or until England had openly sent assistance to the United Provinces. [*Munich ib. Khevenhüller to Elector, 20 February, 1624. London, S.P.O., S. P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 162, No. 62 (Conway Papers). Information for the Duke of Buckingham.*]

Under these circumstances all the Count had to do was to avoid any action which might give fresh umbrage to England. When Khevenhüller advised him to enter into confidential communications with Maximilian as to German affairs, and asked how he proposed that the much desired satisfaction should be given to Bavaria, he replied "that the investiture of the Electorate had only been conferred upon your Electoral Highness for your own person, and that it could not be given to the Bavarian House in perpetuity without the risk of a never ending war," but that the loans advanced by him to carry on the war should be repaid in full by mortgages secured upon either the Palatinate itself or upon the Imperial lands. [*Munich ib. Khevenhüller to Elector, 20 Feb., 1624. let. cit.*]

To save his prestige Olivares wrote to the Infanta Isabella that he had never wished for the marriage, but that the old members of the Council had put such pressure upon the King to consent to it, that he did not dare to be the only one to stand out against it.

[*Goetz op. cit.*, Part II., Vol. I., pp. 433-434. Father Hyacinth to Dr. Jocher, March 16, 1624.]

Through the Nuncio at Brussels Olivares sent soothing messages to Hyacinth. He made out that he had brought round the rest of the Council to take his own views as to the English marriage and added that Spain only meant to retain the Lower Palatinate until the peace, and that in the end they would have more regard for Maximilian than he perhaps expected. "I have replied in such a way to the Archbishop of Patras that I think I shall make them blush a little. However, I am not such a disbeliever as to say that this may possibly not be the case. I am so tired I can say no more. I have constant sermons and must get ready for the Forty Hours Prayers." [*Goetz op. cit.*, Part II., Vol. I., pp. 433-434. Hyacinth to Jocher, March 16, 1624, *let. cit.*]

The attitude of France was possibly the reason why Olivares still continued to remain upon friendly terms with England. For the first time a French Minister was to be accredited to Munich, although, hitherto, the German Catholics had acknowledged themselves to be under the protection of Spain. It was, therefore, absolutely necessary that the Kaiser should send powers to the Infanta to treat for a general peace after which Spain would endeavour to settle the Bavarian claims. [*Brussels ib.* *Etat et Guerre* 190. Philip IV. to Infanta, March 18, 1624.]

Father Diego de la Fuente had been refused a safe conduct by the Dutch Ambassadors in London, but had nevertheless continued his journey to England. [*London, S.P.O.*, S. P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 160, No. 54 (Conway Papers), Conway to Lord Annandale, March 9, 1624.] On his way through France he had been attacked by soldiers in disguise near Amiens, and only released after his papers had been taken from him and sent to Paris. He arrived in London but a few days after Mansfeldt had landed at Gravesend to find the streets ablaze with bonfires to celebrate the announcement of the final rupture of the marriage negotiations and the appointment of the Commissioners to treat with the Ambassadors of the States. However he did not give up all hopes of success and Coloma and Inojosa were still in London. [*Mantua ib.* Priandi to Duke, Paris. April 12, 1624. *London, S.P.O.*, S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 162, No. 62. Dudley Carleton to Sir Dudley Carleton, April 14, 1624.]

His arrival was viewed with apprehension by both Charles and Buckingham who knew only too well that the continuance of the

negotiations with Spain might from their point of view breed much mischief. The Prince who knew that the Duke's remonstrances against the marriage had often been taken but ill by the irresolute King urged him not to do anything which might make James think that he was keeping back something from him or that he was discontented with the course which his father was taking with regard to Spain. [*London, Brit. Mus., Harl., 6,987. Charles to Buckingham, 26 April, 1624. Munich ib., Lorenzo Stefani, 17, 29 January, 1624; 6 April, 1624.*] The Duke had, indeed, acted with such headstrong precipitancy that he had made it almost impossible for the King and Prince to refuse their support to the Palatine's cause, and had Parliament failed to vote the supplies, he might easily have lost his hold over the King. James indeed was not so much in his hands as the outside world supposed, and was anxious to avoid a war. "But what has taken place in Parliament will, on the one hand get him some money, on the other give him credit in the eyes of the world and serve him as an excuse for doing anything he likes against his Catholic subjects." [*Munich ib., Lorenzo Stefani to Elector, 6 April, 1624 let. cit. Brussels ib. E. et. Audience 629. News Letter to M. Benois, June 8, 1624.*]

Under these circumstances the Padre Maestro did not hesitate to put forward the proposals for a general settlement which he had brought with him from Spain. They were received with contempt. The failure of Father Alexander's missions both to London and to the Hague had shown English statesmen that nothing could be done as to Germany without the consent of the Palatine, whilst Mansfeldt, who was now lodged in the rooms which had been fitted up for the Infanta in St. James' Palace, had intercepted the letters which had been sent to Father Hyacinth from Vienna and had laid them before the Prince and Buckingham. [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,447. Carleton to Aston, 26 April, 6 May, 1624. Mantua ib. Priandi to Duke, May 18, 1624.*]

Events were now moving rapidly and the termination of the long drawn negotiations for the marriage which was to unite England and Spain was at length in sight. The principal actors in the drama were disappearing from the stage. Inojosa had been recalled from London whither Bristol was hastening to confront his accusers. Hyacinth was being thrown over both by Maximilian and by his papal employers, Massimi was on his way back

to Rome, having been rewarded by the King for his labours at Madrid with the Bishopric of Catania, a place worth twenty-five thousand ducats a year, and was being replaced by a dependant of the new Pope. [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 35,449. Aston to Conway, 25 April, 1624; May, 1624.*]

Almost at the same moment James signed an Act by which he conferred upon Count Mansfeldt the command of ten thousand foot and two thousand horse which were to be maintained at the expense of England, and to be employed under the direction of himself and France to re-establish peace and to recover the Palatinate upon conditions reciprocally agreed upon. [*London, S.P.O. Conway Lre. Book (S. P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 214), p. 118, April 26, 1624.*]

The King, indeed, was only too anxious to see Mansfeldt out of England, for he could not rest for a moment during his stay. The Prince presented the Protestant general with a splendid carriage and eight and a large sum of money for his outfit of which he was in great want as all his most valuable possessions had been taken at sea by the Dunkirkers. He left England at the end of April with a French passport, and when on his way to Boulogne passed the vessel which was carrying Bristol from Calais to Dover. [*Munich ib., Silisdonio to Maximilian, 15 May, 1624. Mantua ib. Priandi to Duke, May 3, 1624.*]

Inojosa and Coloma were naturally furious at the reception which had been accorded to Mansfeldt. When they went to take their leave of the King they told him that they could prove that Buckingham had been plotting with the Parliament to shut him up in a prison and to crown the Prince of Wales in his place, but James treated their assertions with contempt. He had already sent Aston the memorandum for Philip in which he explained his reasons for breaking off the marriage negotiations, but for all this Inojosa wrote to Spain that "the King told him that though he had given his Ambassador precise orders as to what he was to say to his Spanish Majesty, yet the door still remained open for the marriage negotiations. This is what annoys the Spanish Ministers most of all, as it looks as if he is laughing at them." [*Mantua ib. Priandi to Duke, May 18, 1624. Turin ib. Taran-taise to Duke, May 20, 31, 1624.*]

On June 5, Andres de Prado called upon Aston and brought him the King's reply to his memorial. At the same time he handed him back the jewels which Charles had left for his bride,

"the English and Spanish Dictionary which Your Highness gave the Infanta and seventeen letters, which Your Highness it seems hath wrote unto her Highness since your departure from Madrid, which are delivered unto me so also as they came from Your Highness (as they say) and were to have been delivered to the Infanta on the day of the Espousals." [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,447, Aston's Narrative cit., June 5 St. Vet. Aston to Charles, June 5, 1624.*]

The discovery that his impassioned eloquence had never been read by the Infanta must have been a bitter pill for Charles to swallow. [*Munich ib., Khevenhüller to the Imperial Secretaries, 19 August, 1624.*]

Philip IV. had, in his reply, merely expressed his regret at the course which James had taken, but, when sending the papers to Brussels, he left the Infanta Isabella a free hand as to her future policy. He, however, requested her to bear in mind that his one object was to secure the peace of Germany and to do his utmost to satisfy the King of England as to the Palatine's affairs, without bringing greater troubles upon himself. [*Brussels ib. Philip IV. to Infanta, May 30, 1624.*]

James also was very unwilling to break with Spain until he could secure the alliance of France and the support of other Catholic princes and States "which have the same interest against the greatness of Spain." He thought that even if all the Protestant powers united together they would be too weak to oppose her, and that if they moved against her without Catholic support, it would lead to a war of religion in which Spain would be assisted by every Catholic prince in Europe. He, therefore, continued to negotiate with France and Savoy, but put off sending Sir Robert Anstruther to Denmark. [*London, S.P.O., S. P. Dom. Jas. I., Vol. 167, No. 28. Sir F. Nethersole to Sir D. Carleton. London, June 7, 1624. Mantua ib. Priandi to Duke, 14, 21 June, 1624.*]

"Until Lord Carlisle was despatched to France it was feared that the King in spite of his declaration to Parliament would relapse into a treaty with Spain and there is still doubt that unless the marriage treaty with France and also the alliance between the two countries proceed well, His Majesty will not enter into any direct action against Spain." He continued to allow Lord Vaux to levy men for the Spanish service. [*London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 167, No. 28. Sir F. Nethersole let. cit.*].

In fact, it was supposed that Inojosa was remaining on in London at James' request, and that the King's chief object in negotiating at the same time for a French and a Spanish marriage was to keep up his credit amongst the Catholic Princes and to get supplies from his Parliament without being obliged in return to persecute his Catholic subjects. Many hoped, indeed, that once Bristol's case came before Parliament the Prince who had already received Lady Bristol in the most friendly manner would have his eyes opened to Buckingham's intrigues and of his own accord renew the negotiations with Spain. [*Munich* ib. *London*, 11-21 June, 1624]

But Inojosa was fated to make his position in England impossible. He gave James bitter offence by asserting that His Majesty had joined with Buckingham and the Prince of Wales in a plot for his assassination. Though he professed himself anxious to do all he could to arrange the differences between Spain and England, Aston discovered "that they had resolved to propound the Duke's destruction as the first condition of setting the business on foot again." [*Turin* ib., Tarantaise to Duke, June 28, 1624. *London*, *Brit. Mus.* Add. 36,449. Aston to Buckingham, 27 August, 1624.]

Parliament was prorogued on the eighth of June and on the twenty-sixth Inojosa and the Padre Maestro sailed from Dover, Coloma remaining behind in London to await the arrival of the new envoy, Hurtado de Mendoza. [*London*, *Brit. Mus.* Add, 36,447. Conway to Aston, June 27, 1624.]

Even after his departure it was still thought possible that the marriage negotiations might be resumed. Parliament had separated without having passed any laws against the Catholics. Aston when writing to warn Buckingham of the hostile designs of the Spanish Government said that as he did not know what the intentions of the King and Prince might be as to the negotiations, he thought that Buckingham should know his opinion on the subject before he took any steps to act upon the instructions which he might receive from them. Although Inojosa had as early as the previous April advised the Spaniards that James wished to declare war against them on behalf of the Palatine, he had been left without any instructions from England during many weeks. He had, however, done all he could to preserve peace. [*London*, *Brit. Mus.* Add. 36,449. Aston to Buckingham, 27 Aug., 1624. *Brussels* ib. *Etat et Guerre* 190. Philip IV. to Isabella, 16 April, 1624.]

When Aston could write in such terms to an English subject he must have felt, that, as Maximilian's correspondent wrote, the sceptre had passed into the hands of George Villiers. [*Munich ib.*, Lorenzo Stefani to Elector, 13 July, 1624. Speaking of Inojosa's departure he says: "Doppo sua partenza Buckingham è ritornato al solito grado di maneggiar il cettro."]

The son of a poor Leicestershire knight was now the ruler of England and from the moment when Buckingham wrested the sceptre from the nerveless hands of James, war with Spain became a certainty, for he was not the man to forget the efforts of the Spanish ambassadors to compass his ruin.

The Duke was perhaps the only statesman actively engaged in the negotiations at Madrid who had been the gainer by their failure. That failure was due to various causes, for which he was perhaps mainly responsible. From the first he had misunderstood the European situation and had clung to the belief that Spain could dominate Europe at her pleasure, although if that belief had ever had any substantial foundation, the grounds upon which it rested had been shattered when seventy years before the army of Charles the Fifth withdrew from before Metz. At one moment it is true it seemed as if the scales had fallen from his eyes. After the Prince's engagement he frankly explained his own position to Olivares, and had he been willing to credit the Spanish statesman with equal frankness they might possibly have arrived at an understanding, and secured the departure of the Infanta Maria for England at the same time with her husband. He knew but too well that he had to reckon with public opinion in England, but he failed to see that Olivares likewise had to reckon with public opinion in Spain especially when that opinion had behind it a large section of the ecclesiastics. Perhaps he did not even realise that Spanish public opinion counted for anything. [*London Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987. Charles and Buckingham to James. 15 July. Buckingham to James, 30 July, 1623.]

The death of Pope Gregory XV. proved to be the turning point in the negotiations. Four years later, when reviewing the events of his reign, Philip IV. told his Council that overniceness with regard to the interests of Religion had led to the rupture with England. This view is in a great measure the correct one. Had he not insisted that the marriage should be put off until the arrival of a dispensation from the new Pope, he would not have exhausted the Prince's patience and given him grounds to think that he was

being played with. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987. Charles etc. to James, 29 Aug. Do. *S.P.O.* S.P. Dom. Jas. I., Vol. 160. No. 7 (Conway Papers), Relation touching the Prosecution of the Match, etc. *London, Brit. Mus.* Eg. 335, p. 136. *Relacion que hizo el Rey.* Don. Ph. 4, etc.]

During the same period the position of affairs was completely changed. The ill-feeling between Buckingham and Olivares which had been smouldering since the Duke's refusal to intervene on behalf of the interests of Spain in the East grew every day more hot. Thanks to Inojosa the Council had been persuaded that he was intriguing against the marriage, and at the same time they heard that the spoils of Ormuz were being sold publicly in London. The dispute burst into a flame when the two favourites quarrelled about a seat at a theatre. [*London, Brit. Mus.* Eg. 2,080. Inojosa's Despatches cit. Eg. 318. Council of State, 18 Sept., 1623 cit. Add. 36,447. Aston's Narrative cit.]

At that very moment the news of Tilly's victory at Stadtlohn arrived at Madrid. The Catholic arms had triumphed in Germany and Spain was now at last free to take up her own line abroad. It was for Olivares to consider whether an alliance with England or the assistance of the Empire and of the Catholic League would be the most valuable to him in effecting the subjugation of the revolted Netherlands. He was still glowing with scarcely disguised resentment against Buckingham when he allowed the Council to state in their letter of congratulation to the Kaiser upon his victory, that Philip IV. would be represented at the Diet as a member of the Empire. From that moment whether consciously or not he was pledged to the Imperial side. [*London, Brit. Mus.* Eg. 318. Congratulations of Council, etc., Aug., 1623, cit.]

It soon became apparent to him that he would have to reckon with Bavaria as well as with the Kaiser and therefore to calculate the value of Maximilian and the Ecclesiastical Electors to Spain as compared with that of Great Britain. At the moment, thanks to the policy of reserve which had been adopted by Charles and Buckingham he may not have realized that the favour of Great Britain could only be assured if the Palatine was restored to his dignities and possessions. [*London, Brit. Mus.* Eg. 318. Council of State, 18 Sept., 21 Oct., 1623 cit., Harl. 6,987. Charles, etc., to James. 22 April, 1623 cit. Add. 36,446, Aston to Charles, 29 Nov., 9 Dec., 1623 cit.]

About the same time Buckingham learnt that Inojosa was

doing his utmost to effect his ruin and that he was both hated and despised by the Infanta. On the other hand he found that the Queen of Bohemia was prepared to welcome the vague overtures which he had made to her many weeks before through Nethersole and Carleton. He, like Olivares, was now free to follow his own line, and he had no personal reason to favour the Spanish alliance. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987. James to Buckingham, Aug. 5 cit. Buckingham to Queen of Bohemia undated cit. Add. 36,447, Aston, Narrative cit. Add. 36,446 Carleton to Buckingham, Sept. 2, 1623 cit. *F. de Jesu* op. cit., pp. 83-84.]

Yet Buckingham may have been acting honestly when he brought forward the question of the Palatinate for the first time during the negotiations at this moment. James, in the letter in which he consented to the delay of the Infanta's departure told him not only to go on with the contract, but had sent him the powers "to treat for the Palatinate and the matter of Holland," thus carrying out Inojosa's arrangement with Cottington, which indeed, Inojosa may have suggested in the first instance, that "powers for an alliance and confederation" should be sent to Madrid. A few days later he had learnt that James had accepted the Marriage Articles and thus to use Philip's words which read almost like a quotation from the Duke's own letter to the Queen of Bohemia "it seemed impossible that the marriage could have been broken off except at the cost of a great war." The Duke may, therefore, have thought himself entitled to bring forward a question which if left unsettled would make the marriage as useless for preserving friendship between the two crowns, as the double marriages with France had proved when trouble arose about the Valtelline. Both he and the Prince had clearly seen this from the first, and but a few weeks before he had put the same point of view to Olivares, although at that time he had not gone into details, which would have led them to discuss the question of the Palatinate. Possibly he recollected that the Prince had wished to leave it in Bristol's hands. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Charles, etc., to James, April 22. Buckingham to James, July 30. James to Charles, July 22, Aug. 8, 10, 1623. Eg. 2,080 Précis of Inojosa's, 2nd despatch, July 24, 1627 cit. *Munich* ib. Kh. to Elector, Feb. 20, 1624 cit.]

The Duke forgot that from the very outset the Spaniards had frankly said that they could not secure the restoration of the

Palatinate, not to say that of the Palatine, without the Emperor's consent, and that under no conditions would they take up arms to put pressure upon the Emperor to force him to give it. Nor did he realise that the Emperor unless he could secure the consent of the Electoral College and of the Diet, could not restore the Palatine on his own authority, and that the consent of both bodies was absolutely dependant upon that of Bavaria and of the Ecclesiastical Electors. It would be necessary, therefore, to satisfy their just claims, and though Olivares might propose various methods for doing so, none of these schemes could be carried into effect without the sanction of the Palatine, on whose behalf Buckingham had no power to act. Thus, in the last resort, so far as England was concerned, everything depended upon Frederick himself, and as neither Frederick nor his wife had the slightest confidence in the promises of Maximilian and possibly knew that he had given no proper authorisation to the agents by whom these promises were made in his name, the marriage negotiations were bound to fail from the moment when they were mixed up with those for the Palatine's restoration. [*London, Brit. Mus. Add. 36,447, Carleton to Bristol, 19-29 Jan., 1624 cit. Munich ib. Khevenhüller to Elector, 20 Feb., 1624 cit.*]

Yet, if we leave out of account Buckingham's overtures to the Queen of Bohemia, all those negotiating at Madrid may have been acting in good faith. Ignorance, not treachery, seems to have been the reason why the Infanta Maria never became Queen of England.

But the failure of the marriage treaty had made Buckingham the darling of the Parliament, and as thanks to their generosity the English Treasury was now overflowing, he had a free hand to carry out the policy which they so desired that England should follow abroad.

To understand therefore the situation as it stood in the spring of 1624, we must cast a hasty glance over the course of military events in the Netherlands since the end of the campaign of 1622.

NOTE I.

KHEVENHULLER ON THE FAILURE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

In Khevenhüller's despatch to Maximilian, in which he announced the failure of the marriage negotiations he writes :—

"Im uebrigen werde meine zu des Prinzen aus Engelland Herkhonfft vor ain Jar schriffentlich gegebene Advertisement und Warnung ie langer ie mehr erkant, dann die Englische hayrath zemblich zerloschen und alles das was die Engellander in des Prinzen hiersin im namen des Pfalzgrafen proponiert ist von dem Pfalzgrafen nie consentiert, vel weinger zur ausertragung worden.'

[*Munich*, Geh. St. A. 292-4 K.S. Khevenhüller to Elector, 20 February, 1624. Cf. ib. Khevenhüller to Elector, 12 April, 1623 cit.]

NOTE 2.

PHILIP IV. ON THE FAILURE OF THE MARRIAGE TREATY.

Relacion que hizo el Rey D.Ph. 4 del Estado de su Monarquia a los 6 años de haber entrado a possessarla a Consejo de Castilla (en 1627.)

"El casamiento del Principe de Gales oy Rey de Ingalaterra con la Infanta D. Maria mi hermana tan adelantado que parescia impossible dexarse de hazer sin una guerra grande come se le ha seguido por no dispensar en el ni en una leve circunstancia de Religion." [*London, Brit. Mus.* Eg. 335, p. 136.]

CHAPTER LXVII

ALL through the winter of 1622 Spinola was busily engaged in pushing forward the naval preparations at Dunkirk and Ostend and in the new port of Mardyck which was to take the place of Dunkirk as the base for the fleet. He took a great interest in the negotiations for a suspension of hostilities in Germany which were in progress at Brussels, and warmly congratulated the Infanta Isabella when it was concluded at the end of April. In his anxiety to effect a general settlement he urged her to support James the First's proposals for a peace congress at Frankfort and for a marriage between the Palatine's son and the younger Archduchess by every means in her power, and suggested she might offer to act as mediator in the arrangements and induce the King of Spain to give her his support. [*Villa*, op. cit., p. 406. *Brussels*, ib., *Etat et Guerre*, 132, Spinola to Infanta, Bruges, April 28. Do. to Mirabel, 25 May, 1623.]

During the summer of 1622 the Flemish cruisers had inflicted much injury upon the Dutch traders and herring fishers, and it was therefore decided that before the opening of the land campaign of 1623 they should endeavour to carry the war into the heart of Zealand. [*Villa*, op. cit., p. 406, *Uit onzen Bloeitijd*, "De Handel," op. cit. Pp. 36-39.]

A fleet of fourteen shallops, manned by 300 sailors, was accordingly sent from Antwerp through the canals of Waesland to Blankenberghe, where they embarked 200 musketeers. At midnight on May the eleventh, they put to sea with orders to steer for the Roompot, the channel separating the islands of Walcheren and Schouwen, and commanded by the port of Campvere, for long the staple on the Continent of Scottish trade. Three leagues from land they fell in with a fishing fleet of seventy sail, of which they sank thirty, taking the masters on board as prisoners. At daybreak they found themselves inside the mouth of the Ooster Scheldt and ran on eastwards past Ziericksee to the mainland of North Brabant, where turning southwards under

the walls of Bergen op Zoom, they sailed through the channel between South Beveland and the continent into the Western Scheldt, where lay the road to Antwerp. The river was, however, guarded not only by Fort Lillo, but by four men-of-war lying at anchor in the stream. When the admiral saw the Dutch flag he made the flotilla retreat through the opening in a dyke near Calloo into the flooded land near Hulst. The ships of war followed close upon them keeping up a warm fire. As the tide was low the shallows could not get far in but had to lie high and dry on shore until the flood six hours later. In the meantime the enemy sent two hundred musketeers from Lillo down the Doel Dyke on the opposite bank of the river to attack them, but the crews sprang out of their vessels and gave their assailants such a warm reception that in their turn they were able to take the offensive and drive them back in disorder with the loss of their captain. The tide was now rising fast so they ran in with it over the floods and reached Antwerp on May 13.

The affair made a great noise in Holland, for it was the first time that they had ever seen a Spanish fleet force its way into the heart of their country. [*Villa*, op. cit., p. 408, quoting Arch. Simancas, Estado, leg. 2,313, Spinola to Philip IV., June 3, 1623.]

Philip IV. had already recognised the value of his fleet in Flanders, and in his speech at the opening of the Cortes on the sixth of April, had placed their exploits during the summer of 1622 on a level with the taking of Fort Papenbril and the capture of Juliers. [*Villa*, op. cit., pp. 410-416.]

Spinola had from the first seen that the transfer of the Electorate to Bavaria might well lead to a general war in Germany, and had accordingly advised the King that he must prepare for the worst. [*Villa*, op. cit., p. 410, from Arch. Simancas, Estado leg., 2313, Spinola to Philip IV., March 7, 1623.]

Nor had he any great confidence in the friendship of either France or England. He showed much concern at the news that Louis XIII. had granted permission to the Dutch and to Mansfeldt to raise troops in France. When one of the Ostend galleons, the "Saint Ambrose," was attacked and sunk by the Dutch whilst she was lying at Leith Quay, amid the applause of the Edinburgh mob, and with Privy Councillors of Scotland looking on from their coaches, he warned Van Male that reprisals would be very risky in the face of public feeling in the North. He refused,

therefore, to send his galleons to sink two Dutch vessels which were lying in Aberdeen. The resident must wait and see what James I. would do to punish the offenders. [*Brussels*, ib., *Etat et Guerre*, 132, Spinola to Mirabel, 25 May. Do. to Van Male, 1 June, 1623.]

Meanwhile a great fleet was being fitted out in Holland, and, in his uncertainty as to the object at which they were aiming, he sent orders to the Governors of Dunkirk and Nieuport to be upon their guard against an attack. [*Brussels*, ib., *Etat et Guerre* 132, Spinola to Governors of Nieuport and Dunkirk, 19 June, 1623.]

By the middle of May 1623, however, the Dutch had sent a squadron to sea consisting of 13 vessels, of which eleven were between 400 and 500 tons and carried 40 to 50 guns apiece. Don Manuel of Portugal had gone with Prince Maurice and the Palatine to see them set sail, and as Lhermite, who knew Pernambuco, was in command, it was thought that they intended to attack that port. The fleet made for the North of Scotland, but was overtaken by a storm on their way. A store ship went down and three of the largest vessels were driven into the harbour of Hoy in the Orkneys badly damaged. Here they took on board the guns which had been landed there from a Dunkirk ship to the great indignation of James I., who at Coloma's request sent two vessels to force them to put the pieces on shore again.

Feeling was running high between the English and Dutch sailors and Conway dreaded a collision between them which might bring on a war. In the end the Dutch allowed the Spanish galleon, which was lying blockaded in Aberdeen, to return to Ostend, and for the moment, gave up the idea of an expedition to South America. The news that James had sent the ships to the Scotch seas gave such pleasure at Madrid that it all but decided the Spaniards to allow the Infanta to leave Spain with Charles. [*Villa*, op. cit., pp. 412-419, quoting Arch. Simancas, *Estado leg.* 2313, Cardinal de la Cueva to Council of State. Do. to D. Jaspas de Pereda, to Council of State. Do., D. Carlos Coloma to Council of State, May 30, 1623. Letters from Flanders to Council of State, June 2, 1623. *Brussels*, ib., *Etat et Guerre*, 189, Infanta to Philip IV., May 11, 1623. *London*, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 145, No. 56, Calvert to Conway, 29 May. Do., Vol. 149, No. 25 (Conway Papers), Conway to the Naval Commissioners, July 22. Do., Vol. 150, No. 73, Conway to Cal-

vert, August 10; No. 150, Conway to Lord Brooke, August 14, 1623. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Harl. 6,987, Buckingham to James, 30 July, 1623, *let cit.* *Turin*, *ib.*, Tarantaise to Duke, May 28, 1623. *London, S.P.O.*, For. Series, Flanders gives full particulars as to the attack upon the galleons at Leith, etc.]

But for the intervention of the English it is probable that the Dutch fleet would have succeeded in their undertaking. The news of the intended expedition had reached Madrid through private sources twenty days before the official despatches arrived from Flanders, but no instructions on the subject were sent to Brussels until these had reached Madrid. Thus the Dutch fleet had sailed before preparations had been begun to attack it. "Yet, though this annoys the Infanta Isabella, Marquis Spinola and other Ministers, they take no steps to remedy the mischief by sending advices on the instant of everything that takes place. But such is the way in which the affairs of great monarchies are carried on." [*Turin*, *ib.*, Tarantaise to Duke, 28 May, 1623, *let. cit.*]

Neither the Spaniards nor the Dutch were in any position to take the field during the earlier part of the summer of 1623, as both were hampered by want of money, and it was not until Maurice had been called to the Eastern frontier of the United Provinces to defend the Dutch borders against a possible attack by Tilly and the victors of Stadtlohn, that the campaign on land can be said to have opened in the Netherlands. Spinola left for Maestricht, which he had chosen for his base on the eleventh of August, but probably because negotiations for a truce were still going on, did nothing, and was once more in Brussels by the end of September, busily engaged in those diplomatic dealings with the Catholic League which failed to secure the support of Tilly's army for a Spanish invasion of the Betuwe or Friesland. [*E. Gachard*, *Correspondence de Rubens* (Bruxelles 1840), pp. 8-9; Rubens to Peiresc, Antwerp, August 10. *Goetz*, *op. cit.*, Part II., Vol. I., p. 339, Elector of Mainz to Maximilian, Sept. 30, 1623, *cit.*]

The Marquis appears to have remained at Brussels for some months, as his counsels were of the utmost value to the Infanta Isabella at a time when the negotiations with the Empire, the Catholic League, and England were so largely in her hands. The winter of 1623-1624 was a very hard one, and for a time it seemed likely that the Spanish armies would be able to invade Holland by crossing the frozen rivers; even Carleton expressed his alarm at the

prospect in his letters to Aston, and the Prince of Orange, whose Commissioners were meeting with but a cold welcome in England, hastened to send proposals to treat for a suspension of hostilities to Madrid. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. 36,449, Carleton to Aston, January, 1624, *passim*. *Brussels*, *ib.*, *Etat et Guerre*, 190, Philip IV. to Infanta, February 6, 1624.] But the Spaniards remained inactive and the opportunity was lost.

Philip, however, was now more anxious than ever for peace and of his own accord, as has been said, sent the Infanta powers to treat for the armistice provided that the East and West Indies were included in it. Neither Spinola nor the Infanta seem to have thought that such conditions would be accepted and not only did the Marquis do his best to secure Maximilian subsidies from Spain to prevent the necessity for disbanding the Bavarian army, but he also instructed Count Rietberg to follow Mansfeldt and Halberstadt for two days march over the Weser if they crossed that river. His foresight was justified for at the beginning of March he received orders to prepare for war against the States-General. [*Brussels* *ib.* *Etat et Guerre* 190. Philip IV. to Infanta, Feb. 6, 1624 *let. cit.* *Goetz op. cit.*, Part II., Vol. I., p. 419. Hyacinth to Jocher, Jan. 30, pp. 431-436. *Do. to do.*, March 9-16, 1624.]

Madame de Tserclaes now once more appeared upon the scene. She brought with her from the Hague a paper stating that if the Infanta could declare with Philip's consent that the Truce would be continued in the form in which it had been concluded in 1609, the States-General would consent that the 4th and 5th articles should be carried out in the sense in which they had been agreed upon, and that therefore the Dutch would not trade in any part of the Indies which were under the sovereignty of Spain or held by Spanish garrisons. For the first time also she brought with her a signed letter D. Antonio of Portugal had written to Chancellor Pecquius to say that notwithstanding the malicious reports circulated by those who could not bear to see the sun shining upon others, Mme. de Tserclaes, old woman as she was, stood high in the favour of the Prince of Orange, and was the only person who was authorised to speak of a business "which, if it is not settled now, will never be so." [*Brussels* *ib.* *Etat et Guerre* 190. Infanta to Philip IV., 14 March, 1624.] Philip in his reply said that the proposals brought by Mme. de Tserclaes were not such as would lead him to negotiate upon the basis of the Truce of 1609, but that if the Dutch would re-open the Scheldt he would consent to a

truce with a view to concluding Peace. [*Brussels* ib. *Etat et Guerre* 190. Philip IV. to Infanta, April 22, 1624.]

Before Philip's instructions reached Brussels it had become plain that England would return to the old policy of Elizabeth and assist the Netherlands in their contest against Spain. Philip, therefore, thought it advisable that a fleet of fifty vessels should be fitted out in Flanders which could be used against the Dutch at once and eventually against the English should the necessity for doing so arise and that the new works at Mardyck should be put into a state of defence. [*Brussels* ib. *Etat et Guerre* 190. Philip IV., to Infanta, April 16, 1624. *London, S.P.O. S. P. Dom. Jas. I., Vol. 162, No. 53.* Conway to Buckingham, April, 1624.] Conway, on the other hand, was urging that Carleton should be instructed to ask the authorities at the Hague to promise their full support to England, and that a squadron should be fitted out to protect the coasts against Spanish attacks. He hoped that the Dutch and French would fit out vessels for the same purpose. Conway went on to suggest that a Council of War should be at once established to make preparations for a campaign, that the defences of Ireland should be looked to and that Anstruther should be sent to Denmark and Wake to Savoy. The objects which His Majesty had in view were the recovery of the Palatinate and the defence of his allies, especially the United Provinces. A few days later a Committee, including Buckingham and Conway, was appointed to treat with the States Ambassadors, who had been somewhat disgusted by their experiences in England. On the twenty-sixth of April, as we have seen, James signed the Act empowering him to take Mansfeldt's army into his pay. [*London, S.P.O. S.P. Dom. Jas. I., Vol. 162, No. 53.* Conway to Buckingham, April, 1624 cit. *Do. No. 55.* Draft of a Warrant for establishing a Council of War. April 14, 1624. *Do. No. 60.* Dudley Carleton to Sir D. Carleton, April 14, 1624. *Do. Vol. 214.* Conway's *Lre Book*, p. 118. Memorandum, April 26, 1624.]

The Infanta had for some weeks been persuaded that it would be advisable for Spain to break with England and to come to terms with Bavaria.

She was already discussing such an arrangement with Tilly, who only longed to receive permission from the Emperor and the Catholic League to join the Spaniards in expelling the Dutch from Emden and in an attack upon Holland from that direction,

and she forwarded to Madrid a scheme which had been drawn up by a Dutch refugee for attacking their establishments in the East Indies. The possessions of the United Provinces included not only the present Dutch Colonies, but also Masulipatam and Negapatnam upon the Coromandel Coast. The garrisons as a rule were small, the largest being one of two hundred men at Nexa in the Banda Islands. Bantam the centre for the China trade, and Batavia where the Council of the Indies had already been established were very weakly held. The points most open to attack appeared to be the Coromandel Coast and the Straits of Sunda. It would be easy for an expedition from Manila to occupy Johore or Piedra Blanca so as to intercept the communications with Java, and the natives, who hated their Dutch masters for their cruelty and bad faith, would probably assist the invaders.

Philip, in his turn, instructed her that if England declared war, she was to send Spinola to defend the Palatinate against any attack of the allied Protestant armies, and to bring the Irish regiments in her service up to their full strength to be employed against England. Tyrone, the exiled Irish leader, was then living in Flanders, and the Infanta had already suggested that his restoration to his estates should form one of the conditions in any arrangement about the marriage or the Palatinate. She had not forgotten her father's Irish policy. [*Brussels* ib. *Etat et Guerre* 190. Infanta to Philip IV., April 17, 19, 1624. Philip IV. to Infanta, May 17, 1624. Do. *Etat et guerre* 189. Infanta to Philip IV., February 4, 1623.]

The Kaiser was now thoroughly alarmed at the turn which events were taking. He warned Philip IV. in impressive terms that the United Provinces had induced the French to join them in an attack upon the Spanish and Imperial territories in which they would be assisted by Mansfeldt and Halberstadt and assured him that Spain could count upon the unconditional support, both of himself and of the Catholic League. At the same time he wrote to implore Louis XIII. not to join with England against Spain. [*London, Brit. Mus., Eg.* 318. Ferdinand II. to Philip IV., 1 May, 1624. Do. to Louis XIII., May, 1624.]

For all Inojosa's assertions as to the warlike intentions of England, the Infanta could not forget that despite their bluster the English had not actually declared war. She was, therefore, most anxious that Spain should not put herself in the wrong by making an unprovoked attack upon the English coast, especially

as she could not fit out more than fifty ships in the Flemish ports. It would be much more advantageous to employ these vessels in harrying the Dutch fishing fleets so that they might be at hand if Mardyck was attacked. In the same despatch she wrote that Denmark and Sweden were arming. Indirect inquiries showed that the Dutch would only treat for an armistice if the Truce of 1609 was continued. Her attitude as regards England was justified, for when some Spanish ships were driven by the Dutch into the Downs they were allowed to take in stores and ammunition and to sail from the anchorage two tides before the vessels which were watching them. A few days later she received a free hand from Philip IV. to do her best to arrange a settlement in Germany upon terms satisfactory to James. With this object in view he sent her orders not to take any notice of Tilly's offers without consulting the Emperor, and suggested that the Diet of Cologne should be left to deal with the claims of Bavaria. He could not, however, refrain from pointing out on Bruneau's authority that James had excited great dissatisfaction especially in Scotland by forming an Inner Cabinet, of which Buckingham was a member, to deal with State affairs or from suggesting that if disaffection could be stirred up amongst the Scotch it would be difficult for his successor to induce them to recognise him. The Infanta received his advice in silence. Such was the state of affairs when the news of the prorogation of the English Parliament reached the Netherlands. [*Brussels* ib. *Etat et Guerre* 190. Infanta to Philip IV., May 20, 24; June 8, 1624. Philip IV. to Infanta, May 31, June 18, 1624.]

The task which lay before Buckingham was not a light one. The King still loathed the thoughts of a war; the Parliament which had voted for it had been dissolved. Bristol was clamouring for an inquiry as to all that had taken place in Spain, and the Duke felt the ground giving way under his feet. The fickle Prince might at any time turn upon him and by bringing against him a charge of witchcraft might at once effect his ruin and recover the favour of the Spaniards, for he had received Lady Bristol with the greatest kindness and thanked her warmly for her gift of a handkerchief which had belonged to the Infanta and on which Donna Maria had worked her name. Even the loungers in the New Exchange, were whispering that the favourite's health was shattered and that his influence would vanish with the dissolution of Parliament. Europe had not yet forgotten the fate of the Concinis and far graver charges might well have been brought

against Buckingham. [*Munich* ib., *London*, 8 March, 11-21 June. *Brussels* ib. E. and A. 629. Newsletter to M. Benois, June 8, 1624. M. Benois was President of the High Court at Nancy. *London* S.P.O. S. P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 167, No. 28, Sir F. Nethersole to Sir D. Carleton, *London*, 7 June, 1624 let. cit.]

Buckingham's one hope, therefore, lay in preventing his master from renewing his negotiations with Spain, and this he could not do unless he could arrange an alliance between England and France. With this object Lord Carlisle who with Lords Kensington and Pembroke stood almost alone in the Council as a consistent supporter of France, was despatched to Paris with instructions to bring about at the least a defensive league between France, England, Venice, Savoy and Holland. [*London*, S.P.O., S. P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 167, No. 28. Nethersole to Carleton let. cit. *Munich* ib., *London*, 24 May, 1624. *Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, Paris, April 12, May 10, 1624.]

In the meantime Mansfeldt had returned from England to France and had gone privately to Compiègne where the Court was then residing. In order to secure the support of France he offered that his forces should be employed for the restoration of the Valtelline to the Grisons as well as for the recovery of the Palatinate, a point which was somewhat embarrassing to France and to her Italian allies, who knew that the French kept their eyes fixed upon Italy and longed only to set the country in a blaze. Louis XIII. was most anxious to avoid an open breach with Spain, but was thought to be quite willing to work against her underhand and had already agreed to give the United Provinces a loan of six hundred thousand crowns for two years and a subsidy of four hundred thousand crowns a year. The fleet was being fitted out in England, and it was thought would carry on a war at sea against Spain under the Palatine's flag, whilst commissions in Mansfeldt's new levies were so sought after that Conway had some difficulty in securing one for his younger son Thomas, who had already served in the Palatinate under Vere. [*Munich* ib., *London*, 24 May let. cit. *Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, 18 May. *London*, S.P.O. S.P. Dom. Jas. I., Vol. 107, No. 27. Dudley Carleton to Sir D. Carleton, June 7, 1624. As the Dukes of Mantua were in the habit of presenting pictures and works of art to the Queen Mother of France and such patrons of art as Cardinal Richelieu, their Ministers at Paris were always well informed as to the course of events. *Cav. A. Luzio to Author*. Mantua had no representative

in England. Cf. *London, S.P.O.*, S.P. For. Savoy 18, Sir T. Wake to Ld. Dorchester, July 27, 1630.]

Cardinal Richelieu and Vieuville had been appointed to negotiate the marriage with Kensington. To avoid discussions as to precedence the Cardinal pretended to be ill and received the Commissioners in bed. He was very firm that the conditions already laid down in 1616 should be adhered to, and that the Queen, her household and other foreigners should have the free exercise of their religion. Difficulties, however, arose when the English insisted on an offensive and defensive league with France as one of the conditions of the match, and thereupon Richelieu insisted upon the concessions as to religion which had been granted to Spain. This demand raised an insuperable difficulty as James I. and Charles had already pledged themselves to Parliament that they would never listen to any such terms, and Lord Kensington hurried to London to prevent the negotiations from being broken off. In the end the French promised that they would not insist upon the performances of any engagements which might be entered into for appearance sake. [*Mantua* ib. Priandi to Duke, June 14, 21, 29. *London, S.P.O.*, S. P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 168, No. 40. Sir F. Nethersole to Sir Dudley Carleton June 25, 1624.]

Mansfeldt meanwhile was having long interviews with the English Ambassadors at Compiègne. Louis XIII. had not seen him either in public or in private, but the two Queens had seen him driving in Kensington's carriage, which had been stopped for a short time that they might gratify their curiosity without seeming to show themselves. He soon saw, however, that he had but little chance of employment, for France was most anxious to avoid a war, and in any case would not employ foreign officers. Richelieu, however, was taking every precaution. Coeuvres, who was said to be a man of very violent temper was sent as envoy to the Grisons and the Valtelline with instructions to go on to Milan and to demand that Feria should at once carry out the First Treaty of Madrid, and hand the valleys over to their former masters. Three armies were being levied and it was arranged that, in case of a rupture, Constable Lesdiguières should enter the Milanese with 18,000 men, whilst the Duke of Savoy should advance his old claims against Genoa as to Zuccarello, a point which was of some importance as it commanded the road from Piedmont to the port of Oneglia which was one of his few poses-

sions upon the coast of the Mediterranean. No decision as to war could, however, be come to until the English marriage was settled. [*Mantua* ib. Priandi to Duke, June 21, 29 ; July 18, 1624. *London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 169, No. 26.* Conway to Brooke, July 7, 1624.]

By the end of July the marriage negotiations had advanced so far that it was arranged that the French Government should send Berulle to Rome to ask for the Papal Dispensation and to request that it might be given within three months. [*Mantua* ib. Priandi to Duke, July 31. *London, S.P.O., S. P. Dom., Jas. I. Vol. 167, No. 14.* Nethersole to Carleton, July 3, 1624.]

Great was the disappointment of the English Catholics at the conclusion of a marriage by which they gained nothing for their religion. The English had persuaded the French that the extinction of the Catholic Church in England would be a great advantage to their interests as the Papist faction were simply agents of Spain. For a moment James had wavered. It was rumoured that he had said that "he would rather lay his sceptre at the feet of the Pope than give in to the fury of the Puritans." When he found that the fate of the Catholics was a matter of indifference to the French, he had sent for the Judges before they left on circuit and had ordered them to put the Penal Laws strictly into execution. By such means he hoped to insure the prompt payment of the subsidies. Many priests were thrown into prison, and as a parting insult to Inojosa five seminarists who were leaving for the Continent were arrested in his presence as he was embarking at Dover. [*Munich* ib., *London, 11-21 June.* Stefani Lorenzo to Elector 9, 13 ; 9-19 July, 1624.]

Mansfeldt's six thousand men had now crossed to Holland, despite the loud remonstrances of the English merchants who could not forget the massacre of Amboyna. James would gladly have detained the expedition, but was overborne by Charles who was now an ardent partisan of the Dutch, and had even induced his father to refuse to receive the East India traders. Carleton, in answer to his representations, was assured by the authorities at the Hague that "the fact was as much distasted here, where they are naturally merciful, as it can be in our own country" and went on to praise the appearance of the newly landed troops, and of their Colonels who with other lords and gentlemen "appear here much to the honour of our nation." He thought they would soon see active service. [*Munich* ib., *London, 9-19, July,*

1624, let. cit. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. 36,447. Carleton to Aston, 23 Aug. 2, Sept. 2, 1624. *London, S.P.O.*, S.P. Dom. Jas. I., Vol. 169, No. 50. Conway to Buckingham, 12 July. Do., Vol. 171, No. 5. Conway to Sir E. Conway, Jr., Aug. 2, 1624.]

Although strict orders had been given that the English levies were not to be employed against the Spanish territories, Conway received intelligence that a sudden attack might be expected upon either England or Ireland, and the Irish garrisons were consequently strengthened. [*London, S.P.O.*, S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 170, No. 79, Sir F. Nethersole to Sir D. Carleton, July 30. Do., Vol. 171, No. 24 (Conway Papers), Conway to Council of War, Aug. 6, 1624. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. 36,447, Carleton to Aston, 28 Nov., 8 Dec., 1624.]

He had been correctly informed for Philip IV. was now eager to undertake an expedition against England and had written to the Infanta that no price would be too great if she could secure plans of the English, Scotch, and Irish harbours. [*Brussels, Etat. et Guerre* 190. Philip IV. to Infanta, July 3, 1624.]

James, however, had run greater risks than he imagined by breaking with Spain before he had assured himself of the support of France. At the end of June a certain Portuguese, named Lopez, had been arrested at Paris as a spy. His papers were examined by the Keeper of the Seals, who thus obtained conclusive proofs that the French Court was full of traitors in the pay of Spain. The money had not been expended on the payment of conspirators against the Royal person, or on the purchase of fortresses, but to buy state secrets, and to influence the decisions of the Council. One of those most deeply involved was Le Lecq who had formerly been Secretary to the Queen, but who had fled betimes to Flanders. He had offered to turn King's evidence if he received a pardon. So many persons of the highest rank were implicated, that the matter had to be hushed up for the moment. Amongst those suspected were the Dukes of Guise and Angoulême and M. de Puisieux. [*Mantua ib.*, Priandi to Duke, June 21, July 27, 1624.]

A few days later the news reached the English Court that the Marquis of Vieuville had suddenly been arrested and sent to the Castle of Amboise. For a moment it was thought that Richelieu had hurled him from power in order that he might have the credit of arranging the English marriage upon terms more favourable to the Catholics than those which Vieuville had put forward, and

Conway urged the King to write to Louis XIII. himself to assure him that he would always protect his Catholic subjects so long as they continued in their obedience and that his word would be a better guarantee for their security than a formal article like that made with Spain would have been. Conway wrote to Buckingham that the letters from France "brought lardge relations of sower leaves, with private promises of sweete fruite, covered yet, but will bee ripe," and entreated instructions as to his future conduct. He must have felt relieved when he discovered a few days later that the French were only favouring the Catholics "for honour's sake," and would be perfectly contented with assurances couched in the most general terms." [*London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom. Jas. I., Vol. 171, No. 60. Nethersole to Carleton, August 19. Do., No. 29. Memorandum by Secry. Conway, Aug. 9. Do., No. 38 (Conway Papers). Conway to Buckingham, 12 August, 1624.*]

The marriage was finally settled on Sunday the ninth of September to the great joy of the whole Court. Henrietta Maria formally received the English Ambassadors as Princess of Wales, and it was thought that Charles would come to Paris to see his bride unless he was prevented from doing so by a troublesome question of etiquette for as the King of Spain had allowed him to walk on his right hand, he would not be satisfied unless the King of France did the same. The Queen Mother had played a great part in bringing about the marriage and the French noted with pleasure that it had been settled on the anniversary of Charles' departure from Madrid in the previous year. It was agreed that the engagement should not be formally announced until the Papal Dispensation arrived, and as the Pope had appointed a Committee of Cardinals to draw it up, this might occasion some delay. [*Mantua ib., Priandi to Duke, 14 September, 11 October, 1624.*]

The Parisian gossips did not fail to point out that the Prince's departure from Spain had been the first step towards the rupture between the two Powers. They were soon, however, to learn that the negotiation of any arrangement with England was to prove as difficult to Richelieu and Marie de Medicis as it had been to Olivares and Philip IV. The Papal Dispensation was expected to reach Paris in the middle of October, and the Articles of Marriage were laid before the Commissioners for signature. At the last moment an obstacle arose which proved almost impossible

to overcome. The English Ambassadors formally declared that they would not sign them unless France would make an offensive and defensive alliance with England for the recovery of the Palatinate. Louis XIII. absolutely refused to comply with their request, because he had been brought to see that an alliance between the French and English Protestants might be most dangerous to his interests and that therefore as it was a matter of State policy for him to maintain the existence of the Catholic party in England, as a counterpoise to the Puritans, he had even better reasons than the Spaniards for objecting to the restitution of the Palatinate. On this refusal the English Ambassadors left Saint Germain in a fury and sent off express after express to request instructions from Whitehall. [*Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, Oct. 19, 1624. *Munich* ib., Lorenzo Stefani, Paris, Oct. 8, 1624.]

The couriers did not find James I. in a very conciliatory mood.

On the very day when Inojosa left England, he had sent instructions to Aston to complain to Philip IV. of his conduct during his embassy. Both Inojosa and Coloma had, he said, acted rather as Disturbers of the Peace than as Ambassadors, and had made false accusations against his son, Buckingham and Parliament. They had endeavoured to make trouble between himself and the Prince, and he, therefore, requested that fresh ambassadors should be sent to continue the negotiations as to the Palatinate, for his one wish was to remain upon good terms with Spain. Aston duly handed the memorial to Secretary Andres de Prado and was told by him that Philip had said that he was perfectly satisfied with both the envoys and that he had given them leave to kiss his hand. Aston was naturally indignant at this insult, requested a private audience with Philip IV. and presented him with a note couched in very vigorous terms. He requested that his previous memorial might be laid before the Council of State and that they might consider whether Prado's statement was agreeable to the assurances which His Majesty had already given him "for even when private gentlemen are concerned it is a thing absolutely without example to see anyone whose friend has complained to him about one of his servants receive that servant in his house before he has given the complainant satisfaction or at least offered him some." The Council of State decided that the ambassadors should not be admitted to Court or into Philip's presence until James had been given complete satisfaction, and Jacques Bruneau was despatched in all haste

to London to act as resident there until the arrival of D. Hartado de Mendoza. Many persons thought that this would lead to the resumption of the marriage negotiations as the interests of Spain in the East Indies were so great, but the idea was generally scouted. The scoffers forgot that James I. was heartily afraid of Spain so that his ears would always be open to any proposals as to either the match or the Palatinate. Bruneau, therefore, received a most friendly welcome at Whitehall, although both the Prince and Buckingham were more hostile to Spain than ever. They had indeed good reason for being so as Inojosa had told James in so many words that Buckingham, "with the assent both of the Prince and the English nobility, had threatened to depose the King if he did not break off the negotiations as to the marriage and as to the Palatinate." Philip IV. in informing the Infanta of Inojosa's conduct instructed her to detain him as a prisoner either at Ghent or Antwerp until he had cleared himself of this charge. However he came on to Spain and on his way through Paris was entertained by Bassompierre.

The French in view of James' attitude to Spain could not afford to run any risks of a quarrel with England, especially as Carlisle, after the rebuff he had received at Saint Germain, refused to appear at Court on the plea of sickness. As a way out of the difficulty Louis XIII. proposed that he should not enter into an offensive alliance for the recovery of the Palatinate, but should promise the Palatine his assistance by a letter under his privy seal so that there might be no occasion for a formal breach with Spain. His offer was only accepted after long delays which drove the Queen Mother to despair. She loaded the Ministers with abuse, but, at the same time, went on steadily with the preparations for her daughter's marriage. Finally the English accepted the proposals with the addition that France should pledge herself to assist England upon every occasion, and in the middle of November the Marriage Articles were signed at Paris amid general rejoicings. The more Catholic members of the French Council were, however, greatly annoyed at a marriage, which, as they said, would bring no advantage to anyone except the Huguenots, and their annoyance was the greater because Lord Carlisle loudly boasted that if the conditions included any concessions to the Catholics he would do his best to break off the treaty. The Papal dispensation did not arrive until some weeks afterwards, and was said to have been wrung from the Pope by a

threat that if he did not grant it the French would celebrate the marriage without it. It contained no provisions in favour of the Catholics who were forced to content themselves with James' vague promises. [*Mantua* ib., Priandi, Aug. 16, Oct. 19, 28; Nov. 9, 23. *Munich* ib., L. Stefani. 27 July, H. Silsdon, 7 October. Lorenzo Stefani, 8 October. L. Stefani, 20 Nov., 10 Dec., London, 26 Nov., 6 Dec. *Turin* ib., Tarantaise, Aug. 2. *Brussels* ib., E. et G., 191, Philip IV. to Infanta, Sept. 4. E. et G., 629, Madrid, Aug. 19. *London*, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 175, No. 1, Conway to Pembroke, Nov. 19, 1624. *London*, *Brit. Mus.*, Add. 36,447, Aston Nar., July 12 to Philip IV., July 13, 1624.]

The fact that Carlisle and Kensington were prepared to risk the fortunes of the Marriage Treaty with France upon the rocks of the restoration of the Palatinate may, perhaps, serve to show that Bristol and Buckingham had acted in good faith in bringing forward the question at an equally critical period during the negotiations with Spain in the previous year. At the same time it must not be forgotten that the inquiry into Bristol's conduct was still pending, and that Buckingham was forced to run some risks in order to retain the support of the Puritans. [*London*, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 169, No. 35. Nethersole to Carleton, July 10, 1624.] He had his reward for as soon as the articles had been signed it was seen that Louis XIII. was doing his utmost both to assist Mansfeldt and to recover the Palatinate, whilst M. Ville aux Clercs was sent with a splendid embassy to carry the treaty over to London. In Ville aux Clercs' suite was a Jesuit in disguise who acted as the correspondent in Paris of Maximilian's agent Lorenzo Stefani, and who told him when they met at Calais that the Catholics would receive the same terms as had been granted them in the articles for the Spanish Marriage, but that France would be content with the word and signature of the King and Prince. [*London*, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 175, No. 1, Conway to Pembroke, Nov. 19, *let cit.* Do., No. 35 (Conway Papers), Conway to Lord Brooke, Nov. 23, 1624. *Munich* ib., Lorenzo Stefani, Calais, 10 December, 1624.] As an earnest of the sincerity of the French, the Archbishop of Embrun, a cadet of the House of Guise, showed plainly during his stay in England that he was greatly displeased with the attitude which the English Catholics assumed regarding the Oath of Allegiance. [*Munich* ib., London, 26 November, 6 December, 1624.]

The negotiations between France and England might be important to the two countries concerned, but they were hardly as important to the general affairs of Europe as the long drawn discussion between Spain and England had been in the previous year. Neither France nor England professed to represent any powers but themselves. Any agreement between them could, therefore, have but little direct influence upon the affairs of Germany, of the Netherlands, or of Italy.

It is, therefore, necessary to take up the threads of the negotiations which were going on in other quarters and which did so much to shape the fortunes of Europe during the years which saw the rise of France upon the ruins of Spain, and in a great measure witnessed the effacement of religious differences as the controlling factor in the relations between the nations.

We have already seen that James I. was most anxious to avoid a war of religion, and that the Pope had been forced to comply with the wishes of the French at the expense of the interests of the English Catholics. But if a war of Religion was to be avoided, it was necessary that any alliance against Spain and the House of Austria should be formed by Protestant as well as by Catholic Powers, and the formation of such an alliance now became the object of every diplomatist who was opposed to the establishment of a universal monarchy.

It was plain that the first step towards such a policy must be to prevent restoration of peace between Spain and the United Provinces.

With this object Louis XIII. had, early in May, promised the Dutch by a letter under his privy seal, a yearly subsidy together with a large loan. [*Mantua* ib. Priandi, May 18, Oct. 28, 1624.] The effects of this promise soon showed themselves. Mme. de Tserclaes had duly submitted Philip the Fourth's offer to treat for a Truce to her confidants at the Hague, but was forced to report that she had very little hope that the proposal would be accepted, especially if they had to allow the Scheldt to be reopened, even if the Truce of 1609 were renewed as it stood. If, however, she had been allowed to put forward similar terms a few months before she would have had better prospects of success. Since they had come to an arrangement with the King of France, there would be much greater difficulty in doing so. Philip IV., after reading her letter, instructed the Infanta not to make any further offers at the Hague, but to remain quiet unless they made

advances. However, seeing that he had not the means to carry on the war effectively, he asked her to give him her opinion confidentially as to whether he ought to continue to do so or to make the best terms he could with the Dutch. [*Brussels ib.*, E. et. G., 191. Infanta to Philip IV., July 13. Philip IV. to Infanta, August 10, 1624.]

Her reply must have struck terror into the hearts of the Council at Madrid. She could only write the plain truth "that this is a war which will last for ever. All the enemies of Your Majesty's crown are pressing forward to keep it going, so it will consume all Your Majesty's substance. If you do not see that the wants of this army are supplied to the minute we shall risk a disaster which will ruin all your States. I think it my duty, then, to put this plainly before you betimes, or else if war breaks out next year in Germany, and France joins in with England, Your Majesty will find yourself face to face with the most awful difficulties one can imagine, and utterly unable to wage war in so many quarters at such a fearful cost. In such a contest you would not have a hope. I will not say of victory, but of escaping utter defeat and ruin." [*Brussels ib.*, E. et g. 191, Infanta to Philip IV., September 12, 1624.]

Yet Philip still continued to cherish hopes of peace. Jean Brant, a relation of Rubens' wife, had brought him a paper from Holland which induced him to send the Infanta instructions to negotiate for a six months' armistice with the Dutch during which time she might arrange a definite peace, and even at the end of the year hopes were entertained that D. Manuel of Portugal, the pretender to the Portuguese Crown, who was then in exile at the Hague might return to his allegiance. [*Brussels ib.*, E. et G. 191, Philip IV. to Infanta, October 11, 1624. Infanta to Philip IV., November 24, 1624.]

But the Spanish Ministers, as the King bitterly complained, were utterly careless of the welfare of the Monarchy and looked only to their own private interests. [*Turin ib.*, Tarantaise to Duke, August 15, 1624.]

Apathy or ignorance had led them to overlook the golden moments for coming to terms with the Dutch which had been open to them at the beginning of the year, when the United Provinces had seen their Commissioners in England left for weeks together without an answer to their most urgent representations, and when the French seemed still unwilling to come to a rupture.

But the opportunity was lost. The question of the Valtelline was the reason why Spain had failed to effect an understanding with France.

At the beginning of 1624 it had seemed for a time as if a settlement of that question was in sight. The French were pleased at the willingness shown by the Spaniards to leave the forts in the hands of the Pope, though they were anxious not to enter into any agreement which might be derogatory to their prestige. So long, indeed, as any prospect remained of an alliance between Spain and England they were unwilling to entangle themselves in complications abroad, for their first object must be to assure themselves of La Rochelle, which could only be secure from attack if a fresh fort were erected at the mouth of its harbour and garrisoned by the royal troops. This fort which was named St. Louis was now taken in hand, but the murmurs of the Huguenots showed that this measure might result in a fresh outbreak of Civil War. The Queen, the Chancellor and M. de Puisieux urged the King not to run such a risk, but his Confessor and Cardinal de la Rochefoucauld exhorted him to persevere in the undertaking. [*Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, March 9, 16, 30, 1623.]

Philip IV. had placed himself in the Pope's hands as to the Valtelline, and it was, therefore, at Rome that Commander de Sillery concluded a Treaty by which Spain retained the right of passage for her troops through the Rhoetian Alps, whilst the Pope guaranteed the rights of the Catholics in the Valtelline. [*Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, April 5, 1624.] But for Richelieu this arrangement might well have been accepted by France. [*G. Hanotaux*, Vie de Richelieu op. cit. Tome II. Partie 2me. Pp. 349-356.]

When the Treaty reached Paris the King had it read aloud in the presence of the Grandees and Great Officers of the Kingdom, solemnly refused to ratify it, and disavowed Sillery in such terms that it was thought that he ran a very good chance of losing his head. A few days before Vieuville had ordered the arrest of Padre Maestro at Calais in order to prevent him from reaching London in time to dissuade James I. from complying with the resolutions passed by Parliament for breaking off the negotiations with Spain. On April 24, Richelieu for the first time took his place at the Council Table. [*Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, April 12, May 3, 1624.] Before the middle of June, France had given her support to Holland, and Coeuvres had been despatched to

Milan to demand that the Spaniards should hand over the Valtelline to the Grisons. [*Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, May 10, June 29, 1624 let. cit.]

The way was now open for further negotiations in which the Venetian envoy took an important part. On this occasion the lines on which all the powers hostile to the Hapsburgs could be united in a general offensive and defensive alliance seem to have been originally suggested by Carlisle and Kensington, but were at first received with little favour by the French as they were unwilling to break openly with Spain and were indignant that the English refused to relax the Penal Laws against the Catholics. The position of affairs in the Valtelline forced them, however, to comply in part with the English demands, and when the marriage was arranged they engaged to mediate with the Emperor, Spain, and Bavaria for the restitution of the Palatinate in connection with the general settlement in Germany. A proposal made by Lesdiguières that he should invade the Milanese with the help of Savoy and Venice was rejected by the Council on the ground that there were still hopes that an arrangement might be come to with Spain. For a moment it appeared as if she would have it in her power to meet the wishes of France about the Palatinate, especially as the Imperial Ministers wished for peace. Maximilian offered to hand over Heidelberg and Mannheim to the Spaniards in order to save the expense entailed by garrisoning them, and the Infanta in reply to a question from Philip, advised that his offer should be accepted whilst, on the other hand, she stoutly refused to comply with the request of the Emperor and the Electors that she should refuse to hand over Frankenthal to James I. when the term of eighteen months for which it had been deposited in her hands expired on October the twenty-fourth. The Thirteen Cantons at the Diet of Baden promised the French Ambassador that they would confirm the Treaty of Madrid, but the Catholic Cantons did so with the reservation that Urban VIII. should confirm it as his predecessor had done, and that no religion except the Catholic should be allowed to be exercised in the Valtelline. It is probable that the Catholics acted in good faith in requiring that the new Pope should re-confirm the treaty, as fears had been already expressed that Spain would oppose any Papal decision which might not be quite to her liking. As, however, the Protestant Cantons refused to assent to their proposal, the Diet

separated and left the business still unsettled. [*Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, June 21, 29, July 18, Aug. 16, Sept. 7, 28. Do. Nerli to Duke, Madrid, Oct. 28, 1624. *Brussels* ib., *Etat et Guerre* 191. Philip IV. to Infanta, Oct. 9. Infanta to Philip IV., July 12, Oct. 24, 27, 1624.]

In vain Father Hyacinth hastened to Paris and offered to do his best to find new paths for peace, but he met with a rough reception from Cardinal Richelieu, who probably knew that when at Brussels after his return from England the good father had signed a paper to deny that he had ever acted against the interests of either Austria or Spain, and that, despite his newly born enthusiasm for the House of Hapsburg, the Infanta had been only too glad to get him out of the Netherlands. The very nature of the questions at issue made them indeed almost impossible to settle, for private interests, passions and jealousies as well as motives of State policy were all at stake. Even if the Pope imposed conditions upon the Grisons it would be impossible for France to guarantee that they would be fulfilled, whilst though Spain could through her forts exercise pressure upon the Three Leagues, she could only do so at the risk of causing trouble both in France and Italy. [*Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, Sept. 21, 28, 1624 let. cit. ib., Nerli to Duke. Madrid, Dec. 3, 1623. *Brussels* ib. *Etat et Guerre*, 191. Infanta to Philip IV., July 12, 1624.]

It seems strange that under these circumstances Philip IV. should have given fresh cause for offence to the English ambassador by allowing Inojosa to return from banishment at Bruges to kiss his hand and to resume his seat at the Council table at Madrid. Possibly he was still under the influence of the Marquesa. [*Turin* ib., Tarantaise to Duke, October 25, 1624. *London S.P.O.* S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 17, No. 63. Conway to Brooke let. cit.] Had he been able to read Maximilian of Bavaria's private memoranda he might possibly have drawn back from a quarrel with England.

The Venetian Ambassador at Paris had been one of the most active agents in stirring up public opinion in France against Spain, and accident had led to the discovery of his intrigues. [*Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, June 21, 1624 let. cit.]

His colleague in London, Alvise Valaresso, had just completed his term of office and was returning to Italy through Alsace. Leopold's officers at Ensisheim stopped a waggon which was transporting eighteen of the envoy's trunks containing the office

copies of all his despatches to Venice. These clearly proved that the French had been deceiving della Rota and Father Hyacinth as to their dealings with Mansfeldt. The despatches were communicated by the Archduke to the Ministers at Munich who at first thought Mansfeldt had deceived the Venetians, but were soon convinced of the contrary. All that they could suggest was that the Pope as was his bounden duty should forbid the French and the Venetians "to meddle with such pernicious things," especially as it was most urgent that the Valtelline business should be settled as soon as possible.

Maximilian wrote to the Kaiser that the papers gave a full account of Sir Robert Anstruther's negotiations during the previous summer with some of the "Electors, Princes, and Estates of the Empire," and that he would see from them what confidence he could place in some "who gave fair words enough" and what the objects of their intrigues was. He suggested that the Kaiser might let them know that their doings had come to light, without however naming his informant.

A note in Maximilian's own hand shows, however, how he looked upon the matter as it affected Spain. "I clearly see," he writes, from "the decyphered Venetian despatches that Mansfeldt will not allow himself to be used to attack the Spaniards, but will leave it to them to take the first step. As, however, the Spaniards clearly see through the English policy, they will take good care not to give either Mansfeldt or England any excuse for breaking with them, and so will not send us any help against Mansfeldt so long as he does not attack them. The Nuncio must, therefore, be told nothing of all this so that the Spaniards may not be held back. I should, however, like to have the opinion of the Privy Council as to whether Tilly should be allowed to advance into Mark alone, or what it would be best to do." "I don't know either whether supposing Mansfeldt were to enter the Palatinate without violating Spanish territory, Frankenthal would be handed back to the English, or if the Spaniards would not give Tilly help to relieve it. It would be as well to put this last case to the Nuncio in writing." As the Infanta was pledged to hand back Frankenthal to the English on the expiration of the armistice it was plain that any refusal on her part to do so would be equivalent to an open breach between Spain and England. Tilly, if more brutal than Maximilian, was somewhat more frank. He begged that the Imperial Cities should not be exempted from

furnishing quarters for his troops. "What secret conspiracies and correspondence are set on foot in such places! In fine they are so insolent and perverse that they will do nothing either for His Imperial Majesty or for the army. Why then should they be dealt with more gently than the Obedient States."

Such was the policy of Bavaria and of the Catholic League for whose friendship Spain had sacrificed her alliance with England. [Goetz op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., pp. 629-630. Jocher to Hyacinth, Nov. 29. Do. Note 1. Tilly to Maximilian, Nov. 26. Do. Note 3. Archduke Leopold to Kaiser, Nov. 30, 1624. Note in Maximilian's handwriting undated. *Brussels* ib., *Etat et Guerre*, 191. Infanta to Philip IV., Oct. 24 let. cit. Philip IV. to Infanta Nov. 20, 1624.]

Philip IV. was, however, an honourable gentleman. Despite the Emperor's protests he authorised the Infanta to carry out the agreement about Frankenthal. Referring to a suggestion which he had received through the Count of Ossuna that a settlement in Germany would be effected at the approaching Diet without reference either to the King of England or to the Palatine, if he would agree to hand over the Lower Palatinate to some kinsman of Frederick's, he said that he would always do anything in his power to restore peace in Germany and would be glad of her advice on the subject. He hesitated, however, to hand back Cleves and Juliers to the Duke of Neuburg, who was then his guest, because the Duke would find it impossible to retain those fortresses and Spain would be forced to recover them at any cost. [*Brussels* ib., *E. et G.*, 191. Philip IV. to Infanta, 20 Nov., 1624 let. cit. *Turin* ib., Tarantaise to Duke, Oct. 26, Nov. 28, 1624.]

It is true that the Infanta had written that Neuburg was utterly untrustworthy. [*Turin* ib., Tarantaise to Duke, Oct. 26, 1624 let. cit.]

Maximilian had been correctly informed as to the feelings of the German Princes. Anstruther reported that Brandenburg stood by the Palatine and was opposed to the transfer of the Electorate to Bavaria. "Most of the German Princes are waiting and longing for such a force in the field as might countenance them rallying together to free them from the burdens they suffer and the yoke they fear, hearken willingly to the propositions made them. professe devotion promise assistance, but cannot believe till they see." The Saxons were getting frightened and wished for a settlement in Germany. Denmark, which had learnt by bitter

experience not to rely upon German promises, would not stir until England was engaged in good earnest, but "it seems there is fuell enough if we bring coales and bellows." France now the marriage was settled was doing all she could to assist Mansfeldt in his attempt to recover the Palatinate. [*London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 175, No. 33 (Conway Papers), Conway to Lord Brooke, November 23, 1624 let. cit.*]

Christian the Fourth, however, had at that moment very good reasons for refusing to declare himself openly as the champion of German Protestantism. He was endeavouring to arrange a Commercial Treaty with Spain by which his subjects could exchange their fish for merino wools and other Spanish produce. As, however, the Spanish ministers thought that the Danes had an understanding with the Dutch and English and that the proposed trade would therefore be hurtful to their interests his overtures were rejected. From that time Denmark took her place on the side of England. [*Turin ib., Tarantaise to Duke, August 2, September 12, 1624.*] Once more Spain paid dearly for her commercial policy. But whilst the diplomatists were plotting, the generals were fighting and Spinola was winning those laurels which have made his name immortal.

NOTE I.

THE TREATY OF PARIS, 8 AUGUST, 1624.

Some documents existing in the Episcopal Archives at Chur and in the Additional MSS. at the British Museum appear to have been copied from those found amongst Valaresso's papers, and to have been forwarded by Archduke Leopold to Rome. [Cf. *Goetz op. cit., Part II., Vol. I., pp. 629-630. Jocher to Father Hyacinth, Nov. 29, 1624 let. cit. Mantua, Francia, 673, Priandi to Duke, June 14-21, 1624. Spagna, 616, Striggi, Dec. 8, 1624, May 10, 1625.*]

These papers are peculiarly interesting because they serve to show that the lines on which the policy of France was conducted throughout the latter part of the Thirty Years' War must have been traced out by Cardinal Richelieu at the moment when he came into power.

The version at Chur is in Italian, that in the British Museum is in Spanish, and undated.

The Heading is "Articles of the League concluded for Thirty Years in the City of Paris in France in the presence of the King and of all the ambassadors of the Allied Powers for the recovery of the Palatinate and the Valtelline and the Liberties of Italy against the King of Spain, the House of Austria and their allies and supporters on August 8, 1624."

It was agreed that none of the Allies were to treat with the King of Spain or the House of Austria without permission from the other Confederates, who were to declare war upon any one of their number which did so.

England was to send some Breton ships and a hundred galleons to the Indian seas to attack the Spanish possessions, and promise to settle the differences between Holland and the East India Company amicably. James I. also engaged to keep up a fleet in the North Sea, and to pay the Palatine £300,000 a year. The Palatine is to accept Mansfeldt as his general.

After the Palatinate has been recovered, the Palatine and Mansfeldt were to serve against the House of Austria under instructions from France and Venice. Mansfeldt was to keep up six thousand foot and a thousand horse for the Palatine's service, and James was to find 12,000 foot and 2,000 horse for the Palatine.

The French engaged to attack Flanders, the Valtelline and Milan and to aid the Pope to recover the Kingdom of Naples.

The Venetians were to send forces to assist the Grisons, to attack Milan in conjunction with the French and to occupy Cremona, to send their galleys to assist the Turks and Corsairs in foraging the Neapolitan Coast, and to lend their galleasses to the Pope to recover Naples. Cremona was to be annexed to Venice.

The Dutch were never to make peace with the King of Spain, were to make up their quarrel with the British East India Company, and were to send a hundred vessels to attack Spain in the East Indies. They were to keep up a force of 25,000 foot and 4,000 horse against Spain.

Denmark was to join the League and to aid the Dutch with 2,000 horse.

Bethlen Gabor was to take the field against the Emperor and to induce the Turks, Hungarians and the Pasha of Buda and Temesvar to do the same. He was to be subsidised by France and Venice.

The Grisons were to attack the Valtelline at once and to be supported by the French and Venetians directly they had entered

it. When it had been recovered it was to be retained by the Grisons, but Chiavenna was to be annexed to the Milanese.

Liberty of Religion was to be granted to the Catholics in the Valtelline, and the leaders of the Rebellion were to be amnestied.

The Swiss and Grisons were to furnish forces of 10,000 foot to France and 8,000 to Venice in case of necessity and were to receive from the two powers a subsidy of 40,000 crowns a year.

The Duke of Savoy and an auxiliary French force were to attack Genoa so as to prevent Spanish troops from being sent into the Milanese, and if he could occupy Savona it was to be handed over to him.

He was to allow the French troops to march through his territories to attack the Milanese and the Emperor and to furnish them with supplies.

France and Venice were to arbitrate between Mantua and Savoy if Mantua entered the League. Tuscany and Modena are to be rewarded by France and Venice if they enter it. Tuscany was to receive Lucca, the Duke of Modena employments for his sons.

The Pope was to be assisted to recover Naples if he entered the League, and was to evacuate the Valtelline. He was to promise to induce the Ecclesiastical Electors to vote for the election of the King of France as King of the Romans and was to crown him and confirm him as such.

Prince Thomas of Savoy was to receive a marquisate in Dauphiny or Provence and a revenue of 100,000 crowns [£25,000] from France.

[*Chur. Ep. Arch*, Mappa 53, 1624, Aug. 8, Capitol Della Legha, etc. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. 10,236, p. 233, Capitulaciones de la Liga, etc. Undated.]

CHAPTER LXVIII

THE experiences of 1623 had reminded both the Dutch and the Spaniards of the value of the offensive use of sea-power. During the whole of the first months of 1624 great naval preparations were in progress in their dockyards. The ostensible object of Philip's visit to the South of Spain had been to inspect the harbours and the fortifications, whilst his galleons assembled at Gibraltar, and Olivares had poured into Khevenhüller's unbelieving ears stories of an intended attack upon Tunis and Algiers, with whose corsairs the Dutch had an understanding concealed from the world by the flimsiest of disguises. [*Turin* ib., Taran-taise to Duke, February 2, 1624 let. cit. *Munich*, Geh. St. A., K.S. 292-4, Khevenhüller to Elector, 1 October, 1623 let. cit.]

From the moment when it became clear that a breach with England could scarcely be avoided, the Spanish Government began to study the possibilities of an attack upon England with the Irish regiments in Flanders, or upon Ireland in which the ships in the Flemish harbours might co-operate with a fleet from Spain. Their principal advisers had been the Irish Clergy who were in communication with Van Male the Flemish Agent in London, who acted as Coloma's interpreter. A great meeting was held by them to discuss the question of freeing Ireland from the English yoke and they appointed a delegate who proceeded to Madrid and was promptly sent on by the King to the Infanta at Brussels. Coloma also forwarded to her from London a plan for the invasion of Ireland which had been drawn up in 1618 by Paul Riquet, the General of the Order of the Cistercians in Northern Europe, who was then residing in an Abbey near Bordeaux. But as it was found impossible to fit out more than fifty vessels in Flanders, these plans were for the moment laid aside and the ships were employed to harry the Dutch fisheries and their traders going for salt to La Rochelle. [*Brussels* ib., *Etat et Guerre* 190, Philip IV. to Infanta, Feb. 9, April 16, May 17. Infanta to Philip IV., May 20, 1624. Do., *Etat et Guerre* 191, Philip IV. to Infanta, July 3, 30, Coloma to Infanta Isabella, London, Aug. 26. Infanta to Philip IV., Oct. 24, 1624.]

But whilst Philip was talking the Dutch were acting. For the first time since the Huguenots had failed to establish themselves in Florida, a European Power was endeavouring to effect a permanent settlement in the heart of the Spanish dominions in America, for loudly as the Spaniards had protested against the English occupation of Virginia and Massachussetts, they had never effectively held countries which on their maps were comprehensively described as worthless. The Dutch now proposed to take possession of the coast of Brazil which might afford them a suitable station on the sea road alike to the East Indies and to the Pacific Ocean.

Early in the spring of 1624 a squadron of fifty sail under Admiral Willckens sailed from the Texel. On the ninth of May it arrived off Bahia, the great port near the point where Alonso Cabral, the discoverer of Brazil had made his landing 123 years before. The town was defended by fifteen hundred Regular troops and four thousand Portuguese militia. On the tenth four ships belonging to the West India Company on which fifteen hundred soldiers had been embarked attacked the place without the knowledge of their commander, Colonel Dort. Almost at the first shot the garrison who probably shared the intense hatred felt by their countrymen for the rule of Spain ran away into the woods. Their triumph only cost the conquerors the loss of twelve men. The victorious soldiery, as a complaisant Amsterdam news writer remarked, carried on in a slightly rowdy fashion. In other words they plundered the city which was the richest in Brazil and secured a very large booty which included eighteen ships laden with sugar and other merchandise which were upon the point of sailing for Lisbon, as well as numerous pieces of artillery. The governor was made prisoner, and it was thought that the expedition would at once push on to Pernambuco. Great were the rejoicings at Amsterdam when the tidings arrived and it became known that consternation reigned at Madrid. The burghers could not imagine why the Spanish Ministers would not accept their offer to conclude a Truce in the terms of that of 1609.

Philip was beside himself with rage at the news. He loudly blamed his ministers for their negligence and self seeking which might well cost him a Kingdom from which in duties on sugar alone he drew 350,000 crowns (£87,500) a year. Preparations to expel the invaders were at once taken in hand. As he told the

Infanta his chief reason for breaking with the Dutch on the expiration of the Truce had been that by carrying on a war with them on land he might prevent them in engaging in such great undertakings beyond the seas. He, therefore, urged her, as the season for active operations in the field had now arrived, to use his forces in such a way as to prevent the Dutch from sending reinforcements to Bahia. If they got there before the Spaniards the country might well be lost. A large fleet was rapidly fitted out for sea in the ports of Andalusia. Eight thousand veterans were to be sent from Spain and even the Portuguese nobles hastened to raise regiments at their own expense. Cardinal de la Cueva's trusted agents in Holland were instructed to do all they could to hamper the naval operations in the dockyards, and the Spanish vessels which were blockaded in the Downs were left to their fate unless diplomacy could save them. All Madrid talked of nothing but the preservation or the recovery of what Tarantaise with unpardonable ignorance describes as the "great island." Thrifty housewives bemoaned that sugar which was usually sold at 2½ reals (1s. 3d.) a pound had risen to three reals (1s. 6d.) and seemed certain to go even higher. It was, however, difficult to levy troops. "They want a lot of begging and praying. Ministers keep giving them fine words and promises of reward when they come back. But they cannot sail before next month." [*Brussels* ib., *Etat et Guerre* 191. Philip IV. to Infanta, August 17, 26, September 2, 1624. Do., *Etat et Audience* 629. Amsterdam, August 26, 1624. *Turin* ib., Tarantaise to Duke, July 12, August 2, 15; September 7, 1624.]

The rowdiness of the Dutch soldiery, excusable as it may have been in the eyes of an Amsterdam journalist, was not altogether to the taste of the Brazilian population. The country people took up arms against them, the Bishop of Bahia collected a large force which was joined even by the pagan Botocudos, and in a short time the invaders were forced to evacuate the open country and retire behind their fortifications where they died in hundreds of the climate "for as they come from northern and cold countries they cannot stand the heat and the change of food." The bodies of the slain were eaten by the natives. [*Turin* ib., Tarantaise to Duke, Sept. 12, 26; Oct. 26, 1624.]

More than half a century of war in Flanders had made the Spaniards accept disasters in their Belgian provinces as one of the normal conditions of life, but their pride was touched to the

quick when the "rebels of the islands" dared to violate their dominions beyond the Atlantic. For once their patriotism roused them to make personal sacrifices. "All the Grandees, Dignitaries, Magistrates, and Government Servants here, even those of the lowest class have determined to make a voluntary offering to His Majesty which will amount they think to two million crowns in all [£500,000.] The Infante Carlos gives him two hundred thousand ducats, Count Olivares thirty thousand, the Grand Inquisitor twenty thousand and so on and so on. The merchants, especially the Genoese, will also contribute. The Queen has given jewels for two hundred thousand ducats, the Infanta Maria all she had, but the King has given them back to her."

Even the artisans were called upon for their contributions and when the two million ducats [£500,000] had been collected, 36,000 persons had not yet paid in their gifts. [*Turin* ib., Tarantaise to Duke, December 22, 1624, January 7, 1625.] The colonial trade was, indeed, worth preserving, for a single East Indiaman which arrived in the Tagus had on board a cargo worth four millions of crowns (£1,000,000) in pearls, diamonds, and other jewels alone, although the merchants lost three hundred crowns worth of cloths (£75,000) which they had imported to make the wraps, which Spanish ladies had been forbidden to wear by the Sumptuary Proclamations of the previous year. All their entreaties failed to induce the Government to withdraw the order. [*Turin* ib., Tarantaise to Duke, Oct. 26, 1624.]

On the other hand the estimates for Flanders and Italy alone for 1625 amounted to seven millions of crowns (£1,750,000), and the Agent General for Milan had presented a memorial to the King, loudly complaining of the conduct of their Governor Feria. [*Turin* ib., Tarantaise to Duke, Dec. 7, 22, 1624.]

It was soon found indeed that the attempt to expel the Dutch from Bahia would put a severe strain upon the Spanish resources. They numbered about 2,500 and occupied a very strongly fortified position and the Portuguese if left without assistance could have done nothing to drive them from it. "To His Majesty's great loss the good bishop has passed to a better life." All the ships fit for sea were hurried to America. In the meantime the Dutch corsairs plundered the island of San Thomé and took five ships laden with sugar which were on their way to Lisbon. [*Turin* ib. Tarantaise to Duke, Jan. 14, March 6, 1625.]

Spain was at bay. Whilst she was struggling desperately to retain Brazil, the long war in the Netherlands had reached its crisis, and the Rhœtian Alps and Genoa, those two keystones of her Empire seemed to be slipping from her grasp.

The campaign in the Netherlands did not open until July, 1624, although during the spring the Spanish generals had made several raids into the United Provinces to distract the attention of the enemy and to divide their forces. About the end of February Count Henry de Berg made a raid into the Veluwe. The whole countryside was a desert for every living soul had fled into the towns, and he got with his vanguard to within four leagues of Utrecht filling all Holland with terror and confusion. About the same time Captain Lucas Cayro with a large force raided Friesland and burnt six important villages, but Count Salazar who had invaded Brabant was forced to retire owing to the mildness of the season. The Spanish Council of State in their delight at the news suggested that something should be undertaken upon a considerable scale, but Tilly, anxious as he was to attack Holland from the side of Emden could do nothing as the Infanta could not accept his offer without the Emperor's consent. [*Villa op. cit.*, p. 420, quoting Arch. Simancas. Estado. leg. 2,038, Consulta, etc., March 31, 1624. *Brussels ib.*, Etat et Guerre 190. Infanta to Philip IV., April 17. Philip IV. to Infanta, June 18, 1624, *let. cit.*]

In the meantime Spinola remained at Brussels, busily engaged in diplomatic affairs, although he by no means neglected those of his family. Agostino Spinola had not only received his cardinal's hat, but had taken up his residence in the bishopric to which he had been consecrated in the presence of the Prince of Wales. D. Felipe was at Milan, and Donna Polissena was in waiting at Madrid. She was soon to receive a proposal of marriage. The Duke of Feria was still Governor of Milan, but had requested the Grand Chancellor of the Duchy who was visiting Spain to send him the names of persons with whom he could treat with a view to matrimony. The list was not a long one. "One was a daughter of the Marquis of Pliego, of whom the Duke is a near kinsman, being his nephew, but to this marriage he said there was one great obstacle for the children of that family are sometimes born deaf and dumb, and so they are shy of that marriage. The objection to the Countess of Oropesa, a daughter of the late Count of Benavente is that she is now a widow for the third time and has a good many brothers who are very badly off. As for my

Lady Polissena he highly extolled her good qualities, greatly esteems her person, and thinks it a great matter that she is not a Castilian. The Grand Chancellor tells me what a very suitable match this seems to him for my Lady Polissena as she is of just the quality the Duke is looking for. We can do nothing but wait for his reply." So wrote the veteran, D. Fernando Giron, to the Marquis, who must have been somewhat surprised that her Genoese origin could be of any advantage to his daughter in the eyes of a Spanish grandee. The Ferias, however, had already shown a partiality for marrying foreigners, for seventy years before the Duke of Feria who attended Philip II. to England had brought back Jane Dormer as his bride. [*Brussels ib.*, *Etat et Guerre* 132. D. Fernando Giron to Spinola, 24 January. Polissena Spinola to Spinola, 9 Feb., 1624.]

A few months later he received the news that his kinsman Carlo Spinola had been the chief and leader of the hundred and eighteen martyrs who had suffered for their faith in Japan in the previous year by order of the Emperor Tyemitsu and the printed account of their martyrdom was duly forwarded to him by the Procurator General for the West Indies at Madrid. The letter must have reached him just at the moment when he had entered upon the siege of Breda. The tidings may well have seemed of good omen to one who was himself a crusader for the Faith. [*Brussels ib.*, *Etat et Guerre* 132. Francesco Crespo to Spinola, 2 July, 1624. *Times, Historians' Hist. op. cit.*, Vol. XXIV., pp. 596-597, p. 689. Tyemitsu reigned from 1623 to 1650, and expelled the Portuguese from Japan in 1639. Carlo Spinola was one of the "Martyrs of Japan," who were canonized by Pope Pius IX. Their festival is kept on Feb. 5. (Cf. The Roman Missal. *London*, Burns and Oates, pp. 12, 26, 397.) He is, however, not named in the Collect for that day.]

It was not until the 21st of July that Spinola took the field with an army of twenty-six thousand foot and four thousand five hundred horse. He despatched Count Henry de Berg to attack the garrison in Juliers which were occupied jointly by the Dutch and the Elector of Brandenburg and sent Juan de Laguna to march along the Meuse and the Waal so as to harass the communications between Holland and Germany. [*Villa op. cit.*, p. 422. *Historisches Taschenbuch* (Leipzig, F. A. Brokhaus 1840. Neue Folge-Erster Jahrgang). Die Belagerung von Breda, von Ernst Münch, p. 120.]

Spinola himself took up his quarters at Gilsen, a village two and a half leagues from Breda on the road to Bois-le-Duc, and spread a report that he was going to attack Heusdon on the Old Meuse. Thereupon its garrison promptly opened the sluices and laid the whole neighbourhood under water. [*Villa op. cit.*, p. 422. *Münch op. cit.*, p. 120. *Brussels ib.*, *Etat et Guerre* 191, Infanta to Philip IV., July 29, 1624.]

At the beginning of August the Dutch took the field. Frederick Henry with six thousand foot and eighteen troops of horse was sent to watch de Berg and to guard the country between the Rhine and the Meuse, whilst the garrisons round Bois-le-Duc and Breda itself were strongly reinforced. For the moment Maurice remained at the Hague, where the English regiments levied by Southampton, Oxford, Essex, and Sir Robert Willoughby were arriving in a steady stream. The plague was raging everywhere in Holland. Delft, Leyden, Haarlem, Amsterdam, Nymwegen and Grol were severely infected. At the Hague itself where two hundred and fifty persons were dying a week, it was almost impossible to find men to bury the dead. People who were strolling in the public walks in the morning were dead by nightfall. "God is warring here to punish these people for their pride." So wrote a newswriter to gossiping Benois. To men of other nations the purse proud Dutch burgher was as offensive as the threadbare Spanish Matamore. [*Villa op. cit.*, p. 422, *Münch op. cit.*, p. 120. *London, S.P.O.*, S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 168, No. 27., June, 1624. List of officers of the volunteers for the United Provinces. *Brussels Etat et Audience* 629. The Hague, Aug. 19, 1624.]

The King and Queen of Bohemia remained in the Hague. Conway's younger son Thomas who was sergeant major in Willoughby's regiment was quartered near Elizabeth's lodgings and fell ill and died of the sickness. The Queen sent her own chaplain and physician to attend him. One of her ladies fell a victim to the disease. [*London, M. A. Green op. cit.*, pp. 233-234, quoting, *London S.P.O.*, S.P. Holland, Carleton to Conway, 6th January, 1625.]

At Gilsen Spinola held a Council of War. He had from the first been anxious to besiege Breda, but everyone present except himself was opposed to the plan. The Infanta when informed of their decision ordered Spinola to discover if it would be possible for him to cross the Yssel and to enter the Veluwe, but at the suggestion of Henry de Berg she abandoned this idea and ordered

that the Count should, as he wished, be allowed to attack Grave. When, however, de Berg came to reconnoitre that place, his jealousy of Spinola, led him to report that the attempt would be impossible. It was only after three weeks delay that the Infanta gave the Marquis a free hand to do as he pleased. He allowed de Berg to advance into Cleves where he took a few small villages, but himself remained with 20,000 foot and 4,000 horse entrenched at Gilsen which the garrison of Breda did not venture to attack. He had wished to surprise the Island of Bommel, as the rivers were very low and he had confederates amongst the garrison, but found that it was too strongly held to attempt. The menace of the French armies could not well be disregarded, and his Spanish captains were ceaselessly intriguing against him both at Madrid and at Brussels, so that it was generally believed that he would not venture to lay siege to any important fortress, lest he might be forced to retreat as he had done from before Bergen-op-Zoom.

However the Dutch general was not deceived by his opponent's irresolution. Justinus of Nassau, who commanded at Breda, had known him for many a day and directly he heard that he was approaching collected the flower of the forces of the States in Breda, summoned the French and English auxiliaries under Hauterive and Morgan to reinforce his garrison, and to save forage dispatched his cavalry to Gertruydenberg. He had now under his command forty-five battalions of foot and two troops of horse.

Justinus of Nassau soon found that his prevision was correct. De Berg laid siege to Grave in the hope of starving the place out, but on the twenty-eighth of August Spinola again assembled his Council of War and though all but one of those present voted against his project, decided to run the risk of besieging Breda, and after nightfall gave orders that his army should occupy the two sides of the fortress which offered the best positions for an attack. Next day he advanced to Guineken, a village on the river Marck, lying to the south-east of the town, ascended the church tower, chose the sites for the camps and at once issued the most pressing orders. [*Villa op. cit.*, p. 422. *Münch op. cit.*, p. 120. *Brussels ib.*, Etat et Audience 629. Hague, Aug. 19 let. cit., Sept. 3, 1624. *Mantua ib.*, Priandi to Duke, Aug. 10, 16, 31; Sept. 7, 1624. *Van der Kemp op. cit.*, Vol. IV., pp. 160-162.]

At Paris men thought that the venture was bound to fail. Burlamachi, who in foreign affairs was the oracle of the London Puritans, expressed, however, great anxiety as to the result. Spinola, he wrote, would never have taken a bite at such a morsel had not some happy accident given him a prospect of success. To him the undertaking was a matter of life and death. He was fighting with his back to the wall and would fight all the harder because he had entered upon the design of his own free will and it had not been forced upon him by some Castilian braggart. Victory would make him all powerful for his life and his name immortal after his death. Defeat would mean his overthrow by his rivals. A surrender of Breda would efface the memories of the retreat from Bergen. If he failed he had best slink back to Genoa a broken man to hide himself if he could from the taunts of the jealous Spaniards. When one remembered, however, how Parma's plans had been ruined by the wars in France one might, perhaps, hope that the necessity for relieving Brazil would paralyse the efforts of Spain to defend Flanders. Isabella in the letter in which she warned Philip that the war might prove eternal, added almost as an afterthought that the siege of Breda had begun. [*Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, Sept. 7 let. cit. *Brussels* ib., Etat et Guerre 191, Infanta to Philip IV., Sept. 12, 1624 let. cit. *London*, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 172, No. 7, Philip Burlamachi to Sir Dudley Carleton, Sept. 5, 1624.]

Breda in 1624 had for more than two hundred years been a barony belonging to the Counts of Nassau, the paternal ancestors of the Princes of Orange, to whom it had come by marriage about the year 1400.

The town contained about 1,500 houses, and was built on a morass on the banks of the river Aa, at its junction with the Marek which flowed through the place in several small branches, united with the larger stream in the ditches of the fortress, and passed thence to join the Maas near Dort.

The great Church, a lofty Gothic structure, with a spire three hundred and sixty-two feet high, from which signals could be made across the wide green flats of Brabant to all the neighbouring towns, rose high above the red-tiled roofs. Under its massive vaults were several monuments of the House of Nassau. Conspicuous amongst them was that of Count Engelbert II., through whom the place had come into the family, which was famous for

its statues, emblems and inscriptions. The castle lay upon an island in the Marck which was held up by a sluice so as to form a large basin. It was a favourite residence of Maurice of Nassau who in the previous May had entertained there the King and Queen of Bohemia with joustings, tournaments and banquets, and was surrounded with parks, gardens, and woods, scattered over the low sandy hills which to eyes used to the water-meadows of Holland seemed veritable mountains, and which were described from their beauty by poetic flatterers under the name of Tempe. [*M. A. Green* op. cit., p. 233. *Nugent* op. cit., Vol. I., pp. 187-189. *Calderon*, *El Sitio de Breda*. (No publisher, place or date.) Act II., Scene 2. *Münch* op. cit., pp. 113-116.]

Maurice had fortified the place with the utmost care and skill. The castle projected a little beyond the line of the walls, and with its arsenal formed an enclosure which measured a thousand paces round. A mill leat, working a large water mill, was carried from the Aa at a point a little above this enclosure down into the town, which was also furnished with windmills built upon the bastions.

The town was triangular in shape.

The ramparts were constructed of sods and earth and were planted with an avenue of oaks. A gate built of brick stood at each of the angles: a fourth led to the castle. The curtains were flanked with fifteen bastions planted with cannon, above which rose fourteen ravelins. Two redans or cavaliers had been thrown up to carry the long-range guns. The ditches varied in width from seventy to one hundred and fifty feet. They were supplied by both the Aa and the Marck, but the waters of the two rivers were kept apart by two low brick walls separated by a water channel and built in the ditch itself. As the Marck ran dry in summer, tanks had been formed with earthen dams at the foot of two of the ravelins to keep them full. On the inner side of the moat ran two covered breastworks which rose about four feet above the level of the water and communicated with the town by underground passages. At the foot of the ramparts an abattis of trees and thorn bushes had been thrown up to protect the gunners. It was strengthened with a palisade of pointed stakes. On the outer side of the moat ran a breastwork four feet high, sloping gradually inwards and furnished with a counterscarpe. Five large hornworks had been thrown up between the bastions, four of which protected the gates, whilst the fifth faced the longest curtain. They were furnished with ditches thirty feet

wide and rows of pointed stakes projecting outwards were planted at the foot of their walls. Above the ditches of the outer works rose a half-moon, protected by a ditch, several yards beyond which was a breastwork like those round the inner fortifications and reached by bridges from the hornworks.

The fortifications were about four thousand paces in circumference and were so arranged that the outer line was everywhere commanded by the inner one, and that troops could easily be sent in any direction where they might be required either for the defence or the attack.

As the surrounding country was a quagmire which was frequently overflowed by the sea, it seemed almost impossible that the place could be besieged by the usual methods of approach.

The Military Governor of Breda was, as has been said, Justinus of Nassau, Vice-Admiral of Zealand, a natural brother of the Prince of Orange. He was distinguished not only by his experience in war, and by his daring courage, but for his insight into his brother's far reaching plans. The Civil Governor was Jan van Aertssens, who also commanded the burgher guard of about 1,000 men. He was a zealous patriot and a most energetic, but cool-headed man of action. The fortifications were under the charge of Sir Charles Morgan, a scion of the princely house of Tredegar. A man of gigantic stature, auburn hair and clear cut, resolute, aristocratic features bronzed by the sun and wind, Morgan had seen many years of service in the Netherlands wars, and Spinola, who knew him well, owned that but for his skill, his courage, and his burning haughty words, the defenders of Breda would have surrendered at the first challenge, and that the Englishman bore upon his shoulders the whole weight of its defence. [*Münch* op cit., pp. 113-116, Calderon op. cit., Act II., p. 17A. There is a good portrait of Sir Charles Morgan, which once belonged to his only daughter, by Vandyck.] It speaks well for Spanish chivalry that Calderon should have dared to put Morgan's praises in the mouth of Spinola and to make him the hero of his great song of triumph, "The Siege of Breda," that "Henry V" of Spain, at the moment when an English fleet was on the point of sailing to the attack of Cadiz. [*Calderon* op. cit., Acts I., II.]

Spinola found it no easy task to carry out his policy of delay, but it gained him one important advantage. The burghers of Breda had been lulled into security. Under the delusion that

the fortress could not be attacked, they had only laid in their usual winter supplies and had omitted to provide for the necessities of a prolonged siege.

They had allowed a hundred store oxen and two boatloads of cheese which had been brought into the town to be re-exported, and had used their barges to bring back their property from the neighbouring towns to which they had sent it on the first alarm of an invasion. The Spaniards who looked upon themselves as the ministers of divine vengeance on the heretics were ravaging the whole countryside, and the fugitive peasantry had, out of a sentiment of generosity, been received within the walls. The garrison had also been increased from six to sixteen thousand men. Thus though the authorities at the Hague flattered themselves that Breda was provisioned for three years, such was far from being the case. Probably, for the sake of dramatic effect, Calderon represents Justinus of Nassau and Morgan as ordering that all persons over seventy and under fifteen years of age should be expelled from the place to save the supplies, but this is merely an invention. It is probable, however, that the siege must have been raised had it not been for this carelessness as to the provisions. [*Münch* op. cit, pp. 130-131. *Calderon* op. cit., Acts I., II. *Brussels* ib., *Etat et Audience* 629. *Hague*, Sept. 3, 1624.]

The besieging army had also its own difficulties to contend with. The camp at Gilsen was two hours distant from a river, the water supply was bad and epidemics were raging amongst the troops, whilst forty thousand loaves which had been brought up with great difficulty had gone mouldy owing to the rains. The men's pay was in arrear and there were numerous desertions.

Spinola knew, however, that the advancing autumn would soon render it impossible for the Dutch to make any diversion which might force him to raise the siege. He, therefore, remained quietly at Gilsen until he saw that the time had come for him to advance nearer to Breda.

Before he moved Count Henri de Berg and Count John of Nassau had fallen back from near Grave and had rejoined his camp.

Directly he had reached Guineken and had chosen the positions for his own camp, he had the country round Breda carefully reconnoitred, and the work of constructing the lines began. The two sides of the town from which alone an attempt could be

made to relieve the place were occupied in a night, and the garrison after in vain attempting to disturb his operations by a cannonade at long range, retired within its fortifications. [*Münch* op. cit., pp. 131-138.]

Work was then begun upon the lines which were destined to shut out Breda from the world with an activity which seemed all but incredible. The day was August the twenty-eighth, that on which the festival of Saint Augustine of Hippo was celebrated by the Church and to Spinola it seemed a good omen that he should commence his attack upon heresy under the protection of one of the greatest doctors of the Christian faith. His zeal kindled the enthusiasm of his subordinates. The officers took the place of the weary soldiers and toiled on the blockades which were to bar the river against the convoys of Count Henry of Nassau. Almost as if by magic a network of trenches, parapets, fosses, redoubts, and blockhouses such as had never been seen before was brought into existence under torrents of rain in a quagmire where every excavation was at once filled with water. The workmen wrought with their weapons at their sides, for from within the town the besieged were threatening their lines, whilst Mansfeldt was hastening to attack them from without. Not once did Spinola shrink from any toil or from any danger. Like the Phoenix, as Calderon described him in lines which must have made the Madrid theatre rock with applause, he seemed to gain a fresh life amid the flames in which others found their deaths. Trumbull, sour Puritan as he was, hated the great Catholic General, yet he was forced to write to Conway that the Marquis was "determinately resolved to winne Breda or in the trenches before it to bury his corps or his honour." He used to go the round of the trenches every day, to call for the officers in charge of them and to speak words of encouragement to the brigadiers and captains. When the men sunk under the strain, he brought up fresh shifts to relieve them, so that the work might go on without ceasing both day and night. Within seventeen days the lines of circumvallation were completed. The inner lines were within half a mile of the town; the outer one about two hundred paces off measured 30,600 paces in circumference. They consisted of low walls of earth never more than five feet high, and five feet wide at the bottom, sloping upwards so as to narrow to a width of three feet at the top. The ditches round them were six feet deep, and diminished in width from six feet at the top to

two feet at the bottom so that the earth might not slip down their sides. At short intervals the works were strengthened with about seventy towers and bulwarks in which platoons of soldiers were stationed, and stockades were erected across the roads and in open ground. The villages on their course were fortified as entrenched camps. Medina, who was stationed at Guineken, to the south of Breda, dammed up a small mill stream near the village, so as to strengthen his position, occupied a rising ground near it called Mines Hill, and drew a line of stockades and blockhouses along the road approaching it. Carlo Roma, a distinguished Italian General commanded at Teteringen, due north of the town, where Spinola himself fixed his headquarters, whilst Ter Heyden to the north-west and Hage to the west of the place were occupied by Baglioni, Balanzon, and Isenburg. Ter Heyden and Hage were connected by a causeway two thousand three hundred paces long with a bridge across the Marck. This causeway traversed lands which in winter time were flooded by the river so that boats might have reached Breda over the inundated meadows. It was therefore regarded as the key of the besiegers' position and was placed under the charge of Baglioni. A stockade was built across the Marck under water not only to block the passage to the barges which the Dutch were collecting at its mouth, but to prevent the possible entrance of submarines. This fact would appear incredible were it not stated by Calderon in the plainest terms, when he makes Spinola himself say in discussing the means by which the Dutch could attempt to relieve the city.

"It is impossible for them to send
Relief by river as we, neath its floods
Have made a stockade for we saw of late
That 'tis an engineer's subtilty
To steer a craft when covered by the waves."

Napier of Merchiston, however, the inventor of logarithms, has left a paper in which he treats of various inventions for defending Scotland against naval attacks. Amongst these he speaks of a "boat sayling under water."

Droebbel, the famous Dutch engineer and chemist, had experimented with such a vessel in the Thames, near Greenwich, in 1620 and in the course of his experiment had seriously endangered the life of James the First whom he had taken down in his boat to the

bottom of the river. It is probable that both Napier's and Droebbel's contrivances were perfectly familiar to Spinola, who, therefore, was not without grounds for thinking that Maurice might employ submarines to convey supplies into the beleaguered fortress, and accordingly took measures to prevent him from doing so. The force employed upon the construction of these works was comparatively small, but volunteers of the noblest houses in Spain, in Flanders, and in Italy toiled in its ranks, where Pimentels, Bazans, and Cordovas were to be seen carrying fascines and cutting turves.

Even amidst this press of labours, Spinola found time at the request of the Duke of Neuburg, to order his garrisons in Cleves and Juliers to preserve the strictest discipline, and to congratulate Olivares who had written to inform him of his daughter's impending marriage with the Marquis of Elche. He also held long and frequent conversations with Rubens, now commencing his career as a diplomatist, who bustled to and fro between his camp and the Infantas' Cabinet at Brussels, and hinted mysteriously to his intimates that he had a secret understanding with Prince Frederick Henry with a view to a peace between the United and Obedient Provinces. [*Villa* op. cit., p. 423, quoting Herman Hugo, "Obsidio Bredana" (Antwerp, Plantin, 1627) translated by Emmanuel Sueyro. *Münch* op. cit., pp. 135-149. *Brussels* ib. *Etat et Guerre* 132. Neuburg to Spinola, 27 August. Olivares to Spinola, 10 October, 1624. *Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, Sept. 7, 14, 21, 1624. *Cor. de Rubens* (ed. Max. Rooses) op. cit., Vol. III., p. 252, de Bougy to French Government, Brussels, 30 Aug. Do. p. 308, Trumbull to Conway, 13 Oct., 1624. *Calderon* op. cit., Act II., pp. 10A, 17A. *Morning Post*, 31 July, 1914, p. 11. "Logs" by E. B. Osborn.]

Whilst Spinola was busied with the lines of circumvallation, the besieged were strengthening their fortifications to the best of their power. The peasantry had brought in their cattle and grain from the surrounding districts, but such supplies were insufficient for the wants of a population of about 32,000 souls. Meat and butter soon became scarce and the burghers refrained from purchasing the cheese and herrings which were placed on sale at the Town Hall by the Municipality in order that they might be saved for the soldiers. They contributed 150,000 guildens for the pay of the troops, and a kind of siege money was brought into circulation which consisted of obsolete coins taken

at a fictitious value, and of fragments of plate stamped with the inscription: "Breda besieged by the Spaniards." [*Münch* op. cit., pp. 135-149. *Calderon* op. cit., Act. III., p. 17.]

Maurice, in the meantime, had not remained inactive. Until he had ascertained for certain that Spinola meant to besiege Breda, he had remained at the Hague, but on the fourth of September he set out to join his brother's army which had been lying at Rees since the middle of July to keep Henry de Berg's forces in check. He quickly recovered Cleves and Gennep which had been taken by the Spaniards, but as this diversion failed to draw away Spinola from Breda, he fell back upon Nymwegen where he embarked his forces of fifteen thousand foot and three thousand horse, and sent them by river into Brabant. He had originally intended to sieze a position on the Langstraat, from which he could easily have attacked the Spanish lines of communication, but was unable to do so from want of cavalry, as de Berg was falling back upon Guineken by a parallel road. Maurice, therefore, contented himself with encamping half-way between Gertruydenberg and Breda and was forced to remain inactive whilst Spinola occupied the important position of Oosterhout which was only three thousand paces distant from his lines. As Oosterhout completely commanded the marshes between Terheyden and Hage over which a track easily traversable by light waggons and blocked only by four small towers upon the Black Dyke ran into Breda, the loss was an important one. But for Maurice's excessive prudence the Dutch might well have reached the village on the previous day. The fall of Oosterhout, however, proved to be the beginning of the end for Breda. [*Münch* op. cit. pp. 135-149, *V. der Kemp* op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 160-162. (Note 453. Res. St. Gen., 2 Sept. to 29 Sept., 1624. Note 454. Aitzema I. 33b.) *Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, Sept. 26, 1624. *Brussels* ib. Etat et Guerre 191, Infanta to Philip IV., Sept. 12, 1624.]

The tidings that the siege of Breda had been begun reached Madrid in the middle of September, and excited widespread dismay. The Council of State dreaded the dangers of the undertaking. Some of its members even urged that orders should be sent to the army to withdraw, as it could do so without any loss of prestige. Finally Philip IV. drew up a decree with his own hand in which he embodied the resolution of the Council in the following terms, and at the same time shifted the responsi-

bility for the decision from his own shoulders. "Let them point out to my aunt all the difficulties connected with the siege of Breda, but let them leave it to her to decide as to this business. She must remember, however, that she must not expect any supplies this year over and above the 300,000 ducats already paid and that she must frame her plans for raising any new levies accordingly." He held, indeed, that the siege was inadvisable as it would be so long and costly, and a few days later added a paragraph to a resolution of the Council of State in which he said that though he had already given his answer on the subject he must warn them "to look to it that no fortress of our own is jeopardised for the sake of taking Breda, and that the supplies are remitted promptly." [*Villa* op. cit., pp. 423-424, quoting Council of State, Sept. 10, Oct. 7, 1624. *Münch* op. cit., pp. 138-149. *Brussels* ib., *Etat et Guerre* 191. Philip IV. to Infanta, Oct. 31, 1624.]

The King's caution was well-timed, for Maurice at that very moment was, in the deepest secrecy laying his plans to surprise Antwerp. [*Münch* op. cit., p. 146.]

After the capture of Oosterhout operations before Breda seemed almost at a standstill. Possibly in the hope that the place would be betrayed to him by his partisans within the walls Spinola had refrained from bombarding it, and was not pressing the investment closely. Several French nobles had indeed been taken prisoners when attempting to force their way through his lines. The plague was raging amongst the inhabitants, and the dead were lying unburied in the deserted streets. [*Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, Oct. 5, 11, 1624. *Calderon* op. cit., Act. III., p. 17A.]

Maurice, throughout the whole of his military career, had been discussing plans for the recovery of Antwerp, and his attempts, as in November, 1622, had several times been so nearly successful, that his failure seemed to pious divines only ascribable to the irrevocable decision of the Almighty that the city should never be united with the Netherlands Republic. The sympathies of the population were divided. The exiled followers of Arminius had been allowed to form a congregation within its walls, and, for over a generation, there had been no religious persecution of its burghers. Many of the lower and lower middle classes were, however, partisans of the Dutch. The garrison was very weak, and jealousies were rife between the Spaniards and the Flemings.

Disaffection, indeed, was so general in the city that a few weeks later some of the richest burghers threatened to abandon it unless the Citadel, which was always held by Spaniards, was reinforced, and Walloons were stationed in the stately house of the Hansa which commanded not only the northern suburbs, but the river front with its fort of the Steen. Antwerp swarmed with spies, and such humble though dangerous personages as "Dutchy Bag-o-Tricks," "Flaxy" Segers, mine host of the "Cat" in the Vlammissweck, and Pete Treton, the Big Smith of Malines Square, figure in the lists sent by the magistrates to the Council of Brussels. These and others were in constant communication with the governors of the neighbouring Dutch garrisons and would, so Maurice's advisers hoped, be able to betray the place to him if he could bring up a force under its walls.

A favourable opportunity for doing so seemed to present itself early in October.

Wladislaus Wasa, the Prince of Poland, who in the previous year had been a suitor for the Infanta Maria's hand, was now upon a tour in the Obedient Netherlands. At Brussels he had been lodged in the apartments of the late Archduke Albert, and had had his portrait painted by Rubens. At the Infanta's request the Duke of Croy, husband of that Geneviève d'Urfé, who in Rubens' eyes was the Venus of all Venuses, both in mind and body, had entertained him in his palace and had written Spinola a lively description of the stately ballets with which he had welcomed his guest. From Brussels the Prince had proceeded to Antwerp where he had greatly admired the altarpieces in the Church of the Jesuits, and Plantin's printing office, and in Rubens' studio had seen some "masterpieces which nothing can excel." As the chief objects which the Prince had in view in undertaking his journey were to visit Pope Urban VIII., and to witness the Siege of Breda, he left Antwerp for Spinola's headquarters upon the twenty-sixth of September. The Marquis and all the greatest nobles in his train came out with seventy troops of horse to receive the Prince. At the moment when he entered the lines, the batteries began to play upon the city, which replied with a tremendous cannonade. Spinola invited his guest to take the command of the army whilst he remained in the camp. He accepted the offer, and gave as the watchword, "San Felipe." Next morning a suspension of hostilities was arranged so that the Prince might visit all the trenches and fortifications in safety.

He spent four days in inspecting them under Spinola's guidance. After his visit he could not help remarking that the two greatest generals of the age had cast lots and that one of them must lose his reputation. [*Villa op. cit.*, pp. 423-424. Newsletter from Flandres, Aug. 30, Oct. 20, 1624. *Brussels ib.*, Etat et Guerre 132, Duke of Croy to Spinola, Sept. 1, 1624. *Calderon op. cit.*, Act II., pp. 12b-13b, 15a-17a. *Rubens op. cit.* (Rooses), Vol. III., pp. 306-307 quoting, Diary of Etienne Pacv, Vice Chancellor of Lithuania. *Berlin*, Imperial Library, MSS., No. 161.]

On September the thirtieth the Prince set out upon his return to Antwerp and was escorted for some distance upon his road by a large force of Spanish cavalry. Their absence compensated Maurice for his deficiency in that arm. Taking advantage of this opportunity the Prince advanced to Meerle, a village south of Breda, and on the road to Hoogstraaten, a position from which he was able to threaten the marshy meadows between Terheyden and Hage which formed the weakest point in the besieger's lines. Spinola at once hastened to the threatened spot, and almost under the eyes of Maurice, strengthened the gap with a line of trenches and blockhouses, and returned to Teterlingen. Possibly Orange was unwilling to risk an engagement, because he thought that if he succeeded in his attempt to surprise Antwerp, the Spaniards would at once be forced to withdraw from before Breda. [*Villa op. cit.*, pp. 423-426, quoting *Hugo* "Obsidio Bredana." *London, S.P.O.*, S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 172, No. 70, Dudley Carleton to John Chamberlain, 30 September, 1624. *Münch op. cit.*, pp. 118-120.]

At Hoogstraaten he learnt that the Citadel of Antwerp was garrisoned by a force of only eight hundred men most of whom were veterans and invalids. He at once determined to undertake the venture and summoned Rynhoven, the lieutenant of Bergen-op-Zoom to join him at Meerle. Rynhoven arrived there about four o'clock in the morning with a force of four thousand foot and a long train of waggons laden with siege instruments of every kind, amongst which were some light bridges made of broom and ladders which could be lengthened and shortened at will. In order to make the country people believe that they formed part of a Spanish convoy on its way to Breda, the waggons were covered with white canvas, painted with the red cross saltire raguly of Burgundy, and the officers wore the red sashes which were the mark of the Royalists, whilst those in the service of the States wore orange ones.

The Citadel of Antwerp lay upon the Scheldt to the south of the city, and was supposed to be impregnable. It had five bastions and was separated from the fortifications of the town by a wide parade ground, open to the city, which was enclosed by earth-works and ditches running from the old walls to the citadel.

On the evening of October the twelfth, the expeditionary forces under the command of Rynhoven set out from Meerle, and making a long circuit through Putte and St. Johann in't Goor reached the road from Antwerp to Malines at Berchem and advanced up it to the foot of the citadel where they arrived at three o'clock on the morning of the thirteenth. Hitherto the design had succeeded so well that, as Maurice said, no one but God could make it fail. But Providence this time also checked the Dutch.

The night was dark and eerie, the wind was roaring and the rain was driving over the glacis of the citadel. The assailants unloaded their siege train without being heard by the sentinels, threw two bridges across the outer moat and fastened them to the drawbridge with iron rods. They then stole noiselessly across them to the second drawbridge and were just preparing to blow it down with petards when all of a sudden one of the ladders was thrown down upon the drawbridge below it by a sudden gust. The noise aroused the attention of a sentinel, Andres de Cea, and at the same moment, the darkness of the sky was lighted up so brightly that he was able to see the people moving about in the ditch and at once fired upon them with his musket. The shot aroused the sleeping garrison who hurried to the ramparts and poured volleys of shot upon the Dutch who fled in disorder and returned to Bergen-op-Zoom without losing a single man. They left their ladders and bridges behind them floating in the moats or scattered over the glacis. The Spaniards thought that Antwerp had been saved by Providence, as their forces were too weak to repel a determined attack. The States-General, in explaining their failure to the French and Venetian ambassadors attributed it solely to the miraculous light, although, in private, they blamed Rynhoven for not having pushed straight on to the second gate in place of waiting for his confederates to open the outer one to him. The Infanta announced the failure of the attempt to Philip without going into particulars, but at once proceeded to reinforce the garrison. Great were the rejoicings in Antwerp at this signal deliverance. Bonfires blazed in the streets and squares, the churches resounded with chants of thanksgiving and the great

merchants vied with one another in splendid festivals. All knew that had Antwerp been taken, Brussels and Brabant must have fallen into Maurice's hands, Spinola must have retired from before Breda, and Spain might have had to face the loss of all the lands which had come to her with the heiress of Burgundy. [*Münch* op. cit., pp. 144-150, quoting J. de la Pise, "Tableau de l'Histoire des Princes d'Orange (La Haye, 1689)," f. 7. *Theatrum Europæum* 833. Mem. de Frédéric Henri. *V. der Kemp* op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 162-163, quoting *Aitzema* I., 335a.b., *Wag.* X. 497. Res. St. Gen. 17, 19, Oct., 1624. *Brussels* ib. Etat et Guerre 191. Infanta to Philip IV., Oct. 24, 1624. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. 20,785, *D'Andrade Desc. de Flandes*, p. 91b. *Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, Oct. 28, 1624. *Villa* op. cit., p. 426. Maurice's intention of surprising Antwerp seems to have been known to the newswriters as early as October 2nd. Cf. *Villa* op. cit., pp. 423-424. Newsletter from Flanders from the end of August to 20th October 1624. *Munich, Reichsarch*, 30 J.K.A., 190. *Brussels*, 6 Feb., 1625.]

Grievous as this disappointment was, Maurice did not give up his plans. Mynheers Muis, Souck and Harteveld on their return from Meerle reported to the States-General that His Excellency was in continual travail as to the means of relieving Breda, and was in great hopes of doing so by intercepting the enemy's convoys. On the twenty-second of October he broke up his camp at Meerle, fired his quarters, and in the full light of day, without any loss or disorder, divided his army into two detachments under the very eyes of Spinola, whose forces were far the more numerous, especially in cavalry, and whose sentries were within a pistol shot of his own. One of these detachments he placed under the command of his brother, Frederick Henry, whom he sent off on a reconnaissance to Waalwijk and Sprang, whilst with the other he set off for Rozendal, from which he intended to renew his attempt upon Antwerp. He had hoped that he might be able to interrupt the Spanish communications with their bases at Lierre and at Bois-le-Duc. The Dutch armies were too far apart to co-operate with one another, and de Berg's cavalry was so active that though the convoys to Teterlingen often numbered over four hundred waggons, neither Maurice nor the besieged were ever able to capture one. Spinola was a generous adversary and praised Maurice for his conduct of his withdrawal from Meerle in the warmest terms. D'Espesses, the French

Minister at the Hague reported to his master that the Marquis had described it as being "one of the finest actions which has been performed this many a day." [*Villa* op. cit., p. 427. *Münch* op. cit., pp. 148-157. *V. der Kemp* op. cit., Vol. IV., p. 163, quoting, Res. St. Gen., 24 Oct., 1624. Nyhoff Bijdn. III., 80 for D'Espesses' letter.]

By the beginning of November the Dutch already saw that it was very doubtful whether Breda would be able to hold out. Salt, wood, and boots for the soldiers were all running short, although the price of provisions remained low. The Spaniards by cutting some dykes had flooded Maurice's lines, and Frederick Henry in vain tried to make a diversion by threatening Goch. He could do nothing under the watchful eyes of Henry de Berg, and was forced to fall back upon his headquarters at Sprang.

Spinola, however, was never off his guard. "He was always on the alert, and even his slumbers were interrupted by continual alarms. Yet neither weariness nor anxiety made him for a moment forget his habitual courtesy. The instant he was aroused he looked around him with such piercing glances and turned so promptly to the business in hand that no one would have thought he had been asleep. He went to sleep again as easily as he had woke. He had seen to everything and could sleep without a care. He was untidy in his dress for he cared nothing about his clothes, but he always looked every inch a general." Cold and heat, snow and tempest, mattered nothing to Spinola. Sometimes he slept in a cart, sometimes in a soldier's hut, but he could go without food, rest, or washing, for days together. In good fortune as in bad his face never changed, and his calm bearing and cheery smile always kept his soldiers' spirits high. [*Villa* op. cit., p. 427, quoting Arch. Sim., Estado, leg., 2,038. *Münch* op. cit., pp. 148-150. *Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke Oct. 28, Nov. 2, 9, 1624.]

Spinola had taken good care to send reinforcements to Antwerp and to the frontier fortresses for he knew that Maurice had not given up his intention of attempting a fresh surprise. The clergy were upon the alert and warned him that the Catholics in Holland and in the neighbourhood of Breda reported that the Dutch agents were busy in the city. The most dangerous were a certain Balten known as "Dutchy Bag o' Tricks," and his son, but the "Big Blacksmith" had boasted to Master Corneille the Barber, "that he would see another game before ten o'clock struck next

morning," and some peasants who were in the shop had rushed away in alarm at his daring words.

Accordingly the garrison of the Citadel were upon the look out when at three o'clock in the morning of November the fifteenth some three or four thousand foot and horse from Rozendal and Bergen appeared on the glacis, followed by a long train of waggons laden with soldiers and petards. A gale was blowing, driving rain beat down upon their ranks, and they could not stand against the fire which was poured upon them from the ramparts. They fled in disorder and some French and English deserters who stole into Antwerp next morning reported that some of the greatest nobles in France had fought in their cavalry. To the pious clergy of Antwerp this second deliverance seemed the work of Divine Providence. Their belief was shared by Maurice. To him it was plain that the Almighty would grant him no success and that he had set a bar to his career of victory. He fell sick with vexation, grew sullen and "grumpy," and was so irritable that even his intimates could hardly venture to address him. The States-General were in session and it was necessary for him to go to the Hague to attend their meetings. He arrived there suffering from gout on the eighteenth of November. He was fated never again to look upon the face of an enemy. In a few weeks he was in a galloping consumption. [*Brussels* ib. *Etat et Audience* 629. Mires, Dean of Antwerp to M. de la Faille, 16 Nov., 1624, *let. cit.* List of Spies *let. cit.* *Villa* op. cit., p. 427. *Munch* p. cit., pp. 148-159. *Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke., Dec. 10, 1624. *V. d. Kemp* op. cit., Vol. IV., p. 163, quoting De la Pise op. cit. *Res. St. Gen.*, 19 Nov., 1624. Van der Capellen, *Gedenkschr.*, p. 329, p. 332, p. 344. *Munich* *Reichsarch.*, 30 J. K. A., 190. *Brussels*, 6 February, 1625.]

Frederick Henry had in vain tried to make a diversion by advancing as if to attack Goch. He could achieve nothing under the watchful eyes of Henri de Berg. He entrenched himself at Sprang and lay there inactive whilst sickness and desertion ravaged his army.

The last hope of relieving Breda with Dutch forces had vanished and the United Provinces could now only depend upon the assistance of their allies. It was noted as a sign of the times that the States-General now seemed willing to give some satisfaction to the English East India Company as to the affair of Amboyna. [*Villa* op. cit., pp. 429-430, quoting Arch. Simancas, *Estado leg.*,

2,038 Sitting of Council of State, 7 Nov., 1624. Letter of D. Gaspar de Pereda. *Münch* op. cit., pp. 162, 164. *V. d. Kemp* op. cit., Vol. IV., p. 163, Note 460. *London, S.P.O.* S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 174, No. 58, Thos. Locke to Sir D. Carleton, Nov. 16, 1624. *Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, Nov. 2, 1624.]

France, however, had no intention of deserting allies who had proved their value as a check upon the fancied ambition of Spain, so long as she was not involved in open war. No sooner had Louis XIII. concluded the arrangements for his sister's marriage to the Prince of Wales, than he promised a subsidy of two hundred thousand crowns to the United Provinces who proposed to expend them in sending reinforcements to Brazil and in levying forces in France and England for Mansfeldt's new army. [*Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, Sept. 28, Oct. 28, Nov. 2, 1624. *Bassompierre* op. cit., Vol. III., pp. 197-198.]

Mansfeldt returned to England early in November. He had been shipwrecked during his passage across the Channel and had escaped in his doublet with great difficulty. [*Hist. MSS., Comm. Rep., Lord Cowper's MSS.*, Vol. I., p. 175, Capt. John Chudleigh to Sir John Coke, Flushing, Nov. 11, 1624.] By the middle of the month he was in London and was in communication with the Council of War through Sir William Beecher. The work of levying the forces with which, as was said almost openly, he was to relieve Breda and to march into the Palatinate had already begun. The task was a difficult one. It was hard to find either men or money though the gaols were emptied of their felons and counties replenished their exchequers by hiring out criminals at a fixed sum. In all the large towns press-gangs were at work for men went so unwillingly that they had to be driven rather than led. Some hanged or drowned themselves to avoid service. The exploits of Mansfeldt's recruiters were recorded in folk-songs, some of which were a few years ago still remembered in Hampshire. The magistrates were most unwilling to provide coat and conduct money to fit out this "rabble of poor and raw rascals," and to convey them to Dover where they were to take ship for the Continent. To meet the difficulty some captains who had raised companies to serve in Ireland were forced to enrol them under the Palatine's flag, for, in name at least Mansfeldt held his position under a commission from Frederick, and there was even a question as to whether they should not be compelled to pay the expenses of marching them to the coast out of their own

pockets. This proposal, however, was pronounced to be impracticable. Mansfeldt, who had already received £50,000 of English money, grumbled at the conditions which James sought to impose upon him and said that they were far more stringent than those demanded by the French. Even sharp dealing men of business like Lord Chichester, who had made his fortune out of war, thought that the officers were being unfairly dealt with. The King, the Prince and the Duke had kept the nominations to the higher commands in their own hands, yet Conway, for all his reverence for his "Gratious Patron," was forced to recommend his nephew Huntley not to throw up his company in the States' service in order to undertake such an uncertain employment. The establishment of the regiments had not been fixed, and it was not until the beginning of December that terms were finally arranged with their future colonels and captains. These officers proved to be so incompetent that many of them could not teach their men the simplest exercises or train them to handle their weapons. The Spaniards found that many of their prisoners did not know how to set a musket in rest.

The progress of this rabble's route to Dover was marked by extraordinary robberies and outrages. The Corporation of Gloucester in vain strove to prevent the recruits from Herefordshire from being billeted within their city: in Kent the soldiery plundered country houses, beat Justices of the Peace and made the roads unsafe for travellers.

As Sir John Hippesley, Lieutenant of Dover Castle, wrote to Conway: "The soldiers are so unruly that no man dares to walk in the streets; they threaten to hang the Mayor and to burn the town, and when any are put in prison, they break in and take them out." Hippesley had often put himself in danger "to prevent them from pulling down houses," and as Mansfeldt vowed that he had no money, had borrowed two hundred pounds at his own risk to pay them. No provisions could be brought into the town except under convoy. The ships which were to take them to France could not sail for another ten days, and if Conway could not procure them some relief the design must come to nought. With some difficulty the Council of War procured them £20,000. England was beginning to feel what war is. [*London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 174, No. 30 (Conway Papers), Conway to Council of War, Nov. 8. Do., Vol. 175, No. 23, Sir W. Beecher to Conway, Nov. 22. No. 31, I., Conway to*

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Council of War, Nov. 22. No. 43, Council of War to Conway, Nov. 11. No. 42, Lord Chichester to Conway, Nov. 11. No. 57, Conway to Huntley, Nov. 13. No. 58, Thos. Locke to Sir D. Carleton, Nov. 14. Do., Vol. 175, No. 33 (Conway Papers), Conway to Lord Brooke, Nov. 23, *let cit.*, Vol. 176. No. 12, Conway to Buckingham, Dec. 3, Conway's Letter Book. No. 176, Do. to do., Dec. 4. S.P. Dom, Jas. I., Vol. 176. D. Carleton to Sir D. Carleton, Dec. 18, Vol. 177. No. 22 (Conway Papers), Conway to James I, Dec. Do., Vol. 176, No. 47, Sir J. Hippenley to Conway, Dec. 31, 1624. *Birch*, *op. cit.*, Vol. II., p. 487, Chamberlain to Carleton, Oct. 23, 1624, p. 490. Do. to do., Jan. 8, 1625 *Munich Reichsarch*, 30, J. K., A.190, J. Jacob, London, 7 Jan., 1625. *Historical MSS.*, Court Rep. *Southwell Cathedral*, pp. 457-458, "Song on Mansfeldt's Volunteers." *Lord Cowper's MSS.*, Vol. I. *Sir John Coke's MSS.*, pp. 178, 1624, Sir R. Bingley to Sir J. Coke, Dec. 30. *Munch*, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-164. *Mantua*, *ib.*, Priandi to Duke, Nov. 23, 1624, Jan. 3, 24, 1625. The information as to the Ballad relating to Mansfeldt's Volunteers was given to the writer by a collector for the Folk Lore Society at Winchester in 1906. *Villa*, *op. cit.*, pp. 429-430.]

Although Hippenley and Conway might have been grieved had Mansfeldt's expedition ended in smoke, it was by no means certain that James I. would have shared their feelings. He had been bullied by Charles and Buckingham into giving Mansfeldt permission to levy troops in England, a permission which as International Law then stood he could not well have refused, but he was still willing to lend an ear to the proposals for the restoration of the Palatine which Gondomar was expected to convey to England. On no account would he suffer himself to be dragged into a war with Spain. But Mansfeldt could not be allowed to command English subjects except under stringent conditions, and these James proceeded to lay down. He was in the Palatine's service with a commission to recover the Palatinate, and he could best carry out that commission by leading his troops into the Palatine's territories. The veriest tyro in geography knew that even if he could have flown to Heidelberg "he would have to rest upon the King of Spain's ground." Yet Mansfeldt was solemnly informed that if he wished to pass through Spanish territory he must "demand passage according to the amity between England and Spain." Should, however, the Infanta or Philip IV. refuse to grant it, or deny it to the troops

of the French King "who were united with the English in the same cause," James could not permit his subjects "to abandon their allies," but they must "take upon them their and their own defence, and make their passage by force of arms." It was plain that Spain would not abandon her neutrality if she granted Mansfeldt the right of passage which she claimed as a matter of course from Savoy, from Lorraine, and from the Grisons. To throw a sop to Spanish interests James had, indeed, exacted a promise from Mansfeldt to leave all Catholic ecclesiastics uninjured, and had ordered his officers of justice to suspend all proceedings against Catholic recusants in England, but he knew well that Mansfeldt once upon Spanish soil might easily be induced by the States to commence hostilities against Spain. James had indeed originally wished Mansfeldt to land at Calais or at Boulogne, from which it would be easy for him either to attack Artois or enter Spanish Burgundy where there was no magazine of arms and which possessed only five pieces of cannon. But though this idea was favoured by the Dutch, it was strongly opposed by the French, who wished to gain the favour of Bavaria by keeping Mansfeldt out of Southern Germany, and so the plan had to be given up. Useless as International Law has shown itself to be it comes as a shock to those who believe that it was intended to be a reality when we find Reigersborch writing to Hugo Grotius that "as for the oath which Mansfeldt took in England not to invade the King of Spain's territory, that matters nothing." The Flemings were of the same opinion as to James' assurances.

Inojosa had taken care to win over some persons in high places in Court before he left London, and through them Bruneau, the Flemish resident, was quickly informed that Mansfeldt would attempt to relieve Breda. The Infanta accordingly issued her orders to the nobility of Flanders to be ready to take the field at the first signal, called out the Belgian militia and sent Henry de Berg to watch the French frontiers. So serious indeed was the situation that she warned Philip IV. that it would cause great disaffection if the old practice of placing Flemish under Spanish officers irrespective of seniority were continued, and that she dared not comply with the Emperor's request that the Palatinate should be restored to the Palatine, as she could not leave Spain without a basis of operations in Germany when war might so easily break out again. Philip, however, though he was well

aware of Mansfeldt's designs, insisted that she should fulfil her engagement by placing Frankenthal in the hands of the English regardless of Maximilian's protests.

As a reply to de Berg's demonstration upon their frontiers, the French prohibited the exportation of grain to Flanders and thus greatly increased the difficulty of provisioning Spinola's camp. It was thought that the Spaniards would retaliate by supporting the French Huguenots and by stirring up a revolt at Rochelle, although such a policy would only make the French more bitter than ever against them.

Such was the position of affairs at the moment when Mansfeldt was on the point of embarking from Dover. [*Brussels*, ib., *Etat et Guerre*, 191, Infanta to Philip IV., Sept. 20, Nov. 24, 1624. Do., 192, Infanta to Philip IV., Dec. 7, 1624, Jan. 12, 1625, quoting Philip IV. to Infanta, Nov. 20, 1624. Philip IV. to Infanta, Dec. 24, 1624, Jan. 20, 1625. (As to Inojosa's spies at Whitehall, cf. ib., 191, Philip IV. to Inojosa, April 16, July 3, 1624. Do. to Infanta, July 3, 1624, Infanta to Philip IV., July 29, 1624). *Mantua*, ib., Priandi to Duke, Nov. 23, Dec. 10, 30, 1624. *Reigersborch*, op. cit., Appendix III., p. 759, Reigersborch to Groot, 31 December, 1624. *Munich*, *Reichsarch*, 30 Jahr., K. A., 192, Brussels, 6 Feb., 1625, Newsletter, Dunkirk, 25 January, 1625.]

NOTE I

"THE SUBMARINES AT BRED A"

CALDERON in "El Sitio de Breda," Act II., p. 16B., places the following words in the mouth of Spinola, who, in speaking of the attempts to relieve the city, says:

the	" Por el rio
his tre	Es imposible que puedan
geograph	Meter socorro, que está
" he would	Debaxo del agua hecha
Mansfeldt wa	Una estacada, por que
Spanish terrin	Ya vimos, que es sutileza
amitye betwe	De Ingenieros, navegar
Infanta or Ph	Barcas del agua cubiertas."

The description of Napier's papers, which are in the Bacon Collection at Lambeth Palace, and include the list of the inventions "for defending the shores of his native country against the Spanish Armada or any other fleet," signed by his own hand, is taken from an article on "Logs," by E. B. Osborn, in the *Morning Post*, Friday, July 31, 1914, p. 11."

One of these contrivances, that of a cannon shooting in such a way that the shot would "pass superficially ranging abroad within the whole appointed place" and clearing it of every enemy, had been experimented with upon a Scotch moor, and is said to have resulted in the destruction of a whole herd of cattle by a single shot. Mr. Osborn was uncertain whether this shot was shrapnel or chain shot. In any case, a very similar invention was submitted to Spinola by a retired French engineer in 1622. [Cf. *Brussels*, Eet, G., 187, p. 248. Baron de Ruysellon's proposals.]

It is obvious, therefore, that the suggestions of Napier, who was born in 1550 and died in 1616, may have been known at Brussels, where the accounts of Van Droebbel's experiments may well have been transmitted by the Flemish Legation in London, which was usually better informed than was the Spanish Embassy.

NOTE II.

"DIE BELAGERUNG VON BREDA" V. E. MUNCH

This work is founded upon (1) Herm. Hugo, *Obsidio Bredana*, Antwerp, 1624 fol. (2) "Mémoires de Frédéric Henri, Prince d'Orange," par Bernard Picart, Amsterdam, 1723-4. (3) J. de la Pise *Tableau*, etc., des Princes d'Orange, La Haye, 1689. (4) Lieuwe van Aitzema, "Zaken van Staat," etc. (5) Neuville, "Histoire de Hollande," Paris, 1698, and other works.

CHAPTER LXIX

WHILST Mansfeldt was fitting out his army, Spinola was steadily pressing forward the siege of Breda. His task was no light one. Transport was scarce and all the efforts of the Obedient Provinces were needed to collect the waggons which were to bring up the supplies from Lierre. The rains had been very heavy, the roads were broken up, and Frederick Henry lay in a fortified position at Sprang on the flank of his lines of communication. To save himself the trouble of providing forage and to rest the horses, the Marquis quartered most of his cavalry in the nearest towns, and employed them to meet the convoys and to escort them through their several districts. So well were his plans laid that the Dutch never captured a single waggon, and finally gave up any attempt to cut them off. As, however, they had burnt down the mills and breweries for miles round his lines, scarcity began to prevail in his camp, but he succeeded in preserving discipline amongst his troops.

As soon, however, as he had collected supplies for a month he resolved to bring his approaches nearer to the city in order to prevent the besieged from pasturing their cattle in the meadows round it. There were now thirty-two thousand souls in Breda, and though their supplies of flour proved to be larger than had been supposed, their meat soon ran out and the garrison began to desert. Even the rude mercenaries who had fought in every land from the Danube to the Scheldt were disgusted when the town hangman instead of burying, as was his duty, the dogs whom he had killed, opened an eating house and served the dainty fare to his customers at a low price. A few days later Spinola sent back the deserters into the town threatening them with a hanging if they ever again set foot in the Spanish lines. All were weary of the siege. The rains had brought about sickness and disease was raging amongst the besiegers, whilst all hopes of the arrival of reinforcements from Germany had vanished for it was known that Tilly had refused to move, as he saw that if he did anything to provoke France, Richelieu could

stir up endless trouble for Bavaria in Germany. He had his reward for a few weeks later the Cardinal refused to allow Mansfeldt to invade the Lower Palatinate through French territory. The Spaniards, in their turn, much as they hated Maximilian, were trying to make him distrustful of France. Their efforts recoiled upon themselves. [*Münch* op. cit., pp. 150-159. *Rubens*, *Rooses* op. cit., Vol. III., pp. 309-311. Peirese to Valavez, 12 December, 1624. *Riezler* op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 269-270. *Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, Nov. 9, 23; Dec. 10, 14, 1624. *Villa* op. cit., pp. 427-429.]

Spinola knew through his spies that the Dutch still entertained great hopes of relieving Breda. They had thrown a dam across the Marck at Sevenbergen to hold back the river, had cut several of the dykes so as to flood the trenches held by Baglioni, and intended when the marshes between Terheyden and Hage were covered, to make their way to the city with a fleet of barges. These vessels which were built at Rotterdam could transport men and horses and were furnished with pontoons so that they could put waggons on shore at any point. To man them, a thousand foot and four thousand boatmen had been collected at Sevenbergen under Grenu. Spinola, however, frustrated their plans by opening the sluices below Breda so as to allow the river water to run off and then commenced a furious bombardment directed by Count Philip Mansfeldt, a famous artillery man, who had lately joined his army from the Swedish service, in order to force the garrison to a speedy surrender. [*Münch* op. cit., pp. 150-157. *Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, Dec. 14, 1624 let. cit. *Rubens* *Rooses* op. cit., Vol. III., pp. 309-311, Peirese to Valavez, 12 Dec., 1624 let. cit. *Reigersborch* op. cit., Appendix III., p. 757, *Reigersborch* to Groot, 31 Dec., 1624 let. cit.]

The Spanish engineers had already thrown an earthen dam across the river below the town so as to prevent vessels from running up into it, and now strengthened it with a palisade of trunks of trees, and with breastworks and epaulments upon which cannon could be placed. They also rammed two rows of trunks into the bed of the river above the bridge so that if the enemy tried to destroy it by allowing barges to drift down the current, they would be entangled in the starlings. The boats which had been captured were anchored in front of the rows of piles with their masts let down in order to tear the sails of the enemy's vessels, and a carriage way of boards strengthened with a breastwork of

stones was laid across them, whilst fireships were provided to burn the Dutch shipping. It is noticeable, however, that the Dutch do not seem to have employed the fireships which had struck such terror into the hearts of the Spaniards at the Bridge of Antwerp forty years before. [*Münch* op. cit., pp. 157-159.]

In their turn the garrison had dammed up the rivers inside the town so that when the water had accumulated in sufficient quantities, they could open the sluices and allow it to rush down upon Spinola's works. Their contrivance was all but fatal to themselves for their walls began to totter under the weight of water, which carried away their own dam, and did but little to injure Spinola's, although he lost three barges which had been overladen and had some difficulty in saving the guns on the bridge. Justinus of Nassau hastened to reconstruct his works, and did not renounce the attempt until his efforts had failed three times. [*Münch* op. cit., pp. 157-159. *Reigersborch* op. cit., Appendix III. p. 759, *Reigersborch* to Groot, Dec. 31, 1624 let. cit.]

For a moment Spinola had been in great anxiety and it was thought in Paris that he would have to raise the siege. [*Mantua* ib. Priandi to Duke, Dec. 14, 1624 let. cit. *Münch* op. cit., pp. 157-159. For the description of the dams he quotes *De Obsid. Bred.*, pp. 64-67.]

Rubens, however, continued confident of success. He knew that the Marquis had all along intended to reduce the place by famine and wrote exultantly that it was so well besieged that no force in the world could relieve it. Maurice, on the other hand, expected that the town would hold out for many months. Early in January Spinola was joined by detachments from the Imperial and Bavarian armies and now had under his command a larger force than had been seen in the Netherlands for many years. He had intercepted some letters from Maurice to Justinus of Nassau in which the Prince said that in the early spring he would again make an attempt to relieve the fortress with a force of 40,000 foot and 6,000 horse, and recommended his brother to save his supplies so as to do all in his power to prolong his defence. To meet this threatened attack Spinola re-modelled his lines which in their new form were praised by experts for their likeness to those which Cæsar had constructed round Alesia and Dyrachium. [*Rubens*, *Roses*, op. cit., Vol. III., pp. 309-310. *Rubens* to Valavez, 10 January, 1625. *Brussels*, ib. *Etat et Audience* 629. *Secretary de la Faille* to Souvastre, 16 Dec.,

1624. *Mantua*, ib. Priandi to Duke, January 3, 1625. *Münch*, op. cit., pp. 159-164.]

He had also private troubles to contend with. Shortly before the failure of Maurice's record attempt upon Antwerp the gossips of Brussels had been busily attacking the Marquis's fair name. His correspondent Charles Alexander de Croy d'Havre, Duke of Croy, who is now best known as a historian of Spinola's exploits before Ostend, was a man of very hot temper and had given a lad named Pasturel, who was page to Mme. de Cheverailles, one of the greatest ladies at the Infanta's court, a box upon the ear. Pasturel swore that he would revenge the insult.

On a November evening of 1624 the boy hid himself in the garden of the Duke's hotel, and fired at him when he was passing the window of the dining-room. The Duke fell mortally wounded, but had the strength to rise and to walk to his bed. Like many a great noble of his day, Croy had long wished to die in the habit of a Carthusian Monk. Messengers at once hastened to summon the Procurator of the Convent, but as they forgot to ask him to bring the habit, he had to go back to fetch it. He was some time in returning so that a Minorite had to hear the dying man's confession.

The Duke was eventually interred in the frock of Saint Bruno.

His assassin fled to Italy and remained there undetected for thirty-two years until, on his death bed he confessed his crime. His confessor at his urgent entreaty kept his avowal secret for three years longer for Pasturel feared that if his crime was known his bones would be cast out of their grave as unworthy of Christian burial.

In the first instance, Banquier, a young French painter who was a bastard cousin of the Duchess and a pupil of Rubens was supposed to be the culprit. As Rubens was the trusted friend of Spinola, who despite his fifty-seven years was ardently in love with "that Venus of all Venuses," the widowed Duchess, it was rumoured that the Marquis had been the instigator of the deed. It is true that the fair Genevriève did not respond to her admirer's affection, but, as Rubens unkindly wrote: "One can't take an old vixen easily." [*Rubens*, Rooses op. cit., Vol. III., pp. 309-313. Rubens to Valavez, 12 Dec., 1624, Vol. IV., pp. 243-247. Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 22 April, 1627. Notes 1, 2. *Mantua* do., Priandi to Duke, 23 Nov., 1624.]

As the murdered Duke was a kinsman of the House of Stuart,

and had indeed been the first to give James I. the news of Charles' arrival in Spain, the occurrence excited some attention at Whitehall. Orders were issued to detain the assassin should he seek to land at an English port. [Hist. Mss., Comm. Rep., Rye, p. 172, 1624.]

Time was pressing, for distress was beginning to make itself felt in Breda. In vain the Commandant circulated the most glowing stories of approaching relief. They were not believed by a population which numbered amongst them many Catholics who were in secret sympathy with the besiegers. The Town Council were forced to take stringent measures to keep in check malcontents within the walls. When the flotilla from Sevenbergen failed to take advantage of the full moon in December to force its way into the town across the flooded meadows, the disappointment was general. Spinola was well served by his spies and had fully made up his mind not to raise the siege even if Mansfeldt should advance against him. His Intelligence Department had been organised by the Fuggers of Augsburg, those great bankers who had for over a century been the champions of the Catholic cause, and whose gold had not only raised Charles the Fifth to the Imperial Throne, but had won the rich colonies of Chili and of Venezuela for Castile. Their agents often risked their lives by venturing into the Dutch camps. They won the confidence of the soldiers and inquired as to the state of the armies and of the fleets over the dice-board and the tankard. He knew that if only he had patience Breda must in the end surrender to his arms.

His lines were flooded by the continual rains, and if the Dutch could succeed in cutting the main dyke they would, it was believed, be able to bring their fleet of flat-bottomed barges up to the walls of the city. Day and night the Spaniards, the Walloons, and the Italians fought hand in hand with the Hollanders, the English and the French, waist deep in mud and water, to retain their hold upon the key to their position. Accident favoured the Spaniards. Maurice had sent a messenger named Doublet to Paris with letters to the States' Ambassadors, containing full particulars of his plans for the coming campaign. The man carried them by mistake to the Flemish Legation. The Envoy opened the packet, read its contents, and handed it back to the messenger saying it was not for him.

Both the French and the Dutch were furious, and messengers

galloped to Holland to seek further instructions. The Spaniards had thus learnt that a fleet was being fitted out to reinforce the invaders of Brazil, and that another was to sail from Holland for an unknown destination. [*Mantua*, ib., Priandi to Duke, Jan. 3, 24, 1625. *Münch*, op. cit., pp. 162-164. *Munich*, Reichsarch, 30, J. K. A., 190, Dunkirk, 25 Jan., 1625.] The English wished Mansfeldt to advance on the Lower Palatinate so that they might not break their promise to Spain; the Dutch wished him to go straight to Breda, but neither power could do anything without the consent of France. [*Mantua*, ib., Priandi to Duke, Jan. 3, 1625, let. cit.]

Mansfeldt, however, was in no condition to undertake any such adventures. He was short of money for Burlamachi could not advance any upon the security of the Prince of Wales' Council, and his soldiers, who were discouraged from the outset by the failure to pay them, were deserting, stealing, and falling ill for want of necessaries. He thought that when he arrived at Calais he would be forbidden to land his troops, and Conway, who professed to think that the French as men of honour would not be guilty of such conduct, could only say that James left him free to act as he thought best if his fears were justified. Buckingham advised the Prince of Wales to hire out shipping to the French King for the transport of the French horse to Holland, where they might join Mansfeldt's foot and march with him into some of the ecclesiastical states in Germany, as they would thus avoid any violation of the engagements between England and Spain, and, at the same time, be able to use the United Provinces as a base from which to recover the Palatinate. The only other alternative was that he should take the risk of landing by force. Mansfeldt's prevision proved to be correct. The Duc de Chaulmes wrote from Calais that it would be impossible for him to land in France. It was therefore decided that he should take ship for Rammekens and wait there for the French horse to join him under the conduct of Halberstadt, who was, at the moment, being entertained with regal splendour by his uncle and cousin at Whitehall. The plan was duly carried out. Mansfeldt and his infantry arrived at Flushing before the middle of February. On his way he had touched at Calais but on being refused permission by the Governor to enter the port he had sailed on to Zealand. [*London*, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 181, No. 31, Earl of Lincoln to Secretary Conway, January 9. Do., No. 70, Sir John Ogle and Sir Wm.

St. Leger to Conway, Dover, January 15. Do., Vol. 182, No. 36 (Conway Papers), Buckingham to Charles, January 23. Do., No. 67, Ogle, etc. to Conway, Jan 29, 1624-5. *Mantua*, ib., Priandi to Duke, Jan. 3, 19, 24, Feb. 7, 21, 1624-5. *Brussels*, ib., *Etat et Guerre*, 192, Infanta to Philip IV., Feb. 8, 1624-5. *Lefebvre*, *Histoire de la Ville de Calais* (Paris, 1761, 2 Tomes), Vol. II., p. 496.] At Flushing he decided to remain to await the arrival of the French cavalry. The troops who had sailed from England in the late autumn were still on shipboard in the roads before Ranmekens, where disease and hunger were ravaging their ranks. There had been constant storms from the west and south-west, which had not only delayed the departure of the Dutch reinforcements for Bahia, but had cast a fine East Indiaman of four or five hundred tons, which was on the point of sailing for Batavia, upon the coast at the Texel, and the astrologers of Middelburg predicted a hard frost. The arrangements of the English Admiralty were faulty in the extreme. So badly was the expedition provisioned that Mansfeldt on the first night after he had sailed ran out of bread, beer, water, and fodder for the horses. Two hundred of his cavalry on whom great hopes had been set, would now, wrote malicious Reigersborch, have to go into battle upon their ten toes. Everyone in Zealand was cursing the King of England and blessing the King of France, who had already filled the magazines of Walcheren with bread, cheese, and beer from Calais for his horse, who were expected to arrive with Halberstadt. It was supposed that they would be employed in the first instance for the relief of Breda, although some thought that Maurice when he took the field early in March, would either take up a position on Spinola's lines of communication with Antwerp, or would lay siege either to that town or to Bois-le-Duc. As Antwerp could only be blockaded if the dykes were cut, it was thought that he would prefer to attempt Bois-le-Duc, which was very ill supplied. [*Reigersborch*, op. cit., Reigersborch to Groot, pp. 12-14, January 21, 1625, pp. 17-19, February 18, 1925. *Munich*, *Reichs.*, 30 J. K. A., 190, Queen of Bohemia to Count de la Tour, 14, 24 Jan. *Mantua*, ib., Priandi to Duke, 21 February, 1625.] Maurice's intentions were suspected at Brussels, and the Imperial troops who were advancing from Germany were hurried on to reinforce Antwerp. Forage for the horses was scarce, and it was all but impossible to find enough waggons for the transport services, so that Tilly,

though he had no lack of men, had for the moment to remain at Duisberg. [*Reigersborch*, op. cit., pp. 17-19, Reigersborch to Grotius, 18 February, 1625. *Munich*, Reichsarch, 30, J. K. A. 190, Brussels, 15 Jan., 1625. *Brussels*, ib., *Etat et Guerre*, 192. Infanta to Philip IV., March 24, 1625. *Mantua*, ib., Priandi to Duke, Feb. 21, 1625.] The Infanta fully realised the danger and decided that if circumstances required it, she would raise the siege of Breda without waiting for permission from Madrid. Philip informed her that he was determined to restore peace in Germany and intended to use the Palatinate solely as a means to secure that end. Ossuna had already arrived in England, and had had several conversations with James, who had repeatedly pressed him to intervene with the Emperor to effect an arrangement. At Ossuna's suggestion, Philip wrote to the Infanta to ask her to induce England and the Palatine to proclaim a suspension of hostilities on their own account, as James would be quite willing to do so if he was assured of compensation for his son-in-law and for his grandchildren. Saxony and Brandenburg were now anxious for a settlement, and this plan would be the best to induce the coming Diet and Convention of Electors to assent to one. James suggested that the Palatinate and the Valtelline might be exchanged for one another. As regards the question of the Electorate, the eighth Electorate might be granted to the Prince of Bohemia during Maximilian's lifetime, although there would be some difficulty in abolishing it after his death, but this course should only be taken if England broke off the negotiations. [*Brussels*, ib., *Etat et Guerre*, 192, Philip IV. to Infanta, Feb. 17, March 30, 1625.]

For the moment, indeed, it looked as if England might once more veer round to the side of Spain. The French Ambassador M. d'Effiat, under violent pressure from the English Catholics, had proposed to add some fresh conditions in their favour to the Marriage Articles, and though a very plausible man, had given great offence to James and the Prince. They refused his proposals, but in the most courteous fashion. Buckingham who had received a letter from Gondomar who was on his way to England, referred the servant who brought it to Conway. James, however, did not believe a word of the message from Madrid, but was delighted by a letter from Louis XIII. "If the heartiness goes equall with the handsomeness," wrote Conway, "it did deserve it well." Buckingham, it is true, had not given up all

hopes of forming a third party in Europe with the help of the smaller powers. Without James' consent he had arranged to despatch one of his agents on a secret mission to the Continent, and his creature Wake, the English Minister at Turin, was in communication with the Queen of Bohemia, through Count Thurn. Maximilian of Bavaria promptly secured copies of the letters. [*London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 183, No. 4. Conway to Buckingham, Feb. 2, 1624, 5. Do. No. 23 (Conway Papers), Buckingham to Conway, Feb. 6. Do. Vol. 184, No. 49 (Conway Papers), Conway to Buckingham, 27 Feb., 1624-5. Do. Vol. 185, No. 1. (Conway Papers). Do. to do., March 1, 1624-5. Do. No. 23 (Conway Papers), Buckingham to Conway, March 6, 1624-5 (Modern Copy). Munich Reichs., 30 J.K.A. 190, Queen of Bohemia to Count de la Tour, Hague, 14-24 January, 1624-5. Mantua ib., Striggi to Duke, Madrid, April 15, 1625.*]

The Duke, however, had already taken steps which made a war between England and Spain inevitable. The English fleet was being fitted for sea with such haste as could be made when everything necessary for such an undertaking was lacking in the dockyards, and three Hamburg ships laden with naval stores for Spain which had sought safety from the Dutch cruisers in the Thames were placed under an embargo to transport troops to Mansfeldt. [*London, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 183, No. 4, Conway to Buckingham, Feb. 2, 1624-5. Munich Reichsarch., 30 J.K.A. 190.. Newsletter, London, 7 February, 1625.*] At last the Infanta lost patience. She sent orders to Bruneau to inform James that as he had broken the Treaty of 1604 by allowing the levies to be made for Mansfeldt, she would not carry out her engagement to give him back Frankenthal. Philip who was naturally anxious to know the object of the English naval preparations, requested her to ascertain it, so that he might be able to take measures to resist an attack, if one was intended upon Spain. [*Brussels ib., Etat et Guerre 192. Infanta to Philip IV., March 11. Philip IV. to Infanta, March 30, 1625.*]

Mansfeldt, in the meantime, had sailed from Walcheren with his sixteen thousand infantry for the mainland and landed them at Raamsdonk, two and a half leagues from Breda, whilst he himself remained at Gertruydenberg to await the arrival of the French cavalry which was detained by contrary winds. The weather was terribly severe. Snow was lying deep on the ground, and there was a very hard frost. In England the oyster beds in the

Swale were destroyed by the cold. A large number of Mansfeldt's reinforcements were held up by the ice in the Ooster Scheldt, and owing to the carelessness of their officers, suffered terrible privations. Five thousand of them were billeted in Walcheren, and crowded to the doors all the Town Halls, Churches and empty houses in the island. The province of Zeeland supplied them with straw and fuel, and the charitable burghers opened soup kitchens from which they received large rations of good pottage twice a day. The inns were full of sick, many of whom were in danger of losing their limbs by frost-bite. "They are very fine men, but very poorly turned out as to clothes. They will dwindle away very much before they can be employed and there will be many desertions ere the winter is over." Experience was teaching the Dutch how hopeless it was to rely upon reinforcements from across the seas and what they had lost in losing that storehouse of mercenary soldiers, Germany. [*Reigersborch* op. cit., pp. 21-23. *Reigersborch* to Grotius, March 3, 1625. *Brussels* ib. *Etat et Guerre* 192. *Infanta* to Philip IV., March 11, 1625. *Hist. MSS., Com. Rep., Rochester*, p. 164. *Münch* op. cit., pp. 162-164. *Mantua* ib., *Priandi* to Duke, March 7, 1624.]

The Spaniards, however, were paying dearly enough for the Emperor's help. There were numbers of Croats amongst the German troops who were lying round Brussels, and these wild horsemen made little distinction between friend and foe. They were plundering all Brabant, and the French frontier was strongly held against their inroads. Should war break out between Spain and France Pappenheim proposed to join the Spanish forces with fresh swarms of freebooters. [*Mantua* ib., *Priandi* to Duke, March 7, 1625. *Brussels* ib., *Etat et Guerre* 192, *Infanta* to Philip IV., March 24, Philip IV. to *Infanta*, March 30, 1625.]

Despite Mansfeldt's arrival Spinola was pressing forward the siege. Both the Spaniards and the Dutch were fighting more with water than with steel. The Dutch engineers had laid the whole country under water, but the Spaniards on the other hand had battered down the sluices by which the besieged kept it out of the town, and for a moment, it was thought, would flood them out. The ravages of the plague had greatly reduced the population, and it was said that large quantities of stores had been found in the houses devastated by the sickness. There were still said rumour, good supplies of corn, honey, oil and stock fish, a few cows, and seven hundred horses which could be salted down when

the forage ran out. It was given out that Breda could hold out for six months longer. Spinola's men, on the other hand, were suffering severely. No grain could be imported from France, and the export of provisions had been prohibited by both England and the United Provinces. Even the trade in fresh fish was laid under an embargo. Prices, however, had risen far above the usual rates in the United Provinces where wheat alone was cheap.

Shrewd observers believed that Breda would soon be forced to yield by hunger and want. [*Reigersborch* op. cit., pp. 21-23. *Reigersborch* to Grotius, March 3, 1625, let. cit. *Munich*, Reichsarch, 30 J.K.A., 190, Brussels, 15 January, 1625. *Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, March 7, 1625. *London*, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 185, No. 103. Lord Grandison to Sir Thos. Roe, March 24, 1624-5. *Munich* op. cit., pp. 159-164.] Yet good rye bread was being sold in the town at the rate of five pounds for six stuyvers [7½d.] whilst rations of oatmeal, stock-fish, honey and oil were distributed weekly [*Reigersborch* op. cit., pp. 21-23. *Reigersborch* to Groot, March 3, 1625 let cit.] The finances of the United Provinces were in the greatest disorder. They had sustained a great loss owing to the suspension of the system of licenses for trading with the enemy; the provinces paid in their quotas most irregularly; the interest upon the debt could only be met with the greatest difficulty, and it might be apprehended that the fall of Breda would be the signal for the ruin of the credit of the State. The expenses for the fleet and for the relief of the city were constantly growing, yet the pay of the captains and contractors was more in arrear than it had ever been during the war. But for the subsidies from abroad the Dutch could not have held out. Maurice was very ill, for he had fallen sick of a galloping consumption, but still continued to toil at his desk. England was grumbling about Amboyna, and France was pre-occupied with her troubles at home, where Soubise had risen in revolt and had carried off some ships-of-war from the Breton Port of Blavet in order to force the King to hand over Fort St. Louis to the Rochellers. Well might *Reigersborch* write that he was living through the most anxious time in his whole life. "Man's wisdom stands still and we see many tokens of God's wrath against us." [*Reigersborch* op. cit., pp. 21, 23, 25. R. to Grotius, March 3, 11, 1625. *Bassompierre* op. cit., Vol. III., pp. 199-200. *London*, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 184, No. 49 (Conway Papers).

Conway to Buckingham, 27 February, 1625. *Munich*, Reichsarch, 30 J.K.A., 190, Brussels, 6 Feb., 1625. *Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, Feb. 7, 1625.]

Nor was the position of affairs more happy in Spain and in the Obedient Provinces. Sickness was rife in Spinola's camp, but even the Spanish historians pay a tribute to the good work done in the hospitals by the German women and girls who followed his army. Forage was fearfully scarce. The pay of the soldiers was so much in arrears that the higher officers agreed to serve for nothing so that a small sum might be doled out to the privates. Tilly's troopers, who were on their march from Westphalia had mutinied at Maestricht and had seized the city as a security for the payment of their arrears. The burghers, however, rose in arms and speedily expelled them. [*Reigersborch* op. cit., pp. 23-24 *Reigersborch* to Grotius, March 3, 1625 let. cit. *Münch* op. cit., pp. 164-166. *Brussels* ib., *Etat et Guerre* 192. Infanta to Philip IV., March 24. Do. No. 193. Do. to do., April 24, 1625.]

The Spanish money market was so drained of bullion by the large payments which had to be made in Flanders, in Germany, and in Italy that gold was at a premium of twenty-six per cent., whilst a hundred silver reals passed for a hundred and twenty-six copper reals and the foreign exchanges were heavily against Spain. No payments were made by the Treasury unless at a discount of from twenty-five to thirty-three per cent.

The winter had been open until the beginning of March, when so much snow fell in Castile that Madrid was almost like a besieged town, for the roads were blocked and the horses which usually brought in the bread could not traverse them. "There has been so much distress that amongst others, two knights of one of the Military Orders came one night to my house-steward to ask him if he could give them two loaves." The snow was followed by three days of excessive cold and fearful winds, which raged over Western Europe, destroyed the dam which the garrison of Breda was building at the outlet of the city, and wrought great devastation amongst the vessels of the fleet in which Halberstadt was conveying the French cavalry from Calais to join Mansfeldt's forces. Halberstadt reached Gertruydenberg at the middle of March, and work was again commenced on the dam, which was to close the mouth of the Marck, but the attempt was doomed to failure. Had these storms and floods occurred but two months before, the Spaniards believed that they must have been forced

to raise the siege. [*Münch*, op. cit., pp. 164-166. *Mantua*, ib., Priandi to Duke, March 7, 14, 1625. Striggi to Duke, Feb. 20, 1625. *Turin*, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, March 6, 1625. *Brussels*, ib., *Etat. et Guerre*, 192, Infanta to Philip IV., March 24, 1625.]

Maurice, ill as he was, was determined to take the field at the beginning of April, and had collected forty thousand foot and a large number of horse at Dort, where they were placed under the command of his brother Frederick Henry. Spinola, who was always in fear of a diversion against his own fortresses, at once hurriedly reinforced Bois le Duc, Wesel, and Rheinberg, which were really in some danger. He had succeeded in buying over the messenger who carried the correspondence between Maurice and Justinus of Nassau and ascertained from these letters that Breda could not hold out. He therefore sent a trumpet to the Governor to point out the uselessness of further resistance, but as the number of the inhabitants had been greatly diminished by the plague, so that supplies could last longer than had been supposed, the Council of War refused to surrender. [*Münch*, op. cit., pp. 166-168.]

In Brazil the Dutch held Bahia with a large force and the West India Company was fitting out a strong expedition to reinforce them and thus enable them to attack Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro.

All the dockyards of France and England were busy with naval preparations, and it might well be feared that their fleets might attack Spain both in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean and that the Dutch, if not the Barbary Corsairs, might give them their assistance.

The Italian princes were arming, and though the French Government was still nominally neutral, Savoy and Venice were conspiring with Lesdiguières, who acted almost as if his Government of Dauphiny was an independent state, to attack Milan and Genoa. [*London*, S.P.O., S.P. Dom., Jas. I., Vol. 185, No. 103, Lord Grandison to Sir T. Roe, March 24, 1625, let. cit. *Mantua* ib., Striggi to Duke, Madrid, Jan. 3, Feb. 2, 4, March 1, 16, 25, Priandi to Duke, March 7, 14, April 26, 1625. *Munich*, Reichsarch, 30, J.K.A., 190, Father Hyacinth to Privy Councillor Guglielmo, Rome, Jan. 4, 1625, Brussels, Feb. 6, 1625. *Brussels*, b., *Etat et Guerre*, 192, Philip IV. to Infanta, March 30, 1625. *Reigersborch*, op. cit., pp. 12, 14, Reigersborch to Groot, Jan. 21, 16, 25, let. cit.]

Olivares saw the necessity for making some efforts to break up the League against Spain. He renewed the offers which he had made to France in the previous year, that if a marriage could be arranged between Henrietta Maria and the Infanta D. Carlos, Belgium should be given to the bridegroom as an independent state, and even hinted that he might be made the heir to the Crown of Spain. When he saw that these offers produced no effect, he proposed to send ambassadors to Italy to canvass the various states and to ascertain whose friendship he might count upon. [*Mantua*, ib., Striggi to Duke, Feb. 4, 1625, let. cit.]

With Savoy he assumed another tone. Threats and braggadocio might, he thought, have their effects upon the amiable Tarantaise, who depended largely for his daily bread upon the goodwill of the Genoese bankers, and who might be relied upon to convey to his master anything which Olivares wished him to know. Accordingly he invited the good archbishop to the Palace and whilst strolling up and down with him in the great gallery which had been the scene of the fateful quarrel between Buckingham and the Papal Nuncio, he proceeded to unbosom himself to him with engaging frankness. With the utmost truthfulness he assured him that Philip's one desire was to promote the public weal of all Christendom at whatever sacrifices to himself, and without the slightest thought of his own interest unless it was in the strictest accordance with what was just. Nor was his policy the outcome of any sense of his own weakness. Never in all history had any kingdom had upon foot at the same time such powerful armies and such powerful fleets. The Archbishop knew what sort of an expedition they were sending to Brazil, and what forces they had in Flanders, nor could he be ignorant that Lombardy was very strongly held, and that reinforcements were arriving there every day. All their frontier and coast fortresses were in a thorough state of defence, and they had forty galleons in reserve to reinforce their fleet when it returned from America. [*Turin*, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, March 29, 1625. *Mantua*, ib., Striggi to Duke, March 1, 1625.]

Tarantaise duly forwarded all particulars of these interesting confidences to Charles Emmanuel, and did not fail to point out that if the Spaniards were successful in relieving Brazil and in taking Breda they would be able to act on the offensive against France, Venice, and Savoy, whilst their armies in Flanders and in Lombardy were in the pink of condition. He thought, there-

fore, that "if any noble action is to be performed, the sooner it is taken in hand the more will come of it." In other words, if Charles Emmanuel wished to make an utterly unprovoked attack upon Genoa or upon Milan, it would be well for him to arrange to do so at once.

Possibly he thought that Spain had already furnished Savoy with ample justification for a rupture. They were threatening that if Savoy sent a single man against Lombardy, they would attack Villefranche with all the galleys they could scrape together, and they were already endeavouring to buy over the governors of that place and of the Castle and Harbour of Nice so that they might, in the event of being attacked, surrender without firing a shot. [*Turin, ib., Tarantaise to Duke, March 29, April 7, 1625.*]

If, however, Savoy was to move against Spain, she could only do so with the help of French troops, and the experience of the past showed that France when co-operating with Savoy was apt to look upon the Duchy rather as a vassal than as an ally.

To prevent the disputes which must inevitably arise between Charles Emmanuel and the French commanders, Tarantaise offered a suggestion which might well succeed in accomplishing his immediate object, but which, if acted upon, would almost certainly bring down upon his master the wrath of Spain and grievously offend both the Emperor and the Pope.

Charles Emmanuel had endeavoured during the Civil Wars in France to acquire a Kingdom in Provence, and was also one of the claimants to that Realm of Cyprus, which figured amongst the titles of so many European sovereigns, and was even inscribed upon the coffin-plate of our own Queen Elizabeth. It appeared to Tarantaise that if his master would assume the title either of King of Cyprus or of the Allobroges, the Celtic tribe who in Cæsar's day had occupied Savoy, or of the Cottian Alps, he would be the undisputed superior of anyone commanding a French army acting with his own in Italy, unless Louis XIII. took the field in person. He urged that his master, if he could secure the assent of Lesdiguières, should have himself proclaimed King, as Hugo Capet and Henry of Burgundy, the first Kings of France and Portugal, had been by the acclamations of his soldiers, and should thus avoid the necessity of asking for the approval of either the Emperor or the Pope, to whom alone the right of conferring the regal dignity belonged. In short, the Duke of Savoy was

to act, as Henry VIII. had done, when, to make his breach with the Roman See and Roman Empire irrevocable, he assumed the title of King of Ireland without the consent of either Charles V. or Clement VII.

But it would be impossible for Charles Emmanuel to follow Henry the Eighth's example, unless with Lesdiguières' approval and Lesdiguières, as Governor of Dauphiny, had no reason to wish to strengthen Savoy which was still hankering to recover its lost possessions on the French side of the Alps, and may also have remembered that Geneva was described in Cæsar's Commentaries as the last town of the Allobroges on the side of Helvetia. The very fact that Tarantaise had put forward such a proposal was sufficient to make him reluctant to co-operate cordially with the would be King.

But whilst Tarantaise was dreaming of enrolling his master amongst the anointed sovereigns of Europe, two of the most distinguished of European rulers were lying upon their deathbeds.

James the First had long been ailing. Fits of the gout which prevented him from taking his usual exercise and copious draughts of Greek wine had made a worn out old man of him at fifty-eight, and neither the Stewarts nor the Guises were as families long lived. All through the winter he had been greatly troubled by the political situation. James had never renounced his hopes of an alliance with Spain, and not only had he received messages from Gondomar with pleasure, but had submitted plans for a settlement in Germany to Ossuna. Politicians said that Gondomar was to return to London with fresh overtures from Spain. It was indeed rumoured in Holland that Carleton, the zealous supporter of the Queen of Bohemia had been recalled from his embassy and that Buckingham was losing his credit, because he had been too forward in supporting Mansfeldt. He still retained the Prince's friendship. [Cf. *supra* and *Mantua* ib. Striggi to Duke, April 17, 1625. *Reigersborch* op. cit., pp. 31-34. *Reigersborch* to Grotius, March 18, 1625.] In any case Louis XIII. took the alarm, and late in March sent to say that he would have Henrietta Maria's wedding celebrated within thirty days, the only reason of the delay being that they wished to receive a reply on the subject from Rome, but that they were determined to carry through the marriage whatever His Holiness might think. Scarcely had this message reached London than James, who was at Theobald's, fell ill of an ague, and on the afternoon of March 25, it was known in

London that he was on his death bed. Early on March 27 the King "passed," as the Infanta wrote "to another life." Before he expired he declared to his Council that he died a Protestant, and he exhorted his son to remain true to his Religion. [*Munich Geh. St. Arch.*, 486-23. Lorenzo Stefani to Elector, London, 18-28 March, 1625. *Brussels ib.*, Etat et Guerre 132. Bruneau to Spinola, London, 4 April, 1625. Do., No. 193, Infanta to Philip IV., April 24, 1625. *Reigersborch op. cit.*, pp. 40-42. Reigersborch to Grotius, 29 April, 1625. *M. A. Green op. cit.*, p. 241, Note 5, quoting S. P. Dom., Jas. I., No. —, J. Chamberlain to Queen of Bohemia, 27 March, 1625.]

His death was received with satisfaction in Holland where he was not looked upon as a friend, but was felt very bitterly at Madrid, as he was thought to be less warlike and more favourable to Spain than was his successor. The Court went into mourning and the entertainments which had been arranged at Aranjuez were abandoned. [*Reigersborch op. cit.*, pp. 37-38. Reigersborch to Grotius, 14 April, 1625. *Turin ib.*, Tarantaise to Duke, May 4, 1625.]

The body was brought to Denmark House, as Somerset House was then called, attended by the Privy Councillors and his whole household, who were then dismissed by the new King to their homes. [*Brussels ib.*, Etat et Guerre 132, Van Male to Spinola, April 19, 1625.]

From Denmark House it was conveyed to Westminster and was laid to rest with great solemnity in the Chapel of Henry VII., the ancestor from whom he had inherited the English Crown. He had almost at the commencement of his reign transferred to its vaults the remains of his mother from Peterborough Cathedral.

There is little good, perhaps, to be said of James the First. His one thought was Self Preservation. All through his life he had been forced to fight for his own hand, and his early training left its impress upon him to the end. To secure the Crown of England he had been the willing slave of Elizabeth, and had not only done nothing to secure his mother's life or liberty, but had repressed his natural longing to come to terms with the Pope, although he greatly relied upon the help of the Catholics to assure his peaceable succession to her throne. His long negotiations with Spain were chiefly directed to the same end, namely to paralyse any attempts to throw off his authority on the part of the supporters of Freedom of Religion and of Parliamentary control of the

Royal Power. His proneness to rely upon his favourites was doubtless the outcome of the severity with which he had been treated by those about him during his early life, but he was equally inconstant with regard to such advisers as he was in his dealings with regard to Religion. That he died a Protestant was due to his pusillanimity and to his vanity. He had feared to defy the popular element in his Parliament by allying himself openly with the Catholics. He was unwilling to acknowledge the supremacy of the Pope in the sense in which that supremacy was understood by the ultramontane theologians. Charles the Fifth had displayed much the same mental attitude on more than one occasion during his reign.

As a politician James the First was a partisan of the "Golden Mean." He wished to hold the balance in Europe both in Church and State. His instructions to Charles to bring the beauties of the Anglican ceremonial before the eyes of the Madrid courtiers were dictated by the same impulses as those which led him to coquette with Savoy with Venice with the Swiss Cantons and with the Palatine in a vain attempt to group the central European States into a system which would be strong enough to hold in check the ambitions both of Spain and of Austria. His failure was due mainly to the fact that he was unable to conciliate Maximilian of Bavaria, and that he had not at his disposal the material means to bring about the ends at which his diplomacy was aiming. At the same time he recognized that the commercial ambitions of the Dutch Republic were far more dangerous to English interests than was the policy of a Spain which was fast renouncing all ideas of a missionary propaganda and of territorial expansion. He was justified, therefore in endeavouring to come to an understanding with Spain which would have done much to secure a tranquil existence for his dynasty at home, and he cannot be blamed for a failure which was due to factors over which neither Spain nor England had any control. It must always be remembered to his credit that he set his face sternly against the idea of a religious war. He saw clearly that the time had come when political and economic interests rather than disputes about theology were the guiding principles in international relations, although he did not, perhaps, see that the same principle was beginning to prevail in internal politics. Unfortunately for himself James by his trimmings and indecisive policy had made himself distrusted by every statesman in Europe, as has

been the fate since his days of more than one monarch who made the "golden mean" his guiding star. We cannot blame him for his failure to foresee the rise of France as an aggressive world power.

Of his policy at home we need say but little. His efforts to make himself at least in a limited sense an absolute ruler may have been the outcome of the experiences of his youth, though, it is true, in another country, which had shown him how necessary it was to strengthen the power of the sovereign. His position was identical with that of his contemporaries. For Ferdinand II., for Louis XIII., even for Philip IV. the chief problem was how they were to consolidate the central government which had been shaken by an age of disruption and of civil war. Probably James had the easiest task to face for the feudal system had passed away in England under the rule of the Tudors, but he did not see that the changes which followed the Reformation had produced far less effect upon English society than they had done elsewhere, nor did he recognize the fact that it was possible for him to use the English Parliament as the support but not as the blind instrument of the monarchy. It was owing to his own extravagance that he allowed Parliament to become his rival. Had he been as good an economist as his predecessor he might easily have dispensed in a great measure with their services, and thus have allowed their powers to fall gradually into oblivion. He would have lost little by losing their counsels as to his policy abroad.

In one respect, however, James the First, unconsciously to himself, has proved to be a benefactor to the world. The Thirty Years War was in a great measure the outcome of his diplomacy, and it was thanks to that war that the bankers and manufacturers of Germany lost their hold upon Europe, and thus allowed France and England the opportunity of developing as civilizing and colonizing powers. Individualism and an organization which was brought into being by reasoned discussion have done far more for humanity than the cast-iron mentality of Germany could ever have achieved. The greatness of England as a commercial power dates from the day when Elizabeth stripped the merchants of the Hansa of the privileges which for centuries had made them the masters of the sources of English prosperity. When Gustaf Adolf led his armies into the Rhineland and into Southern Germany he struck with their deathblow those great financial houses of Nuremberg, of Augsburg and of Frank-

fort, without whose aid the bankers of Genoa and of Antwerp could not have upheld the tottering power of Spain. With their ruin the traders of Amsterdam in whose blood the hatred of Spain was inborn became the financial masters of the world. Holland, however, had neither the territory, nor the population to support such a burden. When she was reeling under the onslaught of her commercial rival England, France for a moment aspired to take her place, but her efforts were paralyzed by the religious fanaticism of her rulers. Thus the field was left open to England and to the nations which sprung from the English stock, until time had once more renewed the natural force of Germany and she flung her glove into the arena from which she had crept away a bleeding wreck two hundred and fifty years before and challenged France and England, not now rivals but allies, to deadly combat for the mastery of the world. [For the relations between Elizabeth and the Hansa. Cf. Tar. Colvin, "The Germans in England" (London, 1915).]

But whilst James the First was lying in state at Denmark House, Maurice of Orange was gasping out his life in the Hague.

The Prince had been ailing all through the winter, but he had never for a moment abandoned his hope that, in the spring, he would be able to take the field with his army to relieve Breda. By the middle of March, however, those about him saw that it was very unlikely that he would live long. He suffered greatly from sleeplessness and from want of appetite and grew gradually weaker. Many thought that his illness was caused by his disappointment at the constant failure of his military undertakings, though others attributed it to flying gout. [*Reigersborch* op. cit., pp. 31-34, *Reigersborch* to Grotius, March 18. Do., pp. 35-36. Do. to do., March 25, 1625. *Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, March 7, 1625.]

Ill as he was he continued to toil on at his desk and the constant work weakened him yet more. His understanding was, however, still very vigorous, he showed great courage, and was frequently closeted for hours with Wakeus a professor of Theology at Leyden. The news from Breda proved to be unexpectedly good. So much had the population been reduced by the plague, that the supplies were holding out well, the garrison was in high spirits, and there was no immediate necessity for sending a relieving expedition. For a moment it was thought that the Prince was convalescent, and his brother Frederick Henry, who was now

general-in-chief of the Dutch forces, was able to celebrate his marriage with Countess Amelia of Solms, a lady of one of the noblest families of Germany, and an attendant on the Queen of Bohemia under whose care she had been brought up. Maurice himself had arranged this marriage through which Frederick Henry was to become the ancestor of William the Third, the last representative of William the Silent in the male line. At that time the House of Nassau did not rank amongst the Royal Families of Europe. Even the punctilious Philip III. had thought it possible that Maurice might be willing to accept a principality in Naples. [*Reigersborch* op. cit., pp. 35-36, *Reigersborch* to Grotius, March 25, let. cit., Do. pp. 37-38. Do. to do., 14 April, 1625. *Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, April 15, 1645. *M. A. Green* op. cit., p. 241.]

His brother's marriage was the last public ceremony at which Maurice was present. He took to his bed, and called in six doctors who pronounced that he could not recover except by a miracle. From that moment he grew weaker and weaker, he had frequent and prolonged fainting fits, and gradually "flickered out." The end came on Wednesday, April 23, when he expired between five and six in the afternoon.

Two days afterwards the Prince's body was opened by the doctors. His liver and lungs had perished, and there was not a drop of blood in his veins. The corpse was embalmed, was dressed in splendid robes and was served by his attendants with all the wonted ceremony. It was placed on a chair of state and the whole Court defiled past it, as had been the custom in Bavarian and Burgundian days. He was followed to his grave, beside his father's at Delft, by Frederick Henry, and by the King and Prince of Bohemia. The funeral was postponed until the twentieth of September.

His death occasioned no changes in public affairs though it affected the interests of many private persons. All Holland was "awaiting in patience what God shall give."

Frederick Henry, who had hastened from his camp at Waalwijk to be present at his brother's death-bed, succeeded him both in his property and in his offices, but he did not enjoy the same prestige and influence, for these could only be acquired by a long period of public service. In Paris it was thought that the death of such an experienced general had greatly diminished the chances of relieving Breda. The Doge of Venice when he heard the news

exclaimed "The valiant captain of the world is dead." Splendid services were celebrated in his memory both in Breda and in the camp between Gorkum and Heusden to which Frederick Henry had hastened from the Hague. Whilst they were in progress the vigilance of the outposts was in some degree relaxed and many Flemings and Brabanters who were weary of the long campaign ran away to their homes. On both sides there was a feeling that things must soon end one way or the other. [*Münch* op. cit., pp. 160-174. *Reigersborch* op. cit., pp. 37-43. Reigersborch to Grotius, April 14 let. cit., 21, 29, 1625. *Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, May 7. Striggi to Duke, May 2, 1625. *M. A. Green* op. cit., p. 241. Van der Kemp op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 164-169.]

In Maurice of Nassau his country had lost one of the greatest statesmen and greatest generals who are to be found in the history of the Netherlands.

He had had a hard life task to carry through, but he had had his reward. At his father's death he had been called to take upon his youthful shoulders the government of a state threatened from without by a powerful foe from within by disunion, and which was so little capable of standing alone that it was only anxious to shelter itself under the wing of some stronger neighbour. The independence of the Netherlands is to be traced in the main to the ineptitude of the French candidate for their throne and to the unwillingness of Elizabeth to cripple the financial resources of England for the sake of territorial gains abroad. It could not have been brought about save by Maurice. Carleton, his professed admirer, well described him as a "Prince in word and deed" who was endowed with singular prudence in both civil and military affairs and who was thoroughly acquainted with the politics both of the Netherlands and of foreign nations. "The services he has rendered to them had always been guided by two leading principles," the first of which was "the maintenance of the Reformed Religion in its purity, the second the continuance of the war with Spain," for as he often used to point out in his familiar discourse "the maintenance of the State depended solely from these two maxims." It cannot be denied that Carleton's statements are borne out by the facts of the case. [*V. d. Kemp* op. cit., Vol. IV., p. 175 and Note 516, quoting Carleton's speech of condolence to the States General, April 30, 1625.]

The union of the seven United Provinces was the outcome of the war with Spain, and that war, although it was not in its origin

wholly a war in the interests of liberty of Religion, was for a long time carried on chiefly by a handful of men who found their strength in their religious zeal. It was not until the conflict had been raging for thirty years that the Dutch entered upon commercial enterprises which led them into the regions held by Spain beyond the seas, and it is probable that they would never have engaged in those undertakings unless their shipping had been excluded from the ports of the Iberian Peninsula. But for commercial reasons the Truce of 1609 might well have continued for an indefinite period unless indeed the refusal of Spain to renounce the sovereignty of the Netherlands had produced any practical effects. On the other hand it is certain that when the immediate menace of Spanish invasion was removed the theoretical religious differences which had divided the Netherlands Reformed Church came to be mixed up with the political differences between the supporters of a Centralised Government and those of a loose confederation. Maurice favoured the Gomarists and crushed the Arminians solely in the interests of his personal influence. The same interests led him to bring about the war with Spain to which not only he owed his wealth, but which he held to be the one force which prevented the disruption of the Union of the Seven Provinces. Had Spain been willing to concede commercial privileges in the East Indies to her former subjects, and had Maurice failed to entrap her through Mme. de Tserclaes into asserting her theoretical rights of sovereignty at the most inopportune moment it is very uncertain if all Jeannin's intrigues and all the gold of France could have prevented the renewal of the twelve years' truce when it expired in 1621. Peace might well have come about at any time up to the very moment of his death. It was not until their victories in America had shown the Dutch that their strength lay in their colonial trade that the United Provinces in 1632 refused to unite with the hitherto obedient Netherlands simply because Amsterdam feared the commercial rivalry of Antwerp. Maurice in reality was the incarnation of unscrupulous diplomacy. His frankness was merely that of a man who knows that on some occasion Truth can play the part of Fiction. His policy was directed chiefly to his own ends, and it was a mere accident that it happened upon the whole to coincide with the policy which was best for his country.

It was well said of him that he was a German by birth, a

Frenchman by training, and a Netherlander by temperament, for he was always of an extremely placid disposition until in his old age he grew surly and irritable. He was a thorough man of business and was greatly loved by those whom he employed.

The States-General who could not understand his pre-occupation with military science looked upon him merely as their servant. His whole thoughts were wrapped up in his calling as a soldier, and he loved all the arts and sciences and even the games such as chess, which could be of use to him in it. He was an ardent student of natural science, and was among the first to recognise the importance of the telescope for military purposes, and to establish a Faculty of Engineering at the University of Leyden, possibly copied from the workshops which had been established by Philip II. for the students in the seminary at the Escorial. As a military engineer and as a tactician he ranked as one of the first experts of his age. As a general he was a past master in the art of choosing the positions for his camps and of fortifying his lines. He had never been forced to give battle unless it suited him to do so. The great victory at Nieuport was his chief success in a pitched battle in the field, but he had taken forty-three fortresses by surprise or by force of arms and had raised the sieges of twelve important places. Spinola himself had marvelled at the skill with which Maurice had withdrawn his forces from Meerle, and regarded him as one of his few equals as a soldier. The French Ambassador honoured him with the title of "Father of his Fatherland," but it may well be doubted whether he was not thinking of him chiefly as a useful servant of France, which all through the Seventeenth Century looked upon the obedience of the Netherlands as her due.

He died in a happy moment for himself, but in a dark hour for his country, for though thinking men saw already that the conquest of Breda would prove to be but a barren victory for Spain, many thought that its fall would be the signal for the disruption of the United Provinces. It was owing in some measure to Maurice's life work that they withstood the shock. [*V. D. Kemp*, op. cit., Vol. IV., pp. 170-176.]

CHAPTER LXX

THE army with which Frederick Henry proposed to advance to the relief of Breda consisted of forty-three thousand foot and six thousand horse amply provided with artillery and stores. Many of the infantry however were still dispersed along the frontiers. The men were healthy and well armed and paid to the minute. Frederick Henry was described even by hostile observers as a wise, courageous and cool-headed commander, who was aided by officers who had grown old in the wars under Maurice's leadership, and it seemed almost impossible that his undertaking could fail of success, if internal troubles did not arise in the Provinces. As the cities were now garrisoned by only the burgher guard, it was thought that the factions opposed to Maurice might once more raise their heads. Discipline was, on the other hand, slackening in Mansfeldt's army, which consisted of about ten or eleven thousand French, English and Germans, and it was necessary to restore order by means of severe punishments. It was uncertain whether Frederick Henry intended to advance to some point near the enemies' lines and entrench himself there, or whether he would make a diversion by laying siege to Bois-le-Duc, which had been stripped of all its stores to supply Spinola's army.

After some delay, however, he advanced to Düngen a village which lay in sight of the look-out on Breda belfry and made a violent attack upon Oosterhout, but was beaten back by its garrison of Burgundians, who held out most valiantly against superior forces.

His hesitation had given the Spaniards time to strengthen their entrenchments, and when at two in the morning on the fifteenth of May a large detachment of English advanced to attack Terheyden, they were repulsed with great loss by Carlo Rotta and the Italians. Spinola had indeed been forewarned of their intentions. Though the English ran out of ammunition they fell back in such order under a heavy fire that their conduct excited general

admiration. Lord Oxford was amongst the wounded, and a Captain Cromwell amongst the killed.

This disaster convinced Frederick Henry that any further attempt to relieve Breda was all but hopeless; he fell back upon Heusden, where he embarked his troops in barges on the Maas, but finally took up his position at Langestaat between Breda and Bois-le-Duc.

The Prince's retreat filled the besieged with despair. Whilst he was assaulting the Spanish lines they had seconded his efforts by bombarding them heavily. They had watched from their ramparts Oxford's regiment fighting hand to hand with the Neapolitans and Sardinians upon the breastwork of Terheyden Castle, whilst Nassau's blue banners mingled with the red Burgundian crosses, and the tide of battle surged to and fro until at last the English fell back before overwhelming odds. The streets of Breda were strewn with the corpses of the plague, and as the outposts were in the habit of conversing with one another, Spinola soon learnt that the place was on the point of surrender. His own army was in great straits, for a German who had stolen out in disguise from Breda, had got employment in his magazines at Ginneken and had set a large store of corn and forage on fire with a fire-ball.

He had succeeded, indeed, in perusing the letters between Frederick Henry and Justinus of Nassau. In them the Prince urged his brother to capitulate. He asked him to fire as many shots as the days for which he could still hold out and said that if he was not relieved before that time expired he must surrender. Spinola sealed up the despatches and sent them to their destination. He was, however, unaware that Justinus had received a duplicate of them on the previous day, and that he had fired eleven shots to show that he could not hold out for eleven days more. The shots had been heard in the Spanish lines; their meaning had not been understood. On receiving the signal Frederick Henry sent Gennisson to treat for a surrender. Henri de Berg, who was a kinsman of the Nassaus, was chosen by Spinola to open the negotiations. When the terms to be proposed were discussed in the Council of War, several Spanish officers demanded severe conditions. Spinola who feared to drive desperate men into a corner, brought forward favourable terms. De Berg seconded him warmly, pointing out that Maurice had always treated Spinola with good faith, and that they must

therefore show equal generosity to the Dutch. The better the terms they granted were, the greater would be the triumph of the conquerors. His proposals were adopted, but Justinus of Nassau, who still hoped to be relieved, continued to spin out the negotiations until the eleven days had expired, and did not sign the articles of surrender until the fifth of June.

The conditions were most honourable. The soldiers were allowed to march out ball in mouth with drums beating and colours flying, four pieces of cannon and some mortars. They were permitted to keep their baggage and the Prince of Orange was permitted to remove his furniture from the Castle. One of the articles was remarkable. The Marquis agreed not only to provide waggons to transport the Governor and his officers to Gertruydenberg, but also to convey all the parrots belonging to the garrison. He refused to grant the citizens the right of exercising the Protestant religion in public, but allowed them to profess it in private without molestation and gave such persons a garden as a burial ground. All who disputed about religious questions were to be banished forthwith on pain of death, others were given eighteen months within which to become Catholics or to dispose of their property and leave the place. In his proclamations he describes the Dutch not as "heretics" or "rebels," but as "persons who are opposed to the Catholic 'King.'" Tolerance must have made progress even in Spain when Calderon did not hesitate to place in the mouth of the Burgundian Barlanzon the words "No one can strip himself of his Religion." [*Vivir en su Religion Nadie quitarselo puede.*]

The soldiers were furious that they were not allowed to sack the town. To appease them the Spaniards paid over the value of their share of the expected spoil to the English, Germans and Walloons.

On the fifth of June the garrison marched out through the Bois-le-Duc gate. The road as far as Barlanzon's headquarters was lined by the Marquis' bodyguard, two Spanish and two Italian regiments. On the parade outside the gate Spinola met Justinus of Nassau who handed him his sword. He then embraced the Governor, Morgan, Hauterive, and other persons of distinction and loaded them with praises of their skill and courage, paying them almost the same honours as if they, not he, had been the victors. The garrison which was reduced to half its former number followed and after them came a train of fourteen

hundred waggons laden with the women and children and almost a third of the burghers of Breda who were headed by their preachers, clad in deep mourning. They made their way to Gertruydenberg escorted by the Spanish horse. The Dutch were so well fed and so well clad that they made the Spaniards ashamed of their own misery. Supplies of corn for thirty days were found in the granaries, and all the gardens and open spaces had been sown with vegetables.

Calderon, however, perhaps for the sake of dramatic effect, tells us of horses with their bones starting through their hides and hoofs worn to the quick, and of the hollow faces of the women which bore eloquent witness to the sufferings which the garrison had undergone before the sergeant flung out from their walls amid the blare of trumpets, the clash of kettle drums, and the joyous shouts of "Breda for the King of Spain," the lions and castles of Castile.

Such was the "Surrender of Breda," which the magic brush of Velasquez has made living for all time to mortal eyes, that last ray of glory which was to light upon the Empire of Charles the Fifth and Philip the Second ere it went down to lie by its fellows of ancient days in those grey palaces where dead Kingdoms sleep. Justinus of Nassau was a better prophet than he knew when he told Spinola that he owed his triumph not to his own skill, but to fortune who at her will can turn the proudest realms to dust. When Spinola with stately courtesy replied that the conqueror must thank the courage of the conquered for his fame, he spoke words which in many a year to come were to be addressed to the proudest soldiers and the most valiant captains of Spain. [*Calderon* op. cit., Act III. *Münch* op. cit., pp. 169, 187. *Villa* op. cit., p. 341. *Reigersborch* op. cit., pp. 37-38, *Reigersborch* Grotius, April 14, let. cit. Do., pp. 42-44. Do. to do., 29 April, pp. 49-54, 2 June, 1625. *Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, April 15, 27, May 6, 16, 24; June 6, 1625. *Munich*, Reichsarch, 30 J.K., No. 125, Roca to Croia, 29 April, let. cit., H. W. G. Düngen, May 22. Trumbull to Brussels, May 31, June 7. Carleton to Wake (?), June 2, 1625.]

To Spain her victory was but a barren honour. She had fought for a starved out town and an exhausted land. As Trumbull gleefully pointed out, the Spaniards had lost a very large number of men and expended eight millions of crowns. The revenues of the place would never pay half the interest upon their outlay. Brabant would still have to pay Contribution Money, for the

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Dutch held half the province and such fortresses as Grave, Gertruydenberg, and Bergen-op-Zoom, whilst the successes which Savoy had won over Genoa had done much to cast a shadow over the rejoicings. [*Munich Reichsarch.* H.W.G., May 22. Trumbull, May 31, 1625, *lit. cit.* *Reigersborch*, pp. 40-42. *Reigersborch* to Grotius, 21 April, 1625.]

Philip's letters to the Infanta more than prove the truth of Trumbull's statements. He forwarded to her a paper addressed to him by a Belgian nobleman, probably the Prince of Espinoy, which gave a melancholy picture of the condition of the Obedient Provinces. Belgium, said the writer, was now taxed more extortionately than it had ever been. Law and order were but memories and if the French stationed on the frontier crossed the border they would receive a joyous welcome in Artois, Hainault and Luxemburg. The foreign troops were utterly without discipline, robbed the whole countryside, and spared neither the women, the churches nor the houses of the gentry. Brabant had been drained dry by the requisitions for the army before Breda. Every province had to find the money for its militia who were serving with Spinola, and had to provide for the transport of the convoys at its own expense. Some of these convoys had been worth a hundred thousand crowns apiece. The Infanta, at the request of the Bishop of Bruges had tried to stop the requisitions for waggons in Flanders, but had been unable to do so. The provinces were doing all they could to help in the siege as they knew that His Majesty's prestige was at stake, but they were being utterly ruined by the free quarterings as well as by the levies to keep the besieging forces up to strength, and at the same time the subsidies from Spain had been cut down.

It would therefore be best to remove the bulk of the troops to the Provinces which had suffered least by the war, and which were of little use as they lay so near the enemies' quarters and were, therefore, well accustomed to support such hardships. Cleves and Juliers also might be forced to grant free quarters so as to reduce the burden upon the Obedient Provinces.

In his letter enclosing the memorial Philip said that it had been given by a person zealous for his service who had wished to point out the extortions to which his subjects were exposed. He therefore asked the Infanta to report to him on the matter as he would willingly do everything in his power to relieve them. [*Brussels ib.*, *Etat et Guerre* 193, Philip IV. to Infanta, May 25,

1625.] It was but little that the Infanta could do to alleviate the hardships which had been caused not only by the war, but by the threatening attitude of France and England. Thanks to the war between Savoy and Genoa her Italian men of business had failed. As she had no powers from Philip to mortgage the Crown Lands which were worth four hundred thousand florins, she could raise no money from that source. It was impossible to pay even the gentlemen volunteers who were the pick of the troops, and it was feared that if this became known there would be a mutiny amongst the soldiery. She owed her bankers four hundred thousand florins for anticipations on the revenue, and they were recouping themselves by discounting the bills then being paid in to cover the deficit on those falling due in December, 1624. "It is only with the greatest pains that I can scrape together a little money for the most pressing needs, and I more than fear we shall be utterly ruined." Philip had well said when he heard of Mansfeldt's arrival at Gertruydenberg, "God alone can help us now." He had already suspended the payment of all pensions to Netherlanders which had been charged upon Spain, for as he told the Infanta when she remonstrated with him for depriving many retired officers and civil servants of their bread, "he could not feed useless mouths." [*Brussels* ib., *Etat et Guerre* 193. Infanta to Philip IV., May 1, 10, 1625. Do., No. 132, Carlo Serivani to Spinola, Antwerp, April 9, 1625.]

In his anxiety the King, when he heard that Frederick Henry was advancing to relieve Breda, wrote in cypher with unusual emotion "I am longing to see how this business of yours will turn out, and only hope that Our Lord will assist us as it is His own cause." [*Brussels* ib., *Etat et Guerre* 193. Philip IV. to Infanta, May 31, 1625.] Spain itself was greatly exhausted, and it was looked upon as a significant sign that Aragon and Catalonia had offered to raise a force of twenty thousand men for the royal service at their own expense possibly because they were afraid of a French invasion. [*Turin* ib., Tarantaise to Duke, June 11, 1625. *Mantua* ib., Striggi to Duke, June 8, 1625.]

The King was doing what he could to improve his position by diplomatic means. He had submitted Tilly's proposal for an alliance between Spain, the Emperor and Bavaria to a Committee of the Council, and thought that if a settlement in Germany could not be reached by the approaching Diet, the plan might not be carried out. As Cardinal de la Cueva wrote that Frederick Henry

was much displeased, because he had not been appointed to all the posts which had been held by his brother, it would be well for the Infanta to offer him her help to acquire the sovereignty of some of the rebel provinces, on condition that he handed over some of the fortresses. If he agreed to these terms, France and England would break with him once and for all and he would be left totally dependent upon Spain. [*Brussels ib.*, Etat et Guerre 192, Philip IV. to Infanta, May 31, 1625, let. cit.]

For many weeks the burghers of Brussels had been longing for the news that the siege was over. The streets were thronged with long processions of the religious orders, and the Holy Sacrament was exposed upon the altars of the Churches. It was noted however that fewer confraternities than usual took part in these devotions although the Infanta allowed them to assemble in the Palace Chapel. [*Brussels ib.*, Etat et Guerre. 132, Ottavio Visconti to Spinola, Brussels, March 20, 1625.]

At last on May 30 a letter from Spinola arrived in which he announced that Frederick Henry had fallen back to Langestraat and next day a carrier brought the news that de Berg was to go into Breda at seven that morning to treat for the surrender, which it was hoped would take place within three or four days.

It was not, however, until the ninth of June that the Infanta could write the glad tidings to Philip. "Our Lord has been pleased to grant us a happy ending to the Breda business notwithstanding all the forces that France, England, Denmark, Holland and all the others Your Majesty knows of could bring against us. What toil, expense and danger it has cost us, but at last Your Majesty's arms have proved the victors, and your army is now in Breda and the fortress is Your Majesty's. No one can imagine how overjoyed and happy I am at our success." She enclosed a copy of the articles of surrender, and added that she was sending the despatch by Brigadier Fernando don Guzman, a cousin of Olivares, who had been an eye witness of the siege since its commencement and could give him the fullest accounts of it, as a great deal of the work had fallen on his shoulders. "I am so delighted that I am doing my best to get together all the money I can from the army and the country and am leaving with it for Breda to-morrow to relieve the soldiers who have fought so bravely in this ten months' campaign against such powerful enemies." [*Brussels ib.*, Etat et Guerre 193. Infanta to Philip IV. 9 June, 1625. Do., No. 132, Ottavio Visconti to Spinola, 31 May,

1625. *Turin* ib., Tarantaise to Duke, July 20, 1625. *Mantua* ib. Priandi to Duke, June 6, 13, 1625.] Trumbull wrote with resignation: "This is to let you know that Breda is dead, that is to say has surrendered upon honourable terms (at least the soldiers think them so)." Mansfeldt and his troops had already marched to join the King of Denmark at Bremen where another act in the long tragedy of the war was at the point of opening; the English who had fought so bravely at Terheyden had fallen back to Walwijk and were waiting to see what the next move of the enemy would be. All the bells in Brussels were pealing their loudest, the churches were resounding with the *Te Deums*, the Guilds were parading in their festal garb and joy fires were lighting up the gargoyles, the oriels, and the gables of the ancient streets and markets. "Those who are fond of a quiet life," said Trumbull "are disgusted with all these bonfires, bell ringing and such like triumphs," but he found consolation in the thought that the King of Spain had had to pay ten millions for "that miracle," and quoted with gusto the old English saying that a "Bartelmy pigling costs more than its worth." Sucking pig was the great delicacy sold at Saint Bartholomew's Fair in Smithfield. "In a word, as it would be all but impossible to recover the place, it will remain in their hands till times change." Twelve years later Frederick Henry retook Breda, and Jordaens in his turn was to adorn the Orange Hall in the House in the Wood of the Hague with a "Surrender of Breda." In Holland the tidings were not known for certain for some days as all the passages had been closed. Even as late as the second of June Carleton could write of them as a rumour. He was delighted and with good reason at the conduct of the English troops. "Our countrymen have indeed deserved high praise, both from friend and foe for the courage they have displayed though to no purpose. They have poured out their blood like water to save Breda, but all has been in vain." He sent a list of the officers and great personages who had been killed and wounded, and a picture of the entrenchments and redoubts they had tried to storm which would show his correspondent what their task had been. For once the haughty, cynical theologian-diplomatist, whose high bred face gazes at us from the staircase of his old Oxford College, Christchurch, must have been stirred to his heart's core. The rabble of hen-roost plunderers and tavern roysterers who had marched through Kent to the sound of Mansfeldt's drums, and who had been hurried

into the lines, scarce knowing how to handle pike or hackbut, had for many an hour fought hand to hand with the picked soldiers of Italy under the eyes of the picked soldiers of Castile. [*Munich*, Reichsarch, No. 125, Carleton to —, 2 June. Trumbull to —, 14 June, 1625. *Calderon* op. cit., Act III., pp. 18b-21b.]

The Minister wrote from the bedside of Lord Oxford, who had been wounded in the arm by a hackbut shot at Terheyden and had been carried to the Hague. A week later he died there in agony to the great sorrow of his countrymen, who mourned in him not only the tenth holder of the oldest of English earldoms, but a great soldier and a gallant gentleman who had not his peer in Europe. Trumbull was even more troubled by Oxford's death than he was by the loss of Breda. [*Munich*, Reichsarch, lett. citt.]

On the twelfth of June the Infanta attended by Cardinal de la Cueva, the Duke of Saxony, and a brilliant train of nobility, left Brussels to witness the ceremony of taking possession of her new conquest. The party slept at Mortsel, where they were greeted by a deputation from Antwerp, and set out again next morning for Breda, where they arrived at nine in the evening, after a fifteen hours' journey. Every village on the road from Eckeren within a league of Antwerp to the Spanish lines had been occupied by de Berg and Salazar with their cavalry, and strong detachments patrolled the country on both sides of the way. The Dutch, who had a large force of horse in Bergen-op-Zoom, had threatened to attack the travellers, but their threats came to nothing. Spinola accompanied by the Prince of Barbançon, came out two leagues from his headquarters to receive her Highness, and when she reached the lines she was welcomed with such salvoes of artillery and shoutings of the exultant soldiery that it seemed as if the earth would open. Spinola hastened on into the city and met her when she alighted from her coach at the castle gate with the Duke of Neuburg, two or three princes and a train of more than two hundred gentlemen.

The churches which were thought to have been polluted "by the feet and by the breath of the heretics" were solemnly re-consecrated.

The Infanta took up her quarters in the Castle and greatly admired its stately walks and gardens.

On the morning after her arrival mass was celebrated by Cardinal de la Cueva in the great Church of Saint Barbara, which, large as it was, was too small to contain the crowd of exulting Catholics who sought to force their way within its walls. Great was their delight as the bells rang out from the lofty belfry and the organs, which had so long been silent, swelled in accompaniment of the hymns of victory. Then, as now, the great majority of the population of North Brabant adhered to the older faith. In the afternoon another general salute was fired; in the evening the streets, the walls, and the besiegers' lines were ablaze with bonfires.

The Infanta and Spinola exchanged well deserved compliments with one another in classic taste.

An arch of triumph had been erected at the gate by which Isabella entered the city with the inscription in golden letters, "Philip the King of Spain with the Infanta Clara Isabella Eugenia as his viceroy and Spinola as his general is now lord of Breda, though four Kings took counsel together against him in vain." ["*Philippus Hispanice Rex, Gubernante Isabella Clara Eugenia Infanta, Obsidente Spinola, Quatnor regibus frustra coniurantibus, Breda victor potitur.*"]

In her turn the Infanta set up a monument in the church inscribed with the words: "Breda fell through the generalship of Ambrose Spinola." ["*Ambrosie Spinole vigilantia Breda expugnata.*"]

On the following day the Infanta visited the quarters of the besiegers, and paid many compliments to Carlo Rotta, the Italian brigadier, who had driven back the English in their attack upon Terheyden. She distributed clothes, shirts and a donation of 250,000 crowns which she had brought with her amongst the soldiers, who hailed her with shouts of delight. The French indeed hinted that her visit was one rather of business than of pleasure, for but for her doles it was probable that there might have been a general mutiny. Her amiability and kindness had greatly pleased the burghers of Breda, and it was thought that those who had fled from the town would soon come back.

On the fifteenth Spinola gave a splendid dinner to the Duke of Aerschot, who was a grandee of Spain, D. Luis of Portugal, the Dukes of Neuburg and of Saxony, several generals, and the deputies of Brussels who, to the surprise of the Spaniards, he invited to his own table. He also defrayed all the expenses of

the Court during their residence at Breda. With his usual modesty he had been unwilling to allow any monument to be erected in his honour, but he could not but yield to the Infanta's pressing request.

Spinola had already taken steps to ensure the security of his new conquest, and had sent urgent requisitions for a supply of provisions for a year, and of four thousand waggons to the States of Flanders and Brabant, but these provinces were so exhausted that they were unable to furnish them. M. de Barbanson was made governor of the place which was garrisoned with four thousand men, whilst those soldiers who were utterly worn out were quartered in the surrounding villages to refresh themselves. The demolition of the besiegers' lines was at once begun, and detachments were sent to guard the lines of communication with Lierre and Antwerp.

"To God be thanks and praise," wrote an exultant courtier who had visited Breda in the Infanta's train, for I see more and more every day what a miracle it was that we should have taken such a strong, noble and beautiful city. Its garden and citadel are fit for a King and Her Highness would be delighted if she could live here instead of at Brussels."

Frederick Henry had sent a message to the Infanta before she entered Breda that he hoped that she would make use of all his plate and furniture in the castle, and she accordingly ordered it to be placed in her own apartment. On her departure she sent to thank him for his kindness and to say that he might remove his plate whenever he pleased to do so. The Prince, however, sent a person of position to compliment Her Highness and to say that he hoped she would accept the furniture as since she had honoured him by using it upon such a great occasion, it did not seem right that it should ever belong to any other owner. The Infanta accepted his offer with great pleasure and had the presents removed to Brussels, whence she returned in the middle of July. [*Villa* op. cit., pp. 431-443, quoting "The Entry of the Most Serene Lady Infanta D. Isabella into the City of Breda." Seville, 1625 (a letter from a Spanish gentleman dated 20 June, 1625). *Relacion verdadera de las Treguas*, etc. (Seville, 1625). *Mantua* ib., Priandi to Duke, June 13, 21, July 1, 18, 1625. *Munich*, Reichsarch, 30 J.K., No. 125, John Gordon, Brussels, 5 July, 1625. *Rubens* (ed. Rooses) op. cit., Vol. III., p. 369. Rubens to Valavez, 12 June, 1625.]

The Pope, much as he hated the Spaniards, could not but congratulate the man who had won such a signal triumph for the Faith. Urban the Eighth accordingly addressed a Brief to Spinola couched in the most glowing terms. He celebrated in him both the victorious general and the glory of their common Italian fatherland. The palms which crowned his brow had been watered with the blood of heretics. Heaven itself triumphed in his deeds. In vain the Dutch had turned aside the rivers and hurled their indignant waters against his lines. "The favour of the Almighty and the constancy of thy stout heart have baffled all their designs." [*Villa op. cit.*, p. 432. Brief of Urban VIII. to Spinola, August 9, 1625.]

To the great delight of the Infanta who thanked her nephew as warmly as if he had bestowed the honour upon herself, Philip conferred upon Spinola a Commandery of Castile, which brought in about fourteen thousand ducats a year. [*Villa op. cit.*, p. 439. Arch. Sim. Estado leg. 2375. Infanta to Philip IV., August 6, 1625. *Turin ib.*, Tarantaise to Duke, July 20, 1625.]

Forty pieces of artillery, one hundred and fifty thousand pounds of powder, six thousand muskets, and other military stores fell into the hands of the victors. [*Villa op. cit.*, pp. 434-438.]

Great were the rejoicings at Madrid when on the fourteenth of June the longed for news arrived of the Surrender of Breda. The streets were illuminated. Next morning a "Te Deum" was sung in the Palace Chapel, the Queen went to Our Lady of Atocha, and Olivares with a glittering train of grandees and gentlemen rode in state through the town and Prado to show his joy. All the Ambassadors except those of France and Venice went to congratulate the King and the Minister, and when a few hours later Guzman arrived with despatches from the Infanta, dated from Breda Castle, he was offered as his reward either the Captaincy of the Castel Nuovo at Naples or the command of the cavalry in the Milanese. By a curious coincidence Queen Elizabeth of Portugal, the Infanta's namesake, had just been canonized at Rome, and a procession marched in her honour through streets decked with tapestries and ornamented with altars. Bull fights were held in the Plaza Mayor; the King himself took part in a public masquerade. [*Turin op. cit.*, Tarantaise to Duke, July 20, 1625. *Mantua ib.*, Striggi to Duke, July 16, 1625.] Olivares in his letters to Coloma for once laid aside his usual reserve. His joy, he wrote, was enhanced by the thought that the risks which they had run

had gained them a success far beyond their fondest hopes. "His Majesty (God save him) has those who have served him in this at all times very present to his mind, and as one who knows him so well, I can assure you that his intention is to reward all of them even down to the most friendless and tattered soldier in your army, and that it would give him the greatest pleasure if those set over them would honour and encourage them and bear their services in mind, and I am looking to this with such special goodwill that my offices both in the Netherlands and here will not be a disadvantage to them." Olivares adds a postscript in his own hand, "My Good Lord, Courage and may God's enemies once more fear and dread us." [*Villa op. cit.*, pp. 434-439. Olivares to Coloma, July 5, 1625.]

Scarcely had the Count laid down his pen, when fresh tidings of victory reached the Palace. At two o'clock on the same afternoon, July the fifth, the official despatches arrived announcing that on Saint Philip and Saint James' Day, the first of May, D. Fadrique de Toledo had completed the recovery of Brazil. The Spanish fleet had arrived off Bahia at the beginning of April, and had at once proceeded to bombard the fortress. The garrison had received ample warning of its danger and had supplies for sixteen hundred men for a year, but it was known that the reinforcements which were on their way from Holland could not arrive before the beginning of May. After a short resistance the place surrendered, and on the fifth of April Mass was once more said in the Cathedral from which the bodies of the heretics who had been interred there during the Dutch occupation had been previously removed. Within the next three weeks the whole province once more passed into Spanish hands.

Nor was this the only good news which cheered Philip's heart during the first days of July. He learnt that the Emperor had concluded a truce with the Turks, that Mansfeldt was being deserted by his followers and that Feria had taken Acqui from the Duke of Savoy. The Spaniards might well hope that peace was in sight and that they might once for all put an end to all causes of trouble in Italy.

"Your Highness," wrote Tarantaise "should reflect how great the vicissitudes of this world are for six months ago all the elements seemed to be uniting to bring this Monarchy to ruin, and now they seem inclined to favour everything they do, and all the winds are wafting them on their way."

Both Olivares and the King showed the same moderation in the hour of victory as in the hour of disaster. "Blessed be God who is thus defending his own cause. But all these successes oblige us to stand more than ever upon our guard. It is true that they hit the enemy hard, but they do not cow them. They only irritate them." Philip in his letter to announce the surrender of Bahia to the Infanta, said "Your Highness must join with me in giving thanks to God for these great mercies, for we had never dared to hope that He would show us such loving kindness as He has done in this and in the recovery of Breda at a time when we were so sorely afflicted by the enemies of His Holy Faith, and although it is right that we should acknowledge that we owe it all to Him, we ought to seize the opportunity to devise a remedy for all the evils which threaten us in the future." He suggested that she should enter into communications with the Dutch leaders in such a manner as to make them think that she was willing on their account to mediate with Philip and induce him to listen to any reasonable terms which they might put forward for an arrangement, without letting them see that the proposal had come from Spain. It would be all the better if the Provinces would return to their obedience or consent to acknowledge his authority. He would, however, be satisfied if they would agree to a Peace or to a long truce, and any money which the Infanta expended to secure this result would be well laid out. The Infanta and Spinola had already taken some steps to resume the negotiations with the Dutch which had been interrupted by Maurice's death. Their proposals were based upon those which had been put forward through Mme. de Tserclaes in February, 1623, but they were now using as their agents, Rubens and his nephew, Jean Brant. The old lady was not very popular in Holland, and Philip the Fourth warned the Infanta that he had been informed by her ill-wishers that she had spoken far more openly whilst at the Hague than was needed for the conduct of her business. The Infanta in her reply indignantly defended her friend against his accusations and pointed out that she had brought credentials from Don Manuel of Portugal and was known to have been on the most intimate terms with Maurice, whilst other persons who had been mixed up in the negotiations had not had the slightest right to interfere in them. Philip, who was fond of using every vagabond friar who came to Madrid as an agent in his secret diplomacy may well have taken this as aimed at himself. If Rubens may be

relied upon Mme de Tserclaes had been wrongfully accused. The Infanta went on to say that she believed their late defeats would lead the Dutch to listen to suggestions for a peace and asked to be informed what concessions she might make. The object to be aimed at was to come to terms with Frederick Henry and the French party who hated the English and were only too anxious to thwart them in every way, and, if possible, to spare Spain. The States-Generals, however, were but little inclined to place themselves in the Prince's hands, although the Provinces were feeling the burdens of the war very severely, and he had but little influence with the army. Nothing was destined to come of these proposals. The position of parties in Holland once more barred the way to peace, and the "Surrender of Breda" proved to be but a brilliant feat of arms which did not prevent the Dutch and English fleets from carrying the war within the next few months to the shores of Spain itself. But the expedition against Cadiz was the outcome of the events which had been in progress in Italy, whilst the long drawn struggle in the Netherlands was at its height. [*Villa op. cit.*, pp. 434-439. Olivares to Coloma, July 8, 1625. *Turin ib.* Tarantaise to Duke, July 20, 29, 1625. *Mantua ib.*, Priandi to Duke, July 18, 19. *Striggi* to Duke, July 16, 1625. *Dublin, Trinity College, Miscellanea*. No. 959. "Relacion de lo subcedido a D. Fadrique de Toledo en el Brazil, 1625." *Brussels ib.*, Etat et Guerre 193. Philip IV. to Infanta, July 11, Aug. 2, Toledo to Philip IV., April. Infanta to Philip IV. August 6, 1625. *Reigersborch op. cit.*, pp. 56-57, Reigersborch to Grotius, 24 June, 1625. *Rubens* (ed. Rooses) *op. cit.*, Vol. III., pp. 378-380. Rubens to Jean Brant, 20 July, p. 303. Note, pp. 390-392. Rubens to Valavez, 19 September. Note on the Sittings of the States-General, 30 October, 1625. *Genoa ib.*, Let. Min., No. 2543. Celio Levanto to Doge, Vienna, 18 Feb., 8, 26 March, 1625, for the negotiations for the Turkish Truce.]

CHAPTER LXXI

THE troubles in Italy were intimately connected with the question of the Valtelline, for, as long as that question remained unsettled, France never lacked a pretext for stirring up enmities against Spain.

To the Bourbons, the Treaty of 1563, which constituted France the protectress of the Thirteen Cantons, with their confederates and allies, was what their claims to the Milanese and Naples had been to the Valois, so far as their relations with the House of Hapsburg were concerned. It was a cardinal maxim with French statesmen that unless France was at war abroad, she was certain to have civil war within her own borders. It was not until the English had been expelled from Bordeaux, that France had begun to take an interest in the affairs of Italy, and the feelings aroused by the Reformation had only become a menace to the State, when, in 1559, the gates of Italy seemed to have been closed for ever against her by the Treaty of Câteau Cambrésis. The lesson was not likely to be forgotten at the Court of Louis XIII. [*Hanotaux* op. cit., Vol. I., 433-434.]

The insurrection in the Prätigau in the spring of 1622 which had for a moment freed the Grisons from the presence of the Austrians had produced no lasting results. Archduke Leopold was not the man to renounce his purpose at the first rebuff. As soon as he saw that the Protestants after their defeats at Höchst and at Wimpfen were no longer in a position to threaten Alsace and Southern Germany, he prepared to undertake the reconquest of the Leagues. In order to gain time for his preparations he entered into negotiations with the Leaguers, and it was arranged that a Conference should be assembled at Lindau in September to treat for peace. Before, however, the commissioners could meet, Count Sulz, with a large force had marched from Alsace into Lower Engadine, had re-occupied that district and the neighbourhood of Davos and had laid waste the country with fire and sword. The Upper Engadine surrendered to the conqueror, who forced his way into the Prätigau, defended the Protestant General at

Aquasana and finally fixed his headquarters at Mayenfeld. The Prätigauers went into exile in Switzerland. In their terror at Sulz' victorious progress the delegates of the Leagues at Lindau hastily accepted a Convention drawn up by Austria. By this treaty which was signed late in September, 1622, the Lower Engadine and the district of Davos were annexed to the Tyrol and it was arranged that Chur and Mayenfeld should be occupied for six years by Austrian garrisons. Thus Archduke Leopold secured complete control of the northern entrances to the Rhoetian Passes. [*J. Ragaz*, pp. 249-252. *Hanotaux*, Vol. II., Part 2, pp. 533-534, v. *Moor.*, Vol. III., pp. 795-797.] The Protestant Cantons, and the French representatives at Lindau in vain protested against the excessive pretensions of Austria, which were resented even by some of the Swiss Catholics. [*J. Ragaz*, pp. 249-252.] A few days previously, after long negotiations, Richelieu had received the Cardinal's hat. [*Bassompierre*, Vol. III., p. 158, Note 4.]

The new Cardinal was the soul of the anti-Spanish party in France, and the moment his hands were freed by the conclusion of the Treaty of Montpellier with the Huguenots in October, he set to work to form a coalition against Spain. His efforts were seconded by the Duke of Savoy who visited Louis XIII. at Avignon on the seventeenth of November. In December Richelieu was invested with the hat at Lyons in the presence of the Court, and was met there by the Prince and Princess of Piedmont and the famous General, Prince Thomas of Savoy. As a result of their visit a treaty was signed on February 7, by which France, Savoy, and Venice bound themselves to restore the Valtelline to the Grisons. [*Bassompierre*, Vol. II., pp. 159, 161, 178. *Hanotaux*, Vol. II., Part II., pp. 534-537. *Mantua*, *Priandi* to Duke, 30 March, 1625.]

In the meantime the Grisons were undergoing terrible sufferings. The Austrians withdrew the bulk of their troops in December, 1622. More than half of their forces had perished of dysentery and of the so-called Hungarian sickness of which violent headaches were the principal symptoms. They, however, still maintained garrisons in Chur, Mayenfeld, and Râzuns, and the undisciplined soldiery robbed and murdered all over the country, and exhausted the provisions of the unfortunate inhabitants. Famine raged in the Lower Engadine and in the Prätigau. As all the villages had been burnt down, the inhabitants were forced

to live in damp cellars where they suffered much from the attacks of swarms of mice. Their only food was grass boiled with milk and frozen turnips. When spring came every green shoot was greedily devoured. The whole country was placed under Capuchin missionaries and the inhabitants were everywhere driven to Mass. As twenty-four parishes had gone over to Protestantism within the previous two years, it seemed as if the Catholic Religion could only be preserved by force. The efforts of the missionaries were successful in the Münsterthal, but in the Prätigau, the Lower Engadine and at Davos they effected few real conversions, although many pretended to come over out of fear of banishment, or for the sake of worldly advantages. In the Lower Engadine where party feuds still ran high, the Catholics found a powerful supporter in Rudolph von Planta of Wildenburg, who did not hesitate to menace peasants with the strappado should they fail to attend Mass. The Protestant pastors were expelled and the churches handed over to the missioners. [*V. Moor.*, Vol. III., pp. 795-797. *Ragaz*, p. 252. *Chur, Mappa* 54, *Hist. Rel. R. Ueber die Einführung der Capuchiner-Mission in Unterengadin, etc.*, 1621-1622.]

The sufferings of the Three Leagues awoke great sympathy amongst their Swiss Confederates where the exiles from the Grisons, more particularly George Jenatsch and Rudolph and Ulysses Salis were unwearying in their exertions to secure the help of the Cantons. Venice scattered money broadcast, and as soon as the Treaty of 1623 had been concluded, France and Savoy joined with her in a fresh attempt to win over the Catholic Cantons to their cause. All their efforts were in vain, and although the Reformed Cantons granted the allies the right of Passage and allowed them to levy troops they were afraid to take sides openly against the Austrians. [*Ragaz*, p. 152.]

Olivares, however, was most anxious to avoid a breach with France. Rumour said that he wished to advance himself in the good graces of the Queen, who, as the sister of Louis XIII., eagerly desired to maintain peace. Du Fargis, the French ambassador, in the course of his negotiations at Madrid some months earlier had suggested that the Valtelline might be deposited in the hands of a third power. Lorraine had been spoken of in the first instance. Its Duke, Henri III., who was married to Christina Gonzaga of the House of Mantua, was not only a prince of the Empire, but held the Duchy of Bar as a

French vassal. Olivares now proposed that the Valtelline should be entrusted to the Pope, who would hold it with a garrison of Italian troops paid by Spain. Philip could place himself wholly in the Pontiff's hands as regarded the guarantees for the liberty of the religion of its Catholic inhabitants. It was difficult indeed, for France and Spain to settle the matter by direct arrangements between themselves. The Valtelline question had been submitted to the Imperial Courts and their interference might be regarded as a slight to the Emperor's authority. France was represented at Rome by Commander de Sillery, a younger son of the Keeper of the Seals. He was a warm supporter of the project. His father and his colleagues who were old men and who dreaded the fatigues which would be entailed upon them, if they had to follow the King into the field, were also in favour of a peaceable arrangement. When, therefore, Mirabel, the Spanish ambassador at Paris offered in his master's name to put the Treaty of Madrid into execution his overtures were warmly welcomed. The arrival of Charles at Madrid, seemed to ensure the audience of an alliance between England and Spain, which would thus be rendered independent of the support of France, but it only increased Philip's desire to maintain peace. Orders were at once sent to Feria to hand over the Valtelline and Bormio to the Pope's Commissioners; for the moment, Spanish garrisons were left in the forts at Chiavenna and at Riva. For a time, indeed, it seemed as if a settlement would be effected, and as if France and Spain would remain upon friendly terms. By the end of June, 1623, Olivares and his master learnt with delight that the provinces had been taken over by the Papal representatives, though some delay arose with respect to Chiavenna.

It had been agreed to restore that place to the Grisons, but the Spaniards hesitated to do so, lest they should be supposed to be acting under pressure from the signatories of the February treaty. Directly Charles' engagement became known, the French Ambassador at Madrid had, as we have seen, declared publicly to the Council of State that no alliance existed between his sovereign and the United Provinces. They forthwith sent to Pastrana at Rome instructions to leave the settlement of the Valtelline question entirely to the Pope, and Feria was ordered to hand over Chiavenna on deposit to the Holy See. Riva was still held by Spain. [*Bassompierre*, Vol. III., pp. 159-161; 178, 197, Note 2. *Hanotaux*, Vol. II., Part II., pp. 534-537. *Mantua*, Nerli to

Duke, July 10, 19, 27, 1623. Priandi to Duke, 30 March, 1623.]

The death of Gregory XV. and the election of Urban VIII. had but little direct effect upon the fortunes of the Valtelline. [*Mantua* Nerli to Duke, Dec. 20, 1623.]

When, however, in January, 1624, Marie de Medicis succeeded in inducing Louis XIII. to dismiss Sillery and his son Puisieux from office and to send them into banishment in Champagne, the state of affairs changed. The seals of office were handed to La Vieuville, who for six weeks seemed to be the absolute master of France. The King indeed had from the first disliked the arrangements about the Valtelline. He looked upon them as derogatory to his honour, and his new minister fully shared his feelings. Sillery and Puisieux had fallen under the attacks of pamphleteers, including Richelieu's confidant, Fançan, who never ceased crying out against their subserviency to Spain, and when these writers, urged on by army contractors hungry for war, and courtiers whose pensions had been reduced, turned their batteries upon Vieuville, his thoughts turned to a rupture with Spain. Pretexts were not lacking, for the Spanish garrison still remained at Riva and at Chiavenna. James' ambassadors who were treating at Paris for the hand of Henrietta Maria, were, in words at least, bitterly anti-Spanish. A Dutch deputation was besieging him for help. The question at issue was that of War or Peace, and the Keeper of the Seals, who was best known as a witty punster, was not the man to find the solution. [*Mantua*, Priandi to Duke, March 30, April 5, 12, 1624. Nerli to Duke, Dec. 20, 1623; April 24, 29, 1624. *Hanotaux*, Vol. II., Part II., pp. 549-556. *Bassompierre*, Vol. III., pp. 183-184.] He was forced to invoke the aid of Richelieu. The Cardinal complied with his request. He did so upon the condition that he should be admitted as a member of the Council in which he took his seat upon the twenty-ninth of April, 1624. [*Hanotaux*, Vol. II., Part II., pp. 549-556. *Mantua*, Priandi to Duke, April 25, July 5, 1624. *Ragaz*, p. 252.]

Vieuville had soon reason to regret his pusillanimity. His conduct of the marriage negotiations with England had not been a success. Louis XIII. who was anxious to avoid coming to an open rupture with Spain, as he did not wish to stir up a universal war throughout Christendom, hesitated to accept the English demand that he should enter into an offensive and defensive alliance for the recovery of the Palatinate. He had learnt indeed,

through the papers he had seized from Padre Maestro that James was still dangling with the Spanish proposals. The transfer of the Valtelline to the Pope had made little alteration in the realities of the situation, for Urban the Eighth was strongly suspected of playing into Philip's hands. [*Mantua Priandi* to Duke, March 29, April 5, 12, May 10, June 14, 21, 29, July 8, 18, 27, 31, 1624. *Bassompierre*, Vol. III., pp. 197-198. *Hanotaux*, Vol. II., Part II, pp. 549-556. *Munich*, Geh. St. Arch., London, June 11, 1624.]

Vieuville thought to save himself by throwing suspicion upon his enemies. Antonio Lopez, a Portuguese jeweller who resided at Paris, was thrown into prison on a charge of being a spy and an agent for distributing bribes in the interests of Spain. His papers were requisitioned and placed in the charge of the Keeper of the Seals. They proved that the French Court was a nest of traitors although the object of the Spaniards was merely to maintain their influence in the Council, and not to contrive conspiracies against the King or the safety of the State. So many great persons were implicated in the correspondence that it was thought that the matter would be hushed up at least for the time. Amongst them were the Duke and Duchess of Chevreuse, Luxemburg and Bassompierre. The latter, however, was received by the King during his stay at Compiègne in June, and was able to prove that he was falsely accused. He had purchased from Lopez a set of the stamped leather hangings manufactured at Cordova and known in commerce by the name of "Guardameciles" for two hundred crowns. Vieuville had taken the entry to mean that Bassompierre had received a bribe of that amount through a broker named Guardameciles. This additional proof of the Ministers' incompetence was made good use of by Richelieu. In the middle of July the King decided to dismiss Vieuville from his service. On August the thirteenth a meeting of the Council was held at Saint Germain. Richelieu spoke out. Addressing Louis, he pointed out that Vieuville's blunders both as to the English marriage and as to the Valtelline might ruin the King's reputation and the finances of the State. "Sire, in future you must act so as to show all the world that you are seeing to your business yourself, as everyone wishes." His words appealed to the King's honour. He answered drily, approved of what the Cardinal had said, and complained bitterly of his former ministers,

especially of Puisieux and La Vieuville. He went on to say that it would give him pleasure to look to his own affairs in future, for they would be well managed, and by these words placed his business in the Cardinal's hands. The same day Cardinal Richelieu became Prime Minister. Louis XIII. had, at length, found his master. [*Mantua Priandi* to Duke, June 21, July 29, 1624. *Bassompierre*, Vol. III., pp. 184-187. *Hanotaux*, Vol. II., Part II., pp. 549-556. *Ragaz*, p. 152.]

A few days later Vieuville was arrested at Saint Germain and thrown into prison at Amboise from which he made his escape in the following year. [*Bassompierre*, Vol. III., pp. 192-193.]

Richelieu had from the first moment after his appointment to the Council shown that he would not allow France to be deprived of her rights in Switzerland. In the middle of June, whilst Mansfeldt and the English Envoys were offering to join with France in recovering the Grisons, he had sent the Marquis de Cœuvres as ambassador to the Cantons and to the Leagues, and had instructed him to proceed thence to Milan to require Feria to carry into execution the treaty of Madrid. As the Marquis was a very violent tempered man, it was thought that he would fail to attain his purpose, although he was furnished with two hundred thousand crowns to distribute in bribes. [*Mantua*, Priandi to Duke, June 14, 1624. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. MSS., 34,310. *Sir T. Wake's Letter Book*, Vol. I., Wake to Conway. *Turin*, 21 July, 1624.] Until the English Marriage was settled, the French could do nothing openly, but Cœuvres raised recruits for the French Grisons' Regiments and negotiations were continued with Venice and Savoy. The so-called Treaty for the Liberation of the Grisons is dated at Paris on the eighth of August, 1624. But although it traces out with some exactness the main lines on which the war against the Hapsburgs was destined to be carried on until the Treaty of Westphalia, it may well be doubted if the document is anything but a draft. At most it may have been "a manifestation on paper" as the Venetian Ambassador had said of the treaty of February, 1623. [*Mantua*, Priandi to Duke, June 14, July 18, 1624. *Chur, Mappa* 53, Aug. 8, 1624. *Capitola della Lega*, etc. cit. *Hanotaux*, Vol. II., Part II., p. 544.] Before the Diet met at Baden the Thirteen Cantons had promised the French Ambassador that they would confirm the Treaty of Madrid. The Catholic Cantons, when they did so, made a reser-

vation to the effect that it must be approved of by the new Pope and that no religion save the Roman Catholic should be exercised in the Valtelline, Bormio and Chiavenna. The Protestant Cantons protested against their attitude, and the matter was accordingly left unsettled. The Duke of Savoy and the Constable Lesdiguières were, however, unwilling to allow matters to remain at rest in Italy. [*Mantua*, Priandi to Duke, July 18, September 7, 1624.]

As soon as it was known that the Cantons had refused to confirm the Treaty of Madrid, Father Hyacinth at the request of the Infanta Isabella and the Duke of Bavaria hastened to Paris to endeavour to effect a settlement both in the Valtelline and in Germany, by an arrangement between France and the Empire. He met with but a cold reception and soon went on to Germany. [*Mantua*, Priandi to Duke, Sept. 28, 1624.]

On the other hand on the eighteenth of October, Charles Emmanuel, Lesdiguières, Wake, the English Minister at Turin, the Venetian ambassador and an agent from the Swiss Cantons met privately at Susa. They decided that the first object of the League should be to recover the Valtelline and the Grisons from Spain and to prevent the Archduke Leopold and Tilly, who was then with a large force in Baden, from seizing the Rhoetian Alps. It was arranged that the allies should call out their armies at once and that the command should be given to the Duke of Savoy. Richelieu, however, would not take the offensive until the marriage with England had been arranged, and the Spanish Council, to keep him in check, intrigued to stir up a fresh rebellion amongst the Huguenots of France. When England had come to terms. Richelieu at once decided to act. [*London, Brit. Mus., Add. 34,310, Sir T. Wake's Letter Book, Vol. I., Wake to Conway. Turin, Oct. 28, 1624. Mantua, Striggi to Duke. October 14, December 28, 1624. Priandi to Duke, October 5, 19, 18, Nov. 9, 1624.*] On the fourth of November Cœuvres was appointed commander of the expedition to the Valtelline and Lesdiguières hurried into Bresse to form an army to support him. [*Bassompierre, Vol. III., pp. 198-199. Mantua, Priandi to Duke, Nov. 9, 1624.*]

The Grisons had already taken up arms. With the support of some French troops they had taken Chur, Mayenfeldt and the fortifications on the Luziensteig, occupied some other passes into the Tyrol, and pushed on towards Râzuns, notwithstanding the

protests of the Nuncio and of the Catholic Cantons, who proclaimed that they would never take up arms against the House of Austria. As Priandi wrote, the war fire was now alight and it could not be foreseen where its flames would spread. Everywhere the Leaguers were received with acclamation. The Prätigauers rose; the Austrian officials and the Capuchins fled in terror to the fort at Castels and the partisans of Spain hurried from the valley. [*Mantua*, Priandi to Duke, Nov. 9, 1624, *Ragaz*, pp. 152,]

No sooner were the Lower Engadine and the Eight Jurisdictions clear of the enemy than Cœuvres crossed the Bernina to expel the Papal garrisons from the Valtelline. The winter of 1624 was as severe in the Rhoëtian Alps as it was in the flats of Brabant; the snow lay deep on the passes and the road from the Bernina through the Valley of Poschiavo was blocked by the fort of Pietramala. At Paris it was thought that the undertaking was a desperate one. Cœuvres, however, persevered. Pietramala opened its gates. The other fortresses in the Valtelline, with the exception of Chiavenna followed its example. Some supposed that the Pope was acting in connivance with the King of France in the hope of preventing a war in Italy by allowing the Grisons to recover the Valtelline without the intervention of the Italian princes. With this object he sent a Capuchin to Paris and Father Zaccaria da Saluzzo to Turin, going even so far as to threaten the Duke of Savoy that if he took up arms for the Leagues he would proclaim him the "Disturber of the Peace of Italy." The Duke rejoined that he would in that case proclaim himself its Preserver. Urban VIII. might, however, have succeeded in his object, had not the French cherished designs far beyond the limits of an Alpine Province. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. MSS., 34,310, Wake to Conway, 5 Aug., 29 Sept., 16 Nov., 1624. *Mantua*, Striggi to Duke, Dec. 28, 1624; Jan. 7, Feb. 2, 1625. Priandi to Duke, Nov. 9, 22, Dec. 30, 1624. *Ragaz*, pp. 152.]

The French were only too eager to press matters to a decisive issue. In vain Philip remonstrated with their ambassador against the order that their flag should be hoisted in the Valtelline. He received the reply that the ambassador could not answer for the consequences unless the Treaty of Madrid were carried out at once. A few days later Du Fargis requested a private audience and demanded permission for the French troops to pass through the

Valtelline for the Relief of Breda. The Council met to discuss the question and it would appear that the treaty which had been found amongst Valaresso's papers was read aloud. When they learnt that France, England, Savoy and Venice had combined against them, some councillors asked who the allies of Spain were. When His Majesty heard the names of most of the smaller powers in Italy, he said in a loud voice : " If this be so I think, please God, we shall win," put on his hat and left the room. The Cardinal decided to refuse the request, and at once discussed the necessary measures for defence against a French attack. [*Mantua*, Striggi to Duke, Dec. 28, 1624. Jan. 17, 1625. The paper read before the Council is probably that in *London, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS., 10,236, p. 233. Capitulaciones de la Liga, etc. cit.*] Spain was only too anxious to avoid war and would gladly have left the Pope to settle the Valtelline question as he pleased. He would, it was said, have arranged it very well. Marie de Medicis was pressing her son to maintain peace as she feared, and with good reason, that in the event of war Condé and his supporters would stir up troubles in France. [*Mantua*, Striggi to Duke, Dec. 28, 1624 ; Jan. 17, 1625.]

Charles Emmanuel on the other hand was making large offers to induce Louis XIII. to join him in an expedition against Milan and Genoa. Not only was he willing to recognise the claims over Genoa which the French had asserted for centuries, but he offered to cede the whole of Savoy in return for their support on condition that he was allowed to retain the Milanese. Had the French accepted his proposal they would have been secured against all risk of attack from the side of Italy at relatively small cost to the Duke.

Savoy was already thoroughly French by both language and inclinations. The numerous feudatories who inhabited it were a proud and ignorant caste who contributed nothing to his strength and were far less subservient to his rule than were the nobility of Piedmont. The peasantry were herdsmen who lived in rude plenty upon the produce of their herds and who were so unwarlike that his father had been forced to disband the militia when he found that they used their helmets and corselets for making frying pans and spits. Charles Emmanuel was not sentimental, and would not have hesitated to exchange the rude mountains which had cradled his race for the rich plains and splendid cities of Lombardy.

It was believed, moreover, and not without some grounds, that Archduke Leopold hated both the Emperor and the King of Spain and would willingly if he could, enter the Alliance against them. As he was not only the master of the Tyrol, but Bishop of Strasburg, his accession to the League would bar the Passes of the Rhoetian Alps and the road through Alsace to the Spanish and Imperial armies. Louis XIII. had, indeed, already sent one of his gentlemen to assure the Strasburgers that he would assist them if their city was besieged by Spain. As the good burghers had no great confidence in their would be protector, his offer was declined. [*Mantua*, Striggi to Duke, Feb. 2, 1625. Priandi to Duke, July 5, Aug. 10, 1624. *London, Brit. Mus.*, Royal MSS. 14a. XIII. pp. 1237-1273. *Relazione di Sa Sigre dal viva F. Molino l'anno 1586*. As to Archduke Leopold Cf. Do. Eg., 318. *Consejo de Estado*, 10 Aug., 28 Aug., 1623. *Chur, Mappa* 53. Archduke Leopold to Card. Bellarmin, July 21, 1621; Aug. 19, 1621.]

The Duke of Savoy had already a pretext for a rupture with Genoa. Some years frequently he had purchased from its lords the Carretti, the Marquisate of Zuccarello, a small state which lay on the frontiers of Milan, Genoa, and Piedmont. He had held it as an Imperial Fief under the Emperor Matthias, but Ferdinand on his accession had refused to renew the investiture to him as the title to it was in dispute. The Genoese asserted that the rights had already been sold to some of their citizens and that the heir was trying to dispose of his reversion to Savoy. As Dolceacqua, a village lying within sight of Ventimiglia the Genoese fortress which barred the road from France along the Western Riviera, was included in the Marquisate, the Republic had every reason to be tenacious of their alleged rights. They took advantage of Ferdinand's hatred for and fears of Savoy to induce him to sell them the fief for a large sum before the courts had given their decision in the case, and at once occupied it by force of arms. Charles Emmanuel protested against their action, but the Senate returned no answer, and proceeded to levy troops and to put their frontier fortresses into a state of defence. The Pope's attempt to effect an arrangement proved useless, and from that time the Duke only waited for a favourable opportunity for paying off his score. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. MSS., 34,310, Wake to Conway, *Turin*, 31 July, 1624. *Mantua*, Striggi to Duke, Sept. 27, 1624. *E. le Mesurier*, "Genoa, her History as Written in her Buildings" (Genoa, A. Donath, 1889), pp. 158-160.]

If a settlement could be prevented in the Valtelline it was clear that the Spanish forces in Italy would be forced to divide their efforts. The first step, therefore, was to persuade the Swiss not to sanction any such settlement. For this purpose Gabaleone, who was intended to represent Savoy in London, was sent into the Cantons with a large sum of money in order to induce the Catholics to take up arms for the defence of the Leagues. Wake, at the Duke's request, wrote to the Protestants with the same object as he was likely to have more influence with them than either the French or the Savoyard agent.

Apparently he did not think it necessary to ask his own Government to sanction his proceedings. [*London, Brit. Mus., Add. 34,310, Wake to Conway, 31 July, 1624.*]

On paper the plan of campaign appeared to be a sound one. The French were to threaten Flanders and Luxembourg from Picardy and Metz, and Franche Comté from Bresse, whilst the Savoyards and Venetians concentrated on the frontiers of Genoa and the Milanese and the Swiss and Grisons expelled the Spaniards and Austrians from the Leagues and the Valtelline. In reality the Confederates mistrusted one another, and were wholly incapable of undertaking any concerted action. Savoy was accused of slackness in the cause, and of wishing only to gain Savona and other parts on the Gulf of Genoa, and some advantages from Mantua which she could not secure without the Emperor's sanction. Louis XIII. was fickle, changeable, and a tool of the Jesuits. Lesdiguières was an old man. The Venetians thought of nothing but maintaining peace in Italy. [*Do., Wake to Conway, 5, 13 August, 29 September, 9 November, 1624.*]

The Duke of Savoy was most anxious to ensure himself the support of England. He still hoped to marry one of his daughters to the Prince of Wales, and, perhaps in the hope of gaining Charles' goodwill, had sent money to Mansfeldt. He knew how valuable English help at sea might be to him. When he first received Wake on the ninth of June he asked him to remain at Turin until he could hear what France would do about the League, as he would then submit to him some important and "very feasible projects." The Duke ended by saying that if France would make a diversion in the Valtelline in which he would strive to help her, it would be a great advantage to England as regarded the recovery of the Palatinate. Wake sent his servant Smith to England with these proposals, which related to an

expedition against Genoa in which the Duke desired the assistance of England, and which were considered by Conway. [Do. Wake, 14 June, 13 August, 9 November, 1624. *London, S.P.O.*, S. P. For. *Savoy*, Bundle 11, f. 306, "Questions and answers concerning a League and Expedition against Genoa in which England to assist."]

To Wake, it is obvious, the proposal seemed by no means attractive. After the Conference at Susa, however, the Constable sent M. de Valois, one of his gentlemen, to London, with a plan which from the English point of view offered far greater advantages. The King was asked to lend twenty ships either belonging to the navy or armed merchantmen to Savoy, which were to be employed in an attack upon Genoa.

Though to Wake, the League appeared anything but a strong one, he urged in the most emphatic manner that the proposal should be accepted. He foresaw that if James refused to agree to it, he might be left to undertake the recovery of the Palatinate single-handed, perhaps whilst the armies of the League were being employed against his friends and allies, and were attacking the Huguenots in France, or recovering Genoa for Savoy. [Do., Wake to Conway, 21 Sept., 9 Nov., 1624. *S.P.O.*, S. P. For. *Savoy* 11., f. 254, undated (1624), "The Proposals made by the Duke of Savoy to Sir I. Wake, concerning the loan of 20 warships by Charles I. (*sic*)."]

The Pope, whose one wish was to keep the war out of Italy, was doing his best to prevent both France and Savoy from breaking with Spain. He had sent, as has been said, a Capuchin who carried some weight with Louis XIII. to Paris, and succeeded in delaying the despatch of the orders to Lesdiguières to pass the Alps, whilst Father Zaccaria was having some stormy interviews with Charles Emmanuel at Turin. But neither his threats nor his cajoleries succeeded in shaking the Duke's settled purpose. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, cit., Wake, 26 Nov., 12 Dec., 1624. *Mantua, Francia Priandi to Duke*, 22, 23 Nov., 14, 30 Dec., 1624.]

It was not until January, 1625, that Lesdiguières received orders to enter Piedmont so as to assist Cœuvres. *Mantua, Priandi*, 12 Jan., 1625. *Bassompierre*, Vol. III., pp. 198-199, 205-210.]

The French had made one important mistake. They had forgotten to place a garrison in Riva di Chiavenna, the port near the head of Lake Como, through which runs the road from Milan

to the passes of the Grisons. Feria had promptly re-occupied it, although, according to Olivares, he had acted contrary to Philip's wishes by doing so, and the place was never recovered by Cœuvres, who was thus prevented from attacking Milan in conjunction with Savoy. [*London, Brit. Mus. Wake*, 1 March, 1625. *Mantua, Spagna, Striggi*, 17 April, 1625. *Bassompierre III.*, pp. 198-199.]

Richelieu was not ill-pleased at Cœuvres' oversight. He saw that until the French Protestants were crushed, it was impossible for him to engage in a quarrel with Spain, but he was quite willing to weaken her by allowing the Constable to join with Savoy in an attack upon Genoa, although by adopting this policy, he might well be in the end forced into a war with Philip IV. [*Mantua, Priandi*, 14, 30 Dec., 1624; 7 Feb., 1625. *Bassompierre, III.*, pp. 205-210.]

The Cardinal had judged the situation correctly. Lesdiguières reached Turin on the first of February; on the following day an express arrived with orders to him to return to France. Rohan and Soubise had risen in arms in Poitou to seize, if possible, some place which could be handed over in exchange for the demolition of Fort Louis. [*London, Brit. Mus. Wake, Venice*, 14 Feb., 1624. *Mantua, Priandi* 3, 12, 24, 30 Jan., 1625. *Bassompierre, III.*, pp. 199-200.]

The Rochellers promptly fitted out a fleet, which they placed under the command of Soubise. He at once steered for Blavet, a port on the south coast of Brittany, seized a squadron of the King's ships, which were about to sail for the East under Nevers, and succeeded in carrying off his prizes to Oléron. When Richelieu heard of his rebellion, he told the King that he could undertake nothing against Spain until he had rooted out the Huguenots. Orders, therefore, were forthwith despatched to Lesdiguières to refrain from crossing the frontiers of the Milanese. [*Bassompierre, III.*, pp. 200, 205-210. *Mantua, Priandi*, 7 Feb., 1625.]

Thus the Duke of Savoy and Lesdiguières were left free to turn their arms against Genoa. Great was the alarm both amongst the Genoese and the Milanese, when they heard that the French had passed the Alps. Hannibal was at their gates and the Genoese, who in their times of prosperity were looked upon by the orthodox as arrant heretics, vowed themselves, wrote Puritan Wake, "to more saints than there are in Paradise," trembling lest their money, "which was the only God they worshipped," should prove their ruin. The Spaniards round the Council Board at

Milan would gladly, to purchase peace, have given up the Valtelline, with Chiavenna, Bormio, Riva, and the passes thrown in. The Savoyards smiled when they heard the Spanish Minister aver that the Valtelline now concerned the Pope alone. They knew that Spanish guns were still defending Riva and Chiavenna. In reply to his master's orders recalling him to France Lesdiguières had written that he would never quit Italy until he had forced his enemies to sign an honourable peace. He meant to seize some portions of Genoese territory, to serve as a whet to his appetite until the English fleet arrived, when the city would be attacked at all risks. [*London, Wake, 14 Feb., 1625.*]

In the eyes of the League, England was the keystone of their position. With Gondomar rumoured to be on his way to London, they paused in their designs. The aid of England, would, they imagined, ensure their victory. James the First had, indeed, much to gain by immediate intervention. As Wake pointed out, the Spaniards if they were vigorously attacked in Italy, would have to call upon the Emperor for help, and it would, thus, be impossible for them to use the Imperial forces to reinforce Spinola before Breda, where, in that case, Mansfeldt would meet with but little resistance. On the other hand, if they reinforced Spinola from Italy, they might lose the Milanese. Again, if the Spanish fleet was sent to Italy, Brazil would be left in the hands of the Dutch, whilst again, an expedition to recover Brazil might well involve the loss of Genoa. In any case, the Spanish coast would be left at the mercy of the first assailant. The English fleet would command the Ocean, and the commander of the Ocean might make his own terms as to the future of the Palatinate. Had Wake been expounding his own ideas, in place of merely voicing the suggestion of the Venetian Senators, he might well have ranked as one of the first Englishmen to realise the use of Sea Power. [*London, Wake, 27 December, 1624; 17 Jan., 1 March, 1625.*] It is from Wake himself that we learn that his proposals were inspired by the Senate of Venice.

The Spanish Government at Milan saw that their best chance was to treat for an armistice. They decided to ask Urban VIII. to act as their mediator. His Holiness was by no means loth to undertake the task. He was a believer in astrology, and had been assured by his mathematicians that he would gain great honour from this employment. He had also a nephew, Cardinal Barberino, who was a young man anxious to travel and whom

his ill-wishers at Rome were equally anxious to see in foreign parts. Accordingly, the youthful Cardinal was duly named Legate to the Crowns of France and Spain, and was despatched to match his wits against Richelieu and Olivares. The news of his appointment roused Charles Emmanuel and Lesdiguières to action. They at once left Turin for Asti, which lay on the borders of both the Milanese and Genoa, with an excellent prospect of succeeding in their designs. [*London*, Wake, 18, 28 Feb. 1, 28 March, 1625. Lesdiguières to Wake, 24 Feb., 1625.]

On March the fifth Lesdiguières left Asti and proceeded to Acqui a famous watering-place in the Val Bormida, which lay in the Marquisate of Monferrat, so as to secure his line of retreat, and was followed thither by the Duke of Savoy.

Despite the entreaties of the Venetians, who were urging him to attack the Milanese, the Constable decided to enter the Genoese territories, in the confident hope of the arrival of a fleet either from England or Marseilles, where the Duke of Guise had collected a large force of galleys, when he would at once attack the city itself. [*London*, Wake, 28 March, 1625. *Mantua*, Spagna, Striggi, 15, 17 March. *Francia*, Priandi, 14 April, 1625.]

The news of the advance to Asti struck terror into the hearts of the Genoese, and some of the most powerful nobles sent their families into foreign parts. Nothing, indeed, could stand against the onrush of the French. By the twenty-third of March, Novi, Guado, and Passerano were in their hands. At Rossiglione they took a huge booty. The Spaniards, however, refused the proposals submitted to them by the French Ambassador at Rome, M. de Béthune, that if they return Riva to the Grisons, the French armies should be withdrawn from Italy, for, as they urged, they dare not leave the way into the Milanese open. Later on, however, they changed their minds and begged the Pope to make the agreement in his own name. This offer the French, in their turn, declined to accept. All Italy applauded the boldness of the Duke and Constable. "It is certain," wrote Wake from Venice, "that the Spaniards are in a very great labyrinth, and their weakness doth now evidently appear unto all men. They must defend Genoa or else their honour and all that they have in Italy will be buried in the ruins of that city, and when that source of their money shall be dried up and the passage cut off for their transporting of Spaniards, Neapolitans, and Sicilians, their armies in Germany will not be able to subsist long; but it is a

question whether they can be able at one time to succour Genoa and to maintain Riva, for as things do stand at this present either of these places will take up all the strength that they have, and if they do things by the halves, as hitherto they have done, they will questionless lose all in an instant." [London, Brit. Mus., add. 34,310, Wake, 9 April, 1625.]

The Genoese had scoffed at the idea of an invasion, as they thought the Duke of Savoy too weak to attempt such a venture by himself, and believed that no one else would be bold enough to join him in it. But for their folly it was certain that some neutral powers would have intervened to prevent the enterprise, or that Spain would have sent them forces large enough to overawe the Duke. When at length they realised their danger, they persuaded Feria by a bribe of two hundred thousand crowns to send Tommaso Carraciolo to their assistance with six thousand Neapolitans, as they would not accept Feria's offer of eighteen thousand men for fear lest they should make themselves masters of Genoa. Carraciolo was surprised by the Constable at Serravalle, a village at the northern end of the pass over the Bocchetta from the sea coast to the Valley of the Po, and utterly defeated. He escaped with difficulty into Genoa, and hastily sent to Parma and Modena for reinforcements, which, however, arrived too late to prevent the Savoyards from passing the hills, and he was, therefore, obliged to fortify himself at Voltaggio, a village five miles to the north of the city. Here he was attacked at daybreak on the eighth of April by Charles Emmanuel in person, his army was cut to pieces, and he himself was taken prisoner. There were many German Protestants in the Savoyard ranks and these men committed the most fearful outrages. The Genoese at Madrid went about exclaiming that the Duke of Savoy had burnt the churches with the Blessed Sacrament upon their altars, and that children had been hurled into the flames, whilst women had been outraged, and had been driven through the place stripped naked to their waists. Despite the terms of the surrender the prisoners had been sent off to Turin under guard mounted upon sorry mules, and the conquerers had trailed through the dirt the banners which bore Saint George's cross. No heathen, Turk, or heretic could have acted more vilely. Tarantaise indignantly protested against these accusations so far as the burning of churches and the maltreatment of prisoners was concerned, but is silent as to the women.

The Pope had already, and with reason, protested against the employment of Protestant soldiery in Italy. It was not yet a hundred years since Rome had been sacked by Bourbon's Lutherans. [*Turin*, Tarantaise, 20 July, 1625. *London*, Brit. Mus., add. 34,310, Wake, 27 Dec., 1624, for the Pope's protests as to the employment of Protestant soldiery in Italy, 9, 24 April, 1625.]

To all appearances Genoa was doomed. Faction was raging within its walls, and had Charles Emmanuel pushed on without delay, the city must have surrendered. Lesdiguières, however, protested that, in order to protect their communications against an attack from the Milanese, he must first take Gavi, a fortress supposed to be impregnable, and, with the same object, obliged the Prince of Piedmont to remain near Tortona to watch the frontiers. These delays proved fatal to the designs of the League. Some of the Duke's mercenaries, who had enriched themselves with the spoils of Voltaggio, deserted, others fell sick. His army was forced to prepare to retreat. [*London*, Brit. Mus., Add. 34,310, Wake, 9, 24 April, 2 May, 1625. *Bassompierre*, Vol. III., p. 326.] The invaders had advanced within sight of their prey. A point near Savignone on the heights of the Vittoria, which rise in view of the suburb of Sampierdarena, is shown from which Charles Emmanuel gazed down upon the lordly villas and gardens fragrant with orange blossom which spread along the coast; and, as he gazed, burst into tears at the thought of the rich prey which was escaping from his grasp. Those who visit Genoa may still see a monument of the terror excited by his raid. The outer walls of Genoa were constructed at this time on the model of the fortifications of Spezzia and at the cost of the Bank of Saint George. Legend tells how the builders were urged on to their task by the cry "The Duke is coming." [*E. le Mesurier*, pp. 158-160 *London*, Brit. Mus., Add. 34,310, Wake to Conway, May 16, 1625.]

Genoa had been saved by the jealousies which existed between the allies. The Venetians had, from the outset, been suspicious of the designs of the French in Italy, and said that if they allowed the Genoese to be wholly crushed, the increase of the power of France and Savoy might in the future prove a danger to themselves. At the same time they knew that the fall of Genoa would bring the House of Austria so low that it would not easily rise up again. [*Mantua*, Striggi to Duke, March 1, 1625. *Khevenhüller*, Part X., p. 957.] Lesdiguières, on the other hand, was upon the

worst of terms with his ally. Gavi had surrendered to the Duke of Savoy upon the seventeenth of April, and he had appointed one of his gentlemen as Governor. The Constable remonstrated, and the Governor was replaced by a Frenchman, but the dispute was betrayed to the Genoese by his doctor and by one of his own brigadiers, M. de Tallard, to their great encouragement. The bitterness, however, remained behind and, moreover, Lesdiguières who was an old man was feeling the effects of the campaign. Fera was hurrying troops to the frontiers of the Milanese, the French army was not provided with the equipment to undertake a regular siege, and the Constable would consent to advance no further. Thus the Duke was forced to fall back when on the verge of success. [*London, Brit. Mus., Add. 34,310, Wake to Conway, May 2, 19, June 27, 1625. E. le Mesurier, pp. 158-160. Bassompierre, Vol. III., p. 326.*]

His failure was also in a measure due to the haughty attitude of Lesdiguières who had advised his master to refuse the offers made by the Genoese to conclude a perpetual league with France and to pay the expenses of the expedition, on the ground that they were in reality in rebellion against the French and that the rebellion must be put down before they were admitted to treat with him. [*London, Brit. Mus., Add. 34,310. Wake to Conway, May 2, 1625.*]

The Spaniards were well aware that the Genoese were at heart their enemies. Scarcely had the Savoyards fallen back from Savignone, than the Prince of Piedmont advanced upon La Pieve. The Genoese, who had lost their best generals and whom the French despised as cowards, ran away, and the whole of the Western Riviera except Savona surrendered to the conqueror. Great was the disaffection in Genoa. Four of the principal gentlemen were at once executed upon suspicion of sympathising with France with the only result that the hatred of Spain increased in the town and the French burned "to revenge the blood of their martyrs." Only the clergy still adhered to Spain. [*London, Brit. Mus., Add 34,310, Wake to Conway, 20, 23 May, 1625.*]

Had the Duke of Savoy been assisted by a fleet, he could without doubt have forced his way into the city, which, as he well knew from his spies, could not have resisted an attack from the harbour. The Duke of Guise had collected a large force of galleys at Marseilles, and it was hoped that he would be joined by an English and Dutch fleet, which would enable him to overcome any

naval forces which could be spared from Spain. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. 34,310, Wake to Conway, May 7, June 6, 1625; *Mantua*, Priandi to Duke, May 7, 24, 1625. Striggi to Duke, April 6, June 8, 1625. *Genoa*, Let. Min., No. 2,543, Levante to Doge, March 26, 1625, Let. Reg., No. 1,889, Senate to Serra, Genoa, 3 May, 1625. *Khevenhüller*, X 989.]

The Constable was unwilling to invest the city until it could be blockaded by sea for "feare least by their transporting of their money and wealth, he should take the nest and find those golden birds fled which he doth principally looke after." The Genoese were said to be in greater need of men than of money, and the rumour that they had just received seven million gold ducats from Barcelona, served to whet the appetites of the French army and kept them from disbanding. In reality, but for the help of their fellow countrymen in Spain, the Genoese would have been in great straits. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. 34,410, Wake to Conway, 20 May, 1625. *Mantua*, Striggi to Duke, April 24, May 2, 1625.]

The Venetians were meanwhile enquiring after the English fleet "with such passionate desire as if therein did consist" their only hope of safety. [*London, Brit. Mus.*, Add. 34,310, Wake to Conway, 20 May, 1625.]

But powerful as the English had been at sea during the reign of Elizabeth, their strength had decayed during the twenty-two years which had elapsed since James succeeded to the throne, and, moreover, it was impossible for any English Admiral to ignore the fact that the Spaniards had two fleets in being, and that if their navy was despatched to the Mediterranean they would leave their own coasts open to attack. As Van Male wrote to Spinola, the English gnashed their teeth when they spoke of Mardyke and of Dunkirk. [*Brussels, Etat et Guerre* 132, Van Male to Spinola, April 19, 1625. *Khevenhüller*, X. 959.] The handful of ships, which, owing to Spinola's foresight, had been built in Flanders, few as they were in numbers, could not be disregarded either by the English or by the Dutch. By their forays upon the herring fisheries the Dunkirkers had brought the exchequer of the United Provinces to the verge of bankruptcy. England did not dare to leave her shores exposed to invasion, when her late experiences with Mansfeldt's levies had shown her but too plainly the deficiencies of her militia. Had the Duke of Parma, men said, been supported by a squadron of seagoing ships at Nieuport, or at

Ostend, the Invincible Armada might well have carried its standards to victory in the Thames. The sons of the conquerors of 1588 know but too well the risks which had been run by their fathers, and Spinola might remember how the Spaniards had hastened to fit out a new armada, but three months after Medina Sidonia had returned discomfited to Santander. [*Genoa*, Let. Min., 2,419. Ettore Picameglio to Senate, Madrid 20, 24 Dec., 1588.] Calderon has, in his "Siege of Breda," shown us Spinola at the moment when he learnt the tidings that the banner of Savoy was floating on the mountains which fenced in the palaces of his native city. The great general knew that his presence would force the Duke, in his hour of triumph, to fold his tents and to slink away in terror from his camp. But he held Breda in his grasp, and not even to save Genoa could he forget what he owed to Philip IV., and to Spain. He knew that his country had nought to fear whilst sheltering under Spain's mighty wings. A mummer's lips spoke the truth. Spinola had saved Genoa in the Flemish dockyards. [Calderon, "El Sitio de Breda," Act. III.]

CHAPTER LXXII

THE English Navy had at its head as Lord High Admiral the Duke of Buckingham. In some respects he had from the first taken his charge seriously, and his views as to foreign affairs were beyond doubt coloured by his official position. His connection with marine affairs had taught him that the real rivals of England were the Dutch, and as a consequence he had for long favoured the idea of a Spanish marriage. When, however, his quarrel with Olivares had shown him that such a marriage would be disastrous to his own interests, he had turned his thoughts to an alliance with France, which would necessarily in the end lead to a rupture between England and Spain. He had, therefore, been forced to consider how such a war could be carried on. His visit to Madrid had taught him the weak joints in the harness of the Hapsburgs, and he saw clearly that a shrewd blow in the Rhoetic Alps or in Northern Italy might lay their pride in the dust.

Raleigh and Charles Emmanuel of Savoy had already learnt from the exploits of Ward that the high-board English ships were far superior to the galleys of Southern Europe even in their own waters. Buckingham, however, was the first statesman who endeavoured to carry their theories into practical effect. His first years in office were marked by Mansel's expedition against Algiers. Moreover, he was the first to put into practice the plans for an alliance with the Scandinavian powers and even with distant Russia, which, by enabling England to deprive the dockyards of Lisbon and of Cadiz of the naval stores from the Baltic and the White Sea, turned against Spain herself the weapons which Spanish strategists had for so long hoped to wield for the ruin of Holland. Nor did he fail to understand the importance of the objects which Spinola had sought to attain by fitting out a naval force on the Flemish coast, and was careful, therefore, not to allow the blockade of Dunkirk to be in any way relaxed. Possibly Buckingham may have attached too much weight to the Infanta's scanty forces, but, in any case, he showed

that he understood the value of sea power when used to put a steady pressure upon the enemy. The exploits of the Elizabethan seamen, so far as their offensive operations were concerned, had been merely a series of raids, which, in their permanent effects, were but as swordstrokes upon water. Buckingham, on the other hand, saw that by using a fleet to strike at his adversary's vital strategic points he might go far to attain the object of a war. The Palatinate might be regained at Genoa. It was unfortunate for George Villiers and for his fame that he allowed himself to be allured away from the coasts of Northern Italy to France and Spain. But Mansel's expedition had shown that if England was to undertake any naval operations other than mere raids, in the Mediterranean, it was indispensable that she should possess a base of her own in those waters. This base he studied from the first possible moment to acquire. Within a few days of Charles the First's accession Spinola was informed by the Flemish Resident in London that Buckingham had been making exhaustive inquiries as to Corsica, to which, said Rumour, the Genoese had sent their treasures. Van Male's information was, as a rule, correct, for he had previously reported that several ships were being sheathed as a protection against worms, a fact fully corroborated by the papers of the Secretary to the Admiralty. Many people supposed, therefore, that the fleet was to go to the West Indies, but, as the Resident shrewdly remarked, Buckingham was going in command of it in person, and it was unlikely that he would wish to be away from England for so long a time. "What I do see is that people here would gladly go to war but, at the same time, have not a farthing to do so with, for they have spent all the last money which Parliament voted, and have nothing to show for it. The Crown revenues are mortgaged to the hilt, and the late King died two millions in debt." It would be well, however, that, as reports were rife that even if Genoa were not attacked, a raid would be made upon Madeira, the Azores, or some point on the Spanish coast, some galleys should be kept at Mardyke, where they would do good service. [*Brussels*, E. et G., 132, Van Male to Spinola, 19 April, 3 May, 1625. Hist. MSS. Comm. Rep. Earl Cowper, Vol. I. Coke MSS., Burrell to Coke, Poplar, 24 April, Chudleigh to Coke, Queenborough, 22 May, 1625.]

It is probable that it was Charles Emmanuel who had turned Buckingham's thoughts towards Corsica. The Duke of Savoy

had long been stirring up trouble in the island and knew how the native population hated rulers who could not even protect them against the Barbary Corsairs. The famous towers which lined their coasts and which were destined to furnish England with the models for those raised to defend her against Napoleon, had neither garrisons nor artillery, and had fallen into decay. The soldiers had neither swords, muskets, nor powder. The officers were untrained swindlers, the ranks were filled with worn-out cripples. The only remedy which the Genoese Senate could suggest for these disorders was that the islanders should observe, with unwonted solemnity, the festival of Saint Bernard, whom they had lately enrolled amongst the patrons of the city. [*Genoa*, Let. Min. 2,433, Serra to Doge, Madrid, 3 Dec., 1625. Reg. Lit. Corsica, Doge to Governor of Corsica, 31 July, 1 Aug., 1625.]

The papers of the Principal Commissioner of the Navy, Sir John Coke, furnish a very similar picture of the condition of the English fleet. Coke was a nominee of Buckingham's, who had appointed him to his position on account of his knowledge of sea affairs. He was a lawyer by profession, eventually rising to the post of Master of Requests, and after being returned to Parliament by the Bishop of Exeter for his Cornish borough of St. Germans, was chosen to represent the University of Cambridge. Coke was esteemed by all for his independence, his diligence, and his earnestness. It was probably through no fault of his own that he failed to remedy a state of things which was the outcome not only of a defective administrative system, but of a lack of funds. It was an English tradition to starve the Navy. [Coke MSS., Preface, page 5, Sir F. Grevyll to John Coke, 4 Sept., 1615. Bishop of Exeter to Coke, 26 Jan., 1623-4.]

In 1614 the vote for the pay and upkeep of the Navy had been only £40,000, and that for victualling £10,000, at a time when the allowance for Ambassadors was £12,000 a year. [Coke MSS., 1614, October, Sir R. Bingley's report of the issues of the Crown for this year.]

At the head of the Administration was a Lord High Admiral, who, nominally, held his place for life, and was assisted by twelve Commissioners. His officers held their patents either from the King or from the Admiral during his pleasure, but depended upon the Admiral for promotion. They included a Treasurer, Surveyor, Comptroller, and Clerk, a Clerk of the Checque, and

the staffs at the dockyards. Their pay was low, their perquisites were large. The timber and planks were sold as "chips," provisions were wasted, subordinate places were sold. "Dead pays" and unlawful "allowances" defied the censures of the Commissioners. The fortresses were ill supplied. Chatham was protected only by the half-ruined Upnor Castle and a chain across the Medway, which were the laughing stock of the Dutchmen and Flemings, who came to the river for fuller's earth, and who could lay their finger upon every flaw in the Navy. Yet, with a good wind, a hostile fleet could reach Queenborough within ten hours from Flushing, and might come up with the tide to do mischief to the shipping. [Coke MSS., Sir R. Bingley's certificates of the several officers pertaining to H.M.'s ships, 10 July. Coke to Buckingham, 7 Nov., undated, 1618. To Naunton, Feb., 1618-19.] The pay of the officers was meagre in the extreme. Until 1613 the Lord High Admiral himself had never received an allowance, when on service, of more than five marks [£3 6s. 8d.] a day, but in that year it was raised to four pounds. The Vice Admiral's pay was half the Admiral's, the Rear Admiral's half the Vice Admiral's. That of the captains, which had been eighteen pence a day, was then half-a-crown, and Coke presumed that Buckingham would in no case increase it to more than five shillings. Under such circumstances, "great disorders have crept into the ships," such as "no other state endureth, nor did ours in former times." [Coke MSS. to Buckingham, 16 July, 1621.] Had all the men who were borne upon the pay rolls, been present in the flesh, the vessels would have been grossly overmanned, for every master vouched that with smaller crews in as large ships they had often been victorious in very great fights. The captains and commanders scarcely ever came on board but lived in luxury in London in "the double and never-heard-of allowances" which they drew from the Exchequer in addition to their "large wages upon the sea-books," and would miss a fair wind whilst they danced attendance upon the King at Windsor. Meanwhile the ships, which should have been chasing pirates or guarding convoys, rode in the Downs "wasting the King's cordage," or lay at anchor in some port whilst their crews lived on shore, and His Majesty had to pay "for their wages and victuals as if they had been in service." Possibly it was as well that the Royal Navy kept out of the way of the Dunkirkers and privateers who scoured

the Channel, for the ships "were often so ill-manned that they were ready prizes to all who dared assail them." [Coke MSS. Commissioners of Navy to Buckingham, March, 1618-19. Goddard to Coke, Chatham, 20 July, 1624. J. Downynge to Commissioners, 25 March, 1625.] The men's pay was always in arrears, their food so bad that they ran away, their numbers could only be kept up by the press gang. Those pressed often deserted. The working of the vessels was in the hands of the masters and boatswains, many of whom scarcely went on board their ships once a week, and were often ignorant of their duties, which were performed by deputies. The boatswains' errors as to powder and cordage "had become so habitual" that they did not "look on them as faults." [Coke MSS., Coke to Buckingham (Draft), 10 April, 1622. Downynge to Commissioners, 25 March, 1625. Do to Coke, 29 March, 1625. Sir R. Bingley to Coke, 17 Dec., 1623, as to the supplies from Spain on the fleet which brought back Charles from Santander. Edward Boate to Coke, 16 April, 1623. Sir Thomas Button's "unreasonable gains in victuals. His continual absence, having scarce been on board these three years. Waste in boatswain's stores. Two anchors and a cable lent unto the East India Company. A new cable sold by the Master, Mr. Brooke."]

The vessels were little better than their crews. The *Prince*, which had cost twenty thousand pounds and "was boasted to be of force to fight for a kingdom," had been built of old red and decaying timber, and her double planking of green and unseasoned stuff, so that within a very few years she required an outlay of six thousand pounds to make her "a strong and perfect ship," and "five hundred pounds would have to be laid out even to fit her to put to sea and make a show upon the coast." Coke, in reporting the matter to Buckingham, writes with unwonted indignation, "such faults, tending to the dishonouring and disarming of the State cannot with duty be either coloured or concealed." [Coke MSS., Coke to Buckingham (Draft), 1621.] At the same time, improvements in naval architecture were being introduced. The Dutch ships were copied and the galleries and high carvings which had been so conspicuous in older vessels were left out by Burrell, a designer who knew the dockyards of Holland well. [Coke MSS., Coke to Burrell, 6 August, 1624.]

Within six months of Charles' accession to the throne, he

had ordered Burrell and Pett, the second of a famous family of naval architects, to bring their models to him at Windsor, and to set down in writing their reasons "for and against gallies." Possibly the order was the outcome of Charles' studies in Spain, possibly Federigo Spinola's exploits had not been forgotten. At the same time painting, carving and high buildings were "to be forbidden in the King's ships." [Coke MSS., Notes by Sir John Coke (Secretary of State). "Ordered by His Majesty and the Council at Plymouth, 24 September, 1625." The editor queries "gallies" as "galleries."]

Pirates, French, Dutch, Flemish and Scotch, swarmed on the coast. The line between privateering and piracy was not strictly drawn, but although persons holding letters of marque had leave to dispose of their prizes in an English port, some pretence at least was maintained of preventing pirates from doing so. [Coke MSS. M. Broock to Buckingham, 10 Feb., 1622-3. Coke to Conway, 12 March, 1622-3. James Bagg, jr., to J. Coke, 8 May, 1623. Buckingham Commission to enquire as to the *Centaur*, 10 June, 1623. Chudleigh to Coke, 18 Nov., 1623. J. Weckfris to Capt. Love, 26 July, 1624. Smedmore to Gardner, 2 Aug., 1624. J. Bagge to Lord Admiral, Fowey, 20-21 Aug., 1624. Chudleigh to Coke, 21 Aug., 1624.]

As Buckingham in his quality of Lord Admiral was entitled to the profits of all prizes, it was difficult for any ship which had once been detained in an English port to escape condemnation. A Flemish vessel of four hundred tons had failed to strike her flags when she met the pinnace *Desire* off Portland. She was detained at Weymouth. "The Mayor of Weymouth certified me what she had done. A Turkish man of war was mastered by the Christian slaves, and then taken by this Fleming, who landed the Christians on our shore. The Mayor of Weymouth detained the Captain, the prize is in the custody of Mr. Gilbert Raleigh, the goods are in the *Desire*. The Fleming got ahead of me and sailed away eastward without captain or commission. This pinnace is an ill sailor, and of no force or countenance to command ships of the strength which many of these piratical rogues have." So writes Captain John Chudleigh to a Principal Commissioner of the Navy at the very moment when it seemed probable that within a few months the Infanta of Spain might land in England as Princess of Wales. Sir John Eliot as Vice Admiral of Devon, had to account to Buckingham for all ships

taken by him in virtue of his office. He had helped to secure Coke his seat in Parliament, yet Coke is forced to note upon Eliot's account that he had a "ship of corn and wines in his hands (£1,035) not accounted for." Vice Admiral Sir Henry Marvyn had been placed under arrest by order of the Council for selling the sugar and ordnance out of a French ship taken by a Fleming which had put into Plymouth. He made his peace with the French Ambassador and it was rumoured would be restored to his employment. Humbler freebooters purchased their pardons with chests of sugar bestowed upon county magnates. Pirates, with the full approval of the royal officers, haunted the Helford River and the creeks of the Isle of Wight, which was spoken of as a second Algiers, or lay off Orford Ness in wait for the colliers sailing from Newcastle to the Thames. Almost every month regular engagements took place in the Channel or in the North Sea between the freebooters and English men-of-war; during the whole time England was nominally at peace with every Christian power. [Coke MSS., Chudleigh to Coke, 18 Nov., 1623. Account of Sir John Eliot, Kt. (*sic.*), 10 Dec., 1624. Accounts to be given by Sir John Eliot to the Lord Admiral, 1624. Ersfield to Coke, Cowes, 12 June, 1625.]

In the opinion of grave merchants, piracy ranked as one of the chief causes of the decay of trade. [Coke MSS. Mr. Downing, concerning the decay of trade, 1622.]

Such was the state of the Navy when the request of the Duke of Savoy for the help of an English fleet in his expedition against Genoa reached Whitehall in August, 1624.

For the moment nothing was done, as James the First even then hoped to accomplish the restoration of the Palatine by diplomatic means. In the following November, however, Charles Emmanuel and Lesdiguières sent M. de Valois to London with fresh proposals for a joint attack on Genoa by England, France, and the Italian League. Wake was far from being in favour of the idea. France, he pointed out, was changeable, and the King was so much under the influence of the Jesuits that he might at any moment be induced to desert the allies. Savoy was bound hand and foot to France. Venice would not lift a finger to assist the Palatine. Lesdiguières, on whom Savoy mainly relied was, so Wake thought but erroneously, too old to be of use. The Pope's one wish was to keep the storm out of Italy, if not from beating upon Spain, and if matters could be arranged

in the Valtelline, he would gladly allow the Palatinate to remain as it was. Under these circumstances His Majesty, if he relied upon such an alliance to help the Palatinate, might find himself left alone, whilst the forces which had been got together in Italy might be employed either against the Huguenots in France or to attack Geneva. [*London, S.P.O., S.P. For., Savoy, No. 11, Wake to Conway, Turin, 8 Nov., 1624.*]

Conway was greatly under the influence of his son-in-law, and though Conway was Buckingham's "creature" the Duke seems to have been chiefly guided by him in Italian affairs. In consequence M. de Valois found but a cool reception at Whitehall, and the suspicions which Wake had hinted at left a lasting impression upon the minds of the authorities in England.

When, however, Charles the First had ascended the throne and by his marriage had become the brother-in-law of the Prince of Piedmont, fresh proposals on the subject were drawn up by the Savoyard Ambassador in Paris, which were laid before Charles and Buckingham by the Prince when he visited England, in June, 1625, after the wedding. In these proposals it was suggested that the English fleet should join Savoy and Guise in an attack upon Genoa which was "the mainstay of the power of Spain and Austria," and of more importance in their eyes "than Mexico, Peru, or the Indies." [*London, S.P.O. as above. Proposition's of the Savoyard Ambassador in Paris to Charles I. on the occasion of his marriage.*]

The time for submitting such a far reaching scheme was ill-chosen. Thanks to James' hesitating policy, the work of fitting out the fleet for sea had not been taken in hand until after Henrietta' Maria's marriage had been definitely arranged in the previous January, although it was still thought that it might be ready to sail by the end of May. [*Munich, Geh. St. Arch., Kast Sch., 486-23. Stefani to Elector, 18 March, 1625.*]

The preparations were vigorously carried forward. Ships, seamen and provisions were pressed everywhere. By the end of April sixty merchant vessels, mostly colliers and traders from the East Coast, were reported to be in readiness, and were victualled with bread, beef, beer, pork, cheese, butter, cod, ling, rice, oatmeal and oil. The beer, however, was stinking, the casks rotten and new pipe staves could scarcely be procured. The press gangs had abused their commissions, and tailors, shoemakers, weavers, and husbandmen, who had been pressed rather out of malice than

because they were fit for service," had to be discharged in large numbers. Only forty good men could be found amongst the crew of the flagship. The victuallers sent in bags of biscuit which were fourteen pounds short in the hundredweight, the gunners who fired the salutes when the new King was proclaimed at Chatham were forced to sell powder to pay their charges. [*Coke MSS.*, pp. 179, 189-203.]

The Governnmet however, put a bold face upon their deficiencies. Roysterers in Paul's Walk boasted that such a fleet had never before been seen at sea, and predicted that victory was certain unless the commanders blundered. Soberer citizens shuddered when they bethought themselves that the stores were already stinking and that meat could not be salted in the summer. [*Munich, Stefani to Elector, 13 May, 1625.*]

Under these circumstances there could be no question of acting upon the Prince of Piedmont's proposals, although he was informed that England would lend him some vessels.

In the meantime great uncertainty prevailed as to its intended destination, although it was generally believed that it could attack Portugal or the Azores as large forces of soldiers were being sent to Plymouth. These men behaved as badly whilst on the march as Mansfeldt's rabble had done in the previous year, and loud complaints were made by every county which they traversed. [*Munich, Stefani to Elector, 4 July, 1625. Brussels, E. et G. 132. Van Male to Spinola, 16 May, 1625.*]

June wore on into July, but the fleet still lay at anchor in the Downs or in Plymouth Sound. The delay proved fatal to its success.

Had the expedition been in readiness to sail by the beginning of April it would have found the coast of Spain all but unguarded, as the best ships in the Spanish navy were absent in Brazilian waters, whilst in Italy, the forces of Savoy were still lying on the shores of the Gulf of Genoa. All thoughts at Brussels were turned towards Breda, and work in the Flemish arsenals was all but suspended. By the end of June, however, the situation had changed. D. Fadrique de Toledo had succeeded in recovering Bahia, and was therefore free to make his way back into the northern waters, whilst a force of sixty galleys had gathered to protect Genoa against an attack by Guise's squadron at Marseilles. Almost immediately after the surrender of Breda, Spinola had hastened to the Flemish coast, where he was soon joined by the

Infanta. The States-General, on receiving the news of his preparations, had despatched large reinforcements to their fleet blockading Dunkirk. Had these vessels been sent to join the French at Marseilles, France and Savoy would have been the masters of the Ligurian Sea.

By the middle of May the instructions for Buckingham had been drafted. In them it was stated that the fleet had been fitted out to enforce the King's mediation for the Palatine. The Duke was commissioned to procure information without delay as to the state of the naval preparations on the Spanish coast. [*London, Brit. Mus., Add MSS. 34,310, Wake to Conway, 20, 27 June, 4 July, 1625. Brussels, E. et G., 193, Philip IV. to Infanta, 29 Sept., 1625. Munich, Reichsarch, 30 J. K. John Gordon. Brussels, 5 July, Trumbull, 11, 16, 30 Aug., 1625. Mantua, Priandi to Duke, 16 May, 21, 29 Aug., 5 Sept., 1625. Coke MSS., 1625, May, Instructions for D. of Buckingham. Khevenhüller X., p. 959. Rubens, Vol. III., pp. 378-390, Rubens to Jean Brant, 20 July, pp. 390-392, Rubens to Valarez, 19 Sept., 1625. Villa, pp. 455-457.*]

But whilst the ships in the Thames were loitering for one another, the plague had broken out in London. The pestilence soon spread to the fleet, and wrought fearful ravages in the overcrowded vessels, where even vinegar to wash the decks was lacking amongst men ill-clad and fed upon rotten bread and stinking fish. All efforts to arrest its progress proved of no avail. By the beginning of August the Bills of Mortality in London had risen to 4,515 a week, and more than twenty thousand families had left the city to spread the disease throughout the country. The greatest centres of infection were the churches where sick and sound crowded together at the communion tables. Even the Jesuits, except one who remained to attend to their correspondence, had fled before the storm, and he, too, left after the disease had broken out in the house next to their convent in Clerkenwell. The King and Queen fled from Whitehall and wandered from place to place vainly endeavouring to escape from the infection. The Catholics who lay in Newgate heard the bell at Saint Sepulchre's tolling night and day through the wards where sick and sound were huddled together, and prepared for death. "Even the heretics noted the singular mercy of God in protecting them for scarcely a Catholic was infected. The Puritans murmured that their immunity showed that they were not amongst the number of the Elect,

because they did not suffer from the disease like the followers of the Gospel. However a Jesuit priest had died when ministering to a plague-stricken man." [*Munich, Reichsarch*, 30 J. K., No. 125, Trumbull. *Brussels*, 23 August., 1625. *Do. Geh. St. A.*, 486-23. *London*, 18 July, 2 Aug., 26 Aug., 1625. *Brussels*, *Etat et Guerre* 132. Jacques Bruneau to Spinola, 15 Aug., 1625. *Rutland*, Vol. I., Preface. *Coke MSS.* Sir A. Apsley to Sir J. Coke, 5 Aug., 1625. Sir F. Stewart to Sir J. Coke, 10 Aug., Chudleigh to Coke, 27, 30 June. Burrell to Coke, 18 July, 1625.]

Both the east coast and the Thames were defenceless. Two or three Dunkirkers could easily have burned Harwich and the colliers which were riding at Ipswich, and it was impossible to find ten ships to guard the Thames, although rumours of Spinola's preparations at Dunkirk were everywhere in circulation. Kent was equally defenceless, and if the enemy seized Sandwich they could at any time make it into a strong position by cutting through the neck of marsh between the Stour and the Sea. Spinola, however, had his own difficulties to contend with. Money was so scarce that the soldiers had not received a penny of pay for three months, the plague was raging in Flanders and a fleet of 29 sail was blockading the coast. He himself was fitting out a squadron of twenty-five sail for sea which were to be manned with four or five thousand Walloons, Spaniards and Irishmen, and was determined to take the offensive at the first opportunity. It was an axiom indeed in Spain that the State which remains upon the defensive at sea is lost. [*Coke MSS.*, Wolstenholme and Burrell to Coke, Deputy-Lieutenants of Kent to Lord Lieutenants, 9 Sept., 1625. *Munich, Reichsarch*, 30 J. K., No. 125, Trumbull 16, 23 Aug. *Rubens*, Vol. III., pp. 390-392. *Brussels*, *Etat et Guerre* 193, Philip IV. to Infanta, 11 Sept., Infanta to Philip IV., 9 Nov., 1625.]

The English Parliament, in the meantime, had been occupied with its quarrels with the Duke of Buckingham and in disputes as to its control over the expenditure of the monies which had been voted to the Crown. To escape the pestilence it had transferred its session from London to Oxford, whither it was followed by the plague and after some acrimonious debates was speedily adjourned. A vote of supplies was carried in a thin house from which fear of infection had kept many members absent.

It had already been decided that the fleet should assemble at Plymouth, and in the middle of September Charles arrived there

bringing with him several waggon loads of money. [*Brussels*, *Etat et Guerre*, 132, Jacques Bruneau to Spinola, 15 Aug., 1625. No. 193, Infanta to Philip IV., 20 October, 1625. *Munich*, *Geh. St. Arch.*, 468/23, Stefani to Elector, 26 Aug., 1625.]

The King's marriage had taken place in the previous May. The ceremony took place at Paris, the bridegroom being represented before the altar of Notre Dame by a proxy, his kinsman the Duke of Chevreuse. Foreign onlookers noted that the Queen Mother's face beamed with delight as she stood witnessing the consummation of her long labours. The marriage indeed had been chiefly her work. The ceremony was marked by an incident which might well have seemed ominous. A balcony had been put up to accommodate the suite of English ambassadors facing the platform on which the marriage was being performed. It gave way, those seated in it were hurled to the ground and severely injured; Rubens who was sitting on the edge of the next balcony escaped with difficulty. He had received a buffet of plate worth two thousand gold crowns for painting two portraits [£941 13s. 4d]. Louis XIII. had presented the English envoys with jewels to the value of thirty thousand crowns [£7,500], whilst Buckingham had received a hat cord valued at fifty thousand [£12,500.] The recipients, however, murmured loudly at the royal parsimony for they had expended twenty-five thousand pistoles [£20,000] on their gifts to the courtiers.

From Paris the new Queen of England journeyed to Amiens attended by the whole court, and here Buckingham, amidst his flirtations with Anne of Austria, in vain endeavoured to induce the French Government to pledge themselves to assist the Protestant League and to secure the restoration of the Palatine. The Duke returned to England in dudgeon at their refusal. [*Rubens*, Vol. III., p. 351, Rubens to Pierese, 23 May, 1625. *Munich*, Stefani to Elector, July 4, 1625. *Mantua*, Priandi to Duke, May 16, 1625.]

It had been expected that the marriage might have afforded an opportunity for an arrangement between Louis XIII. and the Rochellers through the mediation of Charles I. Henrietta Maria was to fall upon her knees before her brother and secure his promise that Fort Louis should be demolished. In return the Rochellers would hand back the ships which Soubise had in the previous February carried off from Blavet and would slight the fortifications which they had erected upon the islands of Rhé and

Oleron. These hopes, however, were not realized. [*Mantua*, Priandi to Duke, May 7, 16, 21, June 6, 1625. *Bassompierre*, Vol. III., pp. 201-202.]

The plague was raging at Calais so Henrietta Maria with her train of eight hundred attendants was forced to cross from Boulogne to Dover convoyed by an English squadron. The preparations for her reception at Dover throw a curious light upon the condition of the first English town seen by strangers arriving from the Continent. The gallows were removed from the market place and the place where they had stood was repaired. The streets were duly cleansed and the hogs which usually strayed about them expelled. The glass in the Custom House and the cushions in its hall were repaired, a landing stage for Her Majesty's disembarkation was erected on the open beach, and the constables' staves were carefully repainted. The Corporation expended ninety pounds on two great cups which had been specially brought from London to present to the King and Queen, and distributed twenty-nine pounds amongst the royal heralds and officers. The King met his bride at Dover Castle and went on with her the same night to Canterbury, whence they proceeded to Hampton Court, where they remained until forced to remove by an outbreak of the plague amongst the household. [*Dover*, Corporation Records, *Coke MSS.*, Love to Coke, May 27, Capt. H. St. John Mildmay, 1625, July 6. *Lejeune*, Vol. II., *op. cit.*, pp. 496-497.]

The marriage from the first was not a happy one. Charles had already begun to put the Penal Laws in force against the Catholics, and Buckingham, out of fear of the hostility of Parliament, had thrown himself wholly into the hands of the Puritans. He loudly boasted that whilst the fleet was humbling the King of Spain, he would convert the Queen to Protestantism and recover the Palatinate. As one of the chief reasons which had led the French to agree to the marriage was the hope that concessions would be granted to the English Catholics, Henrietta Maria was bitterly disappointed when she saw how matters really stood, and learnt that the accounts sent to France were false. She was always bathed in tears and was forced to look on in silence when Buckingham loaded her favourite, Mme. de St. Georges, with coarse abuse and ordered her never to enter her mistress's presence. The injured lady was well known in Savoy and through her letters the treatment which Charles inflicted upon his wife became known throughout Europe. The quarrel between Buckingham

and the Queen's French attendants was destined to have important political consequences. [*Munich* ib., Geh. St. Arch. London, 8-18 July, 1625.]

Buckingham's negotiations with France had already produced one unfortunate result on English policy.

The French Government were greatly embarrassed by the attitude of the Rochellers who not only enjoyed the secret support of Spain, but also had at their disposal the squadron captured by Soubise. In order to assist them the English Government, like the Dutch, turned their thoughts from the Mediterranean, and the ships, which, if united with Guise's galleys at Marseilles, might have laid Genoa, and with Genoa the power of Spain, in the dust, rode idly in the roads of Dieppe, whilst their commander quarrelled with the French as to the conditions of his employment. A small squadron of seven vessels had been placed under the command of Captain Penington with orders to report himself to the French Admiral, Montmorency, who at once proposed to employ him to transport troops against Rochelle. Penington had, however, received instructions from Buckingham himself not to admit above half the number of his ships' companies on board, and on no account to engage himself either against the Protestants or in the French Civil Wars. He asked for explanations and was told by Montmorency that he was to be employed against Soubise, upon which he returned to the English coast, whilst his sailors clamoured that they would rather be hanged or thrown overboard than raise a hand in such a cause. Louis XIII. condescended to write to the English captain asking him to carry out his sovereign's wishes by placing himself without reserve under Montmorency's command, and on referring to Buckingham he received peremptory orders to return to Dieppe, and to hand over his ships to the French. Penington was forced to obey and by the middle of August the English and the Dutch squadrons were cruising with Montmorency's fleet off the Ile Dieu expecting at any moment to engage Soubise. On the sixteenth of September the two fleets met. The victory remained with the Royalists, Soubise himself escaped with difficulty from his pursuers and sought refuge in Cornwall. On the previous day M. de Thoyras had landed on the Isle of Rhé and occupied it in Louis' name.

It would now, therefore, be easy for the King to construct a chain of forts round Rochelle and to reduce it to obedience by a

blockade, especially if the great body of the Huguenots remained quiet.

Great was the indignation amongst the English Puritans when they learnt that a portion of the English navy had been employed to crush their brethren in France. They were unaware that the tidings of Montmorency's victory were as unwelcome at the Nunciature and at the Spanish Embassy in Paris, as they were on the London Change, for the Pope looked upon the troubles in France as a means of facilitating a peace in Italy whilst the Spaniards made but little secret of the fact that they were using the Rochellers as their tools to defend themselves and to prolong the war. The French, on the other hand, saw that if they put down their troubles at home they would the sooner be able to restore peace abroad, and for a time they had hoped to secure the help of all sections of the Huguenots in an expedition to Italy. [*Coke MSS.*, MSS, Penington to Coke, June 28. Coke to Penington June. Louis XIII. to Penington, July. Penington to Coke, 18 July, 1625. *Mantua*, Priandi to Duke, May 16, June 6, 17, July 1, Aug. 8, 21, Sept. 23, Oct. 4, 1625. *Bassompierre*, Vol. III., p. 210.]

In France, as in Flanders, negotiations for peace were an almost invariable accompaniment of the operations of war. Early in May the Pope's nephew Cardinal Francis Barberino had arrived in France, with instructions to bring about a settlement in Italy. Urban the Eighth had been greatly annoyed at the expulsion of his garrisons from the Valtelline by Cœuvres, and was above all things anxious to settle this question out of personal grounds. He saw, rightly enough, that if the Valtelline question was arranged it would be easy to bring about an arrangement between Savoy and Genoa, as the Duke, if deprived of French support, would lay down his arms. The Legate accomplished nothing. The Pope wished the forts to be handed back to the Catholics and a provision made that only the Catholic religion should be tolerated in the valley. The plan for a Fourth League was barely considered. The French, who saw in the Valtelline Catholics only the tools of Spain, insisted that the Grisons should be restored to their full sovereignty whilst the Spaniards were to be excluded from the right of passage. The difficulty proved insurmountable, and the Legate left Fontainebleau on the 21st September, after refusing the costly tapestries offered to him by the King. Nor were the negotiations with the Rochellers more fortunate, for they would

sign nothing until Fort St. Louis had been demolished, and to this proposal the King could not agree, despite their lavish offers of assistance beyond the Alps. Their refusal had been the signal for Montmorency to attack Soubise's fleet, and his defeat left them at the mercy of the King. A large party amongst the French nobility was, however, far from anxious to see the Huguenots annihilated, and the chastisement of the rebels was deferred until after the settlement of the troubles in Italy. [*Mantua*, Priandi to Duke, litt. citt., *Bassompierre*, Vol. III., p. 206.]

Meanwhile the hopes of the Genoese were in some degree reviving. The Venetians had, from the first, greatly disliked the idea of an attack upon Genoa, whilst the resistance of Riva and the reluctance of the French Ministers to engage in an open war with Spain prevented either Cœuvres or Lesdiguières from attempting to hold Fera in check by an attack on the Milanese. The Duke of Savoy who was anxious to obtain the title of King through the influence of the Prince of Piedmont at Paris was growing every day more embittered against the Constable who was believed even by the French courtiers to be putting the pay of eight thousand men in his own pocket. The Genoese who dreaded nothing so much as the appearance of an English and Dutch fleet in their Gulf were encouraged by their failure to arrive, and, in his turn, the Duke of Fera advanced towards the frontiers of Piedmont and of Monferrat. The Duke of Savoy and the Constable for a moment forgot their differences and retreated on the road to Turin, but were overtaken by Fera who forced them to throw themselves into Verrua and on the seventh of August laid siege to the place. The besieged made a desperate resistance.

The Emperor sent thirty thousand Germans through Switzerland to reinforce Fera's army, but they were so wasted by sickness during their march that scarcely five thousand arrived at his camp. On the other hand the French whose hands were in some degree freed by their victory at sea were now less reluctant to come to an open breach with Spain and hurried reinforcements over the Alps under Vignoles. He arrived before Verrua on November the ninth and on the seventeenth Fera was forced to raise the siege. The news was received with delight in Paris, as it was thought that the way was now open for the Pope to bring about a general peace, but the opportunity had been lost for striking a deadly blow at Spain by the capture of Genoa, through

the combined efforts of England, France, Holland and Savoy. [*Mantua*, Priandi to Duke, July-November, 1625. *Bassompierre*, Vol. III., pp. 207-210. *Genoa*, Senate to Serra, Madrid, 12, 18 June, 1625.]

Although the plan for a joint attack upon Genoa by the French and Savoyards supported by an English fleet has attracted but little attention from our naval historians, there can be scarcely a doubt that it might have been successfully carried out in the spring or summer of 1625, if the English contractors had acted with common honesty, and had not Spinola's fleet, small though it was, been on the Flemish coast. It is true that the vacillating policy of James the First had prevented the expedition from being fitted out in the early spring, but he had died on the ninth of April and the expedition might well have sailed from Plymouth for the Spanish coast by the end of May, and could, in that case, have passed the Straits of Gibraltar without opposition. The English would have reached the Gulf of Genoa by the beginning of July, at a moment when the Prince of Piedmont and Marshal Créquy were within ten miles of Savona, and when Feria was still acting on the defensive in the Milanese, although a force of sixty galleys had been assembled at Genoa. All through the early summer the Spaniards had been in terror lest the English should enter the Mediterranean. At the end of June it was rumoured at Madrid that a hundred English vessels had been seen cruising off the Straits of Gibraltar. One division was said to be provisioned for six months, the other for a year. It was supposed that the latter would make their way to Marseilles, and after uniting with Guise's gallees there would join in an attack upon Genoa, whilst the other would join with the Dutch in an effort to capture the Silver Fleet on its way from the Indies. A fast sailing galley had, indeed, been despatched to warn the captains of the Flota to put back and remain for a time in some safe port. As it was thought that the English might seize and fortify some points on the North African coast which would secure them a safe passage through the Straits, large reinforcements were hurried to Ceuta. To prevent them from deserting both officers and men were given three months' pay in advance, a measure which was not altogether successful.

The Spaniards were almost as little prepared for a maritime war as were the English. For lack of men and money Ribera's galleys, despite the urgent appeal of the Genoese senate, were

forced to remain idly in Spain, at a moment when Guise's fleet was lying at Villefranche, where the Duke had an interview with the Prince of Piedmont. His preparations, however, had been delayed for want of money, and when he arrived there, Charles Emmanuel had already quarrelled with Lesdiguières. Guise was consequently taken away from his squadron and was employed to raise four regiments for the service of Savoy in Provence. Before he had completed his task, both the Duke of Savoy and the Constable had been forced to recross the Appennines, lest their communications should be cut off by the advance of Feria. Thus Savoy had lost the chance of taking Genoa by a combined sea and land attack. It is characteristic of the diplomacy of the day that Feria was believed to have delayed sending help to Genoa until he had received a present of two hundred thousand crowns [£50,000.]

On paper the Spanish naval strategists were extremely capable, whatever may be thought of their methods of carrying their plans into execution. Olivares assembled a fleet of about thirty five galleons at Lisbon, and ordered them to follow the English fleet wherever it might go. All these vessels were sound and good, and but for the lack of powder, cannon, and sea stores, sixty might have been fitted out. Despite Serra's piteous protests, he had ordered Ribera's galleys to Lisbon in place of sending them into the Gulf of Genoa, for he saw that so long as a Spanish fleet was threatening the English communications in the Atlantic no English admiral would venture into the Mediterranean. After some discussion Olivares convinced the Genoese enemy of the reasonableness of his views.

"It is true," writes Serra, "that all they can do here may seem but a small matter when we compare it with a magnificent fleet like the English one, which has certainly been fitted out to throw a force upon land somewhere. It is known that they have shipped more than six hundred ladders with other siege implements upon a similar scale. . . . As to what concerns ourselves, supposing that they are really going against us, it is clear enough that their original design was to attack us simultaneously both by land and sea, and although I cannot but be very anxious as to a business which is so all-important to us, I am in some degree relieved when I reflect that the delay in the sailing of the fleet has in a great measure thrown their plans out of gear. Possibly Lesdiguières did his best to give them

time to carry them out, but now that the enemy have begun their retreat by falling back from Voltaggio, it seems out of the question that they can hang on waiting for the English, and so the scheme must have come to nothing. It is certain that the English will never risk an attack by sea, unless they are supported by land, and, at this time of year, even if they sail at once, I hope it will be a long time before they reach your shores. Moreover, when they do so they will probably fall in with calms in the Gulf, and will be forced to lie to without doing anything and be exposed to the attacks of the galleys, which can harass them constantly and prevent any attempts at landings without exposing themselves to their broadsides. As, too, their soldiers are, as I have already informed you, the very quintessence of riff-raff, we may hope that they will suffer so much from the hardships of a long voyage in the great heats, that they will be good for very little when they get to you, so I trust in God they are not going to do us much harm, but all the same we ought to prepare ourselves to face all possible eventualities. We ought above all things to look to the defences of the Gulf of Spezzia and any other point of our coast which might be threatened, and the moment I hear they have passed the Straits, and are steering for Italy, I will send an express to warn you to be in readiness. You will then be able to take every possible measure to defend yourselves against these enemies who are also those of the Faith of Christ, as I may add all our other foes are likewise, for they have more than proved it by their deeds."

As the Genoese envoys, like the Venetians, wrote despatches to be read to a large assembly, expressions of ardent piety were never thought to be out of place. Such expressions are correspondingly rare in the letters of diplomats like Tarantaise and Olivares, who wrote solely for the eyes of a handful of cynical statesmen, and are even more seldom found in those of potentates like Philip the Fourth and Charles Emmanuel of Savoy. When they do occur they are, so far as human judgment can decide, sincere.

Great was the relief at Madrid when it became known that the stores in the English fleet had been spoilt and that the plague had broken out on board the ships. For a time indeed, it was hoped that the expedition would come to nothing. The tidings had arrived almost at the same moment as those of the recovery

of Bahia. A few days later it was ascertained that the Dutch vessels which had been cruising to intercept the flota had returned to their own ports. A portion of Toledo's squadron was already on its way from Brazil to join the fleet which had been collected at Lisbon, and which by the addition of these seventeen vessels would be placed in a position to harass the communications of the English fleet should they decide to steer for Italy.

Serra gives a concise summary of the situation in the middle of August. "Most people think that the expedition will never sail at all. They argue that it has proved impossible to man it, and that the coasts have everywhere been put into a thorough state of defence. Another good omen is that we are expecting the arrival of the fleet from Brazil. If this joins the galleons which have already been got together they will be far superior in numbers to the English, and will give King Charles and the Dutch cause enough for apprehension, whilst the fleet which the Spaniards are going to keep up at Mardyke, which is close to the English coast and to the course usually steered by vessels from the Low Countries, will do them an infinity of mischief. All the necessary orders have been given for fitting out this squadron at once and as Marquis Spinola is to be placed in absolute control of it, it will soon be ready for sea."

He was correct as to the state of feeling in England, where an invasion was expected at any moment in the absence of the fleet. London, deserted by all authority, seemed at the mercy of an attack from the forces of the Infanta, Spinola, and Gondomar, and was guarded only by merchant vessels, many of which could not be armed for want of funds.

Spinola's efforts had been crowned with success: the squadron lying in Dunkirk harbour consisted of twenty-five large vessels manned by four or five thousand men, most of whom were either Flemings or Irish. Twenty of them made their way out of Dunkirk and anchored under Mardyke Fort.

It was thought, however, that it would be impossible for them to put to sea in the presence of the Dutch blockading squadron of fifty vessels, commanded by Admiral William of Nassau. So slightly did he esteem Spinola's preparations that he set sail for England at the end of September with fifteen vessels and on the fourth of October joined the fleet assembled in Plymouth Sound.

The plague was raging everywhere in Flanders, and the Infanta had sought refuge at Dunkirk with Spinola and Don Luis de Velasco. Under her watchful care the fleet had been very carefully fitted out, and in no wise deserved the contempt with which Nassau appeared to regard it.

The English fleet had been placed under the command of Sir Edward Cecil, Viscount Wimbledon, the youngest son of the great Burleigh. Under him as Vice Admirals were the Earl of Essex, whose father had taken Cadiz in 1596, and the Earl of Denbigh, a country gentleman from Warwickshire, who claimed kinsmanship with the House of Austria, but who owed his title to his marriage with Buckingham's sister, Susan Villiers.

The Dutch were under the command of William, an illegitimate son of the late Prince Maurice, with Mr. Laurence Revell as Vice-Admiral. As the name of Revell ranks high in the list of the nobility of Piedmont, it is possible that he was appointed on account of some connection with Savoy. Lord Valentia was Master General of the Ordinance: the Sergeant Major General was Sir William St. Leger. Amongst the Captains of the ships were Samuel Argall and John Chudleigh, both well-known seamen, the former of whom had been on Mansel's expedition. Amongst the Colonels were Conway's eldest son, Sir Edward, and Sir Henry Bruce, a distinguished Scottish soldier of fortune, who had been in the Austrian service.

All the higher officers, both Dutch and English, sat in the Council of War which comprised in all twenty-five members.

The fleet consisted of ninety sail with six ketches or yachts to act as despatch boats.

It was divided into three squadrons, commanded respectively by Wimbledon, Essex, and Denbigh. Each of the squadrons included three King's ships, of which the flagship, the *Anne Royal*, of a thousand tons burden, was the largest, the *Dreadnought*, of four hundred and fifty-eight tons, was the smallest, and two catches, with twenty-four or twenty-five merchant vessels, most of which had been employed in the coal trade between Newcastle and the Thames.

The merchant vessels were for the most part ships of between 250 and 300 tons burden with 20 to 26 guns. Some of their commanders had been formerly pirates. They were terribly overcrowded. The *Long Robert*, which was wrecked at Cadiz, had on board a hundred and seventy-five sea and land men.

Two colliers commanded by old "sea sharks," which deserted the fleet and went off to cruise for prizes on their own account, carried off with them two hundred and eighty-four soldiers.

The fleet had a tonnage of 26,507 tons, and was manned by 5,441 seamen. The landsmen numbered 9,983, making a total of 15,424 men in all. The Dutch squadron was of fifteen sail. The artillery included ten large brass guns and ten small field pieces.

It is difficult to understand why Cecil should have been chosen to command the expedition. By his own confession he was no great seaman, and was therefore forced to rely entirely upon the advice of his sea-captains and masters as regards all naval affairs. At the same time, he was a man of undecided character, who did not understand the art of either exercising his initiative and authority or of inducing subordinates to give advice, which, unless asked by their superior to do so, they might naturally feel unwilling to proffer. Such a man was not one to command a large force composed of two different and very ambitious nations. As Contarini, the Venetian Minister at the Hague, foresaw from the outset, it was almost inevitable that the design should fail, for the Dutch and English did not understand how to work together, and he could only hope that a sense of their common interests would gradually teach them to do so.

Possibly the very qualities which made Cecil unfit to act as an independent commander were those which had recommended him to Buckingham as a subordinate at the time when the Lord Admiral had thought of commanding the expedition in person. Cecil had spent many years in military employment in Holland, and since 1620 had been a General in the Dutch service as well as a Member of the English Council of War. Thus his training might well have enabled him to act as Buckingham's go-between with William of Nassau, as Aston had acted as the Duke's go-between with Olivares and the Nuncio.

The Earl of Essex although personally brave and a resourceful soldier, had had no experience at sea, but Denbigh had been in command of the squadron which brought Charles home from Spain.

William of Nassau was described by a friendly English pen as "a brave and hopeful young gentleman and of good command," and had Sir Charles Morgan been appointed in Cecil's place, he might have worked with him as well as he had done with his

brother Justinus at Breda. But fate willed otherwise, and the great joint expedition from which so much had been hoped was ruined by its commanders. [*Genoa*. Serra to Doge, 3, 31 May, 1 July, 22 Aug., 1625; Philip IV. to Juan de Ciriza, 3 May, Senate to Serra, 3 May, 12, 18 June, 12 Sept., 1625. *Turin*, Tarantaise to Duke, 11 June, 20, 29 July, 30 Sept., 1625. *Mantua*, Striggi to Duke, 11 June, 20, 29 July, 30 Sept., 1625. *Priandi*, 5, 18, 19, July, 21 Aug., 5, 12, 19 Sept., 1625. *Brussels*, E. et G., 193, Infanta to Philip IV., 2 Oct., Philip IV. to Infanta, 11 Sept., 12 Oct., 1625. *Munich*, Reichsarch, 30 J.K., Trumbull's Uncle, Hague, 11 August. Contarini to Valiero, Hague, 11 Aug. Do. to Padavino, Minister in Vienna, 10 Nov. Trumbull, Brussels, 16, 23, 30 Aug., 20 Sept., 1625. *Dublin*, Trinity College, Miscellanea, No. 806, p. 346, "The Earl of Essex' Voyage to Cales." *London Brit. Mus.*, add. 34,310, Wake to Conway, Venice, 18 April, 23 May, 27 June, 4, 18, 31 July, 1625. Coke MSS., Letters to and from Sir John Coke and others, 31 Aug., 17 Oct., 1625. Khevenhüller, Part IX., p. 959. Glanville, John, "The Voyage to Cadiz in 1625" (London, Camden Society, 1883), pp. xv.-xvii., 1, 2, 3, 36-37, 125-127.]

CHAPTER LXXIII

ON the first of October, 1625, the grand fleet weighed anchor and set out with a fair wind from Plymouth Sound. Lord Wimbledon's instructions were precise. The Admirals and Captains were to come on board the flagship twice a day, morning and evening, to receive his instructions, and the various squadrons were at all times to keep behind their admiral's ships. If any vessel became separated from the fleet, it was to make for the "southward cape upon the coast of Spain," in the latitude of 37 which was one of the places of rendezvous. If it failed to find Wimbledon there, it was to sail for Cadiz Bay or for San Lucar, which was the other rendezvous. Although it was well known at Plymouth that a Spanish squadron of sixty vessels was collected at Lisbon, part of which was cruising to look out for the expedition between Cape Finisterre and the Burlings, no account was taken of the possibility of their attack. But little care was taken to distribute these instructions amongst the captains, many of whom never had them at all, yet only six of the fleet were missing when it arrived at Cadiz. The want, however, of an orderly course in sailing caused many collisions between the vessels especially at night, and they sustained great injury in cases where a good watch was not kept.

The winds were contrary on the second and part of the fleet was forced to return to Plymouth, whilst others took refuge in Falmouth. On the eighth they put to sea and ran quickly southward before a fresh gale which lasted until the 12th, when bad weather set in as they were crossing the Bay of Biscay, and scattered the vessels far and wide. The storm lasted two days. On the nineteenth they sighted the coast at the mouth of the River Mondego, and after making Cape Saint Vincent on the 20th all assembled together again on the twenty-first. Though the weather was foul, Essex and his squadron entered the Bay of Cadiz on the 22nd and ran up as close to the town and to the ships and galleys in the roads, as they could do without running themselves aground. [*Coke MSS., Langford to Sir James Bagg, 29 Sept. Coke to*

Buckingham, Oct. 8. Capt. Love's Instructions for the Fleet. Capt. Levett's Relation, 1625. *Dublin*, "The Earl of Essex's Voyage to Cadiz." *Turin*, Inghilterra, Mazzo 4, Barozzi to Duke, Salisbury, October 20, 1625. *Munich*, *Geh. St. Ar.*, Stefani to Elector. *Rouen*, 25 November, 1625. *Mantua*, Priandi to Duke, 4, 18 October, 1625. *Brussels*, Infanta to Philip IV., 2 October, Philip IV. to Infanta, 24 October, 1625.]

Naval discipline was at a low ebb in the seventeenth century, and from the outset it became clear that Wimbledon was not the man to maintain order amongst the motley crew of pirates, and merchant captains who had been impressed to take part in his expedition.

Scarcely was his ship out of sight of the Lizard when two of the colliers took advantage of the storm to desert and go off in pursuit of two Hamburg traders which they plundered and took into Falmouth. The vessels were detained as good prizes. [*Coke MSS*, Bagg to Coke, Oct. 17. *Apsley* to Coke, Oct. 17. *Bagg* to Coke, Nov. 9. *Coke* to Burke, Nov. 5, 1625.]

The storm which had fallen upon the fleet in the Bay of Biscay had raged in the Channel and in the North Sea with results which had much to do with causing the failure of the plans which had been so carefully laid against Spain. Rarely have the advantages even of a weak fleet in being, when it is placed at a point of strategical importance, been so clearly shown as they were by the influence which the presence of Spinola's squadron at Dunkirk exercised upon the fortunes of the expedition against Cadiz.

The Dutch blockading fleet which generally lay within sight of Dunkirk was dispersed by the gale. It usually consisted of forty sail which had recently been joined by five English vessels. Three of them were driven upon the French coast, the others were scattered far and wide over the North Sea. Twenty-two of the ships in Dunkirk at once slipped out, fell upon the Dutch herring fleet, sunk forty out of the two hundred smacks, and took a vessel laden with coffee and cochineal, and two others with salt and herrings; the fishermen of Ostend and Nieuport also took heart, put to sea, and made three other prizes.

Great was the consternation in England when it was known that the blockade had been broken, and that the Dunkirkers were lying off the coast near Scarborough. Experienced admirals warned the Admiralty that any desperate attempt might be expected: the militia were hurriedly called out. Harwich,

where it was thought probable that Spinola might make a landing, was garrisoned with ten thousand men; the defences of Dover were hastily strengthened. The Puritans, who professed to believe that the Catholics would rise in rebellion and that they had collected arms for many thousands of men, searched their houses all over the Kingdom. Nothing was discovered, although a few ladies living together in informal religious communities were insulted by over zealous magistrates. The Dunkirk vessels were formidable opponents for they had no galleries, painting, or overhanging weight and so were better sailers than the English. To resist them it would be necessary to build vessels on the same model of about two to three hundred tons burden and armed with twenty or twenty-five guns. Graving places would have to be established at Dover and at Falmouth where these ships could be sent once a month to be washed, greased, and refitted for sea, an operation which required three days. In the meantime the corsairs ranged the Channel at their pleasure. The passenger boats between Dover and Calais were twice detained, and it was recommended that the captains should carry twelve or fourteen muskets in the holds to protect them. The English ships of war rode at anchor in the Downs.

A few days before the fleet sailed from Plymouth, Barozzi, who represented Savoy in Paris, arrived in England to make a fresh effort to procure the assistance of English naval forces in the Mediterranean.

He had already been in London on a similar mission in the previous spring, and had discussed the subject with the King and Conway. On his return journey to Paris he had met the Duke of Buckingham. The Prince of Piedmont had, as we have seen, whilst at Dover, again gone over the plan apparently at some length, and Charles had then offered to supply him with some ships completely furnished. No formal agreement was reached, and it was not until the middle of August that Scaglia wrote from Fontainebleau to Conway to state that Charles Emmanuel was sending an ambassador to England to conclude what had already been negotiated. This delay may be explained by the delays caused by Fera's irruption into Monferrat.

When Barozzi once more landed at Dover at the beginning of October, the Court had returned from Plymouth to Salisbury, where it was hoped that it would at last find a refuge from the plague which had followed it throughout its progress. [Coke

MSS, pp. 219-236. *Brussels, Etat et Guerre* 193. Infanta to Philip IV., Nov. 5, 1625. *Munich*, Geh. St. Arch., Stefani to Elector, Nov. 25, 1625. *Mantua*, Priandi to Duke, Oct. 11, Nov. 7, 15, 1625. *Turin, Inghilterra* Mazzo 4, Barozzi to Duke, Oct. 20, 1625. *London, S.P.O.*, S. P. For., Savoy 11, f. 59, f. 64, Scaglia to Conway, June 19-29, Aug. 2-12, 1625.]

Salisbury was then a town with a population of about three thousand five hundred souls, few of whom were persons of means. The Court was, therefore, but poorly lodged, and occupied the King's House and the Queen's Wardrobe, which still look out at the graceful spire of the Cathedral rising above the trim lawns and lime-tree alleys of the Close. Both are built of dark stone with high pitched tiled roofs, and are separated from the Close by courtyards. The King's House, behind which a long garden runs down to the Avon, is a building of two stories entered by a porch dating from the days of the second Richard. Its massive timber framework is the admiration of artists. The rest of the structure is of Tudor date and is built round three sides of the court. Towards the garden lies a large hall rising to the roof and lighted at each end with lofty, three light windows. Here the courtiers gathered every morning to wait upon the King. To the north lies the Queen's Wardrobe, an even smaller building of ponderous architecture in the perpendicular style of the Fifteenth Century, in which the Queen was lodged. Such was the scene of Barozzi's negotiations.

The envoy had arrived in no very good humour. Although he had had a quick and calm passage from Boulogne, he had been very seasick, and his ship had all but foundered in a sudden squall whilst lying in Dover Roads waiting for the Ferry Boat. The Governor of Dover Castle did not know where the Court was, but supposed it to be in one of the Western Ports. Travelling in England in plague time was not a pleasant undertaking for every road was watched to prevent travellers from spreading infection, and whole villages turned out with guns and dogs to bar the entrance to anyone suspected of being a Londoner. As the village constables of Kent and Sussex were not, as a rule, versed in the French and Italian tongues, Barozzi could never have made his way to Salisbury had he not secured the services of a young Frenchman who spoke English to act as his guide. He left Dover by the post at about eleven o'clock on Thursday morning and, travelling by the cross-country roads of the Weald and Hamp-

shire Downs, reached Salisbury late on the following Saturday. As no room was to be found in the inns he was entertained by the Venetian Ambassador.

Buckingham, who had left Plymouth on the fourth of October was at Salisbury on his way to Holland. The nominal pretext of his journey was to induce the Kings of Denmark and Sweden with the Princes of Lower Saxony to take up arms for the Palatine. His real object was, however, to win the favour of the Queen of Bohemia in order to recover the good graces of Parliament, where he was execrated because he had lent English vessels to serve against the French Protestants.

Rusdorf, who was better acquainted with Buckingham than was Barozzi, thought that the Duke was flying at even higher game. He knew that the favourite was absolutely swayed by his own interests and cared nothing at all for the cause of the Palatine unless he could gain something from him. Buckingham seemed to share the belief of the Jesuits that Charles would never have children, and thought that if he could marry his daughter to Frederick's eldest son, he would become the ancestor of the new English dynasty. As he supposed that he held Charles in the hollow of his hand, he imagined that he would be able to make this alliance the price of the Palatine's restoration. If his overtures were refused, the Duke would throw his whole influence into the scales against him at a time when his cause was growing very unpopular in England. If they were accepted the Palatine would alienate his few remaining supporters. Under the circumstances Rusdorf counselled that no definite answer should be given to the Duke, and his advice was followed.

According to Blainville, the French Ambassador, Charles was aware of Buckingham's wishes, and vague rumours circulated amongst the Catholics in London that the Duke was endeavouring to contrive some marriage which would connect him with the Palatine. Maximilian's informants thought that his chief object was to bribe the Dutch to recognise England as their protector, and to hand over Briel, Flushing, and Sluis in place of the Cautionary Towns which they had repurchased in 1616. This they would refuse to do as they knew that in the past the English garrisons in Briel and Flushing had held the Provinces in slavery.

Such was the position of affairs when Barozzi paid his first visit to the Duke at Salisbury. He found him in bed, but was courteously welcomed and was assured that had he arrived before

the departure of the fleet it might have been possible for England to aid Savoy either by the loan of vessels or in some other way. As things stood, it would be impossible to do so.

As Charles and Buckingham had highly approved of the "Secret Enterprise," as Barozzi styled it, when it had been proposed to them by the Prince of Piedmont, it is difficult to see why it should not have been taken in hand at that time.

Scarcely had Barozzi left Buckingham when Lords Carlisle and Holland sent to invite him to dine with them at midday in order to talk the matter over. As, however, he could not eat at such an hour, he put off his own dinner till the evening. He was introduced to Lady Carlisle, whom he found to be a most accomplished woman. Carlisle said that the fleet was going against Spain and that two other squadrons, making eighty ships in all, were to be ready by May and September, in the following year. The King had hesitated as to declaring war against Spain until he had concluded an offensive and defensive league against them for fifteen years with the Dutch. He hoped that Savoy would join it. England had been greatly hampered by the want of money and by the necessity for blockading Dunkirk. It was also very difficult to find soldiers and artificers.

From Carlisle's house Barozzi went on to meet the Duke of Buckingham, who was in the Queen's room, to which he was conducted by an usher who was personally known to the Duke of Savoy. "He brought me through the very room in which Her Majesty was, but I did not go near enough for her to recognize me as the usher afterwards told me. When the Duke came he spoke a good deal about the expense of the three fleets and about the difficulty of guarding the English ports as also of keeping up the blockade before Dunkirk. Finally, he said that though he could hardly see his way in the matter, they would do what they could and that he would talk over the enterprise again in the morning." Here follow some tantalising lines in cypher without a decyphermant. "He asked if the plan was to take a firm footing there (meaning probably at Genoa), or simply to sack the place as the idea that—(cypher). I replied that it was to gain territory, and that the second point naturally went with this, and pointed out the utter weakness of the Mediterranean as their galleys would be forced to—(cypher). Whilst we were talking the King came through the cabinet

to go into another room, and the Duke of Buckingham, after presenting me to him, told him what my business was. His Majesty, who is certainly a most affable prince, welcomed me with the greatest benignity and told me that he was most anxious to be of service to Your Royal Highness, but referred me to Buckingham to talk over matters, as he would see me again. After His Majesty had withdrawn, we went thoroughly into the matter, but I saw from what transpired that they were still in doubt as to how they could help us owing to their requirements here. I begged the Duke that he would not send me back, without giving me some visible proof that my representations had produced some effect for otherwise (cypher) (possibly the French King) would laugh at us for having placed so much confidence in England and for having expected so much from her. The Duke replied that this was a proof of his wit and, after thinking for a moment, added that his one wish was to do Your Royal Highness some service and that we must hold together. He offered to send for Lord Holland at once, so that we could talk matters over together and see if we could find any way out of the difficulty, and we then went into the Queen's room. By the Duke's advice, I made my reverence to Her Majesty. The French Ambassador was present. She asked me for news of Madame. I told her of the hopes that she was in the family way, and of the grief which she had felt at the Prince's wound. Her Majesty showed much feeling at both pieces of news. Whilst I was talking with the Queen, the Duke and the Ambassador were chatting together, and did not separate for some time. After they had taken leave of one another the Duke came up in a very natural way, took me by the arm and said, 'let us go to supper and afterwards we will talk over our business.' In the meantime Lord Carlisle came up and took us all off to supper at his house. After supper, at which were the Duke, Blainville (the French Ambassador), the Secretary of State, (Lord Conway), Lords Holland, Carlisle, their wives and myself, we danced for two hours, and afterwards went to the Queen's room, where we found the King with her. The Duke, Carlisle, Holland, Conway and Barozzi withdrew into a corner of the presence chamber and there once more went into the whole business, going over the former arguments at length. At last, after much discussion, the Duke asked Lords Carlisle and Conway to suggest some way out of the difficulty before he

left for Holland. They answered that they would talk over the matter together and arrange something. I then excused myself on account of my journey and took my leave. All this took place yesterday, Sunday.

"This morning I saw Lord Conway in private and asked him to give me his help, as I was only asking for the fulfilment of the offers which the King and he himself in his Majesty's name had already made me. He said he would do all he possibly could and seemed very well disposed. I then saw Lord Carlisle, and told him the same thing. He replied, but without going into details, that he had thought of a plan last night, but that they were expecting a Secretary of State in a day or two who had the whole business at his fingers' ends and that he would finally settle matters with me when he arrived." The Secretary of State was Sir John Coke, who had been left behind at Plymouth after Buckingham's departure. It is probable that Barozzi was already somewhat doubtful as to the value of the support of England for when he said that the ships would have to sail in November both Conway and Carlisle replied that this would be out of the question.

Salisbury was full of rumours of disaster. It was said that the fleet had put back to Plymouth because the Infanta's vessels had suddenly come out of Dunkirk and "thrown themselves at the head" of the blockading squadron which had been joined by some English ships from Dover and expected some reinforcements from Denmark. It was believed that the Dutch and English would attack the port. Two days later Barozzi had not been able to ascertain if the English had any settled plan of campaign at all except to attack the Spaniards, a statement which was in a great degree correct. Lord Carlisle had told him that he was going on an embassy to Turin in order to induce Savoy and Venice to enter the League against the House of Austria which England was arranging with Holland, Sweden and Denmark. "I am afraid this will stand in the way of their granting Your Royal Highness' request, as Carlisle will wish to have something to offer you." He hoped, however, to know for certain within the next two days what they might expect from England.

Charles' reply duly reached him on the twenty-fourth of October. It was to the effect that after consulting the Privy Council he had been informed that as a second fleet would have

to be fitted out to support that now at sea, he would need more ships to do so than he could spare from those necessary for the defence of the Kingdom and for the support of commerce, and that he therefore could not undertake anything outside his Kingdom without great danger to the business in which he was already engaged.

It is perfectly certain that Charles and his advisers were speaking the truth. It had been necessary to ransack the Thames and Channel to collect the squadron to escort Buckingham to Holland, whilst trading vessels with provisions for London were sheltering from the Dunkirkers in every haven of the East Coast. Such was the result of Spinola's foresight. Foreign observers like Khevenhüller believed that the English had given up their designs on the Mediterranean because their communications were threatened by the return of Toledo's squadron from the Brazils, but the news of their descent upon Cadiz reached that Admiral at Santiago in the Cape Verde Islands.

The English commanders do not indeed seem to have looked upon Toledo as one of the factors in the situation, but they were in constant fear lest the Spaniards should attempt an invasion of England or Ireland.

It is almost impossible to understand the grounds upon which Barozzi wrapped the "Secret Enterprise" in such a veil of mystery. It had been a commonplace for months at Genoa, and at Brussels that the English fleet would make for the coast of Liguria, and Wake, writing from Venice, had been urging his government in every despatch to undertake the enterprise. Possibly he may have wished to keep the French in ignorance of the plan. Such would appear to be the case from his conversation with Blainville. He informed the Ambassador that he had come to England to see if the fleet was really going to sail and to ascertain what its destination was. Further, he wished to learn if any ships would go to the Mediterranean for objects which would redound to the glory of France as well as of the whole League. "I told him that I had not yet broached the whole business to the English, and, therefore, could not say how it would turn out, but as I saw in what straits they were here, I did not know whom to confide in. I had however told them of the support which France was to give Your Highness, and that the French seem disposed to grant peace to those of the Religion in the Kingdom and to Rochelle, and that the

English had shown much pleasure at this. The Ambassador thanked me for my confidences, and told me that he was certain that the fleet had not yet sailed, and that as for my having vessels he thought I should get none, for he found that people in England were far too much opposed to our alliance, and that, as he puts it, they would much rather hinder than advance our objects. He went on to say that he was glad to learn that people here think that France is going to make peace with the Huguenots and particularly with Rochelle, as this was a thing which he could not get them to believe. This made it impossible for him to induce them to moderate their policy towards the Catholics in England, as they always replied that those of the Religion were far worse treated in France. He had found that Lord Carlisle and the Duke of Buckingham were his chief opponents."

He then went into particulars to show that "England was ill-disposed towards our League, because she had not a share in it. He was on the spot and was offering Denmark and Sweden money to carry on the war in Germany more vigorously and was urging England to do the same, because the war in Germany was all to the good of the League which England had made with the Dutch for the recovery of the Palatinate. He added that England had definitely refused the French offers, although the English still wished France to join the League which they were talking of making with the Kings of Denmark and Sweden against Spain. He thought, however, that France would not consent to this, not only on account of her engagements to Savoy and Venice, but because if she did she would be drawn into far too close an alliance with Huguenot Princes, and would give great umbrage to the Pope. Moreover, the engagements as to money which France would have to contract under such conditions would render it impossible for her to assist your Royal Highness in Italy, which it was far more to her interest to do.

"He also said that his chief complaint against Buckingham was that he had refused all the French offers because he would not bind himself to satisfy France by giving the Catholics a legal status here, which is the condition the French ask in return for assisting Denmark and Sweden. To grant this would not suit the Duke's own ends, as he wishes to appear hostile to the Catholics in order to soften the feeling which exists against him in Parliament, as he knows that they were originally set against

him, because he used to be well enough disposed to the Catholics. Another reason was because the Duke wished to have an excuse for going to Holland to negotiate with Denmark and Sweden jointly with the Dutch, and hoped that during the negotiations he would get into the good graces of the Queen of Bohemia. He would then be able to represent to Parliament that it was he who had got the fleet sent out against the Spaniards and had formed such a League in order to do greater hurt to Spain and to secure the restoration of the Palatinate: he would say that he had made the league with the Dutch for the same object, and, finally, that he had refused to comply with the French requests that he would grant the Catholics a legal status in the three kingdoms. The Duke had run great risks in England because he had not thought of all this before, and so he means to use *contraria contrariis* for his own advantage. England was still very bitter against France, and this is the reason why they rejoice over the misfortunes which have befallen our league and are very unwilling to give back the six vessels which Soubise had carried off, and which were now lying in English harbours."

Barozzi was inclined to think that what Blainville said was true as it tallied with his own views as to the Duke's position.

As befitted a friend of the Princess of Piedmont, Barozzi was very indignant at the way in which her sister the Queen was treated. The English did not like her, as the one person they cared for was the Queen of Bohemia, and she fully returned their feeling. Charles, however, was still devoted to her, and tried to do everything that she wished.

Buckingham had, however, some good arguments for acting through Denmark and Sweden in place of through Savoy. Some of his naval advisers saw that if the carriage of materials for shipping to Spain could be stopped, as had been done by Queen Elizabeth, the Spaniards would be unable to fit out a fleet for sea. Copper, cordage, masts and tar were brought to Spain in the ships of Hamburg and of the Baltic Powers, and if the Kings of Denmark and Sweden would guard the Sound and the Elbe carefully and confiscate all vessels carrying them, the trade would cease. It would be useless merely to blockade the Straits of Dover as the ships would slip through in the night. Moreover, even the Venetians, who were clamorous for the presence of an English fleet in the Mediterranean recognised the value of the intervention of Denmark in Northern Germany.

They hoped that Christian IV., by advancing into Lower Saxony, would force Tilly, who was lying in Baden at the very gates of Basel, to march northwards to meet him. The Protestant Cantons would thus be left free to prevent the Imperialists from crossing the Rhoetian Alps to assist Feria. At the same time, if the English preferred to assist Denmark rather than Savoy, they could do so without removing those vessels from the North Sea which were indispensable to guard their own East Coast against the attacks of the corsairs of Dunkirk and it must not be forgotten that the countries on the East Coast were the stronghold of Puritanism and also the district where it was supposed that the Spaniards would endeavour to land. Such may have been the grounds upon which Buckingham preferred to co-operate with the Baltic powers in place of aiding Savoy in the Mediterranean.

The Duke quitted Salisbury without again seeing Barozzi, but left Holland and Carlisle behind him to conduct the negotiations. The former could only repeat the old argument that England could not spare ships from guarding her own coasts, the latter, who had a far wider acquaintance with Continental affairs than his colleague, went into the matter much more thoroughly. Barozzi pointed out that if England helped Savoy in the Mediterranean she would prevent Spain from sending her own galleys and those of the Genoese into the Atlantic. Italy was the very vitals of the Spanish Monarchy, and, if the Spaniards were threatened there, they would be forced to draw away troops from other places, especially those levies then in Lower Germany, which would otherwise be employed upon the Atlantic seaboard. He reminded Carlisle and Conway, who had now joined them, that both Denmark and the Palatine were pressing England to induce France to support Savoy. It was beyond doubt, therefore, that England, by attacking Spain, would ward off a great danger from Denmark. Some of the forces which were ready to attack the Danish territories from Germany would in that case be sent to Italy, whilst it would be impossible for the Spaniards to reinforce the vessels in Flanders if they put out into the open ocean to attack His Majesty's dominions more especially Ireland, which was the most vulnerable point. As it was, Savoy by attacking Genoa had probably prevented the Spanish forces in the Mediterranean from being sent into the Atlantic. After all, he was but asking

them to give him what His Majesty had told him with his own mouth that he had instructed his ministers to furnish. Carlisle could only reply that England now wanted one ship more than she had wanted ten a few months before, and that the Duke was angry that the fleet had sailed upon the previous Saturday. The other two fleets had to be fitted out, and the Dutch had already asked for reinforcements to be sent to the fleet blockading Dunkirk. The engagements into which England had entered with Holland were the chief reason why the main fleet had been sent off. They would, however, do all they could, especially as His Majesty had promised some vessels to the Prince of Piedmont.

In a second interview Carlisle pointed out that as His Majesty had no money he had been forced to press men for both his navy and army and to give them no pay but only their rations. The soldiers had not had a farthing before the fleet sailed but had been promised that they should be paid when it returned. From Carlisle Barozzi went back to Conway, who said with great feeling that what made them hesitate most was their extreme need of money, for all His Majesty had wanted for the vessels which they were obliged to fit out, but that they would try to find some means to assist Savoy. The Venetian Ambassador told him that if only France had openly declared war against Spain and had joined with Savoy in a request for naval help, the whole fleet would have been sent into the Mediterranean when it was first offered, and that his own Government, whom he had informed of this, had instructed him to support any such request. "I begged him to speak to Carlisle and Conway upon the subject again, and he promised to do so." The Ambassador accordingly spoke to the King, who told him that it was true that he had promised the ships to the Prince of Piedmont, and that he had only been prevented by his own needs from carrying out his promise. He hoped, however, that all his allies would see that his fleet was going to strike a blow for the common cause, as he would give the last drop of his blood to keep the Spaniards within their own bounds. Finally, Carlisle, Conway, Holland and Portland were appointed to answer Barozzi, but they could only inform him once more that England was not at the moment able to help Savoy with either ships or money, but that they hoped to do so later on. All these lords, he added, were Buckingham's creatures and dependants,

although it looked as if Portland felt his position. Lord Carlisle would have liked to see the vessels which the King under his treaty with Holland had to keep in readiness to reinforce the fleet, employed to assist Savoy. Barozzi noted it as somewhat remarkable that he had been forced to speak Latin with Portland although an Englishman who spoke French and Italian was in the room to act as interpreter. He was now preparing to leave Salisbury, and was not sorry to do so, as the King was going to a small country house six leagues from London, amongst villages which were said to be infected with the plague.

After a final leave taking with Carlisle and Conway, he wrote that he believed that if the Prince of Piedmont came to England some help would be given. Nothing, however, could be decided in Buckingham's absence or until they knew how much the Prince would be prepared to pay down beforehand for the hire of the vessels. His Highness' coming was anxiously looked for because they wished to consult him about many domestic affairs. As Mme. de St. Georges, who was the head of the French faction in Henrietta Maria's household, had large interests in Piedmont, it is possible that Charles would have willingly paid a high price to secure peace at home. The Queen had heard with great delight that her sister the Princess of Piedmont had been appointed Regent during the Duke's absence at the war, and had rather snubbed the King when he expressed his surprise. The two sisters were constantly writing to one another and directed their letters "To my Sister," as they had agreed before they married to drop the use of all titles. She had just been out hunting with her ladies and had killed a hare although they were only mounted on hacks. Mme. de St. Georges was doing all she could to forward the interests of Savoy.

Fortunately for the seasick envoy, he was able to cross from Dover to Boulogne, a journey of only six hours, in place of exposing himself to the dangers of the Dieppe passage and the Dunkirk corsairs. He consoled himself with the prospect of his state entry into Paris as Minister of Savoy.

The militia had all been called out and were in readiness to be mustered at the first alarm. "To facilitate such an alarm being given in case of necessity, all through the country they have set up columns at the highest spots along the public roads. These columns have a bucket fixed to their tops and are guarded by sentinels who, at the sound of the alarm bells in the towns

will light a fire made of carefully prepared materials in the said bucket and thus warn the neighbourhood to take up arms." Orders had been issued to disarm the Catholics. Bethlen Gabor had written that if the King of England would give him a hundred thousand florins he would take up arms against the Emperor to make a diversion in favour of the King of Denmark. [*Turin*, Barozzi to Duke, Oct. 23, 29, 31, 1625.]

It was unfortunate both for England and for Savoy that Buckingham was chiefly guided in his foreign policy by his wish to secure the support of a Parliament which probably did not include ten members who had the slightest real knowledge of Continental affairs.

The Genoese were under no delusions as to the fate which would await them if they were attacked by the English and Dutch fleet.

As early as the middle of June they had learnt from both the Tuscans and Feria that the joint squadrons were to consist of a hundred and twenty vessels with two thousand guns and had been warned to fortify the Gulf of Spezzia against a possible attack. On the tenth of October the Spanish Ambassador informed the Doge that he had learnt by letters from England that the fleet was divided into three squadrons of forty sail each. Two of them were to make for the coast of Genoa and the third for the Spanish coast in order to effect a diversion. He added that he supposed they would make for Spezzia, as he thought that they would not venture to press up nearer Genoa at the risk of being attacked from the fortresses of Savona and Vado and he offered to accompany the Duke of Tursi, the Admiral of the Spanish galleys, to inspect the fortifications there. When, however, the Senate again considered the matter on the following morning, "we found that it is very likely that this armada may go to Corsica so as to get a harbour and procure supplies there, stir up a rebellion in the island, and, possibly, occupy some garrison, so as to be able to come upon us in Terra Firma at their leisure, and that if we were attacked simultaneously by land and sea and in several places by the forces of such great powers, that, do what we might, we could not withstand them. Neither our purses nor our territory can supply the money and provisions which the Catholic King used to give us, and thus our state would be utterly ruined. Our enemies' designs are plain. It is self-evident that they mean to strike Spain to the ground and seize

Italy, and to accomplish their ends by making war upon us as being the King's special friends. They know that it is our citizens who supply the needs of that Crown, and that our State may be the door through which they may reach their goal. Though, when the French are making war on us, they are in reality doing so upon the Catholic King to much better purpose than if they were attacking the Milanese. Yet they give out that, at all costs, they intend to enjoy the advantages of remaining at peace with Spain in their own Kingdom and seas. We cannot, however, but believe that His Catholic Majesty and his ministers see well enough through their trickery, and that they will not stand by to see us attacked and if they find that there is any intention of doing so, they will beat up the allies in their own countries, both by land and sea, so that they may be brought to lay aside any such evil designs." A week later commissioners were sent to inspect the harbours on the Eastern Riviera and large reinforcements were hurried to Corsica.

But although the Senators of Genoa were unaware of the fact, Spinola, their most distinguished fellow countrymen, had already more than anticipated their wishes, and the presence of his galleys at Dunkirk and at Mardyke had proved the salvation of his native city. [*Genoa*, Senate to Serra, June 18, Sept. 1, Oct. 11, 18, 1625.]

Philip the Fourth on his side also indulged in dreams of distant conquest.

Early in September he sent to Brussels some plans for an attack upon England, which had been furnished to him by members of the Spanish party at Whitehall.

As, however, the Spanish finances were in such a state that no money could be sent to Spinola, and the secret agents in Holland did not get enough to cover their expenses, it was possible that the project would perforce, not be carried into execution unless it could be carried out from Flanders.

As a state paper the document would have done honour to any diplomatist trained in the school of Burghley. In a long preamble the guilt of England was clearly proved, and their offences against Spain during the ninety years which had elapsed since their breach with Rome were set down with portentous detail. It was owing to the intrigues of England that the Netherlands had revolted against Spain which had been reduced to live upon her Indian revenues ; but for the Battle of Prague English intrigues

in Germany would have brought Spain to utter ruin ; England, again, had provoked the war in Italy at a time when Spain was besieging Breda, was endeavouring to recover Brazil and was forced to guard her own coasts against the corsairs. Her fell purposes had been baffled by the Spanish victories, but her navy was now seeking to carry off the great trading fleets like a skulking footpad. The fleets, therefore, should diverge from their usual course and should make neither for the Azores nor the Canaries as the English pirates could only sight them from within a distance of seven leagues. The galleons, if they were attacked, were to throw the gold and silver overboard and then fight to the death, but the fleets from New Spain, Brazil and Flanders were not to close with the enemy, as every galleon lost meant as much to Spain as the loss of a fort.

"Every state remaining upon the defensive at sea is lost," wrote Philip, repeating the wise counsels of his grandfather's admirals, "so the only safe course is to take the offensive."

The vessels in Flanders should, therefore, harry the Dutch herring fleet, whilst the English fleet was cruising in search of the galleons, and should then land a force of eight thousand men with arms for as many more, and a hundred thousand ducats either at Drogheda in Ireland or somewhere in the direction of the Scottish Hebrides, in the neighbourhood of Tyrone's and Tyrconnel's estates. Bruneau was already in treaty with a great Irish peer, Sorley Macdonell, Lord Antrim and his kinsman, Viscount "Quentaer" (Kintyre in Scotland), both of whom were detained in London by the King. He proposed that they should go to Scotland, bring about a rising there and then join hands with Ireland through the Hebrides. At the same time the Baron of Ledinton, probably James Maitland of Lethington, the only son of Queen Mary's Secretary of State, who had been lately at Madrid, was to raise all the Scotch and Irish he could to join the Spanish forces. It would be easy for him to bring over many of the thirty thousand Scotch who were settled in the North of Ireland as they were very jealous of the English established there and this led them to distrust the King. The task of raising the Irish levies and those in the Scotch Hebrides was to be left to the Macdonnells.

"Ireland is divided into two parts, one being the North in which the diversion should be made, the other the South, which is bounded by a line drawn between Galway and Dublin, faces

England, and is full of English garrisons. The great majority of the Irish Catholics and religious live in this part but, although they are Catholics, they are so closely united with the English by ties of blood and business, and have grown so rich through their trade with Spain, which they enjoy freely and without let or hindrance, that they have no wish to be egged on to revolt and would take up arms on the English side as they have done in previous wars, unless an army of twenty thousand men were landed in Ireland. In that case they would be forced through fear to side with Spain." In a word it was by no means certain that where there were the most Catholics most could be done with them. If, however, the Spanish, Flanders and Brazil fleets united they would be stronger than the English. In that case they could seize Milford Haven which not only lay within easy reach of Ireland, but could serve them as a base from which they could harry English trade, and could thus wear England down as England had worn down Spain. Spain was not anxious to effect a permanent conquest, but it would be easy to hold such a station as the English were born cowards who were only good for peace, whilst the Spanish soldiers after carrying on a defensive war without a single break for fifty-six years would be only too anxious to take the offensive and to enrich themselves with the spoils of England. The English would thus be forced to concentrate their forces at home, and if the Spaniards struck a blow at once the war might be ended in a few months.

"Whilst the campaign in England was in progress that in Flanders might be conducted on the defensive, and the nobles who hated the democratic principles of the Dutch might be relied upon to keep the Flemings in their allegiance to Spain. It would be quite possible to carry out the undertaking whilst the English fleet was away from its home seas. A fast sailing ship of about two hundred tons with a foreign crew and a cargo of spices and other wares to be sold at a cheap rate might be sent to reconnoitre the ports of England, Ireland and the North of Scotland. It should have on board a Spaniard who was an adept at disguising himself. This scheme had been successfully carried out in 1596, when Philip II. had thought of attempting such a diversion, by Francisco de Menda, a captain well acquainted with the Northern seas, although the execution of the scheme had been stopped by His Majesty's death. Time was, however, all important, and if there were any delays there would be mutinies in Flanders. 'If

this design is not carried out this year, we shall have to incur far greater expenses to do so next year and have far less means to meet them. Our trade is dwindling more and more every day, our gold and silver are leaving us and our copper money is increasing. This in itself is enough to destroy utterly the poor remains of our commerce and traffic, so that the one hope left to us is to take a bold resolution betimes, as Scipio did when he attacked Carthage with a handful of men and thus drew away Hannibal from Italy, and as this very England did when she made a diversion in Spain to free herself from the danger of an invasion.' As, however, Bruneau had written that the English fleet would not sail before the middle of August, if then, Philip wrote that he was keeping his own fleet in Lisbon until he had found out where the English meant to make for. If they did not sail he would use his vessels for other objects." [*Brussels, Etat et Guerre* 193, Philip IV. to Infanta, September 19, 1625.]

England has, probably, never sent out a worse army than that which was at that moment crowding the transports in Plymouth Harbour, yet the exploits of Mansfeldt's rabble in the trenches at Terheyden might have taught Philip that henroost robbers are not necessarily cowards.

Few of Philip's influential councillors were men of mature years; the oldest amongst them had been schoolboys when the fatal news that the Invincible Armada had returned discomforted to Santander had reached his grandfather in his pew at the Escorial. Nor had the disasters of 1588 left as profound an impression upon the traditions of the Spanish navy as they have done upon our own annals. At least twice subsequently attempts had been made to invade England or Ireland, and it would not have been an easy matter to prove that Milford Haven might not be as vulnerable to attack in 1625, as Kinsale or Mousehole had been, but a few years before.

The Infanta Isabella, however, belonged to an older day. She had seen with her own eyes the expresses spurring in with the evil tidings that Drake had dashed upon Lisbon or that Essex's soldiery were plundering the most sacred shrines of Cadiz, she could tell how her father had steeled himself to meet the blow of his lost Armada with unruffled brow. Alone, perhaps, of living beings she knew that a human heart had beaten in the breast of Philip the Second. To Isabella Clara Eugenia any plan for an Invasion of England was a direful dream. At the same time her

daily work brought her into close contact with the realities of the northern seas.

Her reply to her nephew was not encouraging. She had received, she wrote, his suggestions about Ireland. She had already, as he proposed, used her fleet to harry the Dutch herring fisheries, but it would have been impossible to fit it out that year for an Irish expedition. Should he, however, wish to carry the war into the British Dominions in the following year it would be best to attack England. Such an attempt would produce a far greater effect both in England and Holland and it would be much easier to send over the reinforcements required to support it. An expedition to England was a most difficult undertaking because it involved crossing the Channel. It would be almost impossible to collect the sea-going vessels required for such an undertaking in Spain and to send them to Flanders as the preparations would attract the attention of both the English and the Dutch, who would concentrate their fleets and destroy them on the way. As there were not enough high-board ships for the purpose in Flanders it would be best to cross in rowing vessels. The English and Dutch had none, so that it would be impossible for them to close the passage altogether, besides the vessels could be sent over in different divisions. Galleys could be built in Biscay and forty pinnaces could be sent from there whilst rowing boats could be built in Flanders ostensibly for the purpose of beating up the Dutch coast. It was clear that the landing would have to be made at the nearest point on the English coast, and, if only an arrangement could be come to with the King of Denmark, enough of the troops belonging to the Emperor and to the Catholic League could be set free to carry out the expedition. Otherwise such an undertaking would be out of the question as only a large force would be of the slightest use. For the moment, the Emperor and the Catholic League had their hands full in Germany, whilst a great part of the Spanish forces were in Italy, and no troops could be spared from Flanders. It would be utterly hopeless to expect any assistance from the English themselves unless the Spaniards had won a good many victories in England, and their prospects looked brilliant.

She had just heard from two masters of ships, which had been taken by the Flemish fishermen, that about a hundred English sail had been sighted off the Scillies upon the nineteenth of October. It seemed, therefore, that the reports from France

which said that the remainder of the fleet had been kept back to guard the English coasts against an attack from Dunkirk were true. As however, the season was so advanced and her ships were between the English and the Dutch squadrons, she had employed them in harrying the fisheries instead of sending them to winter in Spain, where they usually lost most of their crews, who were Dutch and Flemings.

The English had bound themselves by a treaty with the Dutch for fifteen years to keep up an army of twenty-five thousand foot and six thousand horse, and to maintain vessels to blockade Dunkirk. Denmark also had joined the league. [*Brussels, Etat et Guerre*, 193, Infanta to Philip IV., 5 November, 1625.]

Thus so far as its immediate object was concerned Spinola's policy of keeping up a small naval force upon the Flemish coasts had fulfilled its object. The existence of this squadron had diverted the English from undertaking any expedition into the Mediterranean; upon the other hand, it had forced them to come out openly upon the side of Holland. But for the narrow commercial spirit which prevented Spain from conciliating the good will of the Scandinavian Powers by concessions to their trade, it is possible that his wise use of sea-power might have averted the downfall of the House of Hapsburg.

CHAPTER LXXIV

WHILST Philip the Fourth at his writing table at Madrid was weaving anew his grandfather's dream-webs for the conquest of England, Wimbledon's ships were flying before the gale upon the way to Cadiz. "The great English fleet is sweeping the sea like a net, taking everything which comes in its way, that it may first enjoy its spoils and then quibble as to the ownership. Some merchants even in these provinces have already had a taste of this. God keep this mighty body from confusion. The diversity of humours between two ambitious nations gives opening enough for blunders, and it is almost a decree of fate that we can never get on with the English at sea. Still, we must hope that their common interests will make them see that they must work and pull together." So writes Maximilian's correspondent at the Hague. As a Dutchman, he well knew how difficult it is for two navies to carry on a joint campaign.

Even after the expedition had left Plymouth, its destination still remained uncertain. The commanders, it was said, had received sealed orders which were to be opened only when they were at sea. Consequently nothing definite had transpired on land. In Cecil's opinion it was for the Council and not for himself to decide as to his destination. Bruneau, whose sources of information were, as a rule, excellent, was convinced that the fleet would make for Spezzia: the Jesuits, as early as July, had heard a rumour that it would steer for the African coast. Large quantities of arms had been sent to the fleet from the Tower, and it was supposed that they would be used "to arm the Moors who had been exiled from Spain," as being the persons best suited for their purpose, "as they do not believe in God, mortally hate the Spaniards, and know every district in that country by heart, both by land and sea. Everything will be done in the name of the Palatine so that they will not be obliged to come to an open rupture with Spain." Finally, as will be

seen, rumours reached Brussels through Calais that it was intended to attack Seville. They were not without foundation.

On the twentieth of October Cecil convened his Council of War on board the *Anne Royal* to discuss the whole subject. The day was fair, and the fleet was lying with its sails furled within sight of Cape St. Vincent, on which the outlooks could see a beacon being set on fire. Cecil opened the proceedings by reading a paper from which it appeared that the objects of the expedition were " firstly, to destroy the King of Spain's shipping, secondly, to possess some place of importance in his country, thirdly, to hinder his commerce and especially the arriving of the plate fleet as the principal project.

" It imported further that the places to performe these designs were three likewise, Lisbourn, Cadiz and St. Lucar, whereof St. Lucar, would serve for the undertaking of Cadiz and the winning of the harbour there for the undertakeing of Sevyll, and intercepting the plate fleet, which in all judgements was thought the best, and that for the undertaking of all these designs, it was thought fittest to possess ourselves of St. Lucar; with this, that in case we were impeached elsewhere, itt was resolved we should runn so farr into the River, till we should find a landing place fittest for our disbarkeing. And that all this had been discourst and thus farre agreed upon by a full Councill of Warr, his Matie being present. But that yet never the less after all, the finall resolution of the whole was referred to a further consultation to be hadd upon the place." No formal resolution had, however, been entered upon the Council minutes.

After this paper had been read it was taken into consideration by the Council. As they had already passed Lisbon, it was evident that the choice of a point of attack now lay between Cadiz and San Lucar. Both found strong supporters, but the members finally decided in favour of San Lucar, on the grounds that if they could gain possession of that harbour, they would be in a position from which they could not only attack Cadiz but from which they could advance upon Seville and intercept the Plate Fleet.

When, however, the sea captains and masters learnt that the Council were in favour of attempting San Lucar, they raised serious objections to the proposal. Cecil at once asked them " why they could not speak of these difficulties before His

Majesty (when at Plymouth)." Their answer was, "It is now in the depth of winter and stormie, and that they did tell His Majesty that it was a barred haven and dangerous to all men, especially to those that had not often passed it, and that, being upon the place, they could consider more particularly upon the difficulties than discourse of it when they were farre off. To that I could say no more to them, being as I was no great seaman, and that I was strictly bound to their advice that did professe the sea."

Two other plans were likewise brought forward. Several speakers advocated the seizure of the famous and wealthy city of Malaga on the grounds that it was not so strong as Cadiz, and that the ships could enter the port more easily than San Lucar. Their soldiers, they urged, were inexperienced as England had been for so long at peace and were not fitted to attack a great fortress. If they failed at the outset of the expedition they would be utterly disheartened, whereas an initial success would embolden them to undertake greater ventures. Malaga, however, some objected, was so far within the Straits that it would "draw us quite out of the way for the mayne project of intercepting the plate fleet, and the enemie in the parts thereabouts being verie strong in horse, it would make that place as difficult as Cadiz or Gibraltar." Sir Henry Bruce, who had been an officer in the Austrian service, had already suggested that they should attack Gibraltar. He pointed out that it was a very strong roadstead for their shipping, that it was easy to land men about old Gibraltar, and to march from thence up to the New Town. It was true that it was a poor place but was of great importance "as being such by the advantage whereof the trade from all parts of the Levant might be brought under our command." As it was but small it would be far easier to garrison and hold it, "reputation and future benefit was to be preferred before present pillage; strength on the enemy's side and hazard on our owne partes was to be expected and undergone wherever we went, and if we prevayled the difficulter the attempt was, the more should be our honour."

The members of the Council had but small confidence in their men and thought of little but their private gain. They knew that the pressed levies of labourers and gaolbirds, who were overcrowding their ships, had neither heart nor mind for the war and did not scruple to assert that they would rather be hanged

or serve the King of Spain or the Turk than starve under the English flag. Moreover, their chief object was to intercept the Plate Fleet. Accordingly they decided against attacking either Gibraltar or Malaga, and putting San Lucar on one side, finally selected Port Saint Mary's in the Bay of Cadiz. It had a low shore and afforded a better landing place than San Lucar, and their ships could lie there out of reach of the enemy's fire, and at the same time be in a position to attack those in Cadiz Roads. It was therefore arranged that they should proceed there forthwith chiefly in order to supply themselves with fresh water. "When they had anchored there," said Wimbledon, "they might advise what was next to be done." Immediately afterwards the whole fleet, "whereof about 96 sayle beside the Hollanders, were now in viewe one of another, began to beare for the Bay of Cadiz."

It seems probable that had Wimbledon attempted either Gibraltar or Malaga he would have found both places well prepared to receive him. The Duke of Medina Sidonia, when on the evening of November the first, he learnt that the English fleet had entered Cadiz Bay, at once sent off an express to Gibraltar to warn the governors of Ceuta and of Tangier to be upon their guard, and also to D. Julio Faxardo at Malaga where the greater portion of D. Fadrique de Toledo's fleet had been driven by the gale whilst on its way to meet the Silver Fleet at Terceira. "As some people think the English have arranged a joint expedition with the Dutch against the African coast and particularly against Ceuta and other garrisons near it, they have sent large reinforcements thither and some are still being despatched. They have given three months pay not only to the officers but also to the soldiers (a most unusual thing, as no pay is ever given until they have reached their destination), that they may go all the more willingly, and may not desert, but I understand that many have gone back to their homes, although they have received their pay and incur the risk of severe punishment by doing so. They are now, therefore, in no great fears that the enemy will carry out their plan of building fortresses on the African coast so that they may have the free passage of the Straits."

Tarantaise was by no means an authority upon naval affairs, but as Maximilian's Jesuit correspondents had informed him in the previous July that some such plan was

being discussed in London, it is possible that as an Algerine ambassador had been in England in the spring, Buckingham and his advisers may have considered such a proposal. They, probably, thought upon reflection that they could not count sufficiently upon the fidelity of the Moors to allow them to adopt it. Even after the retreat of the English from Cadiz it was rumoured at Madrid, though falsely, that eight Moorish vessels had joined their fleet to cruise with them in search of the flota from New Spain.

Nothing could be done upon the twenty-first of October, as the weather was foul and the wind blew high. It fell upon the twenty-second, and late in the afternoon the fleet put into Cadiz Bay. Essex led the way in the *Swiftsure*, closely followed by his Vice-Admiral, Lord Valentia, in the *Reformation*, and Sir John Chudleigh in the *Rainbow*. The squadron drew in as close to the town and to the ships and galleys in the roads as they could, without running aground. The sea captains who were responsible for the navigation had not however been informed that it was intended to attack Cadiz, and had been left without instructions either to do so or to support one another. This proved to be a serious impediment to the enterprise. The bay is full of sandbanks and shallows and so the large ships were forced to anchor and the smaller ones did the same, as they had no orders to the contrary. Thus they gave time for the Spanish ships to cut their cables and make off through the narrows into the inner harbour. "If our ships of lesser burden had had directions and an active leader, they had without doubt taken and sunk both ships and galleys (in number twenty)." When Essex anchored, Wimbledon followed his example, in place of pushing on to the intended landing place at Port Saint Mary's. "They never thought upon the ships until four days after when it was too late. Only the Lord Marshal once moving something to that end, Sir Thomas Love answered, 'Let them alone, they are ours.'"

Although the alarm had been given from Cape Saint Vincent and the watchers on the fleet had seen the lights flaring up at night all along the coast, the arrival of eighty English vessels seems to have taken the garrison of Cadiz completely by surprise. Jenkinson, the master of an English ship which was lying in the roads, came on board the *Anne Royal* whilst the Council was assembling. He said that although it was known that the

fleet had sailed from Plymouth, no one at Cadiz had expected an attack for which they were utterly unprepared. All were cursing the Count of Olivares as being the cause of the invasion.

Sanguine English captains indeed imagined that they might have carried the town with a rush if the fleet had let fly their broadsides and men had been thrown ashore under cover of the smoke, for they asserted that at that moment there were not above 500 soldiers in the place nor twenty guns mounted on its walls. "But we lay still all that night, and saw them labour hard until they had mounted their ordnance."

Whether this supposition was justified by facts may well be doubted. It would not have been easy for an untamed rabble to capture a town by assault, in which every house was as strong as a castle. Wimbledon's pressed men were far from being the equals of the veterans who under Essex's father had thirty years before overflowed Cadiz like a torrent. They thought of nothing but the gold, silks, and velvets with which its churches and warehouses were so richly stored, and when they saw these treasures being carried away to Saint Mary's by the Spanish galleys they grew utterly discouraged. Had six vessels been anchored before Saint Mary's Port the galleys might have been blocked up there.

Cadiz lies on a flat sandy island named the Isle of Leon, three leagues and a half long, which is separated from the mainland by the channel of San Pedro, an arm of the sea fifteen fathoms deep, three hundred broad, and traversed by a strong current. This channel was crossed only by the Bridge of Cuazo, which supports an old Roman tower and the ruins of an aqueduct.

The city, which prided itself upon its Phœnician origin, had been strongly fortified since its capture by Essex in 1596. It was small but famous for its wealth and for its harbour, which was always crowned with shipping from both the east and west. Save for a few Roman remains none of the public buildings were remarkable, and travellers noted only the Cathedral which had been miraculously spared by the flames lighted by the English and an old gateway near it crowned with a chapel famous for its wonder-working image. Even more renowned was a Flemish eating house where good Lubeck beer was sold at a dearer rate than wine and where fish dinners and salted delicacies were retailed at prices which then seemed outrageous.

The island was covered with vines whose clusters sometimes

weighed more than fourteen pounds, whilst books of travel which issued from the presses of Germany contained prints of the tunny fisheries on its Atlantic shore, from which the "Golden" Duke of Medina Sidonia drew much of his revenues. Only fresh water was wanting, and the inhabitants were supplied mainly from brackish wells.

The English fleet had entered the Bay upon the first of November, Spanish style, but it was not until the fourth that the news reached Madrid.

Young as Philip the Fourth was, he never forgot that he was the great grandson of Charles the Fifth and the grandson of Philip the Second. His grandfather, old and paralysed as he was, "a very Saint Jerome," had taken a fresh hold upon life when he heard that the English flag was floating over Cadiz. Philip the Fourth announced the tidings to the Infanta Isabella with unmoved composure. An English fleet of eighty sail had, he wrote, anchored in Cadiz Bay; they had landed men and cannon and were bombarding the Fort of Matagorda, which commanded the entrance of the Channel of San Pedro. It was obvious that they intended to occupy the city permanently. "We are, however, far forward with our preparations and the fleet which has already been got together here will soon be brought up to nearly a hundred sail by the junction of the reinforcements which I trust will arrive from Flanders shortly and of those vessels which have already got back from Brazil. I trust, therefore, please God, that the English will be foiled in their purpose, and I think I must take this opportunity of reminding Your Highness that it would be as well that you should at once make every preparation for effecting a diversion by pressing an attack home upon the English King in his own house, but this must be done with the coolest deliberation and in such a way as to offer every prospect of success. Be good enough to let me have your views on the subject as soon as you can." At the same time he expressed his willingness to conclude a peace with the Dutch, if it could be done without prejudice to the Catholic Religion. Should they refuse to come to terms, he intended to remain upon the defensive on land and to take the offensive at sea. To secure the free exercise of the Catholic Religion in the United Provinces, he would, however, be willing to acknowledge their sovereign rights in even more explicit terms than had been done in the Truce of 1609, although he

did not in reality intend to renounce his claims. It was certain that all those powers who were opposed to the Spanish Monarchy would use the rebels as their best instruments for attacking him, but he thought the Infanta could bring them to treat by making it plain to them that if they did not do so the war would be a perpetual one, whilst at the same time she enforced the blockade of the German rivers which they were already feeling so grievously, and the withdrawal of the trading licenses.

The King might listen unmoved to the distant rumblings of the English guns; his subjects were far from sharing his composure. On the morning of the fifth three couriers from the South galloped into Madrid one after the other. The whole city was thrown into confusion. So violent, men said, was the bombardment that despite the strength of the fortifications on which Giron had toiled for so many months, in his eagerness to give the English a warm reception, the danger was extreme. Men trembled when they learnt that the fleet had run down before the gale so swiftly that not a whisper had been heard that they were coming. The royal galleons were scattered along the coast at Lisbon, at Gibraltar, and on their way to Malaga, and might be destroyed one by one, as it would be impossible for them to defend themselves.

The Duke of Fernandina with six galleons had hastened to the relief of Cadiz, but his squadron had been driven back from the entrance to the Bay by three of the enemy's ships. An express, who had been thrown into prison for losing four hours upon his road, told all inquirers that he had seen many other vessels in the offing. The King was greatly annoyed at this report, for although he felt that Cadiz was safe in Giron's hands, he feared that the Silver Fleet might be attacked. It was known, indeed, that D. Fadrique de Toledo, when on his way to Terceira to meet it, had steered too near to the Barbary coast, and had been driven back into the Mediterranean by the gale which brought the English to Cape St. Vincent. Toledo arrived off Malaga by night, and the whole city flew to arms as they thought that he was an enemy. As soon, however, as the Admiral had let the citizens know who he was, they had sent him large supplies of provisions for himself and his soldiery, of which they were in need enough, for they had been for some days upon rations "of four ounces of biscuit and a quarter of a pint of wine a man." Toledo had only twelve ships of war with him, and if the English had sent a

detachment to burn the fleet, it would have been easy for them to do so. Directly he heard that they had landed at Cadiz he prepared to send off a large force in his brigantines, cutters, and longboats to reinforce Giron, although he did not think that the attempt was a serious one. His preparations were, however, delayed by his falling sick of a tertian fever, and on the day when the expedition was ready to sail, he received an express from Medina Sidonia with the news that the invaders had retired, and at once gave up the idea.

Although the authorities at Madrid had been completely taken by surprise by the invasion, they did their best to make preparations for defence.

"Every possible measure to resist the enemy is being taken here," wrote Striggi, "but the Genoese are in terror lest part of the English fleet, which is said to number over one hundred and twenty sail, should be going on to Marseilles and thence to Italy. Please God this may not be the case, but it may well be that these gentlemen, who up till now have always been stirring up and egging on His Majesty to make war on Savoy, will now recognize how much better it might have been for them to put up with an evil which can be endured rather than run the risk of one which cannot be." Striggi's opinion was fully justified by Serra's own despatches. "Large as the English fleet is which has arrived off Cadiz, it does not include all the vessels which we know were fitted out in England, and this makes me very anxious as I am afraid that the remainder may have gone on or may be on their way to Italy, although I have not heard a word of this up till now. One ought not, however, to build upon this, for the business is only at its beginning, and no one has been able to get any definite news whatsoever, and in this stormy weather and in these autumn nights they may very well have got through the Straits without being seen; if they are going to Italy, people say that they will now have to put into Toulon in order to carry out their further objects, others fear for Corsica and Sardinia. The fact is we have reason enough to fear for the Gulf of Spezzia and all the rest. May Our Lord assist His Own Cause, which is in such dire need of His help. I will continue to keep you informed of everything that happens."

A few hours later it became known that the English had landed a large force of infantry and were bombarding Fort Puntal, which stands between two inlets on a point of rising ground separating

the outer from the inner harbour, and distant about three and a half miles from Cadiz. A deep sandy plain intersected by the enclosures of gardens and vineyards and broken by a few hillocks lay between Puntal and the city.

Scarcely had the fleet cast anchor, when the Dutch detached five vessels to cannonade this fort; as, however, it was low water, five English colliers which were sent up in support, did not reach them until daybreak upon the following morning. At that hour Lord Essex with his whole squadron began a bombardment which lasted until two in the afternoon, when the infantry under Sir John Burgh were put on shore. Upon this the Spaniards sent out a flag of truce and the same evening they surrendered after receiving fifteen hundred shot from the ships. The garrison, who had inflicted great loss upon their assailants, were dismissed to Cadiz.

As has been seen Wimbledon had neglected to blockade Port Saint Mary's and his negligence soon cost him dear.

At six in the evening of the first of November (N.S.), the Duke of Medina Sidonia, who was residing at San Lucar in his castle amid the pines, received the news that a large fleet had been sighted off the coast. "No one knew whether they were friends or foes though many people at Jerez persuaded themselves that they were the galleons and the flota with some squadron of the fleets. A little later a second despatch arrived saying that the ships had been recognized as enemies. On receiving this news the Duke hastened to send off posts to call out the people to the places assigned for the defence of Cadiz, and despatched an express to Gibraltar with letters for the governors of Ceuta and of Tangier, and for D. Fadrique de Toledo and D. Julio de Faxardo, and to Malaga to D. Pedro Pacheco, and to the City of Tarifa and the places assigned for its defence, to the Governor of Algarve, the Castellan of Sagres and to Lisbon to the Marquis of Inojosa and General Thomas del Arrazpuru and ordered the Superintendent of the galleys to despatch a fast sailing boat with despatches which he enclosed to him to inform the garrisons of Laraiche and La Marmora. He also sent the news to the cities of Seville, Ecija, and Cordova and to Uheda, Baeza, and the town of Carmona and to the estates of the Lords of Andalusia, that they might hasten with all possible speed to his assistance. After doing this he sent off the last express to His Majesty with full particulars of everything and set out from San Lucar for the City of Jerez in con-

formity with his instructions to fix his headquarters for this Province there. "He is summoning all the levies to Jerez so that he may distribute them amongst such places as the exigencies of events may require." Medina Sidonia had acted wisely in putting the garrisons of the Moroccan coast upon their guard. A few days later Tarantaise thought it probable that the English might put into Saltee, the port which was the headquarters of the Moorish corsairs.

When it was known that the long expected invaders were at hand, Spanish pride flared up, and reinforcements poured into Jerez from every village between the Guadalquivir and the Mountains of Tarifa. The Duke of Ossuna, who was living in banishment upon his Andalusian estates, set out at once with two thousand foot. In a short time more than four thousand men were thrown into Cadiz. As Giron reported that he was in want of provisions, Medina Sidonia requested Fernandina to send his galleys to transport them from the mainland. As has been seen they were driven back by the enemy, whereupon Sidonia sent seventeen of his own cutters down the coast from San Lucar. All night long they plied across the bay, bearing the cargoes of wheat and biscuit which the Duke had stored in his castle and bringing back with them the women, children and old men and the treasures of the wealthiest port in Spain.

In the meantime the fourteen galleons from Brazil, and seven galleys which had taken refuge in the inner harbour on the appearance of the English, anchored in the entrance of the channel of San Pedro, drawing up in a half moon so that no ship could try to force an entrance without being exposed to their whole fire. Their commander the Marquis of Cropani sunk four old hulks in front of them, but left a passage through which one ship could pass at a time. They would thus be in a position to come out and fight whenever they hoped for galleons from Malaga and Lisbon made their appearance in the outer harbour.

Some of the English vessels anchored within gunshot of Cropani's squadron and, it was thought would attack them.

Medina Sidonia entrusted Don Luis de Portocarrero, the military governor of Jerez with the defence of the all important Bridge of Cuazo. He took his own time to do so but by the fifth of November he was holding it with two thousand foot and seven field guns which the Duke had sent to him from Jerez on the night he arrived there.

On the fifth Sidonia arranged that Portocarrero should hold the bridge with a thousand men, but that the remainder of his foot together with the crews of the vessels in the channel and the cavalry from the district of Cadiz should be placed under Cropani's command and formed into a flying squadron, which was to harass the enemy at close quarters as much as possible. The reinforcements which were expected from Andalusia were to be formed into a reserve which might be held ready to oppose the English if they advanced. That evening, however, news arrived at Jerez that the garrison of Cadiz had come to blows with the enemy and had forced them to re-embark, many being drowned whilst doing so.

Meanwhile Madrid had been passing through some anxious hours. "His Majesty had let it be known that it would give him pleasure if the lords, who are idling here, would go to Cadiz; the Duke of Lerma set out at once and was followed by a crowd of dignitaries and Knights of the Military Orders, and a train of seven or eight hundred persons. His uncle Count Saldanha left three days afterwards with a good company.

"The King, like a true great-grandson of Charles the Fifth of glorious memory, is talented, active and eager for glory. He was anxious to get everything in readiness for his departure for Cadiz in person, but the Council of State was of a different way of thinking, so His Majesty yielded upon the solid grounds which they put before him, and, all the more readily as the Queen may be in labour at any moment. It was therefore arranged that the Viceroy D. Augustin Mexia, as Quartermaster-General of Spain should leave for those parts and fix his headquarters at Jerez de la Frontera, and he set out forthwith. Orders have also been given to all the Military Knights to set out for Andalusia and they are making their preparations to do so." "They say that H.R.H. the Infante Don Carlos is to be appointed Generalissimo of this monarchy, both by sea and land, with the Count Duke of Olivares as his lieutenant, but many do not believe this for very sound political reasons, so we must wait to see what will happen."

Tarantaise knew that Don Carlos was the favourite's most deadly enemy.

Giron had written to say "that they need not send him any more reinforcements, as he is strong enough not only to defend himself, but to take the offensive."

"It is not yet very well known what has been going on up till

now at Cadiz, although expresses arrive every day, but their letters are soaked through. It seems, and most people think so, that things will go off very well for this Crown, for though the English have taken a post on the bridge by which one goes into Cadiz and a little old castle with a garrison of seventy soldiers, it is still said that they have been driven out of it not only by the bad weather and the rough sea but because Giron has fortified the city most splendidly. Some will even have it that he has defeated them and taken some prisoners, who confessed the whole plan of campaign under torture, but I cannot learn if this is true. One story is that they meant to go in search of the Flota, others will have it that they were making for the Mediterranean. They say, however, that it is certain that their soldiers are of the worst quality, that they were embarked by force and pressed into the ranks by the Duke of Buckingham and that the King had troubled his head very little about the expedition. Your Royal Highness can well imagine what sort of fruit can be gathered from low rabble and from soldiers who did not come of their own free will, but under compulsion.

"It is known for certain that instructions have been sent to the Commanders of the Flota to lie by in a certain port possibly not very far from Cape Verde or the Azores. If the English came against them, they have orders to scuttle and sink the galleons so that the silver may not fall into their hands, as they are not in sufficient strength to defend themselves against both the English and the Dutch.

"Both friends and foes think that the English have arrived too late and that as, owing to the contagion, they could not sail at the appointed date, they should have done nothing this year, for they have given these gentlemen time to make every necessary preparation, and to fill all the places on the seaboard with troops, stores, and munitions of war. They could not, therefore, hope to have the same good fortune as they did last time when they took Cadiz by surprise, and in those days it was far from being as strongly fortified as it is now. As Giron has not allowed any useless persons to remain there but has sent all the women, children and men unfit for service, who are good for nothing but to cumber the place, to San Lucar they do not doubt but that the raiders will be utterly defeated."¹

When the news arrived that Fort Puntal had fallen, Serra hastened to call upon Olivares. "I found him far more alarmed

than I had expected, though I had already heard that he is making every effort to hide his feelings. He is in the greatest anxiety about the galleons of the Flota, although so many despatch boats have been sent off in search of them. He does nothing but give orders from morning till night. He showed me some of them, namely, that D. Augustin Mexia has been sent to raise troops in Estremadura, whilst D. Diego Mexia has been sent to Cadiz to defend the place and more particularly the bridge; please God, he may arrive in time; D. Pedro de Toledo is going to the French frontier on the Pampeluna side and is to enter France at once if there is any sign of a movement there, and they have taken similar steps in Aragon and Catalonia. They are thinking of bringing Germans here from Genoa for this purpose, and, in short, every conceivable measure has been taken for both an effective defensive and an effective offensive. It is true it would have been better if they had done this some months back.

"The Count-Duke told me that he knows for certain that the English fleet was fitted out against us and that he has not yet learnt why they changed their minds. Possibly their plans were defeated by the weather which forced them to enter Cadiz, or else they did so of their own free will. He cannot get any certain information as to whether any part of the fleet is on its way to Italy, but he warns us to be upon the look out. What I can see troubles him most is how he is to find the supplies for next year; he has discussed the question with me in the most eager manner possible, and kept on in his usual strain as to what the Most Serene Republic ought to do and what His Majesty expects from us, but I repeated with the utmost emphasis what I had already told him namely that it is for him to discuss these matters with the men of business, although the Republic would willingly do all they could to help him." All the royal galleys and their crews were being sent to Cadiz to strengthen the squadron there, but it was feared that it had been taken already. Next morning Serra contrived to see Giron's despatch and was greatly pleased by the confident tone in which he wrote. He had had a skirmish with the English and had found that he had no need to trouble about such men. His Majesty might rest assured that he would come out of the business with the utmost honour and glory.¹

Wimbledon's men were meanwhile doing their best to justify Giron's predictions. When they landed on the twenty-third only those companies were put ashore who chose to volunteer for the

service ; however, every one did land because they would not be behind. No care had been taken to see that they had provisions in their knapsacks, and although the Council gave orders that seven days' supplies should be landed at Fort Puntal, Grove and Hill who were in command there refused to receive them on the ground of want of instructions. They spent the night close to Cadiz, but on the morning of the twenty-fourth set out along a hollow track running along the beach to attack the Bridge of Cuazo. Thanks to the fault of their guide, they missed their way when three miles from it ; the commissariat arrangements had utterly broken down, and many were worn out for want of food. The army was therefore quartered for the night in an open field near some large buildings belonging to the Duke of Medina Sidonia, in which they found more than seventy casks of sack. Lord Wimbledon gave orders that a butt of wine should be issued to each regiment. Had the rest been saved it would have been very useful to supply the ships, many of which had neither sweet beer nor wine left. However "manie of the souldiers (indeede as manie as could get some) drank themselves past watching or marching. In soe much as I am confident five hundred experienced soldiers might have put us all to the sword ; for my owne part I slept litle that night, I never sawe a night of such disorder and dannger, neither I hope ever shall againe."¹

The officers vainly endeavoured to restore order. The general himself was loaded with insults, and saw that it was hopeless for him to attempt to advance further with an untrained cowardly mob. "The next morninge we returned backe again to our quarter nere the towne of Cales, but the enemy kild manie of our men, disordered with drinke stragglinge and lagginge behinde our reare, (I thinke at the leaste a hundred)." Cropani's light horse, recruited amongst the half Moorish peasantry of Western Andalusia were terrible foes for infantry to face who could scarcely use their arms. On the twenty-sixth Wimbledon sent five thousand men to seize twelve shalloops which had been found in the store-houses at Hercules' Pillars near the tunny fisheries, and eight of them were towed down to the fleet by the ships' barges under Love. Wimbledon had placed some musketeers in ambush in some buildings near the fishery ; they were quickly attacked by a small party of the enemy's horse who, however, were easily beaten off. At the sound of the firing the main body who were

resting stood to their arms. "At the place where these shalloops were, we found one of our soldiers dead with his ears and nose cut off."

That night the troops lay in the open plain between Puntal and Cadiz at a place called Las Huertas, and their general went the rounds two or three times to see that all was in order.

Ever since the landing the weather had been stormy and rainy, heavy mists hung over the low grounds and the ill-clad soldiers shivered under the night dews. "Though the ground was of a sandy and dry nature, yet it was very uneven and ill to go upon, adding thereby very much to the toil and weariness of our men in three days march to and fro," so that they were "weakened and impoverished both in persone and spiritte, for the major parte of them had neither meate nor drinke in all the time by anie certaine provision."

With great difficulty, Sir Michael Gayer one of the commanders, succeeded in persuading Captain Grove, "to take the most distressed for that night" into the Fort of Puntal, "all men else seeming to neglect them."

Nor had Essex been more fortunate than his colleague. On the morning of the twenty-fifth a Dutch boy swam out to his fleet from a vessel which was lying in Port Royal. From him they learnt of Cropani's preparations to defend the Channel of San Pedro. At nine o'clock Denbigh assembled a Council of War on board the *Swiftsure* to consider this report. By their advice orders were sent to Sir Samuel Argall, who was lying near the barrier with the Vice-Admiral's squadron to attack it with the support of the Dutch. As soon as wind and tide served Argall accordingly despatched a ketch with the boy on board it to Port Royal to reconnoitre, but it was found that the defences were too strong to be attacked successfully.

Thereupon on the same afternoon Wimbledon again convened a meeting of the Council to decide whether the expedition should be re-embarked without making any further attempt upon Cadiz.

After some discussion the members decided to abandon the undertaking. They saw that if they remained in the Bay they might fail to intercept the Plate Fleet, whilst they had not the supplies to attempt the siege of a town which was strongly fortified and which could not be blockaded because their ships could not enter the channel which separated it from the mainland. "Lastly our soldiers by the experience which the commanders had

now gotten of them were found verie unserviceable and unfitt for a designe."

On the following day Wimbledon sent orders through Lord Denbigh that all the captains and pursers in the fleet should be at Fort Puntal at three in the afternoon to arrange for re-embarking the men and to report as to the state of their stores. This order was not executed, as so many boats had been sent away to fetch the shalloops.

Essex, however, was most unwilling to give up his hopes of destroying Cropani's galleons. At his earnest request Denbigh ordered Gayer and Love to reconnoitre the entrance again at nine on the morning of the twenty-seventh, but these captains failed to carry out their instructions.

The army spent another comfortless night upon its old camping ground, and Wimbledon again went the rounds in person.

At eight on the morning of the twenty-eighth the Council of War once more met at Puntal and discussed the question of retaining the fort. Wimbledon was most anxious to hold it, but was overruled by the majority of the Council, who pointed out that it was but a single foothold in an enemy's country, that the fortifications were unfinished, and that it was almost impossible to defend it. Nor could the cannon of Puntal prevent the Spanish shipping from using Cadiz Bay at their pleasure.

It was accordingly arranged that the men should be re-shipped without attempting the town at all.

Before the re-embarkation could be begun, it was necessary to withdraw Essex's squadron from before Port Royal. Argall, however, refused to retire without a written order from Wimbledon. This was duly sent to him, and he at once dropped down to Puntal, and sent his boats on shore to embark the soldiers belonging to his squadron. Six guns from Puntal were sent on board the English ships; two according to agreement were handed over to the Dutch.

"The Spaniards discoveringe, as they might well doe, that most of our men were shipt, charged the rest home and hotlie, the Earle of Essex drewe his regiment into Battalia to relieve and second the reare uppon occasion.

"Colonell Harwood his regiment haveinge receaved the enemies charge and maintained the same lytle hilles and blindes," between Puntal and the walls of Cadiz, "a convenient time (I being of the Earl of Essex his regiment by command drew upp his musketeers

relieved him and made good the sayde places, till such tymes as my munition was spent, and I commanded to draw off my men by Colonell Bruse; in this time I made newe support and discharged more than a hundred shott upon the enemy with my division of pikes and musketeers.)” “Had command been given to have advanced with our division of pikes together with those musketeers (or shortlie), and both to have charged the enemy together, we had putt them to fliggt, but our prime officers in the field were then no nearer than the ffort for which reason wee neither did nor could receave directions with the quickness which was requisite and desired, the Earle of Essex and the Lord of Valentia were in the field in person, but I did not see our Sergeant Major Generall Sir William St. Leger, nor the Quarter-Master Generall Sir George Blundell. In fine wee made our retreate to the fforte disorderly nor was it in the power of the captaines and commanders there to remedie it. The reasons were that the souldiers were wearie and faint themselves, and armes extreame wett and thereby unfitt for service for it rained heard and their munition being spent there was no preasant supplie which gave the Cowardlie occasion of excuse to hast their retreat and disheartened the rest. I thincke in the retreate we lost sixty men at the least, and in all by Lande and Sea in the time we came before and departed from Cales, wee lost three hundred, most of which I am confident were lost through want of orders and disorders through which causes I pray to God we lose no more.

“The twenty-eight the Reere of our Army quitt the ffort named fforte of Pointon (sic), haveing first taken away the ordinance nine brass pieces, but not raised itt.”

During the night the fort was held by a small detachment under Colonel Burgh, who was the first to land and the last to leave, but they were all on board by the morning of the twenty ninth, “when the Sea-captaines had orders to weigh anchor and putt to sea.” On their way to the entrance of the Bay they lost one Dutch vessel which was sunk by the fire of the town.¹

All night long cannon pealed and salvoes of musketry rang out from the ramparts of the unconquered city, and expresses hastening to Madrid bore the tidings that the Spaniards had cut down seven hundred of the English and captured eleven of their brass siege pieces.²

Once more the inevitable Council of War was called together on the morning of the twenty-ninth. They had before them the reports of sixty-two pursers, which showed that though about half the ships were victualled for four months the rest had only supplies for three and a half. "There was some lack of beer, water and candles amongst some few of them, and a mixture of water and of the wine taken from some prizes which was known as 'beverage' was issued to replace the beer. Several of the ships were leaking badly whilst Sir John Chudleigh complained that his crew was so weakened by sickness that he had not enough men to help with the pumps and to pull ropes. Thirty of Sir Edward Conway's regiment were sent from the *Dragon* to assist him.

As a fair wind was blowing to carry away the fleet, Lord Wimbledon by the advice of the assembled captains and masters decided not to wait for the decision of the Council of War.

He accordingly issued orders that the ships should at once make for a point sixty leagues from the shore at Cape Saint Vincent, "and plie to and againe 36 and $\frac{1}{2}$, 37 and 37 and $\frac{1}{2}$ to meete with the plateffleete if they could and in case they should be separated by the foule weather to the Southward then to meet again within the mouthe of the straites at Bugerona," (probably the headland of Cala Burras to the south-west of Malaga), "if to the northward at the Landes of Bayon" (the Islands of Cies off Bayona in Galicia). "The same day the Lord of Valentia was made Vice-Admirall to the Admirall of the fletee his squadron, but the Lo. Delawarr who was formerlie Vice-Admirall to that squadron would not take in his fflagge for that there were two Vice-Admirale fflagges borne out at one time to one Squadron for three daies, but that difference was composed, the Lord Delaware continued Vice-Admirall and the Lo. of Valentia was made Admirall to that squadron bearing his flagg in the maintop.

"The thirty-first we gave chase to four shippes whereof we tooke an Hamburger who said the others were Spaniards, and if our Captaine Osborne had kept his Loafe and continued the chase whereas he bore upp and gave itt over, they had taken the other three, for which he is generally reputed worthie at the least to loose his shipp, but some men doe anie thing without daunger.

"I am confident that if wee had assaulted the Towne when wee made our approach unto itt wee had advanced the takeing of it

with lesse losse of men then we had fruitlesse, for then our men were in heart and desirous to make anie attempt uppon itt, though known for daungerous. I am likewise confident that wee shall performe no greate exploit and for that our men falle sicke daylie, and ar more disheartened and the more as we are not able to lande above four thousand faire and serviceable men."¹

Sickness was raging. Out of 1,380 seamen in the King's ships, 310 were unfit for duty. It was noted with wonder that amongst the 250 men on the *Reformation* all were in good health, and as giving just occasion to inquire why "those of this ship should be all well, when none other were in the like condition nor scarce any ship in the whole fleet."

It was decided to send home all the ships which were in the worst condition as well as the sick, whilst the rest proceeded to cruise in search of the Silver Fleet.²

Such was the fate of an expedition which, had it been wisely handled might well have captured Genoa and by doing so have struck down the power of the Hapsburgs at a single blow.

Rubens who was with Spinola when the news of Wimbledon's defeat reached Flanders writes: "I heard my Lord Marquis say a few days back, though as a rule he is very sparing of his words, that the attack on Cadiz appeared to him to be the maddest piece of folly, for it looked as if they had thought that they could take all Spain with twelve thousand foot and a handful of horse, and he went on to point out that they had landed in that island where there is not a single tree without carrying with them fascines to fill up the canal which they would have to pass to attack the fortress, which had a garrison of five thousand fighting men. Moreover in their rear was the very populous city of Seville, whilst all Spain was in arms to relieve Cadiz, so they showed not one single trace of prudence during the whole expedition, except when they made up their minds to retire even though with loss and ignominy."³

Giron in announcing the news of the retreat of the English to Philip stated that he had cut down more than three hundred of them whilst they were in the act of re-embarking, and that he had purposely refrained from attacking Puntal, in order that he might detain their fleet before that place. "Thanks to this news no one at Madrid is now in the least afraid of the enemy, and we are all hoping that they will go home soon with broken heads. I am indeed, pleased that they are in Spain where they can do nothing

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rather than in Italy where they might do a good deal. Though I should like to see them in a hopeless mess, I cannot help worrying lest, as they now see they cannot carry out their intentions here, they may change their minds, and make for the Mediterranean after all. I know there are many excellent reasons why they should not go there; but in the meantime it is a very good thing that the whole Spanish fleet will soon have got together. In that case it will certainly be able to hold its own against them even if the English turn out to be in far greater strength than most people imagine, for we get many varying reports as to their strength. For my own part I believe they have about a hundred and twenty sail."¹

Khevenhüller, when, many years later, he summed up the history of the Italian War of 1625, gave a very scientific explanation of the reason why both Savoy and England had failed to attain their objects. He points out that the chief cause of the failure of the Franco-Savoyard attack upon Genoa was that Feria called out his forces in the Milanese, so the allies feared that they would be shut up in the mountains and have all their supplies cut off. Another reason was that the English fleet did not put to sea until Don Fadrique de Toledo was on his way back from Brazil, and their commanders, therefore, saw that whilst they were fighting against Genoa in the Mediterranean, the said Spanish fleet might cut out work enough for them in the Atlantic. They accordingly thought it better to look to their own house, than to help in taking other people's. The Dutch were prevented from sending their soldiers and ships there because Marquis Spinola had taken Breda in the meantime, and the same Spanish force might have been employed in other directions. The fleet at Marseilles could not be fitted out in time, although the Duke of Guise had in hand the hundred and fifty thousand ducats which he had taken from the Genoese, and other large sums sent him by the Duke of Savoy. "Thus the foundations which the Duke of Savoy and Constable de Lesdiguières counted upon with the greatest confidence for their undertaking failed them utterly."²

Wimbledon threw the blame for his defeat upon his colonels and upon his want of supplies.³ The English Government, however, knew but too well how their preparations had been delayed by the presence of Spinola's handful of vessels at Dunkirk and at Mardyke. The Marquis had saved Genoa upon the coast of Flanders.

Wimbleton did not succeed in his projects against the Flota.

The fleet from Peru had been detained by the Viceroy, because so many Dutch vessels were cruising in the Caribbean Sea, but that from New Spain had been despatched at the usual time and when the English arrived at Cadiz, was known to have passed the Bermudas.

Sloops were at once sent off to warn the galleons to put into some safe port and to remain there until further orders. None of them, however, fell in with the Flota, which arrived at Cadiz on the twenty-ninth of November with its freight worth over six millions of pesos (£1,350,000) without having encountered any bad weather during its voyage, or having heard any tidings of the enemy until it got into port. When the Admiral was asked if he had met the English, "he replied, 'No,' and added that he had not seen the least sign of them, and three days later the Honduras galleon also arrived with a very rich cargo and without having met with the least hindrance. This good news has completely restored the spirits not only of His Majesty and of the whole Court, but also of all the town and of all Spain. After the Te Deum had been sung the King went to Our Lady of Atocha to render thanks to His Divine Majesty and for the intercession of the Blessed Virgin."¹

"The Flota, as I have already written," says another envoy has arrived and certain it is that it was a miracle of God's, who has shown in this case that He hath a particular care for this monarchy, that it did not fall into the middle of the English fleet, for twelve despatch boats had been sent out by different courses to meet it. They carried instructions to the Admiral to abandon the usual route, keep far north and make for port at either Lisbon or Corunna. It, however, seemed good to His Divine Majesty that not one of these vessels should meet with the Flota, so that it kept on its usual course, and that one of them should be taken by the English, who, as soon as they found out what the orders were, made their way northwards accordingly and, in the meantime, the Flota got to Cadiz without being seen by them."²

Its capture might have brought Spain to her knees. When it was known that the English had gone in search of it measures were already contemplated for melting down all the plate in the Kingdom, even including that in the churches. "As trade has ceased with foreign parts, and money is not to be had for less than fifty per cent., the price of everything imported has doubled.

However a good deal gets through by the connivance of the officers of the Customs. Lately they let five English vessels put into Alicante with cargoes of cod, herring and other fish, and, little by little, trade will be restored. These Kingdoms cannot, indeed, exist unless they are relieved by others nor can the rest of the world live without the money of Spain."¹

The East India Fleet had previously arrived at Lisbon in safety "with the richest cargo, it is said, especially in jewels which has ever reached Portugal since the Portuguese took those islands. It is quite true that just as they were coming into port the flagship opened her seams, but the crew and passengers were saved and as they fished up the jewel caskets the merchants will be at no loss except for the allspice."²

Yet the English might have succeeded in their undertaking had discipline been maintained.

The Council talked unceasingly but would not act. Complaints that Captain Squibb of the *Lion* had shown cowardice by refusing to attack a Spanish ship, and that Captain Osborne had borne up when four merchantmen were within his reach, were utterly disregarded. Even Lord Denbigh failed to obtain satisfaction when he reported two of his captains for insubordination, because they had attacked a blockhouse near Saint Mary's without his orders. Captain Ruckwood, a merchant captain, who had on board thirty seamen and one hundred and twelve landmen, solemnly protested that he had only two tuns of beer and two of water unspent, and "so prayed to be relieved from the prohibition to take in fresh water." The Council, however, would not incur any responsibility "as it was a particular case and concerned not any of the King's ships," so "he seemed as one left to be relieved by the Lieutenant-General."

They certainly issued orders to the Captains to keep their places in their squadrons and "spread abroad in their sailing" on pain of imprisonment, and a watchword was given at night to every ship to prevent other vessels from slipping through the fleet. It was a most important matter that these orders should be strictly observed as it was calculated that every squadron by placing its vessels two or three leagues apart could cover a degree of latitude or one of longitude without the ships losing touch with one another.³

Notwithstanding these precautions time was lost because their cruisers chased their own ships "thinking they had been enemies."⁴

On the fourth of November, the Council decided that they would not wait for the Flota beyond the twentieth, for they were of opinion that if it had not reached Spain by that time, it would not arrive at all that year. Sir Richard Watts proposed that they should attack Madeira. His suggestion was rejected on account of the dangerous anchorage in Funchal Roads and of the difficulty of approaching the town by the narrow ways which led from the only landing place which was not under the fire of the fort.

For twenty days the fleet cruised about sixty leagues off Cape St. Vincent, and by the seventeenth of November were in latitude 38° 30' North. On November the eleventh, Lord Delaware reported that sickness had so suddenly increased in his ship the *St. George* that unless some healthy men were sent to strengthen his depleted crew, they would be forced to "let her drive in the sea. The matter concerning a ship of His Maties. of good burden and great value, my Lo. General was very sensible of it and careful to apply a timely remedy." He therefore ordered the sea-captains who were on board the flagship at the time, who were almost thirty in number, "to at once send in their own boats two good and healthy seamen apiece on board the *St. George* and to receive two sick men out of the same in their place." Twelve ships were sent off the same evening to Plymouth with sick, wounded and unserviceable men.

On the seventeenth it was reported that the sickness was everywhere increasing especially in Essex's squadron. His own ship the *Swiftsure* had a crew of two hundred and fifty men, but only thirty-two or thirty of them were fit for duty, and in such heavy weather they could not possibly handle the sails of such a large vessel. The *Convertive* was in no better case. A Council of the whole fleet was forthwith assembled. With the approval of all but one member they agreed that when their time for watching for the Flota had expired on the twentieth, they should steer straight for England without attacking Bayona which was strongly fortified. By attacking Cadiz "they had declared themselves the open enemies of the Spanish nation, and had so far provoked their King that it was expected that he would in the next spring make some preparation to invade or annoy England or Ireland." It was, therefore, necessary that their vessels, which had grown very foul by being so long off the ground, should be brought back home as soon as possible to be trimmed

and made ready to guard the narrow seas and the coasts "against the times of need." Wimbledon himself insisted upon the fact that the care of His Majesty's ships and the rest of the fleet had been specially recommended to him, and that this was a "point highly to be regarded as well as in respect of the condition and great values of the particular vessels now abroad, as in regard of the singular usefulness of our Navy for the safeguard of our coasts and kingdoms."

On the twenty-first of November they accordingly set sail for England. The weather was cold, stormy and rainy and by the twenty-second they found that they had been driven back into Lat. $39^{\circ} 27'$. Wimbledon, thereupon, reduced the allowance of beer from three cans a day to two for every mess of five men. For a time they were in great fear that they would not be able to weather the Cape of Finisterre in Galicia, but by the twenty-ninth the weather had moderated, and by the thirtieth they were in Latitude $46^{\circ} 30'$. Fresh storms now set in. Wood and candles were growing scarce and great complaints were made that the beer was wasted by "the fraud of quartermasters, coopers, swabbers and the overbigness of some cannns of allowance." Sickness was raging, and corpses were being thrown overboard every day. By four o'clock on the afternoon the *Anne Royall*, which had been thought to be in the Channel, sighted the Scillies bearing four leagues to the East. Only two or three ships and two ketches were in her company. The wind was blowing from the East-South-East, and she was forced to make for Kinsale where she arrived on December the eleventh. As she had six foot of water in her hold, and no men fit to work the pumps she must have sunk within a day or two. She was followed by various other vessels, and the news of the failure of the expedition soon reached London.¹

The feelings excited by the disaster were very various, and were largely coloured by political animosities. "As for Buckingham," wrote Rubens, "I think like you do that he is on the down grade as I have written in so many words to M. Gerbier, and as an Englishman tells me who is a great friend of mine and who has just come from England. He says that on the very day when Buckingham was on his passage back from Holland (during this voyage two very fine ships went down, one of which named the *Assurance* belonged to the King and the other to Burlamacchi) fifty more ships of the English fleet arrived, and that all

the grandees were in extacies at the disaster, "which they all put down to Buckingham's rashness."¹ Stefani writing from Calais viewed the matter in a somewhat different light. "The whole English fleet has got back without having accomplished a single thing, but, on the other hand, after losing five thousand men by hunger, sickness and the sword. Their return after such disasters has made such a stir in the Kingdom that the Government have thought it well to issue orders that no one is to speak of it. Everyone is laughing at this fine plaister for such a wound. They are still spreading broadcast every kind of rumour against Spain which they think may serve to divert popular feeling and keep the rabble from thinking about the fleet. One of the Dunkirk ships of war happened to be off the entrance of the English harbour into which the fleet was running. Seeing its danger it hoisted Dutch colours, and as it was so close to an English port, no one on the fleet suspected it in the slightest, but believing it to be a Dutchman, they told them all the misfortunes they had suffered during the expedition.

"The Dunkirker took leave of them in due form and on its way home made prize of a Dutch vessel which it carried with it into Dunkirk." Three days later he writes: "All the soldiers who came back with "the fleet have been kept with the colours by a royal proclamation; they are about fitting out a new fleet, which it seems will be stronger than the first one. The King has already convoked Parliament for the sixteenth of February in order to secure the necessary supplies for the prosecution of the war which he has begun with Spain."²

The effect of the tidings at Madrid was great. "Thanks to the good news from Flanders and Germany, the retreat of the English from Cadiz and the arrival of the Flota, everyone here is now in the best of spirits. They had previously been utterly cast down at seeing so many enemies discover themselves against this Crown at the same time. Many are now volunteering for service in addition to the men who are levied throughout the Kingdom in the proportion of one out of five. The story still goes that they mean to fit out a great fleet against England, and that His Majesty is going to Portugal for this purpose. I don't think he intends to do so, but I believe he will go to Monzon."³ Serra on the other hand sounded a note of warning which, if the Duke of Savoy could have had his way, might have been justified by events. "I think it would be well that Your Lordships should

push on your preparations for defence in every quarter, for this will make us safe in any event, and we shall not be the losers if the need does not arise. I know well how much you have on your hands and all the difficulties which may turn up, but on the other hand this question is one of supreme importance. You must have in any case some place which is stronger than all the others. What you have done to fortify the Gulf of Spezzia is thought of the greatest value and you did very well to send a force into Corsica, as we gather from all we know that you have reason enough to fear the ill-will of the Corsicans, and the one object of Savoy is to make trouble there. His ambassador in France is going to England with what plans and with what object the Duke's ill-will tells us in plain enough language. I trust, however, in God and in His Most Holy Mother and that He will continue to defend our cause as He hath done until now, and that this great English fleet is destined to effect but little, for, as I have already told you, you need not trouble yourselves about their landing a force, for the men they have with them are a pack of rabble and are nothing to be afraid of. By our last advices the fleet is still off Cape Saint Vincent waiting for the galleons of the Flota, but it seems impossible that out of the many despatch boats sent off one should not have fallen in with them, and that, on receiving the warning, they should not have steered such a course as would bring them clear of danger. Please God it may be so, seeing how important this is."¹

Philip the Fourth showed his usual presence of mind when he learnt of Giron's victory. He informed the Infanta that he was now free from all anxiety on the subject of the English attack and again urged her to take measures for effecting an invasion of England. He stated that he was writing at the suggestion of Olivares who wished that she should negotiate on the subject with the Emperor, the Duke of Saxony and other princes. Denmark might be won over by concessions as to her trade with Spain.² Both the King and the favourite saw in their victory and more particularly in the escape of the Flota the direct intervention of Divine Providence. Olivares in writing to Rubens described it as a miracle; the King issued a decree that the twenty-ninth of November, the anniversary of the day upon which the Silver Fleet had reached Cadiz, should be observed for ever as a festival by the celebration of the Mass of the Most Holy Sacrament in every cathedral in Spain.³

The Infanta replied to her nephew's letter with equal composure. "It was impossible," she said, "to discover the intentions of the English betimes, on the one hand because they had given their captains sealed orders which they were not to open until they were at sea, on the other, because they had kept the ports closed, and had not let a man or a letter pass until the fleet had sailed. A day or two ago we heard from Calais that their orders are to ascend the Seville River and to try and sack the city, but there seems no foundation for this report or any reason for attaching any importance to it."

After noting in her own hand that D. Fernando Giron "is, as I myself have seen, a most experienced and courageous soldier," she went on to comment at much greater length upon Philip's English plans. "As for the diversion which Your Majesty wishes me to make against the English in their own house, I have already given you my views on the subject in my letter of October the fifth, and I must now repeat once more most emphatically that if we are to enter upon this undertaking we shall have to take it in hand most seriously. We shall have to make all the necessary preparations betimes for crossing and for pressing the blow home, for if we have the necessary forces and can once get over the sea, we may fairly hope for success. Without speaking of what we should gain in prestige and by the conquest of such a great Kingdom, we may take it for certain that the Dutch would be forced to come to terms, for if they lost the use of the English harbours whilst Your Majesty enjoyed it, the whole of their trade and commerce would be utterly undone. As for the forces which would be required for such an expedition and to garrison those provinces, if God be pleased to permit that matters should be arranged with the King of Denmark (with whom the Elector of Saxony is negotiating at this moment as Y.M. will see by my other letter), I think we could get them together here if Your Majesty could send us from Spain everything else which it would be absolutely necessary to provide, if the expedition is to want for nothing. The matter will be carefully gone into as soon as we hear that Your Majesty has decided upon this course, but I must tell you at once that absolute secrecy about it is indispensable. As, however, it will be impossible to keep the necessary preparations secret, it would be as well that Your Majesty should give out that you intend to carry on the war against the Dutch with the utmost vigour, and that Your Majesty and the Ministers

who are admitted to your confidence on the subject should be careful to use no language against England in public, but should only say that you hope that every time the English come to Spain, they will get the same welcome as they have just had."¹

The Infanta had at last come to regard the invasion of England as a feasible proposition. Her change of view was clearly due to the outcome of Wimbledon's expedition, and her adoption of Olivares' suggestion was destined to have a lasting influence upon the course of history. Had he not urged that the Emperor, Saxony and other northern princes should be asked to co-operate in active measures against England, it is probable that the Hapsburgs would never have embarked upon the maritime policy which brought them into collision with Sweden, and thus, in the end, secured France the ally whom she needed before she could engage with success in any undertaking in Germany. It is but fair to add that the Count-Duke saw that his proposals could not be carried out if Denmark remained hostile, and suggested that she should be gained over by the grant of those commercial privileges in Spain which had been refused her in the previous year. It is not, however, very easy to see why he should have changed his attitude with regard to these concessions. He may have learnt that Oxenstiern, who as Chancellor of Sweden was now Gustaf Adolf's chief adviser, had in August, 1624, proposed to the Palatine that a great Evangelical alliance consisting of all the Protestant Princes and States should be formed to join with the Franco-Savoyard-Venetian alliance and Bethlen Gabor, in an attack upon the Hapsburg Powers and Poland, and that one of the chief reasons why Gustaf Adolf had not taken the field against Poland and Austria was because he feared that Denmark might attack Sweden in his absence.² It is more probable that he knew that the Danes were very discontented because England had failed to pay the subsidies which they had been promised to aid them in their war against the Empire, and that, despite Rusdorf's representations, the English fleet had been despatched to Cadiz in place of being sent to the mouth of the Weser to support their King. It would be a wise policy to detach Christian IV. from the Protestant Alliance.³

Charles and Buckingham, on the other hand, were far from being disheartened by the defeat of the Cadiz expedition. So far as the interests of the public were concerned, the Duke's mission to Holland had been, upon the whole, successful, and upon his

return home at the end of December he was quite prepared to enter upon fresh negotiations with Savoy for naval co-operation in the Mediterranean.

The siege of Verrua had been raised on the ninth of November by Vignobles with a French division, and Charles Emmanuel at once asked Wake to allow him to send his secretary, Antony Hales, to England to give the King an account of the event. He had already decided to invade the Milanese in order to bring the French to an open rupture with Spain and to draw Venice into the war. The Spanish forces were much diminished and it would go hard with them if they were attacked simultaneously by the Savoyard, the Venetians and Cœuvres from the Grisons. "The Duke," ended Wake, "is very desirous to have ships to help him to deal with the Spaniards and the Genoese." By the tenth of December a letter had reached Turin from the Comptroller-General of the Finances at Nice stating that the English fleet, having failed at Cadiz had entered the Mediterranean.¹

The Abbot Scaglia, "a very talented man, but anything but what one would expect in a cassock," was then the Ambassador of Savoy at Paris.² Charles Emmanuel, on hearing the report wrote to him at once. "If this proves true, I shall still hope they may do great things. In that case your personal presence at Nice will be of the greatest use, as we settled when we talked matters over. If your Lordship has any certain news that they have passed the Straits, I must ask you to let me know at once so that I may lay my affairs here on that course."³

A few days later he sent instructions to Scaglia to proceed to England, nominally in order to condole with the new King on his father's death⁴. Scaglia's mission excited great alarm at the Spanish Embassy. Mirabel wrote to Madrid that the Abbot was "instructed to ask Charles to assist his master to undertake the occupation of Corsica, or at least to allow his fleet to proceed to Italy, or to contribute some money towards the Corsican expedition, and to assist the League." "It seems very probable that this information is correct," wrote Philip to the Infanta "as Scaglia has taken with him a Parisian banker of the very highest standing, and so I must ask Your Highness to request your confidants in England and those whom Bruneau is arranging for to let you know what he is really doing."⁵

Scaglia duly pointed out to Charles that his interest in securing the re-establishment of the King of Bohemia was a reason for his

joining in the League against Spain, and that his great fleet might well be employed against Genoa. He confined himself to asking for the loan of thirty or forty ships to serve under the flag of Savoy and an Admiral named by the Duke "in the enterprise which he had already explained to His Majesty privately, which, if it was successfully carried out would be of the greatest advantage to the public cause." These ships were to be of between three hundred and three hundred and fifty tons burden and should be armed with twenty five-pounder cannon.

"In addition to these pieces he most humbly prays His Majesty that he will have shipped upon the said vessels twenty-five or thirty more cast iron pieces, which His Highness can have brought on shore should he wish," together with five or six thousand rounds of ammunition for them.

As, however, His Majesty would be free to recall these vessels as soon as the undertaking upon which they were to be employed had been carried out, Scaglia requested the loan of twenty-five or thirty more ships of war, of which the Duke wished to make use in the Mediterranean for any purpose he might choose, and for which he was ready to pay by the month.¹

The English were in no mood for undertaking distant expeditions. The people were bitterly disappointed at the disaster to their fleet, and loudly accused Wimbledon for his mismanagement. "I hear on good authority," wrote Priandi "that the Princess of Piedmont has ordered their Ambassador here to England to propose, as he has done here, a fresh undertaking against the Island of Corsica or Sardinia, but probably, he will not find them so inclined for adventures or so uppish as they have been, now that their fleet has come back crowded with sick and with all the commanders quarrelling amongst themselves without having done anything against the Spaniards except taking a few prizes with cargoes of sugar and the like."

"All I wrote you," he adds a week later, as to Savoy's fresh plans in the Mediterranean is absolutely correct, but they will certainly melt into thin air as all his other undertakings have done. He has got four hundred thousand francs out of the French only for the asking, but instead of using them to pay the forces which the King is keeping up for him, he has been buying tapestries, plate and jewels so that they are utterly sick of him here."²

Buckingham, nevertheless, seems to have promised Scaglia that

his request for the loan of some English ships of war should be granted, and with this answer he returned to Paris.¹

The Prince of Piedmont, who had personally brought the project of the expedition against Genoa before Charles and Buckingham in the previous year, was then in France where he was endeavouring to prevent Lesdiguières and Créquy from returning to Italy. He had several interviews with the English, Dutch and Venetian Ambassadors, and determined to despatch his favourite the Count of St. Maurice on his own account to London.

St. Maurice was instructed to call upon Buckingham before he saw the King. He was to thank the Duke for his promise to Scaglia, and was to press for the immediate despatch of at least the vessels which were to be hired out to Savoy. It was of great importance that they should not be delayed "for if His Majesty is to act with effect at sea and on the Spanish coasts, it will be necessary to effect a diversion, so as to give the Spanish forces some occupation in the Mediterranean, and thus prevent them from returning to their own seas to relieve and protect them, and they would be still less able to undertake operations in the Atlantic. The King could thus oblige them to fortify every harbour in Italy, as they will have to do when they see Savoy strong at sea. You should also represent to the Duke of Buckingham that the vessels which they are to give to Savoy, will, if His Majesty has any expedition in view, be in readiness to join his main fleet off the coast of Spain and to serve and reinforce him there for any purpose for which they may be required far more easily than if they were in England, particularly as they would not have to pass the Straits to go from the Mediterranean to the Spanish seas, as has already been explained to the Duke of Buckingham."

"After complimenting the Duke and submitting the above observations to him, you will be presented by him to the King, and you will explain to His Majesty that I have been invited to France for two reasons, the first being that I may represent the present position of affairs in Italy to the King. The second is that as His Majesty the King of England has asked H.R.H., my father, and the Venetians to enter the League which he has just made with the Dutch, my father wishes to explain that as he and the Venetians have been in alliance with the French for the last four years he thinks that they can best comply with His Majesty's request by remaining on good terms with both sides." The

Prince had succeeded in interesting Louis XIII. in the affairs of Italy and thought that much might have been done to bring about a better understanding between France and England if Buckingham could have come to Paris, a visit rendered impossible by the jealousy of the husband of Anne of Austria.

It would be necessary for him to visit Carlisle and Conway. The latter was Wake's father-in-law and he should be told how highly his son-in-law was esteemed by the Duke of Savoy. Finally St. Maurice was to assure Mme. de St. George, who was Henrietta Maria's chief confidant, that the Prince was much inclined to favour her interests in Piedmont.¹

Despite these hints, the mission was destined to be a failure. Buckingham was rightly proud of the offensive and defensive alliance which he had just concluded with the United Provinces for a term of fifteen years, and to which Denmark had nominally acceded, although thanks chiefly to Conway's refusal to assist Sweden in Silesia upon the ground that he could not see the value of Swedish intervention in a country with which England had no concern, he had not secured the adhesion of Gustaf Adolf.

The Duke's first object was to carry out the policy originally suggested by Oxenstiern to Camerarius, of uniting his new League with that of France, Savoy and Venice.² He had good grounds for this for he wished to avoid all appearance of a War of Religion. As Wake pointed out to the Venetian Senate, "under the pretext of a Catholique League, a Catholique Monarchie was visibly sought." Spain, in time of peace had possessed herself of the Palatinate, had trampled on the German Princes and had tried to possess herself of Emden and East Friesland. The seizure of the Valtelline had shown "that their intentions were to open and secure a passage for the communicating of their forces together, which was no less than a threatening of all the Princes of Christendom to be forced peacemeale, if they still not voluntarily submit.

"There was nothing more farre from His Majesty's intentions than to bande against the cause of religion, being in his hart as desirous to endeavour the temporal and civil defence of the persons and states of Catholique Princes as of his owne, and the maintaining of them in their peaceable possessions, leaving the worke of faith unto God, the onely lord of that Kingdom."

It was seen from the outset that the difficulty would be with France. Wake was, therefore, instructed to press Charles Emmanuel to use his influence to bring the French into the League

or at least to pursue the war vigorously in Italy. The French King "will probably be diverted by war with the Protestants, but His Majesty is earnestly mediating between the King of France and his subjects, and it would be well if those engaged in the war in Italy were to intercede to the same purpose."¹

The policy of France for the next few years was to be decided by the Protestant question. Venice had refused to join Savoy and France in an attack upon Milan, unless the French put in the field the full quota of forces required by the terms of alliance. Upon this Créquy and Bouillon pointed out to Louis XIII. that it was impossible for him to make war at the same time in Italy against Spain and in France against his own subjects and therefore advised him to make peace at home. Richelieu, on the other hand, knew that so long as Rochelle remained unsubdued, Louis XIII. would never be master in his own house, and therefore decided to come to terms with Spain. Peace was accordingly concluded at Monzon between the two powers on the fifth of March, 1626, and, as a necessary consequence, Savoy was forced to come to terms with Genoa.²

Charles Emmanuel had already refused to accede to the Convention of the Hague on the ground that he could not do so without the consent of his allies the French and the Venetians, although he protested that he was anxious to break openly with Spain and would not give over the diversion in Italy until affairs were settled in Germany.

Scarcely had St. Maurice set foot in England when the news of the conclusion of the Treaty of Monzon arrived in London. Under these circumstances it was impossible for any English government to grant his request.

Their refusal was couched in terms which would have astonished Elizabeth's seamen.

"Concerning the first demand for 30 or 40 ships ready equipt for war His Majesty will always be ready to accomodate their Highnesses, but at present the King of Spain is preparing in Flanders and Spain to make himself master of the seas and has commissioned Spinola to procure men and vessels to waste his Majesty's coasts. That having settled the Valtelline affairs with France, the enemy has become more powerful, therefore his Majesty must await the result of his present designs against his enemies, before advancing those of their Highnesses. As to the second demand of twenty-five or thirty ships to be employed in

the Mediterranean, His Majesty will not fail to assist them, so far as his means and affairs will allow."¹

The authors of this document might well think the alliance of Holland and Denmark far more important than that of Savoy and Venice. They trembled at the thought of an invasion of England though, as the Infanta wrote, the presence of a large Danish force near the Hansa Towns would prevent those cities from lending shipping to Spain for such an undertaking. Their position was in the main owing to their own irresolution.² Had England sent a fleet against Genoa in the spring of 1625 she would have had no cause to fear an attempt at an invasion from the Elbe in the spring of 1626. But the English flag was not destined to show itself again in the Mediterranean for more than twenty years to come. Such was the outcome of Wimbledon's failure and of Spinola's wise foresight. His naval preparations had made him for a time the master of the seas.³

CHAPTER LXXV

WAR was the normal condition of human life in the Seventeenth Century. The fact that Spain was fighting to the death on the plains of Brabant did not for an instant cast a shadow over the gay existence of the Belgian nobles, although the sentinels on the Brussels ramparts could hear the cannon of Bergen-op-Zoom or of Breda booming from the northward and could see the smoke swirling upwards from the burning villages which had been raided by Frederick Henry's horse. Brussels in the days of the Arch-dukes' had long been a centre of what for two hundred and fifty years has been known as fashionable life. The presence of a Court which, whilst it was in close touch with Italy and Spain, was likewise the diplomatic centre of Teutonic Europe, the residence within its walls of great landed proprietors with all the traditions of inherited wealth, the rich ecclesiastical foundations from which the city had come to be known as the Northern Rome, the artists and musicians who owed their bread to the patronage of Court and Church, the foreign travellers who crowded its promenades, all went to make Brussels one of the most brilliant cities of a brilliant age.

It is to Jean de Tournay, a writer who found his models in Italian romances that we owe a vivid picture of Brussels as it was in the winter which followed the Siege of Breda. His "Romance of the Court of Brussels" is one of those stories dealing with real personages under feigned names which in the next generation gave rise to the "Grand Cyrus" and the "Roman Octavia." It was published in 1627 under a license from the vicar general of Liege who hoped that its perusal would turn away the thoughts of its readers from the pomps and vanities of a world of which Spinola was the hero. It is, perhaps, noteworthy that one of the characters who is named Lycidas is shipwrecked on a desert island. Did Milton borrow his "Lycidas" from Jean de Tournay?

"The great Alcandre would be invisible, were he covered with the laurel crowns which he has won. The fame of his valour resounds more widely than his cannon. This is why we see the ladies, who are love's worst enemies, choose to assay the effects of his kindness rather than feel the manifestations of his courage. He might

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vaunt himself invincible were not Love his conqueror, but the glory of his assailant makes such a defeat an honour, for if he is wounded it is by the fairest eye in the world, and I will feign believe that if any envy him his charms it is the gods alone."

His lady love was Mlle. de Berg, the sister of his general, Count Henri de Berg, "'Chloris in her haughty beauty can brook no rival, and I can pardon her vanity for this, as she has such good reasons to allege in her defence. Her golden locks are love's fetters, her eyes his torches and her glances the arrows with which he pierces hearts; we may now judge if Heaven has not lodged a fair soul in this fair body.'" The future was to show the value of this friendship.

Spinola was not one to hide his triumphs from the world. The winter of 1625 was a hard one and a procession of sledges was arranged to parade the streets. It was headed by Spinola dressed as Mars seated on a high box seat with Diana at his side, half hid in a grove of laurels. In front sat Mme. de la Faille the wife of the Principal Secretary of State, in the garb of Fame proclaiming the general's mighty deeds upon her trumpet. Prince d'Espinoy followed as Alexander the Great in a sledge covered with paintings on canvas of Hope raising her hands to Heaven with the motto, "My bliss is to come." Don Manuel of Portugal, the bastard son of Antonio, Prior of Crato, who had played his part in the negotiations, which had brought about Pecquius' ill-starred mission to the Hague, but who had afterwards sold himself to Spain for a large pension, followed as Scipio Africanus, accompanied by an Amazon. On the front of his triumphal car was painted Victory with her hands bound and the motto, "I triumph in my slavery." Other maskers followed, one an Orpheus with his wife beside him as Eurydice, whilst his coachman dressed as Apollo flung roses amongst the crowd from a box full of growing flowers. Neptune was in a sledge painted like a raging sea in which Cupids were sporting, and next came Endymion and the Moon with Cupid playing the flute and Argus sleeping beside him. It is noticeable that most of the devices were in French for the Spanish language seems to have been but little known in Belgian society, and even in the churches monuments with inscriptions in Spanish are rarely to be seen.¹

The winter evenings were filled with dancing and with ballets. At a ball at Mme. de la Faille's Diana, with her nymphs around her, entered upon a chariot of flowers driven by Pan playing the

flute and drawn by six wild stags. Six Cupids represented six hobby stags chained to the wheels, and behind the Goddess sat Zephyr fanning flowers with his wings. Unfortunately the team were frightened by the lights and music and despite the efforts of the piper coachman bolted and all but overturned the rows of high chairs ranged round the walls on which were seated the ladies glittering with jewels. In another scene the goddesses came on in the chariot of the sun driven by Apollo and drawn by horses snorting sparks and fire. Love with his darts tried to wound the hearts of the ladies, but as they were of rock crystal the arrows rebounded from them. Thereupon all did homage to the chaste Diana.

Finally the performers unmasked and danced stately country dances led by Mme. de la Faille.

One Spanish custom had been adopted by the Belgians. In summer troops of gallants hat in hand might have been seen walking up and down in the courtyard before the palace casting amorous glances at the ladies standing at the windows of the galleries above. Not a word passed between them but these silent promenaders reminded travellers of the serenaders of Seville and Madrid.

The Infanta herself took little or no part in social life. Since her husband's death she had withdrawn from the world and had assumed the white robe of a poor Clare. The palace was in all but the name a convent. When at Tervueren she slept for weeks together in a little lodge in the park which had been fitted up like a nun's cell. In Brussels her nights were often spent in prayer at a window looking into her private chapel.

Under such inspiration the great world of Belgium was at least in outward appearance decent and devout. The fasts and festivals of the Church were solemnly observed, society flocked to the Lent and Advent sermons, and not infrequently some gay courtier who had been rejected by his lady love or some famous beauty exchanged their laces and embroideries for the coarse monastic robe. Maximilian of Bavaria complained as we have seen not without reason that in Isabella's eyes the reception of a nun was of far more importance than the weightiest business of state.

When Mlle. de Conflans entered the convent which had been founded by Isabella for the friend of her childhood, Mother Anne of Jesus, she was accompanied to the altar by the Infanta herself. Since early dawn, "on the birthday of her second life," her

maids had been bedecking the bride of Christ for her espousals. Her robes were covered with diamonds and pearls; her fair naturally curling hair was powdered and floated loose over her shoulders. On her head she wore a crown of thorns. For the last time she gazed upon her face in her glass.

The streets through which the procession passed were crowded with onlookers. It was headed by a band of music and singers. Mlle. de Conflans followed bearing a crucifix in her hands and walking with her eyes fixed upon her spouse who reposed upon it. Beside her was the Infanta followed by a long train of Court ladies in their robes of state.

When they reached the church one of the most eloquent preachers in the Netherlands pronounced a sermon in praise of the victory which the new nun had achieved over her passions. "Her ladies in waiting then began to despoil her of her worldly garb to deck her with the livery of her Divine spouse. What a sweet exchange!

"When her body had been indued with a vesture such as angels wear when they come down from Heaven to earth, they cut off her hair which she forthwith offered up at the feet of her spouse, no doubt to bind them with their chains, so that he may ever remain beside her. When she was clad in her new dress her beauty seemed more charming than ever.

"Urania takes a last fairwell of this great Princess in words full of humility and thankfulness for the honour which she had done her by being present at the ceremony and for her loving kindness in giving her such a good example. The Infanta said nothing in reply, but bent down and gave her the kiss of peace. All the ladies of the Court followed, but in varying moods; some were filled with joy; others with sorrow. Urania alone kept smiling with pleasure, for she could not hide her heartfelt rejoicing. Her brother was the last to bid her fairwell, and though there is no one but admires his courage, he could not hold back his tears.

"He loved her too well not to run the risk of being blamed for his weakness and his tears, rather than receive fresh praises for his courage because he had parted from his dear Urania with undimmed eyes."

Such was the spirit of an age when men felt that "it was well worth praying for a day to gain everlasting life."

The ceremonies of Holy Week were observed with great solemnity.

On Palm Sunday the Court in penitential garb followed the Infanta on foot through the town to visit the Churches.

On the night of Holy Thursday "all the streets and Churches are full of torches to light the people at their devotions. The ladies crowded with eager curiosity to those where the companies of noble penitents were to hold their stations. Their captain was the Duke of Aerschot, who wore sackcloth and carried a heavy cross in his arms, whilst tears, which I hope were the fruit of piety, streamed from his eyes." The Prince of Barbanson was scourging himself to the bone in order to atone with his blood for the errors into which he had been led by his senses. Around them knelt the greatest nobles in Belgium muttering 'misereres' before the sepulchre of their Redeemer to the dull thud of the whips falling upon their shoulders. Possibly they forgot that they spent most of their time in pestering the Government for grants and offices which they did little to deserve. Even at this solemn hour some of these contrite sinners fell a prey to the allurements of the fair. Mlle de Berg "might try to hide her face under her veil but she is always a sun hidden behind a cloud, her light shone out, but it did not dazzle." It is true that the beauty was suspected and with some reason of too great a liking if not for the tenets of Calvin, at least for those who preached them, so possibly she got rather weary of the devotions and sermons which other ladies followed with such enthusiasm throughout the week. On the other hand, the outside world thought that her brother "is so strongly inclined to virtue, that his one passion is to follow after it." After events seem to prove that in Count Henry de Berg's eyes the pursuit of virtue was quite compatible with a fondness for Protestant money.

The manners of the great were still in many ways very simple. At the beginning of Lent it was the custom that the ladies should draw lots for their valentines, who were bound to attend upon them faithfully throughout the following year, and to send a present of flowers to them every morning. The language of flowers was in general use, and narcissuses, violets and marigolds each had a meaning in these bouquets. Others took their lady for a walk in a garden, and attended her to church to hear a famous preacher. On May Day everyone sent his mistress a tree chosen so as to express his passion. The Prince of Barbanson sent a laurel on the trunk of which was painted Daphne entwining a heart with a wreath; Mlle. de Berg received

a cypress as an emblem of cruelty ; a peach tree was planted before a beauty's door.¹

Flowers, indeed, played a great part in Belgian life. The Infanta had inherited her father's love of horticulture, and her gardens at Brussels were famous throughout Europe. When the first Lord Salisbury was laying out those at Hatfield, he had sent his gardener, John Tradescant, to make purchases in Belgium and Holland. Amongst them were quinces, medlars, black currant trees and cherry trees, bought from the Archduke's gardener, Pierre Voyens. A famous cherry was known as the Archduke's whilst a few years later a tulip with red and yellow fringed petals named after the Infanta was sold at Amsterdam for four hundred pounds. With the famous "Semper Augustus" this blossom figures in a picture known as the "Triumph of Folly," which is still in the gallery at Haarlem. From Holland Tradescant imported "rathe ripe cherry trees, flowers called anemones, Provence roses and fritillaries."²

In winter flowers grown under glass were to be seen in profusion at every festival, and the private rooms at the palace were filled with sweet-scented blossoms from the hot houses.³

Although Brussels was not a large town it could boast of many splendid public and private edifices. The Town Hall with its lofty tower was famous for its beauty, although the Grande Place before it was known chiefly for the "Glass Fair" which was held in it annually during the first week of Lent, and which, so French travellers reported, was as well stored with curiosities and rareities as their own fair of St. Germain. In the evening the square was lit up with torches, and the court ladies in full dress might be seen dicing at the tables in the booths for jewelry and trinkets. It was noted that though the fair was chiefly frequented at night no case of robbery had ever occurred at it.⁴

Ceremony and etiquette were the habitual marks of every day life, and were not forgotten even on a deathbed. When a suitor visited his mistress "after the first exchange of compliments a page gave him a chair, the lady asked him to take his seat and sat down upon another." They addressed one another as "Monsieur" and "Madame" and when the gallant heard his suit refused, he rushed off to a Church and prepared to enter a Capuchin Monastery. "For my part," writes the novelist, "I envy his lot, for, after all, one must admit that there is no safer haven in the sea of this world which is so reef-strewn and storm tost. It

is true that even in this refuge one must always be fighting, but the victory of which we have already won over ourselves, is a sure sign of our final triumph."

A lady in her last moments gives her lover a rosary which, instead of a crucifix, was ornamented with a head of which the hair was formed of worms gnawing the skull. All the greatest ladies in Brussels crowded to her death room and she was seated in full dress on the bedstep as she listened to the physicians pronouncing her doom. Her lover hastened to have as many masses said for her soul as he could find priests to say them, and for months would only walk in a cypress alley or seat himself in an arbour by the fountain of Niobe.¹

The chief Church in Brussels was Sainte Gudule famous not only for towers like those of Notre Dame at Paris, but for a chapel containing the hosts which had bled miraculously when pierced with a dagger. Gothic art, however, was dead, and the Churches which Coeberger reared for the Archdukes were modelled on those of the Jesuits in Italy. Their carved altars, inlaid pavements and walls lined with jasper and coloured marbles were the wonder of the age. Amongst them the Church of the Augustinians and that of our Lady of Succour were the most famous, although Isabella also lavished her treasures upon the Abbey of Coudenberg, the Charterhouse with its beautiful gardens, and the Carmelites of Saint Theresa, who owned the precious relics of Saint Albert. Everywhere were to be seen altarpieces by Memling, by Crayer, or by Rubens.²

Nor was she less careful of the needs of the poor. In 1614 she founded a State pawnshop which advanced money upon pledges at the rate of six and one quarter per cent. interest whilst the ordinary usurers demanded twenty-two and even thirty-two per cent. As the usual interest even upon State loans was eight per cent., this establishment must have been carried on at a loss.

The Archdukes showed an equal zeal for the advancement of education. Under their patronage a branch of the Augustinian College at Louvain was established at Brussels and soon attracted more than five hundred pupils, most of whom were the sons of the nobles and richer burghers. The course of study included Greek, Latin, Rhetoric and Geometry. On the annual speech day the scholars recited their exercises in prose and verse and performed tragedies on the stage erected in the splendid hall.

The Ducal Palace which stood upon a hill above the city had

been begun about 1364 by John the Good and had been added to a hundred years later by Philip the Good. In front was a court surrounded by a low, Gothic balustrade of stonework surmounted by thirty columns supporting the statues of the rulers of the Netherlands. The entrance hall had an open roof and was adorned with trophies of arms. From it two galleries led to the chapel. They were filled with statues, amongst which was one of Wladislaus, Prince of Poland, who had been Spinola's guest at Breda, and another of the Emperor Ferdinand II., with his white dog at his feet. Those of the Archdukes were so contrived that those who looked closely at Albert's statue saw the portrait of Isabella whilst Isabella's disclosed that of her husband.

In the second storey were long suites of drawing rooms and cabinets hung with priceless pictures.

On the first floor was the Archduke's apartments, that of Isabella was on the second. The men and women had separate quarters on the model of the monasteries in Spain. The furniture was magnificent. When Marie de Medicis visited Brussels she was lodged in the rooms which had been the Archduke's. The bedchamber was hung with cloth of gold and white satin upon which pots of flowers were embroidered in high relief. Her bed was placed in an alcove hung with rough cloth of gold. Everywhere stands of silverplate and clocks placed upon inlaid tables were to be seen, with tapestries woven at Arras from the designs of the first artists of Italy.¹

To the north of the palace lay the Park which was famous for its fountains, the work of Solomon de Caus, who had designed the gardens of Heidelberg and Richmond. A broad walk ran through it to the modest house in which Charles the Fifth spent his childhood. At each end was a fountain from which brooks two feet broad flowed down its sides in channels of polished stone. "If I had seen an apple-tree," wrote a French tourist, "I should have fancied myself in the earthly Paradise." A maze filled with birds lay behind it. Their songs echoed from artificial rocks on which stood Orpheus charming the beasts with his lyre, and Niobe lay bathed in sweat and turning into stone. "All of a sudden visitors are drenched with artificial rain and a sharp storm bursts over them." In a labyrinth formed of trees carefully pleached together was hidden a pavilion in which fêtes were sometimes given to favoured courtiers. The park was well stored with deer.

"All respectable persons may walk in it at any time; twice a

year it is opened to the people." In winter the lawns before the palace were covered with sledges.¹

The favourite carriage drive was an avenue which ran through the fields along the Antwerp canal, and greatly resembled the promenades in the Tuileries. On state occasions five or six hundred coaches might be seen there at once. A pleasure garden near the city with covered walks, arcades of vines, and fountains, surrounded by flower beds laid out in elaborate patterns which displayed half the figures of mythology, also attracted many visitors. Its arbours were crowded in the hot summer nights.²

The palaces of the great nobles, some of which dated from the Burgundian period whilst others were in the style of the Renaissance, were worthy of their owners, amongst whom were the Dukes of Croy, Aerschot, and the Prince of Orange. Spinola, too, had a house famous for its magnificence.

Nor was Antwerp less admired by travellers fresh from the murky allies of London and the mud and gloom of Paris. They gazed in wonder at its wide straight streets, neatly paved and with a rounded crown from which the water flowed down into subterranean channels through grated gully holes. The cathedral with its spire wrought like an Easter sepulchre, the Town House, the House of the Eastland merchants, and the Exchange with its cloisters where the traders walked and its galleries filled with shops for costly trinkets could scarcely be matched anywhere north of the Alps. "A wide canal which traverses the best part of the city runs under the houses into the middle of the town. Here it is open and has a cover or scuttle like those on ships which can be opened or closed so as to allow the large barges on which the goods are carried to and from the shipping in the river to go up on one side and come down on the other." The houses of the Antwerp merchants were thought even by Andalusian visitors tasteful in their exterior and delightful inside. Behind them lay well ordered gardens gay with tulips and with hyacinths and set with shrubs brought from the West Indies and from the Levant.³

Such was the life of the Obedient Netherlands in the days when they were still the centre in which Southern and Western Europe met, and where the models were shaped on which our civilisation of to-day was moulded. We do not always recognise how much the courtiers of the thirteenth and the fourteenth Louis, or the nobles who crowded the ante-rooms of the first

James and the first Charles owed to the Belgium of the Archdukes Albert and Isabella.

But a great gulf was fixed between the gay Belgian nobles, to whom Spanish was all but an unknown tongue and the Spanish and Italian soldiery who fought for the cause of Spain year in, year out on the gloomy heaths of Northern Brabant.

In the autumn of 1626, Philip the Fourth received reports which led him to believe that grave disorders had occurred in his army in the Low Countries, and he wrote to the Infanta to inquire as to their truth.

"I have been informed that the principal military officers who are in my service in your states indulge, both when in the field and at Brussels, in the greatest excesses, such as banquetting, extravagant eating, drinking and display. Such doings will certainly bring my army into discredit; the soldiers will do what their officers do and copy their ill-example. It cannot be otherwise when they see those who ought to endure the greatest hardships patiently and live frugally, seeking after nothing but their own enjoyment. I must, therefore, tell Your Highness that these reports have greatly grieved me, and all the more so because if such things could with truth be said of myself or of my Court I should feel myself disgraced. This will show you what I must think when I find that my chief military officers have been guilty of such excesses. I should think myself far worthier of respect if I gave a livelihood to four poor soldiers here than if I had wasted my substance upon fellows who squandered it upon giving good dinners and in riotous living.

"They tell me, too, that they waste outrageous sums upon jewels, lace, embroideries, and horse-trappings. All these things, it is true, make a brilliant show, but we pay for it far too dearly when we bethink ourselves what an expense such outlays as this entail (and every one can see what an example as to this I set in my own person), and that, too, at a time when we are doing our best to cut down all useless expenditure upon our army, so that we may show our enemies that we shall not run short of means for supporting it.

"I can quite see that if I look into these matters as carefully as I ought, we shall not have to raise their pay on this account. But I cannot but see clearly that for this very reason they will bring themselves into the greatest straits if they are guilty of such extravagances, and so will be forced either to clamour for their

arrears or to make good at the cost of the poor wretches upon whom they are billeted what to the shame of their profession they throw away so recklessly upon such hurtful things. I have thought it well, therefore, to call Your Highness' attention to this and to instruct you, as I now do most emphatically, to take such steps as you may think best to reform these disorders and to put things upon a footing which will enable everyone to live in greater comfort and ease, without in any way failing in his duty, for this is a most pressing matter."

The King added with his own hand, "Luxury and excess are the sworn enemies of discipline and of the military calling. I am by nature greatly inclined to that profession, although circumstances have never allowed me to exercise it, and so I should be very angry if anyone could point out any leaning on my part to that kind of extravagance either in my person or in my table even when I am at Madrid. I hope, therefore, that I shall not have to take any further measures to correct these abuses when my opinion of them becomes known and people understand that Your Highness is carrying out my express wishes."

The Infanta was in no mood to accept her nephew's implied rebuke in silence.

"I have been no little surprised," she wrote, "at the reports which have reached Your Majesty as to the excessive expenditure of your principal officers serving in these states both when on active service and at Brussels upon extravagant banquets, eating, drinking, luxuries, costly jewels, embroideries, lace, and horse-trappings, seeing that I have never heard of nor seen anything of the kind. I am certain that the heads of the army have not sufficient means to support any such expenses, even if they wished to live on such a footing. They live in a very modest way when they are in this country, but considering the employments which they hold, they must when on service or away from home invite some persons to their tables as a matter of course. Formerly they used to entertain upon a much larger and more expensive scale than they do now, and as for their cloths and jewels no one can be more economical in these respects than our officers are. At Brussels even the brigadiers and captains dress in baize or in plain unembroidered cloth, and on service in coloured cloth which is almost as plain, for their poverty allows them nothing better. From this Your Majesty may gather what foundation your informant has for his statements.

“As for the Belgians, it is their custom to indulge in banquettings, high living, and fine cloths, although, now-a-days, they are not such spendthrifts as they used to be. It is certain that it would occasion great discontent if they were told to moderate their expenditure. If the excesses, which Your Majesty points out, were ever to occur, I should take every means to correct them in accordance with Your Majesty’s wishes as expressed in your letter of the twenty-seventh of January, which I have, I think, answered fully.”¹

Whilst the gaieties at Brussels were at their height, events were taking shape which were destined to exercise a far-reaching influence upon the history of Europe. The centre of diplomatic activity was to be transferred from the shores of the Mediterranean to those of the North Sea, and of the Baltic, although, in the eyes of the principal actors, the issues nominally at stake remained unchanged.

CHAPTER LXXVI

SPINOLA had not forgotten his brother's teaching as to the value of Sea Power. He saw that circumstances were making a fleet more important than an army. No sooner had he returned from Breda to Brussels in July, 1625, than he had accompanied the Infanta on a tour of inspection of the naval preparations on the coasts of Flanders whilst Frederick Henry slowly withdrew his forces to Heusden and the Isle of Bommel. Mansfeldt soon quitted his colours and marched to join the King of Denmark on the Weser, whither in October he was followed by a large force of Dutch. In November the army retired to its winter quarters.¹

Philip's finances were in the greatest disorder, and although his troops in the Netherlands were almost on the point of mutiny, he was forced to resort to every kind of expedient to raise the money for their pay. In the middle of September he sent the Infanta the patent for a title of Duke in Italy to dispose of to Don Carlos Coloma who was most anxious to purchase one. He informed her that instead of giving pensions to the English and Scotch officers who were being placed upon half-pay, he was distributing amongst them four habits of the Military Orders of Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcantara. Lord Argyll and Counts Anhalt and Ysenburg were to have the Golden Fleece, instead of money, and if she chose she might pay the Emperor's State councillor, Collalto, in the same coin. His treasury was in such a state that he could give Spinola nothing, and even his spies in Holland complained that they did not get enough to cover their expenses. Finally the Spanish troops were sent into garrisons on the frontiers of Picardy, Champagne and Metz, so that the French were forced to send large reinforcements to those quarters.²

Spinola had by his measures with respect to the fleet succeeded in preventing the English from reaching Cadiz until the commencement of winter. He was, therefore, the more ready to continue on the offensive at sea.³ As he wrote to the King in February, 1626, "We should devote particular attention to the encouragement of our sailors. Within the last three days the

royal galleons have made two prizes, and the privateers three more, so that we are continuing to disquiet the enemy, and are keeping as many ships as we can at sea to do so." Such were his plans at a moment when Wimbledon's shattered fleet was but just finding its way back into the English harbours from Kinsale and other Irish ports.¹

Buckingham, who had sailed from Harwich to Holland in the middle of November had had ample opportunities for forming an opinion of the quality of the Flemish sailors. A hundred knights and gentlemen superbly attired and equipped had set out to attend him on his visit to the Palatine's Court at Rheenen. Their ship fell into the hands of the Dunkirkers who "stripped them to their shirts and packed them into a cellar until they could pay ransoms on a scale proportionate to their several qualities." The Duke himself had crossed in a fearful storm, his vessel had been all but driven upon the sandbanks, and he only landed with difficulty in Holland four days after leaving England. Two of the vessels in his convoy were lost with their crews.²

His mission to Holland marks the moment when he finally decided to base his efforts for the restoration of the Palatine upon an alliance with the Northern and Protestant powers, although he did not cease to solicit the co-operation of France and her Italian allies. Probably his chief motive was his desire to secure the goodwill of the English Puritans.

He also, as has been seen, had two other objects in view in visiting the Hague. He decided to secure the restoration of the Cautionary Towns to England as the price of the English alliance, a suggestion which the States with the warm encouragement of the French Ambassador repudiated in decisive terms.³ He also with the approval of Charles the First attempted to arrange a marriage between his daughter, Lady Mary Villiers and Charles Louis the Palatine's eldest son, possibly in the hope of seeing his grandson Prince of Wales.⁴ Such a proposal was not so unnatural in those days as it would have seemed to our fathers. In England marriages between sovereigns and their subjects had very frequently taken place within the preceding two hundred years, whilst though the children of the Duke of Savoy were in the direct line of succession to the Spanish Crown and ranked as Infants of Spain, it was at one time the wish of Charles Emmanuel that his son Prince Thomas, whose descendants now wear the crown of Italy, should marry the daughter of Olivares.⁵ The

Queen of Bohemia, however, scouted Buckingham's advances, either out of pride of birth or because she thought like Rubens that her brother's favourite was upon the down grade. As, however, she could not openly quarrel with a still powerful minister she intimated that she could not decide such a matter without the approval of her husband's relations, amongst whose number the Duke of Neuburg and Maximilian of Bavaria, as well as Prince Frederick Henry, were included.¹

Buckingham was more fortunate in his ostensible undertakings. On the ninth of December he signed an offensive and defensive alliance with Holland to which Denmark shortly afterwards acceded. Under this Treaty which was to remain in force for fifteen years, the three powers agreed to put a large force into the field against the Emperor with monies to be furnished by England and the States, and also to declare war against Spain. Sweden and the Protestant Princes of Germany would, it was hoped, join in the alliance. By a secret arrangement, however, it was agreed that Denmark should be at liberty to make a separate peace whenever England should fail to pay her the stipulated monthly subsidy. As none of the contracting parties to the treaty, which became known as the Convention of the Hague, had the means to carry on a war upon a large scale, the project was bound sooner or later to fail. In the meantime, however, Buckingham had some results of his mission to show upon his return to England.²

Scarcely had he got back to London, when he sent his painter Gerbier, and Clerk his confidential servant, who had been his agent in breaking off the Spanish Marriage, to Paris in order to pave the way for his journey to France. To George Villiers, as an unkindly Jesuit wrote, "Politics are a matter of pure caprice, and he changes his mind every day as the fancy takes him." He was so madly in love with the Queen of France "that no sort of argument whether drawn from reasons of state policy, his own security or even from common decency can suffice to wean him from his passion."

He thought that by his personal presence in Paris, he could induce "France, Savoy, Venice, and the other members of the Holy League to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance against the House of Austria," and that "if they do so Spain will be frightened into making a general peace." It must be allowed that the Prince of Piedmont to judge from his instructions to St. Maurice, attached great value to a visit from Buckingham.

The Duke, however, forgot that France was by no means anxious to see England upon good terms with Spain. "To make himself the more welcome in France he is now doing his best for the Queen of England and is trying to get her dowry secured upon the safest and surest revenues and the penal measures against the Catholics relaxed. He talks of inducing the French to demolish the forts at Rochelle and to replace the Huguenots upon the same footing as they were before their construction." Louis XIII., who had not forgotten the scenes at Amiens, declined the proposed visit of his wife's admirer. The King was at the same time anxious to come to terms with Spain in order to be left with his hands free to put down Huguenot disaffection once and for all. He, therefore, turned a deaf ear to Gerbier's overtures and proceeded to treat with the authorities at Madrid for a settlement in the Valtelline if not in Italy.¹

The moment was not ill-chosen for a negotiation. The successful resistance of Riva had prevented the Marshal de Cœuvres from pushing forward into the Milanese, and Baron de Pappenheim its commander had succeeded in defeating the French and in destroying their flotilla upon Lake Como. As the result of his victory the feelings of the Swiss towards them gradually changed. Twenty-five thousand Austrians were on their march through the Cantons to join the Spaniards in Italy, and it was thought that the existing alliance with France might be denounced.² In consequence Bassompierre was in November hurriedly despatched as Ambassador to the Diet and took with him 250,000 crowns [£62,500] to aid him in his task. He arrived at Bâle early in December, and was received by the Senate who escorted him to see their Arsenal, the Minster and the cabinet of the naturalist Plater, and complimented him with a present of wine and fish. From Bâle Bassompierre hastened to Soleure, where he convoked the Diet on the 7th of January, and despite all the efforts of the Papal Nuncio, induced them to carry a resolution demanding the restitution of the Valtelline to the Grisons. During their session he entertained the deputies to great banquets and balls, and, when they broke up their sittings on 21 January, "not only paid them all their expenses, but when he took leave of them had them given a year's pension for each Canton, and a year's pension for each of themselves as well as the instalment due for the year on their debts." The Grisons recognised Bassompierre as their Captain General and authorised

him to convoke their Pitach in the name of the King of France. They also threatened to close their Passes to the troops of any princes who had a garrison in any part of the Valtelline and who might refuse to give up what he held there. From Soleure he went to Berné where he was taken to see the Cathedral, the Bear Pit, the Arsenal and the terrace and was entertained at a banquet in the Town Hall which lasted a whole day. On his return to Soleure the "High and Mighty Lord" of the canton performed a sword dance before his quarters, and by a scolding and a good dinner he induced the deputies of Fribourg who had made difficulties about their agreement to send their Secretary to him with their Great Seal to sanction any document which he might choose to draw up. By the sixteenth of March he was back at Paris and received a warm welcome from the King, who had now with him the Prince of Piedmont who had come to urge him to carry on a vigorous campaign in Italy. Bassompierre asserts that it had been arranged that twelve thousand Swiss should join the French Grisons regiments in the Valtelline and advance against Milan, so that the Three Leagues might well hope that they had at length gained the object of their desires. They were, however, destined to be bitterly deceived.¹

The Pope's nephew, Cardinal Barberini, had gone on from France to Spain, and although he had met with but little success in Paris, because he was thought to be too much inclined to the Spanish interests, he still continued to work for an understanding between the two courts.² It was soon found that a settlement as to Italian affairs would encounter far fewer obstacles at Madrid than had been expected, for Philip IV. was most anxious for peace now that the prestige of Spain had been restored by her victories in Brazil, at Breda and at Cadiz. The internal condition of France also inclined her to peace. The Rochellers were known to be preparing for war and were laying in stores with which the French naval commanders were willing to supply them at a high price.³ On the other hand their greatest enemy behind the scenes was Aerssens, the Dutch Special Envoy in Paris. "He would gladly see them humbled because he thinks that they prevent the French from taking active measures against Spain in Germany and Italy. Yesterday he secretly despatched his Secretary who is a Huguenot Dutch engineer to see if as he confidently asserts it is possible to close or destroy the harbour of Rochelle. The Ambassador has promised that he will do all he

can to forward this plan."¹ As early as November, 1625, the Mantuan envoy says, "His Majesty has received an offer from certain persons to cut Rochelle off from the sea by a dyke within a fixed time, but it is thought that it would be almost impossible to carry out such a scheme in winter owing to the storms and high tides." France and England were daily growing more estranged, the English had sequestered some French vessels for which they would not give satisfaction and it was believed at Paris that the Catholics were being cruelly persecuted. Finally the disputes between Charles I. and his wife's French household were becoming embittered.¹ "The Bishop of Mende," writes a correspondent at Paris to Kuttner at the end of January "is going to England. The object of his mission is to bring about a reconciliation between Richelieu and the English favourite. Both of them are very anxious to be on good terms again, for their interests are identical. They are both of them equally odious to their fellow countrymen and think that they can keep themselves in power far more easily if they can keep up a good understanding between their masters. This is the real reason for the Bishop's journey and he is also to get Buckingham to come here if possible so that the two favourites may make up their differences at a personal interview and may swear to co-operate with one another and remain for the future united by brotherly love."²

Rota was of opinion that England and Holland wished the war in Germany to go on, but that the Venetians who were utterly disgusted with Savoy only wished to get the Valtelline question off their hands. Savoy alone wanted to carry on the war in Italy, as he was drawing money from France for the pay of his troops which he simply embezzled and he would lose his command if peace were made in Italy. Under these circumstances it would be very difficult for Richelieu to come to terms with Bavaria. He had already assured Maximilian through Father Hyacinth that he would not be disturbed in his enjoyment of the Electoral dignity, although it was uncertain whether it would be granted to him for life or made hereditary in the House of Bavaria. Nor could the writer be sure whether the offer through the French agent Fançon would be made in good faith. "But if we are to suppose that Richelieu really wishes to bring about a settlement in Germany, we must also pre-suppose that he intends to do so upon terms which will be more advantageous to the heretics than to the Catholics and the Catholics must not think that he will fall

in with their wishes. Richelieu may think that in order to promote the interests of the Palatine and the heretics, it will be necessary when his Ambassador sets out or is negotiating in Germany to send large reinforcements to join the King of Denmark and Mansfeldt in the field, so that the Catholics may be frightened or, at least, to save themselves from the burden of a long war, may make a good many concessions which they would not otherwise grant, or in a word he wishes the heretics to be in a position to treat with the Catholics upon equal terms." If the English fleet were to sail for the Elbe, the French Ambassador in Germany would have to propose a suspension of hostilities, "but I must always believe the worst of Richelieu, and that those who do not trust are never deceived. Richelieu's one maxim in life is, that he never says what he means to do and never does what he says he will," and as the Venetian ambassador says, "if one does not want to be taken in one must always believe the opposite of what he says." The Cardinal was greatly embarrassed not only by his fear that Archduke Leopold would attack the Grisons, but also that Bavaria might go over to the side of Spain.

When Louis XIII. was informed confidentially that Maximilian had accepted the Infanta's invitation to send an envoy to a conference at Brussels, "he could only reply that he knows well enough that he is ill-served everywhere, but that he means to put an end to this. My friend tells me that the King of France is very well meaning, but that he cannot carry his intentions into effect because his hands are tied by Richelieu whose one maxim is to deceive every ambassador and every prince as he does His Highness. Not only the foreigners but the French themselves are very ill-pleased because Richelieu's presumption is such that in order to make people think he has no need for them to tell him anything, he will not listen to a word they say. The French are now in such a tangle thanks chiefly to their want of money owing to Richelieu's management of affairs that it will be a miracle if they clear it up. They are in a great fright at the impending conference at Brussels."

The Cardinal's one object was to avoid an open rupture with Spain. He knew that the Catholic party were furious at the very thought of peace with the Huguenots, yet at the same time if one could not be arranged upon terms satisfactory to the Protestants, they would at once fly to arms in case France declared war on Philip IV. He was also afraid that the Prince of Condé, whose wife was loudly protesting against his banishment from Court,

might again make trouble. "Lastly the Duke of Orleans, the King's brother, comes of age in April, he knows that His Highness dislikes him and he fears that he will ask for his appanage and the government of some province." Moreover if war broke out the King would have to take the field in person, attended by the Cardinal who dreaded the thought of a campaign, or else confer the command upon some general at the risk of displeasing his brother. In order to gain time His Eminence had thought of sending the Duke of Angoulême into Germany to occupy the Duchy of Zweibrücken and County of Nassau Saarbrücken and possibly to advance into the Lower Palatinate, "with an assurance to the German Princes that once the Palatine is restored the two states will be handed back to their rulers," but this plan could not be carried out until peace was arranged with the Rochellers. Rota suggested that in order to prevent this expedition from being despatched, the Spaniards might occupy the passes of the Valtelline, as the Emperor could not do so without consulting the Electors.¹

Richelieu, however, was merely making a show of force. The English had refused to allow the eight vessels which had been lent to Montmorency in the previous summer to remain in the French service, whilst the Dutch squadron under Admiral Haultain which France had hired from the States refused to extend his engagement. Thereupon the Rochellers pressed more vigorously for the demolition of Fort St. Louis, the Huguenots of Languedoc seized a fortress in the Vivarais and troubles broke out in Dauphiny. Richelieu bowed to circumstances and endeavoured to come to terms with Spain.²

Early in January Rambouillet had been despatched to Madrid to represent Marie de Medicis and Louis XIII. at the baptism of the new born Infanta. At the beginning of February the secretary of Du Fargis the French ambassador in Spain made a sudden visit to Paris, and apparently carried back with him a commission from his sovereign to M. du Fargis to negotiate a settlement, though the transaction was kept secret even from the French Council.³

It was soon seen that the chief obstacles to a peace in Italy came from the Pope who was hoping to recover the forts in the Valtelline with the help of the Spaniards whilst Archduke Leopold seized the Grisons Passes.⁴ Urban the Eighth was, indeed, doing his best to recover the possession of the Valtelline for the Church.

On the seventeenth of February he issued a brief to the Swiss Catholic Cantons in which he informed them that he would use his utmost efforts "to wrest the deposits of the Valtelline out of the hands of the heretics of the Grisons by the force of his just arms, and exhorting them not to give any assistance to those who impugned the liberty of the Church."¹ At Paris it was believed that the Pope had through the Archduke Leopold come to an understanding with the Emperor, Spain, and Bavaria on the subject, but that, notwithstanding this, the presence of the Cardinal Legate at Madrid would at least lead to the conclusion of the war in Italy as both sides desired peace. Such a peace was wished for by England and Holland, who hoped that if a settlement were come to in Italy, the French would turn their attention to Germany. In the meantime through English mediation peace was patched up with Rochelle at the end of January, and though the Rochellers made difficulties as to ratifying some of the articles they finally agreed to do so under pressure from Charles the First. The ratification reached Paris on the tenth of March; the King at once came back from hunting and assembled a council in the Queen Mother's rooms to discuss foreign affairs more especially the questions of the Valtelline and of Piedmont. It was rumoured that reinforcements were to be sent to Cœuvres who was to enter the Valtelline with the Swiss and to attack the Spaniards if the Pope's forces joined them, but as Priandi points out, the presence of Gueffier, who was the first authority as to the Grisons in France, at Paris seemed to show that the two crowns had come to an agreement upon the subject to please the Pope and to enhance his prestige.²

His supposition proved to be correct. On the twentieth of March the Secretary of Du Fargis arrived from Madrid, bringing with him the articles as to the peace in the Valtelline and the suspension of hostilities in Italy which had been signed at Monzon in Aragon on the fifth of March by the French Ambassador and the Spanish ministers, but not by those of His Holiness or any other power. Everyone at all well informed thought that peace was now assured, although Savoy and Venice would probably not find the Treaty to their advantage.

The conditions of the Treaty were that the exercise of the Reformed Religion should be prohibited in the Valtelline. The sovereign rights over the Valtelline, Chiavenna, and Bormio were to be restored to the Grisons, but the Valtelliners were to have

their own civil and criminal courts and the Grisons were only to be allowed to appoint native Valtelliners as the officials. The Valtelliners were to pay a tribute of about one hundred and seventy-five thousand francs a year to the leagues. As regards Savoy and Genoa, they were to conclude a suspension of hostilities for six months, during which time the differences between them were to be settled by the intervention of France and Spain.

The peace had been concluded by Du Fargis and Olivares on their own responsibility in virtue of the powers which they already held from their sovereigns and solely for the good of the public. Their reason for acting in this fashion was that the French had declared that they would not negotiate with Spain, whilst the Papal Legate Barberini, who had returned to Paris, was in France, because the Spaniards had refused to say a word on the subject whilst he was at Fontainebleau in the previous year. Moreover if His Holiness had been taking part in the negotiations it would have been impossible to consent to the retrocession of the Valtelline to the heretic Grisons, and unless this point had been conceded nothing could have been settled.¹

Louis XIII. was at first very angry about the Peace and said that M. du Fargis was to be recalled for having signed it. His anger was, however, probably feigned in order to throw dust in the eyes of Savoy and Venice. As everything was now settled about the Valtelline there seemed to be no reason why the war in Italy should continue although the French pretended, to please the Swiss, that they would have liked to hold some guarantee such as a fort in the Valtelline so as to prevent the Spaniards from re-entering the country. England and Holland professed to be extremely annoyed at the Treaty, but as the English and French were already upon the worst of terms owing to a riot which had been provoked by Blainville, the ambassador in London, who had tried to prevent the pursuivants from arresting some gentlemen who were coming out of his chapel, their complaints remained unheeded.

After some delay the King decided to ratify the Treaty as it stood and to appease the Prince of Piedmont showed him an intercepted despatch from the Genoese Envoy at Madrid in which he said that M. du Fargis had shown him a letter from the King authorising him to conclude a settlement. The Prince left Paris in great annoyance, but his departure was little regretted by the courtiers who were repelled by his cold, reserved manners and

were possibly jealous of the favour he had gained with the Queen Mother and Richelieu.¹

The wisdom of this policy was shown when in May the Duke of Orleans' favourite Marshal Ornano was arrested at Fontainebleau and it was discovered that the Duke had arranged to marry Condé's daughter, Mlle. de Bourbon, and in the name of the public weal to take up arms in Berry or some other province in Central France to demand the government of a province which had been bestowed upon him at his birth. A gentleman had also been arrested at Toulouse carrying letters from the Spanish Government to Rohan in which they promised him their support if he would stir up fresh troubles amongst the Huguenots. Probably in order to avoid inconvenient disclosures the Parliament of Toulouse had had the unfortunate captive beheaded without delay.²

The Spaniards also were in great straits for money. It was rumoured that the produce of the Flota had been far less than was at first estimated, although exchequer bills secured upon it were still taken up, and eighty thousand ducats of Government annuities were issued at eighty. "To this I must add that some days ago they collected a tax in the town and district of Madrid of twenty per cent. on the property of everyone between fifteen and sixty, which they call a quinta, and now they are going to demand it from all the artizans as well."³

The Treaty of Monzon was, however, in reality favourable to Spain. The Protestant Religion was banished from the Valtelline, and the Grisons were now sovereigns of the province only in name, whilst the rights of passage remained on the same footing as they had been before the troubles. The Leaguers were bitterly disappointed and began to reflect that if they had not recovered the Valtelline with the help of France, they might yet do so with the aid of Spain and Austria. Their deep though hidden resentment was to bear its fruit in the not distant future. Nor were the arrangements as to Genoa less satisfactory, Savoy was forced to give up all claim to Zuccarello, and after some grumbling the Genoese agreed to pay them a hundred thousand ducats as compensation.⁴ To soothe his master's vanity Tarantaise did his best to induce the Pope and Olivares to recognise the Duke in the Treaty as King of Cyprus, but to this Urban VIII. "who is a true Florentine" refused to agree, whilst he turned a deaf ear to the proposal that Savoy should be guaranteed the restitution of Geneva.⁵

Nor had the Leaguers any grounds for satisfaction as regards their Grisons lands. The Münsterthal and the Lower Engadine continued in the possession of the Archduke Leopold who was doing his best to turn them into Catholic preserves. The Münsterthalers who had tried to instal a Calvinist preacher were cited before the Criminal Court at Fürstenberg; the Capuchin Missioners were left with a free hand.¹ Previously to the conclusion of the Treaty the Pope had been arming to recover the forts in the Valtelline with the help of the Spaniards. Scarcely had it been concluded than he addressed a brief to the Emperor and to the Kings of France and Spain in which he protested that the rights, revenues, and property of the Church must be safeguarded in any settlement of the Valtelline, and possibly, in order to strengthen the hands of the Austrians he called on the Bishop of Chur for a report on the state of the Mission in the Lower Engadine.²

The reply shows how great the strength of Protestantism in the Rhoetian Alps still was.

"Although the Commissary from Chur has brought orders from the Three Leagues to the heretics not to enter the Churches, they pay not the slightest attention to his proclamation and say that they would rather die than stay outside of them. I think they will, perhaps, be granted the grace of dying, as they are so worthy of it for their incredible stubbornness; God has been pleased to give us a sign of this, by raining down fire from heaven upon many persons, and first and foremost and in the most tangible shape upon the Minister about a fortnight back. Master Preacher was made so ill by the fright that he has had to keep to his bed, and the truth of this is being proved every day." The officials at Tarasp were very lax in putting down heretic conventicles, but as they had been reported to the government at Innsbrück, they would be severely punished. The Missioners, however, had other difficulties to contend with. "The Vicar of Tarasp has given great scandal by his very suspicious friendship with a certain lady, not only to his own parishioners, but what is worse to all the heretics in the Engadine. Everyone is up in arms about his conduct. We had repeatedly advised him not to have so much to do with such a person, and have implored him to give her up, he has again and again promised to obey us, but it seems impossible for him to do away with the cause of the offence. A day or two ago he went off with her to Val Venosta and brought her back

home again with him. This made a great deal of talk, especially amongst the heretics, who have got together in large numbers to drive the cows up to the Alps." The scandal to the Church was all the greater because the lady was a kinswoman of some of the leading heretics. It was most urgent that the Bishop should induce the vicar to send away his light-of-love, as she was the laughing stock of every enemy of religion. The case must have been a flagrant one as the Protestant pastors in the Three Leagues were not remarkable for their high standard of morality.¹

Under such circumstances the Engadiners were by no means inclined to renounce their former beliefs. When Bishop Joseph Moor succeeded the aged Johann von Flügi who had resigned the see after holding it for thirty-five years he warned the Propaganda that thanks to the return of the Calvinist preachers to the Engadine during the French invasion "many of the converts have gone back to their vomit again, although in many parishes there are still large Catholic congregations." "To the great grief of myself and the fathers of the Mission" the churches had been restored by the Calvinists by voluntary contributions, and they had retaken possession of them. He therefore asked for advice as to his future course.²

In the previous year the Archbishop of Mainz as Metropolitan had warned the Bishop of Chur who was said to be asking for French protection that he must not acknowledge any protector except the Emperor. Archduke Leopold had also endeavoured to secure the entrance of his own nominees into the chapter, in whose hands was the election of the Bishop.³

It was, therefore, but little likely that the French would take any steps to promote the views of Capuchins whom they regarded simply as Austrian agents. In June, 1626, Louis XIII. published a Declaration explaining the provisions of the Treaty of Monzon.

After stating that the Grisons were the sovereigns of the Valtelline, it continued—

"By the second article of the Treaty of Monzon, no Religion except the Catholic Apostolic and Roman can ever be exercised hereafter in the Valtelline, and in the counties of Bormio and Chiavenna, and all others are excluded. Nevertheless the natives of the Grisons and natives of the Valtelline and its dependencies who are Protestants and who have taken up their abode in or withdrawn to other places are permitted to resort freely and

without hindrance to the Valtelline and to reside there for several months every year to gather in their harvests and collect their rents, provided that they do not practice their religion publicly or give any cause of offence, and they shall not be interfered with on account of their belief either in their persons or in their property. They are also allowed to sell or alienate their property without let or hindrance.

"The election of the Officers and Podestats who are to hold office in the said valley and other possessions of the Grisons in the Valtelline, is to be made by the Valtelliners in a good and legal form, and without any canvassing or exclusive franchise, and such officers and podestats are to be duly confirmed by the League within the time and in the form laid down by the third article of the said treaty."

This declaration must have convinced the most hopeful Leaguers that by the recovery of the Valtelline they had gained nothing save the empty show.¹

Scarcely had Johann v. Flügi resigned the see when he died. He was buried in his own cathedral, the church dedicated to that Saint Lucius who according to tradition was the first Christian King of Britain. A fresco in the nave still preserves his portrait. The old bishop was tall and thin, his face was oval in shape and ruddy with high cheek bones, his hair and beard were long and white; his dark eyes set deep under high arched brows look stern and hard. Beside him our Lord walking on the Sea of Galilee is stretching out his hand to Saint Peter sinking into the waves. It is a fit emblem of the Bishop's life, rich as it had been in troubles and in conflicts. John of Flügi is one of the forgotten champions of the Catholic Faith.

The conclusion of the Peace of Monzon left both Spain and France free to devote themselves to other objects, and, at the same time, seemed to prove to England that it was impossible for her to make use of France to forward her aims in Germany.

On the other hand it was equally disappointing to the Catholic Princes of Germany.

Maximilian expressed his views on the subject to the Archbishop of Patras, the Nuncio at Brussels, in a letter carefully corrected in his own hand. He said that he hoped that the report that the Pope was trying to arrange a peace in Italy without any consideration for Germany was incorrect. If a peace was concluded in Italy and not in Germany the whole weight of the war

would be thrown upon the latter country and, "in the last resort, neither the Spaniards nor the Brussels gentlemen will be able to stand up against it." His Eminence would earn the gratitude of all Germany if he could persuade the Infanta, Cardinal de la Cueva, and Spinola to see that they ought not to accept any settlement about Italy in which Germany was not included and that if they did so they would leave the French, Savoy, and Venice free to employ the forces and the money which were thus set free in Italy against Germany. Even the King of England and his son-in-law had nothing to gain from the Confederates of Lyons as the League did not affect the Catholics in the Empire either for good or evil.

On the same day the Elector wrote to Father Hyacinth at Paris, instructing him to induce Cardinal Rochefoucauld to bring Louis XIII. over from the side of the German Protestants to that of the Catholics. This would be a difficult matter as France had pledged herself under the Convention of the Hague to invade the Palatinate and restore the Palatine. It was possible that before the Legate could arrive, the King of France might get wind of the negotiations which had begun at Brussels with the Empire and Bavaria and try to frustrate them. The Father, was, however, to urge Rochefoucauld to deal sincerely with Bavaria as he might otherwise change his policy. It was no wonder that the Spanish and Imperial Ambassadors had begun to suspect Hyacinth's mission when they saw him constantly with Rochefoucauld.¹

The French for their part had done their best to reassure Maximilian. Fançan through whom their first overtures had been made to him, wrote to Rota before the conclusion of the Treaty of Monzon "that he might inform and assure the Elector of Bavaria, that whatever may be done it will be with the reservation that we shall be in a position to give him ample satisfaction as to the Electorate even if notwithstanding that he went with the King of Spain."²

On the other hand M. de Baugy assured Jocher on the authority of the Government at Brussels that Philip IV. and the Infanta "are most anxious to secure the preservation of our Holy Religion and the maintenance of Public Liberty." The best means to secure these objects would be to bring about a general peace, especially in the Empire, upon terms which would insure that it would be a durable one. A temporary peace during which the parties to it

were recovering strength for a future struggle would be of no advantage to anyone.¹

Richelieu himself was adding postscripts to Fançan's letters to Hyacinth and showing his sincere interest in the Elector of Bavaria. Unfortunately at the same time, whilst Rochefoucauld was in treaty with Maximilian, his brother Cardinal was trying to persuade both Fançan and Father Joseph that his master's promises were lies from beginning to end and were only intended to keep the Bavarians quiet until France could occupy the Lower Palatinate, or as Rota tersely put the case "all the offers he has put forward through Father Hyacinth are nothing but tricks, lies and bad faith of the Richelieu brand." This meant that he intended to carry out his promise to England to invade the Palatinate and force Bavaria to restore it to its late ruler.²

Hyacinth had already anticipated Richelieu's action. Directly he had been informed by Kuttner that Angoulême was to occupy the Duchy of Zweibrücken, he had communicated with Spinola, who had despatched an express to Verdugo, the Spanish commander in the Palatinate to ask him "whether with his own forces and some help from Jocher, the Imperial commander, he could occupy some positions in Zweibrücken, whilst Angoulême was advancing on the Palatinate. If Verdugo replies in the affirmative he will be given the necessary orders, but the Marquis is afraid that they will arrive too late to save the Palatinate." Verdugo's answer shows what effect seven years of warfare had produced even in districts which had lain outside of the main theatres of the campaigns. The Duchy of Zweibrücken was so wasted and desolate that Colonel Cratz had been forced to withdraw the two troops of cavalry and the companies of infantry which he had put into quarters there. It would be best therefore to seize some positions on the Saar to oppose the French advance and to ask the Emperor to allow Colonel Jocher's regiments to be sent to support him.³

Under such circumstances it was perhaps difficult even for Rota to maintain his faith in the sincerity of the French negotiations. In answer to some inquiries from the Elector despatched upon the twenty-first of February he said that what he wrote as to Cardinal Rochefoucauld's own intentions, "may be true, but as he is nothing but a tool of that cheat Richelieu, the whole negotiation is nothing but a blind and a trick in the best manner of those French liars to make us postpone taking the necessary

measures for our defence, and happy are the innocents who may persuade themselves that he means to begin a fresh negotiation with us and who take for gospel everything the King told Hyacinth and Fançan said to me." It would be a good thing if Richelieu could get the French to throw over the German heretics for the Catholics, and it would have a good effect in France itself if they would do so. If, however, France would not come to terms, Bavaria and the Catholic League would be ruined ten times over, as she would be bound to aid England and Holland in restoring the Palatine. Only the King could prevent this out of zeal for religion.

Jocher had not perhaps a very high opinion of Rota, but he heartily thanked him for exposing Father Joseph's deceitful conduct throughout the negotiations. Rota had been sent to Paris solely on the faith of his assurances, and had been given full powers to treat. If the French did not take action at once, Fançan would have had all his trouble for nothing. They had still time to do this before the Brussels Conference met, and if the French would set about doing so, it might still be possible to put off the meeting "though I cannot see how to do this whilst the French are fighting against us underhand under cover of Mansfeldt and the Danes and at the same time give out through other channels that it is their wish to further our cause." He announced the signature of the Treaty of Monzon, which he learnt from the Nuncio at Brussels and others would probably not prove as permanent a settlement as had been thought at first. Rota would have to see that if Richelieu sent Father Joseph to the Elector the mission was not merely a trick. If the father brought full powers to conclude a treaty which would force the French to carry out their promises all would be well. Otherwise Fançan would have wasted his "oil and toil."¹

Trouble was also brewing between France and the Emperor. Ferdinand II. meant at all costs to make the Holy Roman Empire a living power, and had called upon the Bishop of Metz to do homage to him as his feudal superior upon pain of being cited before the Imperial Chamber at Spire. M. de Verneuil had treated the summons with contempt, but the insult was one which Richelieu was not likely to forget. A revolution which had broken out in Lorraine, where the sovereign was at once the vassal both of the Empire and of France, was also pregnant with seeds of discord, for both powers were deeply interested in a

province where the roads from Italy to Flanders and from France to Germany met.¹

But these causes of future trouble took time to work. France, for the moment, was engrossed with her troubles at home, and now that Philip IV. was relieved from anxiety as to the Valtelline and to Genoa, he was free to devote himself to the task of chastising England and of subjugating his rebels in Holland, who were continuing the war with the help of such subsidies as France could squeeze out of her penury. But as Olivares had already pointed out, these measures could not be carried out unless with the co-operation of the Emperor and the Princes of the Empire.

On the fourth of January, 1626, Philip IV. wrote an important despatch to his aunt at Brussels. He said that Gondomar had pointed out to him that an invasion of England would be advisable. In such a case it might be well to send agents thither who might organise a Spanish party in the country and assure them of a refuge in Spain if the attempt failed and they lost their estates. He had heard from Bruneau that Mansfeldt was furious at the loss of his pension from England, and that by employing a suitable agent they could easily gain him over. As the Infanta had arranged in the previous November to send Count Sora to Poland to induce the Poles to furnish ships and seamen to intercept the Dutch trade with the Baltic, he might whilst on his way through the Hanse Towns negotiate with the Danes for an arrangement on the base of granting them trade privileges in Spain, a concession which had been refused to them two years before.

A few days later the Infanta forwarded to Madrid from Brussels a plan for attacking the Dutch trade with Russia by the White Sea, which had probably been drawn up by some of the Flemish seamen who during the Truce with Holland had to the anger of the Dutch pursued the whale fishery on the coast of Spitsbergen. The Dutch, she writes, traded with Russia mostly in English and Dutch cloths, linen from Haarlem and Leyden, and East India goods. They also exported large sums in ready money, twenty-eight or twenty-nine "tuns" of silver being shipped thither yearly from Amsterdam.

The trading fleets usually sailed from Amsterdam for the White Sea in May or June. They consisted of vessels carrying from four to sixteen guns, and one man of war was allowed as

an escort to every convoy of sixteen. It was thought that a squadron of forty Spanish vessels could easily take these convoys, and could at the same time ruin the Dutch whale and herring fisheries. These cruisers should be placed under Spinola's orders and should be fitted out in the Flemish ports. It was reckoned that three thousand five hundred men would be sufficient to man them, and it would be easy to procure Dutch pilots for money. A fleet ought to be fitted out in Biscay to support them, which should set out about the middle of April and steer a hundred and fifty leagues into the Atlantic, from which point it might lay its course for the White Sea. Apparently the vessels from Flanders were to join it on its way North. The course taken should leave the British Isles and Scotland on the right hand and Greenland, Iceland and Spitsbergen on the left, "as the chart clearly shows."

If the White Sea was frozen the squadron might lie under Kildin Island, which was inhabited only by a few Russian fishermen and lies very little beyond the mouth of the River Kola, which is fifty leagues from the entrance of the White Sea. It would be dangerous for them to enter Vardohuus, as it was a Danish port. The vessels should fly English or Dutch flags, sink every merchant ship which they met, and give themselves out as Dutch at Kildin. When the White Sea opened they were to blockade the River Dwina. Vessels were to be detached to lie off the island of Solovetzk and the other islands in that sea, namely, Marjovits and Sosnovits. After they had taken the English and Dutch Arkhangel fleets, they might easily capture those returning from the Spitsbergen whale fisheries if they waited for them off Jan Mayen's Island. They should then cruise off Shetland to intercept the herring boats, and return in September to Dunkirk with their prizes which might be reckoned at about thirty sail.

"It will be difficult," adds the Infanta, "to carry out this scheme with the ships of the fleet here, for as they are not very large they cannot carry supplies for more than three months, and it would be necessary to send some which could take six months' supplies in case they should be delayed on their voyage, and so Your Majesty had best send out a squadron from Spain for the purpose straight to the White Sea." It would be well to have the project inquired into by competent persons.

A few weeks before the Infanta had sent to her nephew a

detailed and somewhat unsparing criticism of Olivares' plans for an invasion of England. This document was now returned to Brussels with Olivares' rejoinder.

She had observed that if the forces to do so could be secured, it would be advisable to carry out the Count Duke's suggestion to invade both England and Ireland at the same time. As however, he suggested that the Emperor should be asked to raise those forces in the Hanse Towns which were in open rebellion against the Imperial authority, it might prove a difficult matter to provide them. It would be almost impossible to induce Poland to supply either ships or men, whilst if Flanders was to fit out an expedition against Ireland they would have nothing to spare for an invasion of England. Only twenty sail at most could be fitted out in Flanders, as they had neither men, artillery, nor harbourage for more, and if those vessels were to try to slip out of Mardyke during the short summer nights they would be overwhelmed at once by the Dutch and English blockading squadrons. If the undertaking against England was ever to be carried out, ships would have to be sent from Spain for the purpose. It would be useless to count upon the help of Lords Tyrone and Tyrconnel as they had neither a following nor influence in Ireland, and so could not stir up a rebellion there. It would also be impossible to disguise the preparations by pretending that they were being made for an attack upon Holland, as Philip IV. had already written to several princes asking them to join with him in an invasion of England. All that could be hoped for was that, if a settlement could be come to with Denmark, the Emperor and the Catholic League would lend His Majesty troops, as they would be ready to do whenever he chose to pay them. He would have to send a large number of highboard vessels as well as some gallies and forty pinnaces which could be rowed over whilst the highboard vessels were fighting. This flotilla, some of which could be built in Flanders, should be collected at Mardyke. In any case, if the expedition was to be carried out with Imperial troops, who had been set free by a peace with Denmark, nothing could be done that year, as it would be impossible in that time to collect troops sufficient to garrison Flanders against the Dutch and to invade England. As things stood, His Majesty would have to fit out a much larger fleet than he had done in the preceding year, for the English would most certainly send far stronger forces

to sea, but if such a fleet were got together it would be possible to employ it eventually for the expedition supposing that they could have the Imperial troops. If the forty pinnaces were sent they could be used against the Dutch. If the invasion of England was to be carried out it would be useless to treat with France and the Count Palatine, and still more so to negotiate with Savoy and the Duke of Neuburg, unless, indeed, some opening occurred for making an arrangement with France about Italy upon favourable terms. Nor need an army of observation be sent to the French frontier, until it was decided whether or no an expedition against England was to be carried out.

Olivares, who had probably already heard that Rambouillet was upon his way to Madrid, was not willing to leave the Infanta's objections to his favourite scheme unanswered.

If, he wrote, sufficient vessels could be brought together, there could be no reason why simultaneous attempts should not be made upon Ireland from Spain and upon England from Flanders. As for the Hanse Towns, the government had already received several offers of shipping from private quarters there, whilst the Count of Sora might yet succeed in getting men from both them and from Poland. "In any case England (as is most important), can be attacked from Flanders even if the expedition against Ireland from Spain is adjourned. It will be quite easy to keep the object of the preparations secret, as, so far, the negotiations with other sovereigns have merely been intended as a proof of good will by furnishing them with an explanation of His Majesty's grounds for declaring war against England. It would be an unheard of thing if the Emperor and the Catholic League, once a settlement had been arranged with Denmark, did not aid His Majesty in a war with England which had been brought about solely owing to the help which Spain had given them in the Palatinate. A blow struck at England would do much to insure peace in Germany. The forty pinnaces, which Her Highness has asked for, are being pushed forward, and will, as she suggests, be sent in separate detachments." In any case, transports would be sent to Flanders with the troops who were to replace the four thousand Walloon veterans whom Sora was to bring back with him to Spain.

It would be a great advantage if a Peace could be arranged

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with the Dutch, as they had never intended in Spain to close the door to such an agreement but only wished to prevent the conclusion of a truce like that of 1609. "If Rubens is right, this will be an easy matter, especially if the Dutch are really willing to recognise His Majesty as Suzerain, as a mere outward form and symbol." In that case, the other details could be readily settled, and such a settlement would facilitate one in Italy. He ended by leaving the Infanta a free hand as to the manner in which the expedition should be carried out.

At the same time Olivares was forced to point out that owing to the breach with England and the stoppage of the Dutch trading licenses, Spain had no naval stores whatsoever. Unless the Infanta could induce some private traders to procure them even from Holland before the end of March it would be out of the question to provide them, and so no reinforcements could be sent to her. She might issue any passports and safe conducts she pleased in order to get such supplies.

Eventually the Infanta was enabled to secure a supply of the coveted stores through a Brussels trader.

In the middle of February she wrote that she hoped that Gondomar would buy over some supporters in England. She had often negotiated with Earnest Mansfeldt, "but it is utterly useless to do so, as he never will do anything when it comes to the point, and his demands are so exorbitant that he would be more loss than gain."

The deficit on the pay of the army in Flanders was 1,800,000 ducats [£460,000] for the year 1625. "It costs three hundred thousand ducats a month, and there are also the current expenses for the civil administration which amount to 1,603,660 ducats [£400,915] or a total of 5,203,663 [£1,300,913] of which the subsidy from Spain only comes to 1,800,000 ducats [£450,000.] Even the garrison of Breda had to live upon the country, and their supplies could not hold out beyond the end of April, and there were no supplies at all for the rest of "this powerful machine," so that unless help were sent all must come to ruin. "It will be all but impossible to raise the four thousand Walloons for Count Sora" before the end of the summer, "as there are very few Walloons, for the wars in France, Germany, and Italy have consumed so many, and it will be out of the question to raise this large number without breaking up the Walloon regiments for very few of them will be willing to

leave those in the German service in which they have served for so many years, especially as the pay of the Walloon infantry in the Spanish army is far below that of the German foot."

An additional cause of disquietude was that she had learnt from Philip that the Duke of Neuburg was negotiating with the Dutch. "This does not surprise me, as the Archduke my late husband, who is in glory, had a very poor opinion of him, and would not employ him in such matters, and I, too, think that he is very ill-suited to be employed in Your Majesty's service." Her distaste for him was increased by the fact that he was grumbling loudly because she had asked him to allow her troops to be quartered in her states for a few days.

Nor did the Infanta lose the opportunity of throwing cold water upon Olivares' suggestions as to the management of Northern Europe.

In her opinion the King of Poland should be asked to carry on his war against Sweden as vigorously as possible in place of furnishing troops for an expedition against Ireland. If only peace could be made with Denmark, it would be possible to employ troops from the Emperor and the Catholic League to garrison Flanders, and to use her own troops to invade England, but if that peace could not be secured it would be impossible to carry out such a scheme. It would be well, therefore, to carry on the war against Denmark through the Emperor, the Catholic League, and Bavaria, and to induce the Emperor to declare the Hanse Towns rebels against his authority so that he might be able to employ force to reduce them to obedience. All the expenses of an expedition against England would fall upon Spain, as the Emperor and his supporters would not pay troops for such a purpose, and, at the same time, it would be impossible for Philip to reduce his expenditure in Germany. "In other words, it will be best to allow the invasion to stop for a time, but to send the thirty ships which have been promised to us so often to Flanders, as this will frighten the King of England and force him to keep his fleet at home, whilst the forty pinnaces will serve to hamper the Dutch trade which has already suffered so much from the armed boats upon the upper rivers." But it would be unwise for the King to involve himself in further expenses when he already had so many calls upon him for the Danish War.

She soon learnt that the Count of Sora's mission would be a

failure so far as the Hanse Towns were concerned. On his arrival at Lübeck he found that such large Danish forces were massed in the neighbourhood that it was most unlikely that they could be induced to furnish any shipping for a Spanish expedition against England, although if she were furnished with money she might be able to hire some vessels from merchants.

She, however, expected that the deputies who were to discuss the question of a League between Spain, the Emperor, and Bavaria would be at Brussels early in April.¹

Maximilian saw that by entering into negotiations with Spain he would be able to exercise some pressure upon Richelieu not only in order to induce him to give him his support in making the Electoral dignity hereditary in the Bavarian house, but in coming to an arrangement with the Palatine Frederick, for he was determined in no event to allow the Spaniards to gain possession of Heidelberg and Mannheim². Louis XIII., however, had been pleasantly surprised when he had learnt that Maximilian intended to take part in the Brussels Conference.

Before that Conference assembled the Infanta had taken some steps to carry out the naval schemes which she had put forward at Madrid.

By the middle of April a Dutch fleet of thirty six sail was blockading Mardyke, and it was expected that some English reinforcements would join it. She therefore proposed that the twenty cruisers which she had requested might be sent from Spain should at once attack the herring fleet, and afterwards proceed to Ostend. She also concluded an agreement with Duke Frederick of Holstein for the use of the town of Friedrichstadt which he had recently founded at the mouth of the Elbe.³

On May the twelfth the Conference met. The Emperor was represented by Count Schwarzenberg, who had been in Spain with the Archduke Charles, and who had been already employed by Philip IV. in a secret negotiation with the Emperor to obtain permission for the Spaniards to occupy some posts in East Friesland. In order to avoid giving the Princes of the Empire grounds for complaint, it was suggested that they should nominally do so at the request of Count Rittberg, the claimant to East Friesland, in order to protect them against the Dutch. To this proposal Rittberg agreed on condition of being appointed Governor, but as he died suddenly, Schwarzenberg was sent to Brussels to discuss other plans with the Infanta. Bavaria

and the Catholic League were also represented, amongst their envoys being Baron Schomberg.

The first proposals put forward by the Germans were confined to a request that Spain would assist the Emperor against Denmark.

In replying to them the Infanta raised far wider and more debateable issues.

She proposed that the powers taking part in the Conference should enter into a general offensive and defensive alliance against the rebels in the Empire, a term which would include the Dutch as members of the Circle of Lower Burgundy. She entertained no doubt that her proposals would be accepted. "In that event it would be much to Your Majesty's service if you kept up war vessels in the Baltic Sea, as they would so hamper the trade which the Dutch carry on there, that they would soon be brought to reasonable terms."

With the object of enabling the Spaniards to keep up a fleet in the Baltic, not only should Tilly and Wallenstein unite in driving the Danes out of Germany, but they should occupy any port in the Baltic which his Spanish Majesty might select in the Emperor's name so as to enable the Spaniards to use it as a base, and they should also agree "that no peace or agreement is to be made with the King of Denmark until His Imperial Majesty has got such a port into his hands. His Imperial Majesty should prohibit all "trade and commerce between the Empire and the rebel provinces, and with this object should keep garrisons and raise fortresses as low down the rivers as possible." The Spaniards would maintain six thousand foot and eighteen troops of horse to fight against the Danes in the Empire.

In his reply Schwarzenberg pointed out that he had no power to deal with the matters raised by the Infanta, who had also asked that it should be left to Spain to deal with everything connected with the Ban against the Palatine. He added that he must refer her communication to the Emperor. As the reinforcements which she had promised to send against the Danes were most urgently required, he begged that they might be despatched at once. At the same time he explained that the Emperor intended that his offer of assistance would include help against the Dutch who were in rebellion against the Empire and in alliance with its avowed enemies.¹

Scarcely had the Infanta received Schwarzenberg's despatch when on the third of June she sent a joint letter with Spinola to Philip giving him particulars as to their plans for the conduct of the summer campaign.

"In a letter dated March the twelfth last Your Majesty commands me to inform you what I propose to effect with the army this summer. My answer is that as Your Majesty was upon the thirteenth of June last year pleased to communicate to me your decision that the war in these States against the rebels should in future be confined to the defensive upon land, and that our principle efforts against them should be made by sea, we are making and have made every effort to beat them up and harass them by sea.

"Our view is that no army should take the field unless we are forced by the enemy to put one into it, although rumours have been current for some time that they will do so. We also conclude from Your Majesty's orders that you do not wish us, whilst the King of Denmark's armies are on foot and so near us, to engage this army in any siege, but if the arrangements which we are negotiating with the Imperial Ambassador and the Duke of Bavaria's envoys are successfully concluded, our forces will assist to carry them out."¹

His plans had so far met with success. The Dunkirkers had not only "stopped all the traffic from England to other countries, but hung about the English coasts, and made it impossible to send goods by sea from one country to another. Consequently there is such a scarcity of some things in London that what used to be sold for fifteen pence cannot now be bought for forty."²

At the end of April the English were reported to be fitting out a fleet of thirty or forty sail, it was said for the West Indies, although it was certainly intended either for an attack upon Dunkirk or else to remain on the defensive.³ Six vessels had already been sent out to clear the English coast of corsairs and so give the trading vessels some freedom of movement.

As Charles I. had professed himself satisfied by Wimbledon's report of his expedition, Parliament had been forbidden to take any action against that luckless commander. This was Buckingham's work as he was afraid that if they took up the case against Wimbledon, it would end in an onslaught upon himself.

Plans more or less feasible for an attack upon Dunkirk from the sea were being discussed.

Unfortunately for the realisation of the Infanta's hopes, she had for once miscalculated the force of the varying currents by which the policy of the Empire was swayed.

Ferdinand's answer to her proposals sent through Schwarzenberg was much to her annoyance delayed for some weeks, but when it arrived it proved to be distinctly unfavourable to her wishes. The Emperor did not wish to accept the proffered reinforcements from Spain if they were neither to be allowed to cross the Weser nor to be employed in Lower Saxony, on the ground that Spain did not wish to go to war with Denmark, although he himself had sent troops against the Dutch at Breda. It was Philip's duty to aid him against the Danes, because as Duke of Brabant he was a member of the Empire, and so was bound to assist in repressing disorders in it, and as a member of a neighbouring circle would only be fulfilling the obligations imposed upon him by the Imperial Constitutions. He would have no objection to permit Spain to occupy a Baltic Port if the war progressed in such a manner as to allow the Imperial armies to advance in that direction, but he was very unwilling to bind himself not to make peace with the Palatine until Spain had occupied such a port. Such a promise would be in direct opposition to the policy which invariably hitherto had been advocated by Spain, and would never be sanctioned either by the Diet or by the Convention of Electors, and he was much annoyed that such a stipulation should be required of him as a condition for their sending him reinforcements. Nor would it be possible for him to prohibit trade between the Empire and the Dutch without the consent of the Diet.

This answer was not unexpected at Brussels. The Infanta had already learnt from the German Ambassadors that the Catholic League would never consent to take part in the war with the Dutch as there seemed no hope that it would ever come to an end. They would not allow any agreement upon the subject to form a part of the treaty even in covert terms, as they said anything of the kind would never be carried out. She, therefore, asked Philip for instructions whether she was to continue the negotiations for an alliance without such conditions, or whether she was to break them off.

Commenting upon the Emperor's letter, she remarked that

Ferdinand and Maximilian were making difficulties as to excluding the Dutch from the Elbe and the Weser and allowing Spain to occupy a port on the Baltic. If Bavaria would not agree to this, whilst the Danish war was still in progress, they certainly would not do so after they had defeated the Danes as they would then think that they had no further need of outside help.

Philip for his part instructed the Infanta that she ought to employ the interval before she received the Emperor's reply to her proposals in treating with Denmark in order to induce that King to negotiate for the pacification of Germany either at a Diet or a meeting of Electors. As the Emperor had decided to convene one, the Danes could have no reason for continuing to employ force especially as Spain would be willing to act upon the same lines as they did at the Diet, as far as she possibly could.

"You might hint to the Danish King and his Ministers as clearly and convincingly as you can how very advantageous it would be for their maritime provinces if they would not strain our relations to breaking point at a time when the English are at war with us, and I have also one on my hands with the Moors of Algiers and Sallee, and am on anything but good terms with France, thanks to the embargos which I and the French have proclaimed against one another. Under such conditions the Danish King's subjects and vassals would be the lords of all the treasures and merchandise of Europe, and you may use what arguments you please to support your statements. I enclose a letter from myself to the King which may serve as credentials for any one whom you may send to him."

He would not enter into any defensive League with the Emperor and the Catholic League unless they agreed to allow it to cover the Belgian provinces and consented to take the offensive against the Dutch. Every care must be taken not to alienate the Duke of Bavaria "for he could do irreparable harm to the House of Austria, as he has talent and ambition enough to get himself elected King of the Romans." It would, therefore, be necessary to meet his wishes and those of the Ecclesiastical Electors as far as possible.¹

In the meantime the depleted condition of the Treasury had done nothing to check the lavish expenditure of the Court of Madrid. When Cardinal Barberini, the Papal Legate, set

out on his return to Italy, "if he would have accepted presents, he might have gone away loaded down with them, but he would not take any gold, silver, or jewels but only such trifles as scents, fans and gloves, with a few horses.

"The first detachment of the gentlemen of his court set out some days back and were followed last night by the second. The King has given every one of them a chain worth about a hundred crowns with a medal hanging from it with His Majesty's head on one side and on the other some hieroglyphic or other with a Fortune's Wheel."¹

Great alarm was felt when in July the news arrived that the Duke of Guise had left Marseilles "with five or six galleons and a convoy of tartans laden with troops. He gave out that he was going to Africa, but in reality intended to attack Corsica." He was, however, driven into Leghorn by a storm, and the Genoese were offering thanks to God, Who by that tempest had saved the Republic from such harm.² But a few months before, on Lady Day, the Blessed Virgin had been solemnly proclaimed "Queen and Sovereign of Genoa" in the great basilica of San Lorenzo, and Cardinal Giovanni Spinola had crowned the Doge Francesco Brignole with the royal diadem and placed in his hand a sceptre and the city's golden keys "as signs that the Doge was the vicar in things temporal in Genoa of the Blessed Queen of Heaven." Such was the thank-offering of the Genoese for their deliverance from Savoy.³

The Duke of Savoy was not equally fortunate in his endeavours to secure a temporal crown, whether shadowy or real. Tarantaise wrote ruefully that Venice and Tuscany would oppose his assumption of the title of King of Cyprus because the Venetians would not give up their claim to that island, although they had originally usurped it. For the moment, too, nothing could be done about Geneva as Charles Emmanuel himself admitted.

Olivares was still doing his best for his kinsmen. "Yesterday Cardinal de Guzman passed to a better life after having been but four months a Cardinal, and that as a youth of twenty-two, to the great sorrow of his parents and of the whole Court. His death is put down to his despair when he heard that he had been created one, as he wished to marry."⁴

Possibly owing to their disgust at the Count Duke's methods the Cortes of Catalonia had been somewhat more reluctant than even those of Aragon and Valencia to supply the needs of the

Royal Treasury. Philip had been forced to go in person to Saragossa to secure a subsidy from his Aragonese vassals, and it had been thought that he would encounter even greater difficulties at Barcelona, "for the Catalans are far better off and more comfortable and are far more attached to their rights, customs, and privileges, although everything will be settled in the end as it has been in the other two kingdoms, to His Majesty's no small satisfaction.

"Thanks to fair words, exhortations, prayers, perhaps even to a threat or two, he has got far more out of them than he ever expected."¹

These experiences were not lost upon either Philip or his favourite, and an elaborate plan for effecting the centralisation of the Spanish administration occupied their attention almost as much as their plans for the overthrow of the English and of the Dutch. Their failure to realise the fact that Spain was merely a geographical expression and that the Peninsula might more correctly be described as "The Spains" was destined to cost both Olivares and the Monarchy dear.

The King laid the outlines of his plan before the Infanta in the same despatch in which he instructed her how to deal with the answer made by the Emperor to her proposals of the twenty-ninth of May.

It was certain, he wrote, that the Spanish Empire was never wholly at peace, and that the expenses of those wars fell upon Castile alone. It was therefore his intention to unite Aragon and the other states of the Aragonese Crown with Castile under a system by which whenever war broke out a force of twenty thousand men raised and paid by every part of the Spanish Monarchy might be ready to take the field. They should also keep up a fleet of fifty vessels, as the need for one had been shown by the surprise of Bahia by the Dutch. "An offence to Aragon is one to Castile and vice-versa," yet the Aragonese, the Castilians, and the Portuguese look upon one another as little better than foreigners, but if they came to regard one another as fellow subjects the Kingdom would be all powerful. Moreover, Aragon has always enjoyed peace since its union with Castile, whilst Castile and Flanders have borne the brunt of every war, so Aragon might well offer to raise ten thousand men."

The King, in giving a list of the enemies of Spain, states

that they included France, England, Denmark, Sweden, the Dutch, the Marquess of Brandenburg, the Dukes of Saxony and Weimar, the Venetian Republic and the Duke of Savoy. If Spain were a really united empire it would be easy to raise an army of one hundred and forty thousand men for general service, of whom twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse could always be kept in readiness as an expeditionary force to be used where they were required, and this number could be doubled if war was going on say in Flanders and Italy at the same time. They should be officered by Spanish subjects but all those employed in the war department and administration should be natives of the Kingdom in which the force was raised. The soldiers would have to be raised by voluntary enlistment, but every kingdom would be obliged to provide for its own defence in case of invasion with the help of the expeditionary force. The failure of the Armada had shown how useless pressed levies were. He reckoned that the Aragonese provinces could raise 32,000 foot, Castile and the Indies 44,000, Naples, Sicily, and Milan 30,000, Flanders 12,000, and the Islands in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic 6,000, whilst Portugal could furnish 16,000.

Turning to topics of more immediate interest, Philip went on to instruct the Infanta that she was upon no account to enter into any alliance with the Emperor, Bavaria, or the Catholic League unless they would agree to make it a defensive but not an offensive one against the Dutch. This was the only return which he expected for all that he had done in Germany, as he had no desire to keep possession of the Palatinate. His sole wish was that his hereditary states as being fiefs of the Empire should enjoy the same rights of being assisted by the other members of the Empire as other fiefs did. It was also absolutely necessary for him to have a port in the northern seas to serve the Spanish ships as a base from which to harass the Dutch trade. It would be advisable, therefore, for her to satisfy the Duke of Saxony and to humour the Archbishop of Mainz and his brother-in-law, Landgrave Louis of Hesse.

The Infanta was quick to dispel Philip's illusions as to the good result to be hoped for from his centralising schemes so far at least as they concerned Flanders. It was absolutely impossible for Belgium to provide for its own defence even with the aid of the expeditionary force paid by Spain. "Now that

the Trading Licences have been revoked, these provinces only live by the subsidies Your Majesty grants them, and have to support a deficit of between seven and eight hundred thousand florins every year. How then is it possible then for to bear almost the whole cost of the war? They all but ruined themselves by supporting the army during the siege of Breda, and though the interruption of the traffic with Holland has injured the Dutch, it has made the price of living rise fearfully here because our supplies from there are cut off." She ended by saying that it was impossible to get any information as to the object for which the English were fitting out their fleet, as every letter from England gave a different account, and it might well be upon the coast of Spain before she had learnt the truth.

By the end of August the Infanta was able to inform her nephew that she had opened up communications with the King of Denmark through a commissary whom he had sent to Lingen, and that his answer gave an opening for negotiations for peace. She had written to Aytona, who had now succeeded Oñate as Ambassador at Vienna, and would forward the Emperor's reply to Madrid. As regards the Baltic port it would be best to treat directly with Bavaria at once, as even if the Emperor accepted the proposals, his assent would go for nothing without that of the Electors, and they were wholly in Maximilian's hands. It would be all but impossible to make a treaty with the Catholic League, if they were to be asked to engage themselves to assist Spain against the Dutch.¹

Philip already realised how completely he had placed himself at the mercy of Bavaria by engaging in a policy which could not be carried out except with the assistance of the Empire. On receiving the Infanta's letter, he wrote to Aytona to say that he would restore the Palatinate without insisting on the repayment of his war expenses, and instructing him to use every effort to induce the Emperor to take advantage of an exchange of letters which was going on between the Palatine and the Duke of Wurtemberg to begin peace negotiations. He also informed the Infanta that she ought to point out to Maximilian that Spain was only carrying on one war in Germany and another with England for the sake of Bavaria, and that the Duke should, therefore, as a token of his gratitude to him, close the German rivers against the Dutch, allow Spain to have a port on the North

Sea, and secure either a truce for a long period or a peace for Flanders.¹

But, like the Emperor, Bavaria was now no longer in need of Spanish help, and neither Ferdinand nor Maximilian were in any mood to yield unresisting obedience to Philip's demands.

On the twenty-sixth of August Tilly had won a crushing victory over Christian IV. and the Danish army at Lutter on the Bärenberg, Wallenstein was in full pursuit of Mansfeldt and Weimar, and the Imperial forces had stamped out a dangerous insurrection in Upper Austria. The Infanta must have read Tilly's letter announcing his success which reached her on September the eighth with mingled feelings.²

CHAPTER LXXVII

ONCE again the Walloon Tilly had proved the saviour of Bavaria and of those who fought to maintain the so-called "liberties" of Germany against the encroachments of the rulers of his native land, although those encroachments were now but a memory of the past. By his victory at Stadtlohn he had prevented Spain from concluding an alliance with England which would have wrested the Palatinate and the Electorate from the Bavarian House. By his victory at the Lutter he had made the electors the arbiters of the destinies of Spain.

Tilly's despatch, in which he announced his success to the Infanta, was couched in modest terms. He confessed that for a very long time he had felt uncertain as to the outcome of the contest. "The King of Denmark is clearly a most talented general, as I have seen myself at Lutter on the Bärenberg. Some people will have it that the cause of his disaster was that he yielded to pressure, others again say that his understanding has suffered from his fall into Hameln fosse last year. He has, however, shown no lack either of courage or of intelligence, but drew up the plan of the operations for the day in a way which shows his thorough military skill."¹ In her answer the Infanta informed Tilly that "the Duke of Friedland is in pursuit of Mansfeldt and Weimar. We have written to him that if God grants him the success which we may hope for from His hand, we think it very necessary that he should at once secure some harbour on the Pomeranian coast in order to prevent Germany from being invaded from that side by the Swedes or other enemies."² Her advice was sound. Gusta Adolf on receiving the news of his Danish rivals' defeat determined to transfer the seat of the war, in which he was defending his crown against the just pretensions of Sigismund III. of Poland, from the Baltic provinces into the territories of the Empire.³

To conciliate the victorious general the Infanta at once asked her nephew for leave to make him a grant of some villages near his ancestral home in Brabant, whilst she also offered

to send him reinforcements. The Duke of Bavaria, however, declared that they were not needed, a fact which he subsequently found it convenient to forget. Philip thoroughly approved of her proposal and wrote that the reinforcements should consist of the best troops which she could find, as Tilly was the chief support of the Catholics in Lower Saxony and had, hitherto, been left without assistance by the Emperor, who had his hands tied by the peasant revolt in Upper Austria and by the threatening attitude of the Turks in Hungary. Had the Dutch not taken the field, he would have sent them earlier.¹

Maximilian of Bavaria had not been slow to appreciate the advantages which he had gained from the defeat of the Danes by the General of the Catholic League. He knew, moreover, that the Emperor was anxious to transform the Empire from an elective into an hereditary kingdom in which as in almost all other kingdoms the succession should pass from father to son. "But he will meet with infinite difficulties from the Electors who will not deprive themselves of the right of election and, perhaps, also from the Pope, who will not give up that of confirmation."² As things stood, Maximilian, who was the paymaster of the Army of the Catholic League, held the Emperor and the Catholic Electors in the hollow of his hand.

All through the summer, whilst his envoys were in conference with those of Spain and the Emperor at Brussels, he had been secretly in treaty with the French. Father Joseph had sent Rota and, subsequently, in September, Marcheville, to Munich nominally in order to induce Bavaria and the League to co-operate with him in restoring peace in Germany, where France would thus at once become the predominant power. He had even given Marcheville discretionary powers to offer that France would join them in forcing the Palatine and the King of England to accede to such a peace. It was also again suggested that Maximilian should be raised to the Imperial throne and, on this occasion, the Duke lent a favourable hearing to the proposal. But as Richelieu would not comply with his request that France should not in future continue her support of the German Protestants, the negotiations for the moment fell through.³

After Marcheville's departure the Duke again tried to come to an understanding with Spain, and important explanations took place between Olivares and Count Frankenburg, the Imperial envoy at Madrid.

The Infanta Maria had been married by proxy to the Emperor's eldest son, Ferdinand, King of Hungary and Bohemia, but had not yet left Spain. After discussing some arrangements for her household, Frankenburg went on to broach the real objects of his interview.

He asked to be allowed to assure the Electors and other members of the Empire of His Majesty's good will, for his servants were continually vexing them by quartering troops and with forced contributions. The chief sufferers were the Duke of Neuburg and the Electors of Cologne and Treves. As no commissaries had been appointed the Spanish soldiery took what they pleased. Even the Dutch treated these princes better, and some Foreign Ministers were doing their best to persuade them to desert the Catholic cause. They would be forced to ask the Emperor to intervene to protect them, and it was to be feared that they might say one fine day, "He who robs me of mine own is my Turk and Dutchman in one." If they were once to break with Spain it was as clear as crystal that it would mean that they would call in the Dutch, as many of their advisers were already urging them to do.

Olivares asked for some particulars to prove these assertions. His Majesty had never refused to comply with any just request which was not prejudicial to the well-being of the Empire. Spain had spent many millions to preserve Cleves and Juliers for the Duke of Neuburg. Had they not done so he would then be holding only what the Dutch and the Marquess of Brandenburg might have chosen to leave him. If, therefore, he were to turn against Spain he would be turning against himself.

Whilst the Duke was at Madrid in the previous year, the King had promised not only to relieve him of the quarterings but to guarantee him in the possession of his states. Olivares could not think that he would show himself ungrateful for this. If his fortresses were left without garrisons, the Dutch would at once quarter troops in such rich cities.

"After all, it was no great matter comparatively speaking, if his subjects were discontented because the rivers were closed. On the other hand, if the royal army mutinied he would be left at the mercy of Brandenburg and the Dutch. Were he to desert a King who had loaded him with benefits, even those German Princes who were the King's most bitter enemies would cry shame upon him."

Olivares added that the one thing which he had learnt during the tenure of the post which he then held was that one must hear both sides before deciding upon a complaint, "for though no one is to blame, nor am I under any outside influence, I see every day (even in this tomb in which I lie buried) with what blindness and prejudice I form my judgment as to anything which concerns me personally, and later on when my heat has cooled, I acknowledge (although, perhaps, only to myself) that I had little right on my side, and a little more reflection shows me that I had none at all. Please God, I may feel the same about my sins, for I have need enough to do so." If Frankenburg would give him particulars as to the losses which the Electors of Cologne and Treves had sustained they should receive compensation.

The Ambassador then broached the thorny subject of the Brussels Conference.

He said that Schwarzenberg and the Commissioners of the Catholic Princes had come to an agreement with the Infanta of Brussels that His Majesty should furnish them with some help against the King of Denmark. When, however, Count Ysenburg was on his way from Flanders to join Tilly with reinforcements, and the Danes were approaching with forces which were stronger than the whole Catholic army, so that Tilly had greater need of assistance than ever, Ysenburg suddenly received orders to return to Belgium on the pretext that the Dutch were advancing, although his column was not large enough to be of any real use, and the Dutch were in no great strength. In the meantime the Battle of Lutter took place, and many of their advisers urged the Emperor and the Leaguers to refuse Ysenburg's help. He heard that he was now again on the march to join Tilly, and although the Emperor had sent to stop him on the ground that he would do no good by leaving Belgium, yet the Germans felt strongly that they ought to be treated with the same frankness as they had always shown themselves. If Ysenburg were now to arrive at the headquarters of the League, he would by his presence only bring His Spanish Majesty's authority into contempt and breed ill-will against Spain.

Olivares replied that he could not answer any point which brought the Emperor into question, as nothing could ever lessen the goodwill which existed between Spain and His Imperial Majesty. The Duke of Bavaria and the other princes must

see that no Prince who is receiving assistance from an ally has a right to blame him if on account of a change in the position of affairs he fails to send the help which he has promised. He would, however, ask Spinola to report to him about the matter.

The Emperor and Electors, said Frankenburg, could not understand why Spain had assured them four years before that she wanted nothing in the Palatinate whilst now "every mail from Flanders brings letters pressing for the positions which the Duke of Bavaria is occupying there. This makes the Duke and the other princes suspect that His Catholic Majesty means to keep the Palatinate for himself, and that all these contradictory assertions are merely a trick to effect this object."

Olivares could not answer such an assertion, as it was impossible to use plainer words than those which the *pue supy* Aytona had already employed to the Emperor and the other princes upon this subject, and he offered to prove, with the papers in his hand, to anyone whom they might appoint to represent them, that Spain had acted in complete good faith throughout.

"*Frankenburg.* Some of the Spanish ministers were trying to make mischief between Bavaria and Spain by going about saying that the Duke had been treating with France and England. He pointed out that Bavaria was obliged to keep an agent at the French Court because France was opposed to the interests both of Bavaria and of the House of Austria. He was, moreover, instructed to deny that the Elector had been in treaty with England, as he had not been aware that Father Hyacinth had sent his companion to London. As a truth loving and Catholic prince, His Highness would never refuse to give an account of his actions to anyone, least of all to a prince of the House of Austria. 'In reference to the accusation that he is trying to secure the Imperial Crown, the fact that the Elector did not take it at a moment when the Emperor was an exile from his dominions, and the Spanish armies were very far away and the Palatine and Brandenburg had offered him their votes shows that he does not wish for it. On the other hand, he risked his states and his life in the Emperor's service, as the Battle of Prague is there to show, for if the Catholics had been defeated, he would have shared the same fate as the Emperor.'

Olivares would not in the least question anything that Frankenburg had said, but would point out that Spain had every reason for being displeased with the Elector as ever since the

Diet of Ratisbon he had refused every proposal for a settlement as to the Palatinate and Electorate which would enable Spain to arrange her difficulties with England, even though he had been offered full satisfaction for them. At the very moment indeed, added the Count Duke, when the Prince of Wales was a guest at Madrid, he himself had addressed the Duke as "Elector" when writing to him. It was his support of the claims of Bavaria which had led to the war between Spain and England.

Frankenburg ended by complaining that they accused the Elector of wishing to retain the Upper Palatinate in place of Upper Austria as a security for the repayment of the monies which he had expended upon the war, and that they had opposed the grant of the Electorate to him and to his successors of the Bavarian House.

Olivares flatly denied both these assertions.¹

This conversation marks an important stage in the relations between Spain and the Princes of the Empire, whose good-will was now becoming of such importance to the Spanish interests. The Duke of Bavaria never forgot the Infanta's conduct in withdrawing Ysenburg at a time when Tilly had only fifteen thousand men with his colours and when Wallenstein had been forced to march from Northern Germany to the Danube in order to put down the rebellion which was raging in Upper Austria. On the other hand, although it was true that the Dutch had not put any large forces into the field, they had taken Oldenzell and threatened Groll, at a moment when the Spaniards had arranged to carry on a merely defensive war. Moreover, Frankenburg's lies as to the Duke's ignorance of Rota's mission and as to Father Hyacinth's dealings with Father Joseph, contrast strongly with Olivares' frankness as to the attitude of Spain about the Palatinate. Amongst the statesmen of the seventeenth century the much maligned favourite of Philip the Fourth may well rank as a comparatively honest man.

He had won the admiration of so prejudiced a diplomatist as Tarantaise. When writing to urge his master to come to terms with the Genoese the good Archbishop says, "I must point out to your Royal Highness with my accustomed freedom, devotion, and respect, that I should be glad if Your Royal Highness would make every effort to settle the differences between yourself and the Genoese amicably and not put matters to the test of war again, for if you were to do so, this Court would

again find itself forced to take up arms against your Royal Highness.

"One reason for this is because they deem it their greatest honour and glory to help their friends and even those who are not their friends but who ask their help and protection.

"This we may see by their dealings with the Duke of Mantua, for although they do not count him amongst their friends, yet every time that he has asked them for assistance they have willingly given him all the support they could."¹

At that very moment Olivares was upon the worst of terms with the Duke of Mantua, who was not only intriguing with the French and the Emperor to secure their support in his dispute with Savoy about Monferrat, but had refused to recognise the Prince of Stigliano as lord of the important Gonzaga fortress of Sabbioneta, which was also claimed by the Emperor as an Imperial fief. The Emperor indeed was doing everything in his power to induce the minor Italian princes to look upon him as their protector and thus to make the power of the Empire once more a reality in Italy.²

Ferdinand's centralising policy made the Empire of more importance to Spain than ever, and thus the good will of Maximilian of Bavaria became a factor of the utmost consequence. It had been the custom that the next heir of the reigning Emperor should be chosen King of the Romans in his father's life-time, but by the law of the Empire no one could be elected to that office before he was twenty-five years of age, and at that moment the King of Hungary was only twenty. Possibly this fact in some degree explains Maximilian's readiness to listen to the French proposals that he should come forward as a candidate for the Imperial throne.³

The Elector had, it was true, refused to authorise Father Alexander of Alais to return any definite answer to the proposals which Louis XIII. had sent to him in the summer of 1626, but the King, on the sixth of December, instructed M. de Marcheville to return to Munich to again submit them to him in an amended form. The envoy was to emphasise the fact that the King's earnest wish was to restore peace in Germany and to preserve its liberties, "of which the Electors were in duty bound to be the chief defenders in their own country." If Maximilian could induce his colleagues to approve of the conditions, Marcheville was instructed to proceed to Denmark to call upon

Christian IV. to disarm. Louis indeed apologised for mentioning the Danes at all. He said that he had done so in order to induce them to make peace, and also because the Infanta was offering them some specific and improved terms. It had been his wish to be guided by the Elector of Bavaria in drawing up the conditions of a treaty which would be approved of by the other Electors.

In other words, France was again trying to detach the Electors from the Emperor and thus to gain the position of Mediator in Germany to which she had aspired since 1552.

When, however, Marcheville arrived in Bavaria he found that the position of the Imperial arms had so greatly improved that it would be impossible to induce Maximilian to adopt an independent line of policy, and so for the time the French schemes were perforce laid aside. This failure was one more proof that France was comparatively powerless abroad until she could crush disloyalty at home.¹

In the same letter in which the Infanta declined to comply with Philip's suggestion that she should send reinforcements to Tilly, she informed her nephew that so far as they concerned Belgium his schemes for centralising the Spanish Empire were foredoomed to failure.

"The Provinces cannot pay more than they are now doing. If the soldiers had to pay billeting money as they do in France and Holland, the inhabitants could pay but they are worn out with the Free Quarterings, which are of no advantage to the soldier himself, for the commanders make the sutlers pay for their places. Thus the soldiers get very little out of their pay, though the cavalry receive the whole and the infantry two thirds of it every month. When the troops are well paid, as in Flanders, the province willingly pays its full quota and, indeed, even more."

The King's proposal, therefore, that the greater part of the cost of the war should be thrown upon Belgium and that he should only send an auxiliary force of twenty thousand foot and four thousand horse from Spain was wholly impracticable.²

But ten days earlier she had sent to Madrid a suggestion which had Philip been able to take advantage of it, might well have altered the course of history.

A confidant of Gustaf Adolf, the Duke of Sudermania, had, she wrote, arrived at Brussels in order to request the good

offices of Spain and the Emperor to mediate a peace between himself and the King of Poland. She had accordingly written to Poland on the subject. The Envoy, Eric Larsen, had also brought instructions to secure an arrangement for trade between Spain and Sweden. The Swedes, had, however, not made any offer as to restoring Livonia and Prussia to Poland. Gustaf Adolf had refused offers to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with England, France, Denmark, and Holland, and was at peace with the whole world except Poland. His one wish was to bring about a universal peace.

In the eyes of most Catholics and, indeed, in those of some Anglican Bishops, the legitimate King of Sweden was Sigismund III., King of Poland, so that in any official document issued at Brussels his rival Gustaf Adolf could only be styled Duke of Sudermania.

In commenting upon the Swedish proposals the Infanta said that in itself it would be advisable to take advantage of the request of the Swedes to bring about an arrangement between Sweden and Poland, as the Poles would thus be left free to assist Austria. If there was any risk, however, of Spain offending Poland by engaging in such a negotiation she ought to decline to do so. On the whole she thought, therefore, that it would be best for Philip not to make any agreement with Sweden. Larsen had only brought credentials and a commission to treat for the sale of copper in Spain, which had been given to him by the Bestuurmen or administrators of the mines with the authorisation of their sovereign.¹

There can be but little doubt that Gustaf Adolf was thoroughly in earnest in his wish to come to terms with Poland and to enter into political and commercial arrangements with Spain. Although during 1625 and 1626 he had succeeded in wresting Livonia, Courland and Prussia from the Poles, he had derived but little advantage from his occupation of those provinces. By entering Prussia he had given great offence to his brother-in-law, George William, Elector of Brandenburg, who feared that he would occupy his duchy of East Prussia, whilst the burghers of Danzig and Riga, Protestants as they were, lived by their trade with Poland and neither dared nor wished to sever their all but nominal connection with the Polish Crown. On the other hand, the Emperor, as Feudal Superior of the Teutonic Knights, was suzerain of East Prussia, and might be

willing to grant him the investiture of that province, possibly even with the consent of the nobility of Poland, who derived their revenues from the export of corn through Danzig, and who were weary of bearing the burden of a war undertaken by their king solely to recover his hereditary states beyond the Baltic.¹

Consequently, as we learn from Wallenstein's correspondence with Arnim, one of his colonels named Farenbach, who seemed to have stood in somewhat suspicious relations with the Swedes, had, in the early autumn of 1626, brought some proposals for an alliance between Sweden and the Austrian House before Eggenberg, Ferdinand's favourite and confidant, although for reasons unknown to Wallenstein the negotiations had been allowed to drop. Possibly the Imperial Court like the Infanta were unwilling to offend Sigismund by giving an ear to his rival.²

To Spain, at that moment, the good-will or the enmity of Sweden might seem but a small matter. To Italian onlookers her position appeared very strong. As Tarantaise wrote when urging his master to comply with Olivares' wishes and conclude peace with Genoa, "The Spaniards would certainly do their utmost for that republic far more willingly than for any other Italian state.

"This is not only because they are very friendly to the republic and always find its citizens in their private capacities very ready to assist them in their pecuniary affairs when they are in need of money, but because that city and state are from their situation of the greatest advantage to them in all their affairs. They not only assist them to retain possession of their kingdoms in Italy, Naples, Sicily and Milan, but also of the Low Countries. Thus the Spaniards would be far more willing to let any of their kingdoms or provinces outside Milan be lost, than to allow Genoa to be occupied by a foreign prince. Moreover, they would be all the readier to assist the Genoese to resist any such attempt because they know what the difficulties in the way of such an undertaking are, and that though it might be possible to occupy the city, yet it would be no easy matter for any power to hold it which had not got a good fleet in those seas, so that anyone who tries to take Genoa might as well be shaking his fist or kicking at the sky. They will, therefore, as I have said, do their best to keep it under their undisputed control.

"Again though the King finds that his resources have run

very low, money is always to be found for the war not only through these Genoese merchants, but also through his own peoples in Spain, especially the Castilians. It is true that they are for ever grumbling at the heavy taxes, yet they are always ready enough to supply His Majesty's necessities and to raise not only hundreds of thousands but millions. I have often thought over these subsidies and have been absolutely dumbfounded and could only conclude that the resources of this Power are inexhaustible."¹

At the end of the year the Silver Fleet arrived with a cargo such as it had not brought for many years as "Your Royal Highness will see by the enclosed list, a note of the gold, silver and country wares, which come to seventeen millions (£3,400,000), and they think it certain that there are at least seven millions (£1,400,000) more on board, that is to say in gold, silver, and jewels, which are not registered and which belong to private persons.

"Amongst others there is a man from Nice, a subject of Your Royal Highness, who went to Peru since I came here, and who writes from Seville that he has brought back with him twelve thousand pesos (£2,400), and I should say that a peso is a crosone or piece of eight reals (4s.)." As Tarantaise had only reached Madrid in 1619, it had not taken many years for the Niçois to make his fortune in those "Pieces of Eight," on which the greatness of many an old English family was founded.

"The King, as you will see, has three and a half millions on board (£700,000), besides the Tenth or Half Tenth which is paid upon everything brought by the Flota.

"There are many rumours afloat as to this flota, amongst others it is said that Gerardo Basso, who was formerly in Y.R.H.'s service, proposes to pay off all the debts of this crown with the Flota money by buying up all the perpetual annuities or "Giuri," which were granted by Philip the Second and Philip the Third to the amount of thirty-five millions (£8,750,000), and at the same time extinguishing the "Quarti," or 'Quartigli,' exchequer bills secured upon the excise or grain, which have been the cause of the dearth which exists in this city and throughout Castille.

"The Ministers are giving a hearing to this proposal or as they say here to this "pleasure" (arbitrio) of Bassos, and as there is a law that anyone who invents anything which proves to be profitable to the royal treasury, gets four per cent. upon the amount

which it brings in, people reckon that he will make a million of ducats (£250,000) by it. He is to give sixty thousand (£15,000) out of his commission to the Jesuit Fathers for building their church, two hundred thousand (£50,000) to the Marquis of Inojosa, who is to bring forward his scheme in the Council, and four hundred thousand (£100,000) to the Count Duke, so that he will have three hundred and forty thousand (£85,000) left for himself which will be a very nice little windfall.

"A Junta of Financial Experts has been held to decide as to the means by which this "Pleasure" of Basso's is to be carried into effect. They have reported that to extinguish the Exchequer Bills and to raise the price of silver it will be necessary to strike a fresh coinage of a lower standard than the present one so as to prevent an influx of them from abroad, especially from England."

Nothing, however, except the issue of the famous brass money, appears to have resulted from these proposals, unless indeed they may a century later have furnished some hints to John Law, who was well acquainted with Northern Italy, for his Mississippi Scheme.¹

The campaign in the Netherlands during the summer of 1626 was singularly barren of results. Spinola's attention was chiefly directed to establishing a commercial blockade of Holland both by land and sea, whilst the Dutch were for want of money late in entering the field, and then with regiments formed of companies consisting only of twenty or thirty men, although they left strong garrisons in their frontier fortresses from Sluys to Heusden. At the end of July Frederick Henry joined his headquarters at Arnheim, and for a moment it was thought that he would attack Wesel. He, however, turned north-eastwards and laid siege to Oldenzell which was soon forced to surrender.

The Dutch at once removed all the Catholic magistrates from office and replaced them by the only two Protestants to be found in the town. They also prohibited the public exercise of the Catholic religion and placed at the head of the principal church a minister whose salary was charged upon the property of the Chapter. The Dean and Canons were allowed to remain in the place. Frederick Henry and his forces withdrew to an open plain near Helbrugh, where they erected huts for an encampment which was separated only by the Rhine from Count Henry de Berg and his army of observation.²

The fall of Oldenzell was chiefly due to the conduct of the Duke of Neuburg.³ As Olivares had pointed out to Frankenburg, he had been treated with the greatest courtesy when in

Spain two years before, although he had been piqued by the refusal of the government to give him back Cleves and Juliers which they thought that he could not hold against the Dutch. As some compensation he was named Governor of Wesel for life, with a salary of six thousand ducats. Some blamed the appointment because Neuburg thus became a Spanish subject, whilst others thought it a good one because it showed that the King put confidence in him, though the Infanta wrote that he was utterly untrustworthy. He was, however, most anxious for peace as his States had suffered greatly from the war. On his way back through France in March, 1625, he had fallen into the hands of De Bye and Fauchier, two adventurers, who were subordinate agents of the French Government and asserted that they could secure peace by bribing M. de Thoyras the Governor of Fort St. Louis who was a favourite of Louis XIII.

The Duke was a great chatterer and even at that time Mirabel the Spanish Ambassador at Paris was afraid that he might betray to the French and English Ministers the negotiations for a Truce which Prince Maurice was carrying on with the Infanta through Jean Brant, the kinsman of Rubens, although Maurice had expressly said that if they became known in Paris and London he would break them off. Neuburg had apparently been prevented from betraying the secret of these negotiations but, on the other hand, had conceived the idea of treating with the United Provinces upon his own account, and of endeavouring to do his utmost to thwart the interests of Spain.¹

To please the Duke who was always complaining that Spain had done nothing to satisfy his just claims, nearly all the Spanish troops had been removed from his territories, although it was known that he was negotiating with the Dutch. It was, therefore, impossible, to send reinforcements in time to relieve Oldenzell. To the Infanta's indignation his claims to Wesel and Orsoy had been decided in his favour, but notwithstanding this Neuburg would not allow his regiment, which was paid by Spain, to serve outside of his own territories, and he grumbled yet more when by Philip's express orders his subjects were forbidden to trade with the Dutch.² As one of Spinola's correspondents wrote, "Your Excellency will allow me to tell you that the Duke's nature is such that if he is not spoken to and dealt with very firmly, he will interpret every answer, however generally it may be worded, in his own fashion, and will push his claims further and

further. In place of being satisfied if his requests are complied with, he will, if he is subsequently refused anything, grumble more than ever, and though at this moment he only complains of the government of Flanders he will later on grow discontented with that at Madrid."

Such was the man for whose sake Spain had fifteen years before plunged into the welter of German politics and who was destined to deal her a most dastard blow.

Scarcely had the Prince of Orange taken Oldenzell when he attempted a dramatic stroke which had it succeeded might well have ended the long contest in the Netherlands in a single campaign.

He secretly assembled a large force on the Scheldt below Antwerp and ordered the fleet which was blockading the river to draw up so near the city that it could be seen from the Church towers. On the twenty-eighth of August it was thought that the place would be attacked at once and regiments were despatched in all haste from the camp at Calloo. "That night fire signals were placed upon our Cathedral tower, the citadel discharged a salvo of artillery and all the forts on the river replied. The Lord Marquis had the bridge of boats chained together thrown across the river in front of the city, so that the troops might pass from Brabant to Flanders and back again as the case might require." The Prince, however, intended to make his way up a canal leading from the left bank of the Scheldt to Hulst, a place which is the key to the dyke system of East Flanders. "On the twenty-ninth the enemy's ships advanced as if they meant to attack Antwerp, but when they had got a little above Lillo, they sailed up the bend of the river, drew towards the Saftingen channel, sailed up it and laid their course straight for Hulst. As, however, they neared Kieldrecht which is a league below that place, they all collected in a body. In their van were four ships of war and a galley which thanks to the negligence of the captain, who was not on board, they lately took at Ostend with the help of the slaves." But the tide was falling, regular soldiers with six thousand armed countrymen had hastened to the dykes and kept up so heavy a fire upon the assailants that they were forced after sustaining great losses to withdraw to Tholen. It was clear that for the moment the Dutch were not likely to be welcomed as liberators by the Flemish peasants who had turned out in such numbers to resist them that as the *Antwerp News* wrote, "it seemed to have rained men."

The skirmish at Kieldrecht was unimportant in itself, but as an episode it serves to show what life was like at Antwerp in Rubens' day.¹

A few days later every city in the Obedient Netherlands was ablaze with bonfires, bells were pealing, echoing with "Te Deums" to celebrate Tilly's victory on the Lutter.² It was impossible for the Dutch to undertake any offensive operations at a time when at any moment they might see themselves attacked by the forces of the Emperor, the Catholic League and Spain, so Spinola was left free to devote himself to his plans for a war by sea.

He had already learnt that the English under Willoughby intended to join with the Dutch in a raid on the Spanish fleet and he therefore collected as many vessels as he could to attack the Zealand coast. He began his operations about the middle of October, but as the Dutch had taken measures to defend themselves, they led to no result.

About the end of the same month, he attempted to surprise the Fort of Het Pas which commanded the entrance to the channel leading to Sluis. If this fort could be taken it was supposed that that place must necessarily surrender. On the night of the thirtieth, Count Horn, at the head of three of the best regiments in the Netherlands advanced to the attack. A sentinel gave the alarm. The Count rushed forward to have a petard placed against the gate, but was shot down and had both his jaws broken; the man who carried the petard was killed by his side. The garrison of Sluis made a sortie and cut down four hundred of their assailants. As Rubens remarked, Count Horn who was an alchemist and an engineer "has not been more fortunate in the conduct of this undertaking than he has been about his philosopher's stone." In November both armies went into winter quarters.³

All through the summer the Dunkirkers had been very active, for although the whole coast of Flanders from Ostend to Dunkirk, was blockaded by the Dutch, they seem to have been able to run in and out of their port despite the presence of twenty sail of the enemy in its roads and before Mardyke, whilst forty more were cruising in the straits towards Gravelines and Calais. Spinola was most anxious that the sloops which were building in Biscay, should be sent to the Flemish coast at once, as the pilots from Spain had reached him by the middle of July and he could make

good use of them.¹ The cruisers even raided the English coast and burnt a vessel with a cargo of wheat which had run ashore there. In the previous February they had taken a Turkish pirate which had shown itself in the North Sea. The Dutch, however, were even more ferocious than the Turks for notwithstanding the kindness with which their prisoners were treated by Spinola and the Infanta they had thrown about seventy men who were captured in private vessels sailing under the Royal Standard into the sea bound back to back.²

In England everyone was in terror at the prospect of an invasion. Every man between sixteen and sixty was ordered to put himself in readiness to march at an hour's notice. The militia battalions were doubled and Milford Haven was put into a state of defence as it was known that in the eyes of Continental strategists it ranked as one of the most vulnerable points on the British coast. They had not forgotten that Henry the Seventh had landed there when he gained the English Crown, and his life by Lord Bacon in a French translation was eagerly read by all students of international affairs. The fear of an invasion as we have seen served Buckingham as an excuse for refusing the renewed requests of the Duke of Savoy for the assistance of English vessels in the Mediterranean, whilst the Puritans persecuted the Catholics with greater severity than ever. William Trumbull, who had so long been the English resident at Brussels, visited the prisons in London with the Sheriffs and took everything which they possessed from the priests who were imprisoned in them, inspiring such terror that no one dared to visit the fathers except by night.³ When the landowners were called upon to furnish men for service in accordance with the conditions of their tenures, every Catholic was called upon equip two. The invasion panic gradually ceased. By the beginning of September people began to whisper that the preparations for defence had been thrown away and that the rumours were a mere trick of the King's for getting their money out of them.⁴

A few days later a large squadron was mustered at Portsmouth, of which Lord Willoughby took the command, with Denbigh as Vice-Admiral. Buckingham was upon the worst of terms with the brethren of the Trinity House, and had refused to appoint a single one of them to any command in the expedition, so that he had been forced to entrust the vessels to mere boys, or to old pirates and men of broken fortunes who if they saw a chance of retrieving them would have hazarded the King's ships in any

desperate enterprise which offered a prospect of mending them. "The Captains are convinced," wrote one of the courtiers whom Inojosa had bought over before he left London, "that they are going to cruise after the Flota, but men who are experienced in maritime affairs, say that the fleet is neither victualled nor manned for such an undertaking, and think that it is most likely that they mean to take all the vessels of the Hanse Towns which are going to Spain with any kind of cargo from the Eastland," in other words from the Baltic, "as they think that by doing so they will cripple the King of Spain and make it impossible for him to send a fleet of any size to sea next year, by which time they fancy that they will be prepared to carry out a certain scheme which, if it were all they imagine it to be, would be sufficient to strike down the power of Spain at a blow. This scheme was submitted to them a few days back, so I have not yet been able to learn all the particulars, but I will ascertain them as soon as I can and let you know. In the meantime I can assure you that the person who brought it forward would be in a position to prove that if his scheme could be carried out at the cost he estimates, it would be the most dangerous plan which has ever been suggested for ruining Spain." Such was the impression left upon the mind of an English politician who had got an inkling for the first time that England had been asked by Savoy to join in an expedition against Genoa. A few days later the same correspondent writes: "It is thought from the comings and goings of the Venetian Ambassadors who were here that some design is intended on Italy in order to make a diversion against the Spanish forces."

The fleet which had been got together at Portsmouth consisted of only thirty sail, ten of which were the King's and twenty merchantmen sailing under the royal colours. Lord Denbigh put to sea to cruise against Spanish commerce and did not let a vessel pass without being searched. He was in great want of sailors, and had been forced to man his ships with invalids who could not possibly endure the hardships of a prolonged campaign. Difficulties, as has been seen, had been experienced in regard to the appointment of the officers, and the City of London were blamed for their refusal to allow the King to name the captains and masters of the vessels which they had furnished at their own expense.

Willoughby achieved practically nothing. His men mutinied

on account of the bad provisions, and by the end of October he was back in port. During his cruise he had captured three French ships on their way from Spain with a rich cargo of cochineal, pearls and bezoar stones, a slight which France was forced to swallow "like pills," as she was all but exhausted.¹

But a few days before Willoughby's return the *Dunlirkers* had broken through the blockading fleet and captured many English ships. Spinola had good cause to be pleased with their success. "The gallies have taken a Dutch cutter ladened with twelve pieces of artillery and manned it with men from their crews and then went cruising. They dispersed two fishing fleets and drove them off the fishing grounds. This has made such a noise in Holland that the States have recalled their vessels which were lying off the Flemish coast and sent them to go in pursuit of His Majesty's ships and reopen the fisheries. Two vessels with sails and oars built on a new model have put to sea under Baron de Vacquen, and we hear they are turning out capital sailers."²

The English had always looked upon their trade with Spain as one of the most important branches of their commerce, and greatly regretted its loss, whilst the embargo upon their intercourse with Flanders and the captures of their shipping by Spinola's privateers were also keenly felt. A desire for peace was becoming general amongst the commercial classes, and was increased by their suspicion that the King regarded the war chiefly as a means of getting money.³ Vague rumours were in circulation that negotiations were in progress, and it was even whispered that Charles had authorised Argyll's confidant, Sir William Alexander, to communicate with Gondomar upon the subject and that the Count had in consequence set out for Spain.⁴ He was not destined to reach Madrid, for on his way thither he died of the plague near Burgos. His death seems to have excited little notice and less regret.⁵

Whilst Spinola relied chiefly upon his privateers as a means for harassing England, he took other measures to ruin the trade of the Dutch. The issue of trading licenses to Holland and of convoy licenses were suspended. He endeavoured to induce the Emperor to prohibit all commercial intercourse between the Empire and the "rebels," and also to allow him to control positions upon the great rivers leading into the interior of Germany which would enable him to cut off the trade to which the Dutch riverain ports owed so

much of their wealth. Lastly the Marquis who had long learned to value the suggestions of his engineers, embarked upon a design for which he might have found precedents in the campaigns of Tiberius and Germanicus against the Batavians and the Frisians.¹ "Here they are planning two most glorious undertakings, one is a scheme for making a navigable canal from the Meuse near Maestricht to a point upon another river called the Demer which is near Malines. This canal will be fifteen leagues long. I have seen the model which seems to promise a great success, but the undertaking will be a long and costly one, the other is to turn the Rhine out of its channel and so uncover a large part of the enemy's territory. This would remove every obstacle which is thrown in our way by the other rivers which branch from the Rhine, and thus enable us to enter the Veluwe and lay all the province as far as Utrecht "under contribution." The canal was to leave the Rhine at Rheinberg and was to join the Meuse at Venlo in Upper Guelderland and with its prolongation to the Demer which was an affluent of the Scheldt it would furnish a waterway from Antwerp to the Middle Rhine. As the Yssel which was the chief protection of the Veluwe had been originally a canal cut by the Roman General Drusus from the Waal to Lake Flevo, which had been enlarged by successive inundations from the sea into the existing Zuyder Zee, the design may not have appeared wholly without prospects of success. Spinola was at the same time anxious to keep his soldiers from idleness and thus to avoid all appearance of wasting the royal revenues to no purpose. The Infanta Isabella, however, in writing to Henry de Berg said that the chief object of the works was to keep the Dutch from raiding Juliers and to provide Belgium with a direct communication by water with Germany. Two thousand pioneers were sent from the garrison of the Palatinate and, in September, 1626, work was begun in Upper Guelderland upon the Rhine-Meuse canal. As had been foreseen the Dutch used their utmost efforts to stop its construction. Frederick Henry built a fort at Ysselbourg from which parties could sally forth to harass the workman, but on the third of October the garrison under Count Stirum were successfully attacked by Berg, and the scheme was vigorously pursued during the ensuing year "to the great hurt of the Dutch." Some engineers had, however, pointed out that the prospect of laying dry the Yssel and the other streams which flow round the Veluwe was a futile one, and that when the Meuse and Rhine rose in the winter

or after heavy rains "they would flood all the surrounding country and so injure all parties." After Spinola's departure from the Netherlands late in 1627, the scheme for the "Fossa Euganea" or "Mariana" as the canal had been named fell into discredit. In 1628 it was finally laid aside partly on account of the attacks of the Dutch and partly to meet the wishes of Ferdinand of Bavaria, Bishop of Liège, who feared that his revenues would suffer by the diversion of the old overland trading route from Antwerp to Cologne.¹

When Spinola returned to Brussels to pass the winter of 1624 amid the festivities of the capital, he seemed to all human appearance to be at the height of his power. "Every Minister here is doing his best for the service without a thought of pushing himself into an intimacy superior to his place, and so they all grow old at their posts, and neither look for any special favour nor fear any slight from a Princess who does not know the meaning of the words, "Hatred" and "Excessive Love," but who is kind and gentle to all and sundry. The one really powerful person is Marquis Spinola, who carries more weight than all the others put together, and is, in my opinion, a most prudent and far-sighted man, not to say a most diligent and unwearying worker."²

He might well have been thankful when he contrasted his position, even as estimated by somewhat partial onlookers, with that of his French and English rivals. Rubens thought that Cardinal Richelieu could not long remain in such excessive favour, and added with caustic sarcasm, "I think it must be difficult to transact any business, at a Court where there is only one man who can do anything, and where the King seems a mere figure-head."³ Buckingham, although he had in some degree won favour with Henrietta Maria by his efforts to patch up an arrangement between France and England was "despite all his greatness in the depths of despair because he could not revenge himself upon his enemies both at home and abroad."⁴ He had flattered himself that he would be sent as envoy to Paris in order to effect a lasting settlement between the two powers, but the invitation had been refused for reasons at which Marie de Medici and her confidants hinted in malicious whispers.⁵

"The greatest evil, which people foresee, is the outcome of the little love there is between the King and Queen, which has its root in the contempt and jealousy, not to use harsher terms, which they have felt for one another ever since Buckingham was over

here last year, and which was afterwards increased by the dishonourable practices of the Duchess of Chevreuse, a rascally woman, who, mainly on account of them, has been driven from Court and banished to a distance. They were upon the point of bringing her to trial, but have finally decided not to do so for very sound reasons. This makes those who see the farthest fear that in the end the King will divorce and repudiate the Queen and thus bring about very strained relations between France and Spain, or else that if they continue to live as they are doing, that is as man and wife merely in name, there can be no hope of offspring. We may judge from a very modern instance in Henri's time as to the effect which this might produce upon Monsieur's mind." As Monsieur who had but lately married Mlle. de Montpensier, was supposed to be furious at the treatment which had been meted out to his favourite Ornano, it may well be that the courtiers felt no great goodwill to Buckingham who was the cause why the Crown seemed unlikely to pass by direct descent. Even the Nuncio, Cardinal Spada, who was a mere creature of the Cardinal Nephew Barberini, was intriguing with Cardinal de la Valette and other prelates to secure Richelieu's dismissal, but it was foreseen that he would be forced to leave France a disappointed man.¹

Nor was Olivares happier than his opponents. The Count Duke of San Lucar was supposed by the outside world to be a heartless self-seeker. A touching letter which he wrote about this time to condole with Rubens upon the death of his wife gives us, perhaps, a truer picture of the great minister.

"Although you have never told me that you had lost your wife, and thus showed even in this the discretion with which you always act, yet I have heard of it, and feel greatly for the loneliness in which you are left, for I knew how much you loved and valued her. I trust much to your good sense, as I think that at such times it is best to keep up one's courage and to bow to the Will of God, rather than to look about for means of consolation. For myself I need them more than anyone in the world, if I look the causes for sorrow which I have at this moment straight in the face. My nephew the Lord Cardinal de Guzman has just died at the age of twenty-two, and was followed a few days afterwards by my only daughter in whom all the hopes of the continuance of our house reposed, and whom I loved for her virtue, her understanding, and her kindly nature even more than as my daughter, for her qualities were indeed worthy of admiration. But God has been

pleased to grant me relief and comfort even in the midst of my sorrow, and I rejoice that my natural affection is working gently so that I may have the more to offer you in your own trouble. I speak to you as a wise man that I may let you see that in the midst of my own grief and crushing toil, I value in your person the qualities and talents which God has bestowed upon you and would make manifest to you the satisfaction which I feel at the love which you bear me. Of this the portrait which you have had engraved gives good proof, for Love alone knows how to inspire such ideas, and to represent the appearances of Nature, and Love likewise engenders expectations which surpass one's deserts."¹

Doubtless, Spinola sledging in fantastic guise over the Brussels snows was, at that hour, the happiest of European statesmen.

Nor did the outlook before the two branches of the House of Hapsburg appear less promising. The English, cowed by their defeat before Cadiz, were forced to remain upon the defensive, the French, hampered by Court factions and by Protestant ambitions, had to all seeming, renounced their designs in the Alps and in Italy; Wallenstein and Tilly had struck down the rebels in Upper Austria and the Danes on the Lutter and every Princelet of the Union was trembling before their arms; the Dutch had not yet recovered from their disasters of 1625. It looked indeed as if the dominion of the world had, at length, passed into the hands of Ferdinand and Philip.

In reality both Spain and the Empire had entered into a path which they were to follow to their destruction and Ferdinand's statecraft was destined to reduce his title of Holy Roman Emperor to an empty name.

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PP. 522-611.

As, for various reasons, the References to Authorities were not incorporated in the original MS. of "Sidelights on the Thirty Years War" after Vol. II., p. 521, it has been found necessary to print the detailed references to Authorities separately for pp. 522-611, Vol. II., in addition to the general "List of Authorities" for the volume.

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572	1	[<i>Munich</i> , do. Baugy to Jocher, 21 Feb., 1626.]
572	2	[<i>Munich</i> , do. Rota, 3 March, 1626.]
572	3	[<i>Munich</i> , do. Hyacinth to Jocher, 27 Feb., 7 March, 1626. Anon., Brussels, 7 March, 1626.]
573	1	[<i>Munich</i> , do. Rota to Elector, 17 March. Jocher to Rota, 7 April, 1626.]
574	2	[<i>Mantua, Francia</i> 673. As to Lorraine, Priandi, Dec. 5, 16, 24, 1625. <i>Francia</i> 675, do. Jan. 16, 30 Feb. 13, 1626. As to Bishop of Metz, do. 673, Priandi, Oct. 4, 11, 1625.]
580	1	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 194, Philip IV. to Infanta, Jan. 4. Infanta to Philip IV. Jan. 15. Philip IV. to Infanta, Jan. 22. [Cf. No. 193, Philip IV. to Infanta, 19 Sept., 1625.] Feb. 16, March 28, 1626.]
580	2	[<i>Riezler</i> , S., op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 282-284.]
580	3	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 194, Infanta to Philip IV., April 21, 1626.]
581	1	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 194, Infanta to Philip IV., June 3. Infanta to Schwarzenberg, May 28. Imperial Ambassadors to Infanta, May 23. Schwarzenberg to Schomberg, May 29, 1626.]

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582	1	[<i>Villa</i> op. cit., pp. 446 <i>et seqq.</i> Infanta to Philip IV., June 3, 1626. <i>Simancas</i> , Est. Leg., 2316.]
582	2	[<i>Munich</i> , <i>Geh. St. Ar.</i> K.S. 486/23 London, 24 April, 1626.]
582	3	[<i>Brussels</i> , <i>E. et G.</i> , 194. Infanta to Philip IV., April 21, 1626.]
584	1	[<i>Brussels</i> , <i>E. et G.</i> , 195. Infanta to Philip IV., July 14. Philip IV. to Infanta, July 19, 1626.]
588	1	[<i>Turin</i> , <i>Spagna</i> 18, <i>Tarantaise</i> , Aug. 5, 1626.]
585	2	[<i>Turin</i> , <i>Tarantaise</i> , <i>Let. Cit.</i>]
585	3	[<i>Staley</i> , <i>E.</i> , "Heroines of Genoa and the Riviera," op. cit., pp. 222-224.]
585	4	[<i>Turin</i> , <i>Spagna</i> 18. <i>Tarantaise</i> , June 23, 1626.]]
586	1	[<i>Turin</i> , <i>Tarantaise</i> , March 29, 1626.]
588	1	[<i>Brussels</i> , <i>E. et G.</i> , 195. Philip IV. to Infanta, Aug. 9. Infanta to Philip IV., Aug. 12., 27; Dec. 22, 1626.]
589	1	[<i>Brussels</i> , do. Philip IV. to Aytona; do to Infanta, 9 Sept., 1626.]
589	2	[<i>Rooses</i> , <i>Rubens</i> , Vol. III., pp. 461-462. Rubens to Valavez, Sept. 11, 1626.]

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590	1	[<i>Baring-Lüsberg</i> , <i>H. C.</i> "Christian IV., Danmarks og Norges Konge," pp. 347 <i>et seqq.</i>]
590	2	[<i>Brussels</i> , <i>E. et A.</i> , 630. <i>Corr. Hist.</i> (1626) 6. Tilly to Infanta, Aug. 28. Infanta to Tilly, Sept. 9. Benois to De la Faille, Sept. 12, 1626.]
590	3	[<i>Hjärne</i> , <i>H.</i> , op. cit., pp. 100-108.]
591	1	[<i>Brussels</i> , <i>E. et G.</i> , 194. Infanta to Philip IV., Sept. 12. Philip IV. to Infanta, Nov. 15. Infanta to Philip IV., Dec. 22, 1626.]
591	2	[<i>Turin</i> , <i>Tarantaise</i> , Oct. 8, 1626.]
591	3	[<i>Munich</i> , <i>Reichs. Arch.</i> , 30 <i>J.K.A.</i> 195. Instructions to Marcheville, Paris, 6 Dec., 1626. <i>Riesler</i> , op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 283-284.]
595	1	[<i>Munich</i> , <i>Reichs. Arch.</i> , 30 <i>J.K.A.</i> , 195. "A Memorandum presented by Count Frankenburg to Olivares and his Answers," 14 Oct., 1626.]
596	1	[<i>Turin</i> , <i>Tarantaise</i> , 12 Nov., 1626.]
596	2	[<i>Mantua</i> , <i>Spagna</i> , 617. As to Mantuan Succession, Olivares to March. Gio. Gonzaga, 3 March. Striggi, 13 March, 1626. As to Sabbioneta, Striggi, Sept., Oct., 1626.]
596	3	[<i>Turin</i> , <i>Tarantaise</i> , Oct. 8, 1626.]
597	1	[<i>Munich</i> , <i>Reichs. Arch.</i> 30, <i>J.K.A.</i> , 175, Paris, Dec., 1626. Marcheville's Instructions <i>cit.</i> <i>Riesler</i> op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 283-284.]
597	2	[<i>Brussels</i> , <i>E. et G.</i> , 195. Infanta to Philip IV., 22 Dec., 1626.]
598	1	[<i>Brussels</i> , do. Infanta to Philip IV., 12 Dec., 1626.]
599	1	[<i>Hjärne</i> , <i>H.</i> , op. cit., pp. 95-100.]
599	2	[<i>Förster</i> , <i>Wallensteins Briefe</i> , Vol. I., pp. 124-126, Wallenstein to Arnim, 2 Nov. do., pp. 143-144, do. to do., 21 Nov., 1627.]
600	1	[<i>Turin</i> , <i>Tarantaise</i> , 12 Nov., 1626.]
601	1	[<i>Turin</i> , <i>Tarantaise</i> , 25 Dec., 1626.]

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601	2	[<i>Munich, Reichs. Arch.</i> , 30 <i>J.K.A.</i> , 195. Newsletters from Brussels, Aug. 22, Sept. 11, 19, 1626.]
601	3	[<i>Villa</i> , op. cit., p. 449.]
602	1	[<i>Rooses</i> , Rubens, Vol. III., pp. 335-340. Rubens to Infanta, March 15, 1625.]
602	2	[<i>Villa</i> op. cit., pp. 449 <i>et seqq.</i> , Spinola to Olivares, Dunkirk, 15 Nov., 1626. [<i>Sim., Est. Leg.</i> , 2,317.]
604	1	[<i>Rooses</i> , Rubens, Vol. III., pp. 460-462. Rubens to Valavez, 11 Sept., 1626.]
604	2	[<i>Rooses</i> , Rubens Let. Cit.]
604	3	[<i>Rooses</i> , Rubens, Vol. IV., pp. 13-14. <i>Gachet</i> , E., Rubens, pp. 55-57. Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, Sept. 30, pp. 60-62. Do. to do., Nov. 12, 1626.]
605	1	[<i>Villa</i> , op. cit., pp. 452-456, Spinola to Philip IV., Oct. 11, 1626, <i>et alice.</i>]
605	2	[<i>Munich, Reichs. Arch.</i> , 30 <i>J.K.A.</i> , 195. Brussels, 7 March, 1626, do. <i>Geh. St. Arch. K.8</i> , 486/23, London, 24 April, 1626. <i>Rooses</i> , Rubens, Vol. III., pp. 424-426. Rubens to Valavez, 12 Feb., 1626.]
605	3	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 195, Infanta to Philip IV., 22 Sept., 1626.]
605	4	[<i>Munich, Reichs. Arch.</i> , 30 <i>J.K.A.</i> , 195. London, 14 Aug. 4 Sept., 1626. <i>R. H. MSS. Com. Rep. Rye</i> , p. 179. <i>Great Yarmouth</i> , pp. 309-310. <i>Wodehouse</i> , pp. 441-447. <i>Delawarr</i> , p. 289. Invasion plans discussed in House of Commons, June 12, 1626, <i>Gawdy</i> , p. 123.]
607	1	<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 195, Infanta to Philip IV., Sept. 22. do., <i>E et A.</i> 630, <i>Corr. Hist.</i> 6, 1626. To Councillor. Pastor, Nov. 13, 1626.]
607	2	[<i>Villa</i> op. cit., pp. 453-454, Spinola to Philip IV., 11 Oct., 1626, Let. Cit.]
607	3	[<i>Brussels, E. et A.</i> , 630. To Benois, Jan. 24, William Sterill to Anon., Aug. 11, 1626.]
607	4	<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 195. Infanta, 22 Sept., 1626, <i>Let Cit.</i>]
607	5	[<i>Turin, Tarantaise</i> Oct. 8, 1626.]
608	1	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 195, Infanta to Philip IV., Aug. 12 (<i>Cf.</i> Infanta to Schomberg, <i>E. et G.</i> , 194, May 23). 1626.]
609	1	[<i>Rooses</i> , Rubens, Vol. III., pp. 447-451. Rubens to Valavez, 24 July, 1626.]
609	2	[<i>Rooses</i> , do., Vol. III., pp. 472-473. Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 1 Oct., 1626.]
609	3	[<i>Do.</i> Vol. III., pp. 479-481, Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 22 Oct., 1626.]
609	4	[<i>Brussels, E. et G.</i> , 195, Londres, 12 Sept., 1626. [<i>Cf.</i> Infanta to Philip IV., 22 Sept., 1626.]
609	5	[<i>Mantua, Francia</i> , 675, Priandi, Dec. 27, 1626.]
610	1	[<i>Mantua</i> , do. Priandi, 28 Sept., 3 Oct., 1626.]
611	1	[<i>Rooses</i> , Rubens, Vol. III., pp. 453-454. Olivares to Rubens, 8 Aug., 1626. Do. Vol. IV., pp. 29-30. Rubens to Pierre Dupuy, 28 Jan., 1627.]

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